Energopolitics by Boyer, Dominic

Energopolitics
This page intentionally left blank
Energopolitics
Wind and Power in the Anthropocene Dominic Boyer
Duke University Press Durham and London 2019
© 2019 DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 
PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMER I CA ON ACID- FREE PAPER ∞
DESIGNED BY COURTNEY LEIGH BAKER AND TYPESET IN MINION PRO  
AND FUTURA STANDARD BY WESTCHESTER PUBLISHING SER VICES
Library of Congress Cataloging- in- Publication Data
Names: Boyer, Dominic, author.
Title: Energopolitics : wind and power in the Anthropocene / Dominic Boyer.
Other titles: Wind and power in the Anthropocene
Description: Durham : Duke University Press, 2019. |  
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: lccn 2018047267 (print)
lccn 2019000347 (ebook)
isbn 9781478004394 (ebook)
isbn 9781478003137 (hardcover : alk. paper)
isbn 9781478003779 (pbk. : alk. paper)
Subjects: lcsh: Wind power— Research— Mexico— Tehuantepec, Isthmus of. |  
Renewable energy sources— Mexico— Tehuantepec, Isthmus of. | 
Renewable energy sources— Political aspects. |  
Electric power production— Mexico— Tehuantepec, Isthmus of. |  
Energy industries— Mexico— Tehuantepec, Isthmus of. | Energy 
development— Political aspects. | Energy policy— International 
cooperation. | Geology, Stratigraphic— Anthropocene.
Classification: lcc tj820 (ebook) | lcc tj820 .b694 2019 (print) |  
ddc 333.790972/62— dc23
lc rec ord available at https:// lccn . loc . gov / 2018047267
Cover art: Grid, La Ventosa, 2013. Photo by Dominic Boyer.
This title is freely available in an open access edition thanks to generous 
support from the Fondren Library at Rice University.
For Cymene
This page intentionally left blank
Joint Preface to Wind and Power in the Anthropocene  ix
cymene howe and dominic boyer
Acknowledgments xix
Introduction 1
 1 Ixtepec  27
 2 La Ventosa  60
 3 Oaxaca de Juaréz  95
 4 Distrito Federal  127
 5 Guidxiguie’ (Juchitán de Zaragoza)  158
Joint Conclusion to Wind and Power in the Anthropocene 194
cymene howe and dominic boyer
Notes 199 References 225 Index 251
Contents
This page intentionally left blank
A Dynamic Duo
Welcome to our duograph. You may be entering into the duograph through 
Ecologics or Energopolitics, but in each case, we invite you to engage both 
sides of this work. The duograph is a new and experimental form that needs 
your active engagement. But what is a duograph? you might rightly ask. A 
duograph consists of two single- authored ethnographies that draw from a 
shared fieldwork experience and the same archive of research material. As 
a textual form, the duograph emerged from our field research (2009–13) 
on the po liti cal and ecological dimensions of wind power development in 
Mexico’s Isthmus of Tehuantepec. The idea evolved partly out of experi-
mental interest and partly out of necessity. The two of us spent many long 
eve nings debating the significance of one aspect or another of the research 
and gradually found ourselves setting out from the center of the proj ect in 
dif er ent theoretical and thematic directions. The fieldwork itself was a joint 
enterprise from start to finish;  every interview,  every meeting,  every protest, 
involved both of us. We originally expected that the writing would follow 
a similar path  toward a coauthored monograph. But while coauthoring of-
fers many opportunities to learn and grow through dialogue, it also involves 
many compromises and ultimately must resolve in a synthetic voice and 
direction. We wanted to do this diferently.
We eventually realized how impor tant it was to each of us that we be able 
to tell a dif er ent part of the im mensely complex story unfolding in the isth-
mus. Cymene wanted to spotlight the salience of human- nonhuman relations 
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in energy transition while Dominic wished to concentrate on unraveling the 
po liti cal complexity of wind power. We de cided to experiment by elaborating 
our dif er ent analytics and interests in companion volumes that are meant to 
be read together. A working definition of the duograph would be a conversa-
tion between researchers that materializes in two texts, which do not require 
analytic synthesis or consensus. We view the duographic form as a way to 
produce collaborative scholarship that helps to make vis i ble the multiplicity 
of stakes and attentions existing within the practice of research collaboration. 
The observations and arguments found in each of  these volumes emerged 
from close dialogue and are by no means incommensurable, but neither are 
they serial parts of the same narrative. They speak in parallel, but not always 
in unison. Characters, dynamics, and events crisscross them, but they are ap-
proached through dif er ent analytic lenses. We hope that the duograph ofers 
an experimental prototype in collective authorship that may be of value to 
other collaborators and other proj ects elsewhere.
Wind Power in Mexico
Our ethnography addresses a central question of our anthropocenic times: 
How can low- carbon energy transition happen? Or, put diferently, What 
happens in  those transitions? Who sets the agenda? Who— human and 
other wise—is afected? And what are the po liti cal (in the broadest sense of 
the term) forces that shape the possibilities for low- carbon energy  futures?
 These questions initially took shape at Busboys & Poets café in Washing-
ton, DC, in late 2008 as we prepared for a move to Houston, Texas, a global 
epicenter of the fossil fuel industry. We considered a number of dif er ent 
fieldsites of renewable energy production that appeared to be poised for 
rapid development. We looked at the desertec solar proj ect in Morocco 
and nascent programs of wind development in Venezuela and Brazil among 
other cases. But the one that attracted and held our attention most strongly 
was Oaxaca’s Isthmus of Tehuantepec.
A gap in the Sierra Madre Mountains creates a barometric pressure dif-
ferential between the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific Ocean, forming a wind 
tunnel in the isthmus where wind speeds regularly flirt with tropical storm 
strength. The istmeño wind is capable of overturning semi trailers with ease, 
uprooting trees, and stripping the paint of boats. This region— often said 
to be the least developed in a state that is the second poorest in Mexico—is 
considered to have among the best resources for terrestrial wind power any-
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where in the world. That potential was first tapped in the mid-1990s through 
government demonstration proj ects designed to lure transnational invest-
ment in renewable energy production. But wind development only  really 
gained attention and momentum during the administration of President 
Felipe Calderón (2006–12). Although Calderón’s administration is better 
known for its drug war and for ceding sovereignty to cartels and capital, his 
climate change advocacy transformed Mexico from a pure petrostate into a 
global leader in low- carbon energy transition. Mexico passed some of the 
most ambitious, binding clean- energy legislation anywhere in the world, in-
cluding a  legal mandate that 35  percent of electricity be produced from non- 
fossil- fuel sources by 2024, with 50  percent of that green electricity expected 
to come from wind power, and with most of that wind power expected to 
come from the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. Private- Public Partnerships (ppps) 
in wind  energy development mushroomed rapidly. Between 2008 and 2016 
the wind energy infrastructure of the isthmus expanded from two wind 
parks ofering 85 megawatts of production capacity to twenty- nine wind 
parks with 2,360 megawatts of capacity, a 2,676  percent increase in less than 
a de cade that has made the isthmus the densest concentration of onshore 
wind parks anywhere in the world.
Over the course of sixteen months of field research (in 2009, 2011, and 
2012–13), we sought to cast as broad a net as pos si ble and speak with repre-
sentatives of  every group of “stakeholders” in wind development in Mexico. 
Conversations with community members and corporate executives; federal, 
state, and local government officials and ngo staf; industry lobbyists and an-
tiwind activists; conservationists and media professionals; indigenous rights 
advocates, bankers, and federal judges, all provided a meshwork of perspec-
tives, which we traced as we moved between the many communities of the 
isthmus; to the state capital, Oaxaca City; and fi nally to the federal capital, 
Mexico City. In total, we conducted more than three hundred interviews and 
participated in hundreds of hours of less formal conversations. Working with 
a team of local researchers, we  were able to conduct the first door- to- door 
survey of reactions to wind development in La Ventosa— one of two isth-
mus towns that are now nearly completely encircled by wind parks. We sat in 
on governmental and activist strategy meetings and toured wind parks. We 
marched, rallied, and stood at the fulcrum of many roadblocks erected by 
opponents of the wind parks. We witnessed the evolving politics of solidarity 
between binnizá (Zapotec) and ikojts (Huave)  peoples whose shared re sis-
tance to par tic u lar forms of energy infrastructure brought them into alliance 
 after hundreds of years of interethnic conflict. We arrived at and left fieldwork 
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as committed advocates for low- carbon energy transition. But our experi-
ences in Mexico taught us that renewable energy can be installed in ways 
that do  little to challenge the extractive logics that have undergirded the 
mining and fossil fuel industries. Renewable energy  matters, but it  matters 
more how it is brought into being and what forms of consultation and co-
operation are used. We thus came to doubt that “wind power” has a singular 
form or meaning. Everywhere in our research, it was a dif er ent ensemble 
of force,  matter, and desire; it seemed inherently multiple and turbulent, in-
volving both  humans and nonhumans. To capture that multiplicity, we came 
to think about our object of research as “aeolian politics,” borrowing from 
the Spanish term for electricity derived from wind power, energía eólica.
Three case studies of aeolian politics came to absorb us in particular— 
Mareña Renovables, Yansa- Ixtepec, and La Ventosa— the first is the most 
complex and is treated at length in the Ecologics volume. The other two are 
highlighted in the Energopolitics volume. All three represent distinct con-
figurations of aeolian politics; two can be categorized as cautionary tales of 
failure and the other as an example of the successful achievement of what 
for many is the renewable dream come to life. And yet success and failure 
 were always in the eyes of their beholders. In all three studies we have sought 
to balance the fact of anthropogenic climate change and the need for global 
decarbonization against the local salience of vulnerable statecraft, demands 




Ecologics tells the story of an antidote to the Anthropocene, one that was both 
a failure and a success. The Mareña Renovables wind park would have been 
the largest of its kind in all Latin Amer i ca, and it promised im mense reduc-
tions in green house gas emissions as well as opportunities for local develop-
ment. In Ecologics we follow the proj ect’s aspirational origins as well as the 
conflicts and ethical breakdowns that would leave it in suspension. Drawing 
from feminist theory, new materialisms, and more- than- human analytics, 
this volume of the duograph examines the ways that energy transitions are 
ambivalent: both anticipatory and unknown, where hope and caution are 
equally gathered. In the case of Mareña Renovables, distinct imaginaries of 
environmental care and environmental harm  were in conflict, efectively 
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diagnosing the deeply relational qualities of energy and environment. The 
core argument that Ecologics advances is that the con temporary dynamics 
of energy and environment cannot be captured without understanding how 
 human aspirations for energy articulate with or against nonhuman beings, 
technomaterial objects, and the geophysical forces that are at the center of 
wind power and, ultimately, at the heart of the Anthropocene.
The analytic architecture of Ecologics is both anticipatory and interrup-
tive, and readers are encouraged to engage with the work in an itinerant 
and wandering way. Three chapters focus on the case of the Mareña proj ect, 
tracing its inception and the policy regimes and economic conditions that 
allowed for its initial development (chapter 2, “Wind Power, Anticipated”), 
following it through a series of dramatic standofs and protests against the 
park’s creation among indigenous and mestizo communities in the isthmus 
(chapter 4, “Wind Power, Interrupted”), and fi nally witnessing the collapse 
of the wind power proj ect itself resulting from multiple po liti cal, economic, 
and communicational impasses (chapter 6, “Wind Power, In Suspension”). 
 These chapters are interrupted by  others that focus on wind, trucks, and spe-
cies respectively. The interruptive design is intended to mime the empirical, 
ethnographic dynamics of the research, where forces (like wind), techno-
material tools (like trucks), and other- than- human beings (creatures of all 
kinds) came to stall and vex human- designed notions of pro gress and in-
frastructural development. In Ecologics creatures, materials, and elemental 
forces are bound up with wind power as an analytic object, and they in turn 
invite new  human responses to the paradoxes we face in a time of climato-
logical uncertainty.
energopolitics
Energopolitics engages the case of Mexican wind power to develop an anthro-
pological theory of po liti cal power for use in the Anthropocene anchored by 
discussions of “capital,” “biopower,” and Dominic’s own neologism, “energo-
power.” At the same time, the volume emphasizes the analytic limitations of 
 these conceptual minima when confronted with the epistemic maxima of a 
situation of anthropological field research on po liti cal power.  Those maxima 
not only exceed the explanatory potential of any given conceptual frame-
work, they also resolutely demand the supplementary analytic work of his-
tory and ethnography. Concretely, the volume argues that to understand the 
con temporary aeolian politics of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, one needs to 
understand, among other  things, a contested history of land tenure, caciqu-
ismo (boss politics), and student/teacher/peasant/worker/fisher opposition 
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movements specific to the region; the phantasmatic status of state sovereignty 
within Mexican federalism; the clientelist networks and corporatist machina-
tions of the Mexican po liti cal parties; the legacies of settler colonialism; a fed-
eral government anxious about waning petropower and climate change; and 
a vulnerable parastatal electricity utility trying to secure its  future in an era of 
“energy reform.”  These forces are just as critical to Mexico’s aeolian politics as 
the pro cesses and dynamics that are duly captured by concepts such as capi-
tal, biopower, and energopower. Energopolitics is thus an urgent invitation 
for Anthropocene po liti cal theory to unmake and remake itself through the 
pro cess of fieldwork and ethnographic reflection.
The invitation unfolds across five ethnographic chapters, each highlight-
ing a dif er ent localization of aeolian politics. We begin with the as- yet failed 
efort to build a community- owned wind park in Ixtepec, then move east 
to the town of La Ventosa, which is successfully encircled by turbines that 
 were built in the dominant ppp paradigm, yet has also been beset by uncer-
tainty and unrest. We encounter the performative sovereignty of the state 
government in Oaxaca City as it searches for a means to regulate and profit 
from wind development and then journey northwest to Mexico City to in-
terview  those in government, industry, and finance who firmly believe they 
are steering the course of wind power in the isthmus. Fi nally, we return to 
Juchitán, which is not only the hub of local aeolian politics in the isthmus 
but also a town whose citizens imagine themselves to be the inheritors of a 
decades- if not centuries- long tradition of re sis tance against the Oaxacan 
and Mexican states. In this way, Energopolitics seeks to speak terroir to pou-
voir, highlighting the need to resist anthropocenic universalism by paying 
attention to the profound locality of powers, agents, and concepts. As Claire 
Colebrook has argued, recognition of the Anthropocene should mark the 
“return of diference” that has been long called for in feminist and ecological 
criticism.
Collaboration in Anthropology
Our duograph belongs to a long history of anthropological collaboration 
in research and writing. In the early de cades of North American and Eu ro-
pean ethnology, the discipline’s close ties to fields like geography and natu ral 
history meant that the scientific expedition was an impor tant apparatus of 
anthropological research practice. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, proj ects of linguistic and cultural salvage and analy sis remained 
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closely allied with archaeology and museology, which explains how some 
of the most ambitious and impor tant collaborative anthropological enter-
prises of the era— Franz Boas’s Jesup North Pacific Expedition (1897–1902), 
for example— were or ga nized principally around building natu ral history 
collections. As the twentieth  century wore on, an individualistic model of 
field research came to predominate in American and Eu ro pean anthropol-
ogy, at least normatively, and was celebrated for the transformative qualities 
of participant- observational immersion. But one would scarcely have had to 
scratch the surface of any ethnographer- informant dyad to illuminate the 
complex webs of social enablement— involving research assistants, transla-
tors, laborers, intermediaries, government agents— that made anthropologi-
cal research in the classic Malinowskian mode pos si ble.
 After the Second World War, a new emphasis on interdisciplinary area 
studies research in the social sciences expanded and intensified anthro-
pology’s range of collaborative engagements around the world. Much as 
expedition- era anthropology was absorbed into colonial and imperial knowl-
edge proj ects, the area studies era was imbricated with the national and inter-
national po liti cal dynamics of the Cold War. Governments sought to enroll 
anthropologists in military and intelligence operations across the world— 
Proj ect Camelot being one of the most well known. However, anthropology 
was also broadening its epistemic ambitions and moving from cultural sal-
vage proj ects  toward a grappling with modernity and the complex cultural 
and social dynamics of cities, nations, and world systems. Interdisciplinary 
exchanges no doubt served to accelerate this shift. And 1950s enterprises like 
Cornell’s Vicos proj ect in Peru (creating a “laboratory for social change”) or 
the mit Modjokuto proj ect in Indonesia (which gave Cliford and Hildred 
Geertz their first fieldwork opportunity) cultivated the kinds of long- term 
interdisciplinary research networks that influenced gradu ate training and 
pedagogy as well.1
The postwar period also saw an efflorescence of anthropological research 
partnerships mediated through marriage and other life partnerships. Mar-
garet Mead and Gregory Bateson are a classic example, Margaret Mead 
and Ruth Benedict a more elusive but possibly more substantial one. Then 
came the Geertzes as well as June and Manning Nash, Marilyn and Andrew 
Strathern, Edith and Victor Turner, and Margery and Eric Wolf, followed 
 later by Barbara and Dennis Tedlock, Michelle and Renato Rosaldo, Sally 
and Richard Price, and Jean and John Comarof, among  others. Anthro-
pology has seen many  couples practice the crafts of research, teaching, and 
writing  under at least a partly shared sense of identity, each navigating its 
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own relational dynamics as well as the dominant masculinist heteronorms 
of the discipline and the university in the twentieth  century.
Reacting to the still broader and more complex scale of post-1980s glo-
balization and its social, economic, and environmental consequences, the 
twenty- first  century has seen renewed interest in collaborative research part-
nerships. Three that have inspired our duograph in par tic u lar have been the 
Matsutake Worlds Research Group (Anna Tsing, Shiho Satsuka, Miyako 
 Inoue, Michael Hathaway, Lieba Faier, and Timothy Choy), the Ethnographic 
Terminalia collective (Craig Campbell, Kate Hennessy, Fiona McDonald, 
Trudi Lynn Smith, and Stephanie Takaragawa), and the Anthropology of the 
World Trade Organ ization group (Marc Abélès, Máximo Badaró, Linda 
Dematteo, Paul Dima Ehongo, Jae Aileen Chung, Cai Hua, George Marcus, 
Mariella Pandolfi, and Phillip Rousseau).2 All are multi- institutional and 
international partnerships that have explored new ways of creating anthro-
pological knowledge by crossing the bound aries between anthropological 
research practices and the arts.
Collaboration itself is nothing new in anthropology;  there is abundant 
evidence that it has been a productive dimension of anthropological research 
and writing since the discipline’s beginning. Further, intimate research part-
nerships have long fueled the production of anthropological knowledge. 
 There is doubtless an impor tant book to be written about how the par tic u-
lar qualities, subjectivities, and dynamics of par tic u lar collaborations have 
influenced the kinds of knowing and knowledge that  those enterprises gen-
erated. But our intervention  here is more  limited. We have found it striking 
that the spirit of collaborative research has not always translated well into 
practices of authorship. Coauthored texts remain the exception rather than 
the rule in anthropology, even when they derive from jointly undertaken 
field research.3 The reasons for this gap are not  simple and involve consid-
erations ranging from professional reputation to relational dynamics to 
institutional audit cultures that seek to impose a mathe matics of individual 
accomplishment and accountability on the sociality of research, analytic, and 
writing practices. What is striking in our view is that  there are relatively few 
models for collaborative writing beyond the model of the jointly authored 
single text that synthesizes analytic perspectives  under a common “we.” This 
is why we have centered our methodological intervention on the duographic 
form: we are looking for ways to strike a better balance between individual 
ideation and expression and collaborative fieldwork and archiving.
An impor tant added benefit of the duograph is that it permits a more ex-
tensive analytic division of  labor between its volumes, as parallel yet distinct 
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arguments can be developed with re spect to the common research archive. 
In our case, the Ecologics volume’s close focus on how  human energetic and 
environmental aspirations intersect with other- than- human beings and 
agencies complements yet also reframes the Energopolitics volume’s efort to 
ofer a more nuanced and comprehensive set of analytics of ( human) po liti-
cal power, and vice versa. If the general premise of the entire research proj-
ect has been that a certain politics of energy is creating a situation of eco-
logical emergency, then it is fitting, and we might say necessary, to be able 
to ofer detailed conceptual and ethnographic accounts of both sides of the 
equation— energopolitical and ecological. Had we tried to compact all  these 
storylines into a single, synthetic account, however, we might well have burst 
its seams or have been forced to simplify  matters to the extent that neither 
side would have received its due. In the duographic form, meanwhile, two 
volumes working together in the mode of “collaborative analytics” can dive 
deeply into dif er ent dimensions of the research while still providing valu-
able ethnographic elaboration and conceptual infrastructure for each other.4
Your Turn
One of our favorite rationales for the duograph is what is happening right 
now: you are deciding where to start. True to the lateral media infrastructures 
and expectations of this era, we aspire to ofer a more dialogic, collaborative 
matrix of encounter with anthropological writing. We have sought the words 
to write; you now seek the words to read. We have left signposts as to where 
we think the volumes intersect. But you can explore the duograph as you like, 
settling into the groove of one narrative or zigzagging between them. Think 
of it somewhere between a Choose Your Own Adventure book and open- 
world gameplay. Follow a character,  human or other wise; riddle through the 
knots and vectors of aeolian politics; get bogged down somewhere, maybe 
in the politics of land or the meaning of trucks; then zoom back out to think 
about the Anthropocene. Or perhaps pause for a minute or two to watch the 
birds and bats and turbines that now populate the istmeño sky.
Cymene Howe and Dominic Boyer
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Introduction
Anthropolitics Meets Anthropology in the Anthropocene
This volume of the duograph is concerned with the relationship of energy to 
power in the context of the Anthropocene. It seeks to highlight and explore 
how the material and infrastructural dimensions of energy both enable and 
disable certain configurations of po liti cal power. The line of analy sis ques-
tions  whether po liti cal power in the conventional (human- centered) sense 
can  really be taken to be an autonomous and efficacious domain. This has 
both theoretical and practical implications at a time when po liti cal power is 
a growing “ matter of concern” in the strug gle against pro cesses like global 
warming and species extinction, when politicians are called upon to “get 
serious” about climate change, and when governments are implored to plan 
for energy transition or resilience to rising sea levels.1 How can we reform a 
human- centered understanding and practice of politics— anthropolitics— so 
that it can adequately comprehend and address the conditions and chal-
lenges of the Anthropocene?
When Cymene and I wrote the proposal to the National Science Founda-
tion for the grant that would eventually fund the main period of our field 
research, we more or less took for granted the significance of  human po liti-
cal power in addressing climate change. We said we wished to investigate 
the “po liti cal culture” of wind power development in southern Mexico in 
order to understand how a “vulnerable state” like Mexico was  going to be 
able to orchestrate a diverse and potentially contentious field of stakeholders 
and follow through on the federal government’s ambitious clean electricity 
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production targets. We questioned  whether “states, especially  those already 
struggling to meet their current governmental obligations, possess the po-
liti cal authority to implement impor tant programs of national development 
such as renewable energy.” But we did not question  whether “po liti cal 
culture” itself— a term we used in a deliberately expansive way to signal not 
only the interactions between states and citizens but also the po liti cal negoti-
ations and exchanges among stakeholders including local landowners, activ-
ists, po liti cal parties, ngos, journalists, and representatives of transnational 
corporations— was an assemblage from which one might reasonably expect 
efficacious responses to climate change and strategies for energy transition 
to emerge.
But is the efficacy of po liti cal culture in the Anthropocene actually a 
reasonable assumption? What we did not emphasize in our grant proposal— 
and this is very likely  because we  were appealing to another equally anxious, 
if not equally vulnerable, state for funding—is that one of the articles of faith 
of the past thirty years of global governance is that market and technologi-
cal forces are better positioned to answer any dilemma than any existing or 
imaginable configuration of po liti cal actors, instruments, and imaginations. 
The incremental and perpetually disappointing series of cop (Conference of 
Parties) meetings— even including the comparatively successful Paris cop 
21 meeting in December 2015— have only seemed to reinforce this sense that 
the po liti cal pro cess is inadequate to the task of engaging prob lems as mas-
sive and time sensitive as global warming.2 Across the world, liberal po liti cal 
institutions seem too compromised by corporatist and populist influence, 
too much in the hands of po liti cal professionals operating according to their 
own temporalities and interests, and too belabored by inflexible, archaic po-
liti cal technologies to compete with entrepreneurs and engineers when it 
comes to delivering solutions. This skepticism has been paralleled in the 
discursive realm of po liti cal theory as figures ranging from Wendy Brown to 
Chantal Moufe to Jacques Rancière to Peter Sloterdijk to Slavoj Žižek have 
diagnosed the economization, overformalization, militarization, spectacu-
larization, and technicization of liberal po liti cal institutions that have led 
to a golden age of po liti cal ritual, cynicism, and theater at the expense of a 
capacity for a literal politics that might be able to address urgent anthropoce-
nic pro cesses of common (and not only  human) concern such as droughts, 
flooding, warming, desertification, species extinction, plasticization, and 
oceanic acidification.3 Probing more deeply into the scar tissue of late lib-
eralism, Elizabeth Povinelli ofers a reminder that “biontological” crises are 
nothing new on the frontiers of settler late liberalism, and she recommends 
Introduction 3
that we take the wisdom of  those who live on  those frontiers more seri-
ously. In the register of a probative and experimental “Karrabing analytics,” 
she writes, “The earth is not  dying. But the earth may be turning away from 
certain forms of existence.”4 Featuring prominently among  those  dying forms 
of existence is what I have termed “androleukoheteropetromodernity,” an ugly 
word commensurate with the ugly lifeworld designed over the past several 
centuries to enable the dominion and luxury of hypersubject white men.
Yet back in the po liti cal centers of late liberalism, such a reckoning is 
held at bay by afective and epistemic investments in “markets” and “technol-
ogy” as generative nexuses of innovations and solutions.  These investments 
are also intimately attached to the po liti cal apparatus we call “neoliberal-
ism.”  Whether one wishes to schematize that apparatus through the unfold-
ing dynamics of capital and its class affiliations or through the evolving relay 
networks of power knowledge, it is obvious that neoliberalism has had a 
historicity unto itself; that is to say, it came into being,  rose to global au-
thority, and is now—so it seems anyway—in a state of gradual dissolution.5 
As that dissolution spreads, one finds that new and heterogeneous po liti cal 
potentialities are emerging.  Whether one thinks of the racialized authoritar-
ian movements rapidly gaining ground in many parts of the world  today 
or the Arab Spring, the Occupy movement, the indignados of Spain, or the 
indigenous asambleas that are coming into being around wind parks in the 
Isthmus of Tehuantepec, it is difficult not to feel that new politics are seek-
ing to be born that do not wish to be constrained by the inherited - isms 
(e.g., liberalism, socialism, communism, fascism, anarchism) of nineteenth- 
century Eu ro pean po liti cal philosophy. Neoliberalism appears to have lost 
much of its credibility and vitality as a world- making po liti cal ideology over 
the past de cade. And yet it has no obvious heir- in- waiting, especially at the 
global level. Instead, a multitude of po liti cal experiments are emerging, often 
investing po liti cal attention and energy into smaller spheres of action. Some 
of  these experiments, it goes without saying, embrace oppression, exclusion, 
and hatred in the manner of “integralist” movements past;6 some perhaps 
augur a “time of monsters.”7 On the other hand, one finds movements com-
mitted to peace and humanism in unpre ce dented ways— Iceland’s Best Party 
for one example.8 Mea sured within this  human’s lifespan,  there has never been 
a more invigorating time to think about po liti cal power.  Things are happen-
ing in the world of politics, but they are escaping our conventional categories 
of analy sis, often reducing analysts to a stilted language of “neos” and “posts” 
that, at the end of the day, seem inadequate for comprehending the pro cesses 
of po liti cal formation we are witnessing.
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Although perhaps an accidental conjuncture, the dissolution of neolib-
eral authority has occurred more or less si mul ta neously with wider media-
tization and recognition of the Anthropocene. This has meant that  there 
has been a vibrant zone of po liti cal experimentation focusing specifically on 
remediating anthropocenic vectors— for example, Transition Culture and 
the degrowth movement.9 It has also stimulated some critics of neoliberal 
capitalism— Naomi Klein and David Graeber among  others—to argue that 
acknowledgement of the Anthropocene marks a definitive beginning of the 
end for cap i tal ist consumerist society since we have fi nally come to experi-
ence the deterioration of ecological systems at a planetary level.10 The 1970s 
“limits to growth” and “tragedy of the commons” debates have been reac-
tivated. But other theorists have abandoned the anthropo liti cal in  favor of 
the ecopo liti cal. As Claire Colebrook writes, “The Anthropocene seems 
to  arrive just as a  whole new series of materialisms, vitalisms, realisms, and 
inhuman turns require ‘us’ to think about what has definite and forceful 
existence regardless of our sense of world.”11 Although it is pos si ble to take 
the antianthropocentric turn in the  human sciences as another reminder 
of why paying attention to  human po liti cal power seems quaint in the con-
temporary world, I would rather take it as a challenge and opportunity to 
recalibrate the anthropo liti cal to a postanthropocentric conceptual universe. 
In other words, let us ask, How, where, and to what extent does and should 
 human po liti cal power  matter in the con temporary world? I have argued else-
where that  human agency, at a planetary scale, is difficult to deny given not 
only the vari ous phenomena clustered  under the Anthropocene rubric but 
also the generative potentialities of practices like synthetic biology and nano-
engineering on the one hand and the destructive potentialities of advanced 
weaponry on the other.12 Even if we have truly never been modern in an 
ontological sense, the fact that some  humans have been behaving as though 
they  were modern for centuries now— creating a potent instrumentarium 
for terraforming/anthroforming the planet for their con ve nience along the 
way— demands accountability and, one hopes, remediation. This means, I 
would argue, that an interest in understanding or influencing the anthropo liti-
cal cannot be bundled together with a rejection of anthropocentrism, fair 
though that rejection may be.
And  here I would modestly propose that anthropology has an impor tant 
role to play. As one of the more reflexively oriented disciplines within the 
 human sciences, at least since the 1970s,13 anthropology has viewed its own 
methods and objects of investigation with no small amount of skepticism. 
However, as the one discipline that has anthropos inscribed in its very 
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jurisdiction, it seems unlikely that anthropology  will ever fully commit itself 
to a posthuman turn. As such, anthropology seems an excellent “culture of 
expertise” from which to stage a reproportionalization of the  human in the 
 human sciences. Moreover, what ever soaring theoretical, even philosophi-
cal, aspirations anthropological knowledge might have,  these are always 
connected umbilically to the sociality and materiality of a changing world 
of  humans and nonhumans.14 Anthropological knowledge is perpetually in-
complete, disrupted, uncertain, somehow less than the sum of its parts. It 
is the right kind of knowledge for grappling with what Anna Tsing and her 
collaborators have termed “a damaged planet.”15 If Isabelle Stengers poses a 
cosmopo liti cal question, “How, by which artifacts, which procedures, can 
we slow down po liti cal ecol ogy, bestow efficacy on the murmurings of the 
idiot?” then I would argue that the murmurings of the idiot— meaning not a 
fool but one who provides what Claude Lévi- Strauss once termed “the other 
message”—is precisely the domain of anthropological knowledge.16 It is thus 
an apt domain from which to elicit “hyposubjectivity” in the face of Timothy 
Morton’s diagnostics of “hyperobjectivity.”17
with  these preliminaries in mind, a reader solely interested in the eth-
nography of wind power in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec could skip ahead to 
chapter 1. The remainder of the introduction is a more detailed discussion 
of theory of power in the Anthropocene. My purpose is twofold. On the 
one hand I wish to schematize the conceptual minima of an anthropologi-
cal theory of po liti cal power for use in the Anthropocene. Concepts such 
as capital and biopower clearly belong to  those minima, not least  because 
of the profound influence that Marxist and Foucauldian theory have ex-
erted over human- scientific analy sis of po liti cal power in the past several 
de cades. And, while their status is more contested, I think it is, for the same 
reason, necessary to briefly discuss the psychoanalytic theory of desire and 
Brian Massumi’s “ontopower” for what they might contribute to the analytics 
of po liti cal power. Since all  these concepts share an inattentiveness to the 
energo- material contributions of fuel and electricity to po liti cal power, I also 
put forward my own neologism, “energopower,” to expand the set of minima 
in a direction that I believe is analytically crucial for understanding our (the 
planet’s, our species’) con temporary conditions. On the other hand, I wish 
to emphasize the delicacy, one might even say the preciousness, of  these 
conceptual minima when confronted with the epistemic maxima of a situa-
tion of anthropological field research on po liti cal power.  Those maxima not 
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only exceed the explanatory potential of any given conceptual framework, 
they also resolutely demand the supplementary analytic work of history and 
ethnography. For example, to understand the con temporary po liti cal culture 
of wind power development in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, one needs to 
 understand a deep history of colonial resource extraction and the more re-
cent politics of land tenure and caciquismo (boss politics) specific to that 
region as much as one needs to understand the pro cesses and dynamics 
captured by concepts such as capital, biopower, and energopower.
To an anthropologist this may simply appear to be a sky- is- blue statement 
about the importance of ethnography to complement and validate theoreti-
cal intervention.18 But, as suggested above, my broader purpose  here is to 
argue that if po liti cal theory wants to get serious about a critical engagement 
with anthropocenic phenomena, then it is  going to have to become more an-
thropological along the way. The obvious prob lem baked into terms such as 
“Anthropocene” is their species- level universalism. This universalism often 
seems to be a rhetorical strength, especially when deployed to convince a 
species whose collective be hav ior is generating planetary efects while lack-
ing a species- level po liti cal apparatus to take collective action. But without 
doubting that universalizing rhe toric can be efficacious in some contexts, 
the hailing of humanity as a species unfortunately obscures the diferential 
culpability for global warming and environmental toxification, ignoring the 
fact that Northern empire has perpetrated  these and other global conditions 
of precarity for centuries with impunity.19 Univeralist rhe torics also typically 
obscure the fact that the reasons for anthropocenic action and the impasses 
to its recognition and transformation are highly, one might even say fun-
damentally, vari ous. The reasons that one wind park near Cape Cod might 
be challenged in court and that another would be blockaded near Juchitán 
cannot be reduced to a general condition of nimbyist self- interest. The same 
could be said of the support for utility- scale renewable energy proj ects in 
some corners of the global North and the support for postgrid energy solu-
tions and degrowth in  others. Moreover, the postanthropocenic  futures that 
are being  imagined and aspired to are equivalently multiple. For some, the 
strug gle against the Anthropocene quests more or less to preserve famil-
iar cir cuits of fulfillment in climatological terra incognita (e.g., sustainable 
green capitalism); for  others, it is about resuscitating idealized past forms of 
life (e.g., nationalist nostalgia or indigenist restoration); yet for still  others, 
it about a radical break with the past and pre sent to prepare the way for 
hitherto- unrealized socio- ecological relations.
Introduction 7
My argument, then, is that po liti cal theory needs to embrace the fact 
that, as Claire Colebrook has put it, “the Anthropocene is the return of dif-
ference.”20 Taking diference seriously means a willingness to think across 
scales, to recalibrate the capacity of “the local”— meaning both locus/place 
and also  those beings who inhabit par tic u lar localities—to afect and trans-
form the translocal.21 It is in this re spect that anthropological analy sis of 
po liti cal power can play a valuable supplemental role as well as in Derri-
da’s sense of supplement as that which reveals an originary lack.22 Anthro-
pological analy sis thrives on the interillumination of translocal and local 
epistemics, on showing what universalizing schemata can and cannot reveal 
when confronted with an  actual world of fluctuating, heterogeneous, and not 
infrequently contradictory signals.23 This is, then, a call for po liti cal theory to 
not so much “take ethnography seriously” as to accept ethnography’s invita-
tion to unmake and remake itself through the pro cess of fieldwork. Ethnogra-
phy is a repre sen ta tional medium and as such  will always game with words; 
 those games do sometimes influence understanding for some interlocutors 
but not in the way that fieldwork, as ontomedium, can more fundamentally 
challenge and transform horizons and ways of knowing. If we wish to ap-
preciate diference within the Anthropocene, fieldwork is a much- needed 
supplement to any theory of power.
As a proof of concept, this volume turns loose a certain set of power con-
cepts in Mexico to show where they can help us to gain interpretive traction 
on specific events and dynamics and also where a variety of local forces and 
forms exceed or disable them.
Conceptual Minima: Capital, Biopower, Energopower
I have already proposed that capital, biopower, and energopower belong to 
the conceptual minima of an operational theory of po liti cal power in the 
Anthropocene. I discuss each of  these terms in more detail below, but let me 
say at the outset that is this not intended to be a closed set of concepts, nor is 
my argument ontological in any sense. That is to say, first,  there are many 
potentially valuable concepts missing  here. I have selected  these three not 
only to reflect key touchstones in recent po liti cal anthropological debate 
concerning the Anthropocene but also in light of the specificities of our case 
studies. Second, I resist (strongly) the idea that categorizing a type of power 
to enable the possibility of recognition and discussion corresponds to an 
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argument for the being of power.24 Capital, biopower, and energopower are 
conceptual lenses that help to bring into focus certain force relations. They 
do not represent singular forms of power per se. The “beings” that concepts 
like capital, biopower, and energopower signal should be regarded as mul-
tiplicities, diverse forces that have been bundled into more  limited nominal 
forms as part of an analytical proj ect.
Nonetheless, I would argue that none of  these concepts can be function-
ally derived from the  others, nor should any of the force clusters be trivial-
ized with regard to the  others. Each concept has its own analytic attentions 
and, by extension, its own uses. Karl Marx was able to use “capital” as an 
analytic instrument for examining the formalization, expropriation, and 
circulation of  human productive activity, just as Michel Foucault was able 
to utilize “biopower” to explore objectification of and intervention in life 
from ethics to administration to science. As I have detailed elsewhere, “ener-
gopower” seeks to attend to the contributions of fuel and electricity to the 
possibility of modern life and its ways of knowing and being. Each of  these 
power concepts is thus more a gestural shorthand than a name for a  thing 
in the world.25 This makes sense if we supplement our typical En glish con-
sideration of “power” as noun with the referentiality of the French pouvoir 
or the Spanish poder, which in their modal forms indicate the ability to do 
something— enablement.  These are forces that allow other forces to happen. 
Enablement is indeed critical to my perspective on power in this volume. 
I am interested in what  these power concepts enable us to understand about 
enablement in the world.
With this focus on enablement in mind, I address each of  these three 
categories briefly by turn.
capital
Kapital for Marx was a dimension of the objectification of  human  labor power, 
specifically a result of the manner in which the division of  labor severed  labor’s 
capacity to channel  human  will in the development of the self.26 Instead of an 
ideal dialectical pro cess of self- realization through productive activity, “capi-
tal” signaled how the division of  labor allowed  labor power to congeal in such 
a way that it could be alienated from its source, circulate beyond the self, be 
appropriated and commanded by  others, and thus be transformed into new 
social and material forms. Capital was, in this way, a means of remote enable-
ment (yet one that was always enabled de infra by  labor power). One  thing 
that capital enabled was the emergence of a class of cap i tal ists who parasitized 
the  labor power of  others. But cap i tal ists  were not puppeteers— creatures of 
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 will and reason—in this paradigm; they  were more like mushrooms sprouting 
on a rotted log of alienated  labor power, which was the true  enemy that com-
munism sought to oppose. Nevertheless, once capital was set into motion on a 
mass scale and stabilized by institutions such as money and wage  labor, quan-
tifiable, appropriated  labor time became the logic of social value in modern 
society. As Marx wrote in the first chapter of Das Kapital, “As values, all com-
modities are only definite masses of congealed labor- time.” In other words, 
commodities— useful  things— were, in efect, masses of capital.
But “congelation,” from the Latin verb “congelare” (to freeze together), is a 
slightly misleading translation of the  actual noun Marx uses, “Gallert,” which 
refers to a gelatinization pro cess in which dif er ent animal substances with 
the potential to yield glue (e.g., meat, bone, connective tissue) are boiled 
and then cooled to produce a “semisolid, tremulous mass, . . .  a concen-
trated glue solution.”27 Rather than a freezing together of in de pen dent parts, 
“Gallert” suggests an ontological transformation accomplished by adding 
and then subtracting thermal energy— a  recipe of dif er ent fleshy forms 
rendered through heating and cooling into a single sticky material:  human 
 labor, in the abstract, binding commodities,  people, machines, and “nature” 
together with its glue. Indeed, this glue potential was unlocked by the ther-
mal rendering pro cess itself.
Paul Burkett and John Bellamy Foster have argued that  there was a power-
ful energo- metabolic substrate to Marx’s theories of  labor power, alienation, 
and value extraction. On the topic of surplus value, they write,
Of course, this value (energy) surplus is not  really created out of noth-
ing. Rather, it represents capitalism’s appropriation of portions of the 
potential work embodied in  labor power recouped from metabolic re-
generation largely during non- worktime. And this is only pos si ble inso-
far as the regeneration of  labor power, in both energy and biochemical 
terms, involves not just consumption of calories from the commodities 
purchased with the wage, but also fresh air, solar heat, sleep, relax-
ation, and vari ous domestic activities necessary for the hygiene, feed-
ing, clothing, and housing of the worker. Insofar as capitalism forces 
the worker to  labor beyond necessary  labor time, it encroaches on the 
time required for all  these regenerative activities.28
Seen in this way, capital becomes an appropriation, quite literally, of fleshy 
power, a sapping and storage of the regenerative potential of being.
In the Grundrisse and the second volume of Das Kapital, Marx outlines a 
more diferentiated understanding of capital’s forms and also a model of the 
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dialectical development from circulating capital  toward fixed capital and of 
fixed capital  toward automated machinery. That machinery constitutes at 
once infrastructure for the production of use values and also, in the manner 
of Gallert, a potential energy storage system, gathering and holding produc-
tive powers in technological suspension. In Marx’s vision, capital strives across 
its historical development to make itself in de pen dent of  labor, to be able to 
absorb the productive powers of  labor into itself. As one might expect of the 
vis viva of bourgeois po liti cal economy, capital seeks its liberty. The develop-
ment of fixed capital— the part of the production pro cess that retains its use 
form over a period of time rather than being wholly consumed in a produc-
tion process—is the first stage of this pro cess. Marx emphasizes that durability 
is crucial: fixed capital must durably stand in for direct  human  labor. The more 
decisive phase is the movement from fixed capital  toward automated machin-
ery, a productive apparatus that operates mechanically according to  human 
design and in which “the  human being comes to relate more as watchman and 
regulator to the production pro cess . . .  instead of being its chief actor.”29
Automation not only advances capital’s desire to durably emancipate 
itself from  labor but also precipitates the final paradox between exchange 
value and use value that Marx believed would necessitate the eventual col-
lapse of the cap i tal ist mode of production.
On the one side, then, [capital] calls to life all the powers of science 
and of nature, as of social combination and of social intercourse, in 
order to make the creation of wealth in de pen dent (relatively) of the 
 labor time employed on it. On the other side, it wants to use  labor 
time as the mea sur ing rod for the  giant social forces thereby created, 
and to confine them within the limits required to maintain the already 
created value as value. Forces of production and social relations— two 
dif er ent sides of the development of the social individual— appear to 
capital as mere means, and are merely means for it to produce on its 
 limited foundation. In fact, however, they are the material conditions 
to blow this foundation sky- high.30
In other words, infrastructure stores the productive energies of  labor in 
such a way that they can be released  later in magnitudes that appear to tran-
scend nominal inputs. Technology, as productive infrastructure, thus ap-
pears to be capable of generating and distributing use values with  limited 
need for direct ( human)  labor power. Once the mass of humanity has  those 
means of production at hand, “the worker,” as such, can dis appear and with 
it the alienation of  labor and the capital it breathed life into.
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In its bridging of  labor, productivity, and infrastructure, capital remains 
a quite generative power concept in the Anthropocene, but perhaps not al-
ways in the standard critique- of- capitalism mode. Capital is a critical con-
cept, to be sure, but it must be noted that capital also eventually plays an 
emancipatory role in Marx’s dialectical history, one that seems very much 
in line with con temporary scientific and po liti cal faith in the capacity of 
technology— and its hidden magnitudes of transformational  labor power—
to ofer us salvation from anthropocenic damnation. Marx could almost 
be recruited for the accelerationist camp in  today’s debates.31 But this also 
reveals what is problematic about classical Marxist analytics from the per-
spective of  today’s damaged planet. Undoubtedly Marx was more attuned 
to metabolic and energetic questions than is often recognized, but  there is 
no obvious “limit to growth” in his model. Anthropo liti cal and technopo-
liti cal domains seem to have potentially limitless powers at their command. 
The blind spot of Marx’s theory of capital is that he does not account for 
how machine  labor is fueled in the first place and what the ecological con-
sequences of all that fuel use might be. His story of the transformation from 
 human to machine  labor does not incorporate adequate attention to what 
empowers, in a physical sense, the propulsion of use value generation in the 
machine world. Any utopian proj ect— whether automated cars or renewable 
energy— that positions technology as the means for enabling the perfection 
of modernity draws deeply from the conceptual well of capital.
As a final note, I  will have  little to say about capitalism in this volume. It 
has a descriptive presence, of course, but I find it to be a red herring analyti-
cally. As Kaushik Sunder Rajan has argued, to speak of capitalism in the sin-
gular “is an absurdity.”32 I also do no more than gesture  toward the concept 
of the “Capitalocene.”33 I agree  here with Dipesh Chakrabarty that  there is a 
necessary division of  labor between the analytic work of the “Anthropocene” 
and the “Capitalocene.” Both terms tell impor tant yet partial truths about 
humanity’s history of geological and ecological impacts.
biopower
“Biopower,” in Foucault’s original articulation,34 in the elaborations of his 
philosophical and so cio log i cal interlocutors,35 and as it appears in the work 
of anthropological writing on power,36 signals the consolidation of concepts 
of life, sexuality, and population as objects and methods of modern gover-
nance. In a discussion of the related concept, “governmentality,” Foucault 
shows that life and population became both means and ends of modern po-
liti cal power: “Population comes to appear above all  else as the ultimate end 
12 Introduction
of government. In contrast to sovereignty, government has as its purpose not 
the act of government itself, but the welfare of the population, the improve-
ment of its condition, the increase of its wealth, longevity, health, and so on; 
and the means the government uses to attain  these ends are themselves all, 
in some sense, immanent to the population.”37 Foucault denies the singular-
ity and separability of the means and ends,  causes and efects, bodies and 
knowledges, instruments and environments, and of course subjects and ob-
jects of modern power. But neither is he satisfied with a dialectical portrait 
of contingency in which subject- object relationality is held in a mutually 
constitutive dynamic as in the relationship between  labor and capital. 
Foucault’s power concepts all denote networks of enablement composed 
of links and relays that cannot be analytically reduced below the level of a 
circuitry of forces and signs; in other words, the “apparatus” (dispositif) is a 
“system of relations” between “heterogeneous ele ments” including corpo-
reality, ethics, discourse, institutions, laws, administrative procedures, and 
scientific knowledge.38 This is the operational architecture of biopouvoir.
In this re spect, the concept of biopower is an extension and refinement 
of Foucault’s general model of modern pouvoir. In Discipline and Punish, 
for example, he contrasts the distributed, discursive, and productive na-
ture of modern power from the more centralized, excessive, and repressive 
character of sovereign power.39 Then, in the History of Sexuality, Foucault 
defines biopower as a discursive concentration on sexuality, reproduction, 
and life: “Bio- power . . .  designate[s] what brought life and its mechanisms 
into the realm of explicit calculations and made knowledge- power an agent 
of the transformation of  human life.”40 Rather than a Victorian repression 
of sexuality, Foucault stresses the relentless signaling, voicing, policing, and 
mea sure ment of sexual instincts and activities that occurred during the 
Victorian period as the biopo liti cal organ ization of modern governance be-
came increasingly sophisticated and detailed in its operation. He proposes 
biopower is much the same spirit as this volume does, not as a theory of 
po liti cal ontology but rather as a po liti cal analytics capable of mapping a 
network of modal enablement.
Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose argue that Foucault’s concept work on 
biopower was both incomplete and historically specific; that is, it was a way 
of denoting the gradual conjoining of two force clusters during the eigh-
teenth and nineteenth centuries in Eu rope. The first force cluster was the 
anatomo- politics of the  human body, “seeking to maximize its forces and 
integrate it into efficient systems,” while the second was “one of regulatory 
controls, a biopolitics of the population, focusing on the species body, the 
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body imbued with the mechanisms of life: birth, morbidity, mortality, lon-
gevity.”41 Rabinow and Rose then ofer their own more precise and generaliz-
able formulation for “biopolitics”: “The specific strategies and contestations 
over problematizations of collective  human vitality, morbidity and mortality; 
over the forms of knowledge, regimes of authority, and practices of interven-
tion that are desirable, legitimate and efficacious.” One notes immediately 
that this formulation, like Foucault’s original, is anthropo liti cal, and in Povinelli’s 
terms, “biontological.” Biopower and biopolitics specifically concern the 
management and control of a  human vitality that is distinguished doubly 
from a domain of nonhuman life and nonlife more generally. Rabinow and 
Rose, and many other anthropologists besides, have efectively retooled the 
biopower concept for twentieth- and twenty- first- century conditions by 
bringing together the sciences, politics, and economies of life, where “life” 
itself involves issues as far ranging as sexuality, reproduction, genomics, 
infrastructure, population, care of the self, and indeed “environment.”42
Still, life in the Foucauldian analytical imagination clearly centers on 
 human life. This close anchorage to “the  human,” even as it denies the au-
thoritative overtures of “humanism,” is, I strongly suspect, one reason that 
the concept has proven so compelling among anthropologists as a way of 
gaining traction on po liti cal power. Another reason is that the analytics of 
biopouvoir, especially if generalized as Rabinow and Rose have done, are re-
markably flexible and adaptable to almost any circumstance of governance. 
More than this, biopower captures rather elegantly many salient features of 
po liti cal power  today, especially interventions of expertise and authority 
concerning health, security, and population.
In Mexico, as we  will find in the ethnography, governmental discourse on 
renewable energy development is deeply saturated by biopo liti cal reasoning 
in two re spects. First,  there is the abundant environmentality expressed by 
the federal government and renewable energy developers in the proj ect of 
climate change mitigation, a proj ect that is also tied to securing the safety 
of Mexico’s population as new vulnerabilities to drought and flooding are 
exposed.43 Second,  there is the administrative concern to use wind resources 
to stimulate the circulatory economy of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, to at-
tract new resources for development, and to provide new opportunities and 
infrastructures for commerce, education, and health. Especially in the dis-
course of state and local governance, the proj ect of wind power development 
is consistently articulated in biopo liti cal terms: as means of guaranteeing or 
improving the health and welfare of  human environments, economies, com-
munities, and individuals.
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Yet the phenomena of the Anthropocene challenge the anthropolitics 
and technopolitics of the biopower concept as well. The shockwaves set of 
by overuse of carbon and nuclear energy— from rising seas to environmen-
tal toxicities and nuclear tragedies— have shaken the foundations of con-
temporary biopo liti cal regimes in such a way that we find fissures opening 
and fuel (sometimes quite literally) flowing into the groundwater of bios. 
This is why I believe the time has come to add “energopower” to our roster 
of concepts for analyzing po liti cal power. Foucault, I think, would approve 
in that his genealogical method was not designed to inquire into timeless 
conditions that endure throughout history but rather to examine “the con-
stitution of the subject across history.”44 That is to say, if “biopower” is one 
of our most enabling keywords for analyzing po liti cal power  today, it also 
seems appropriate in the spirit of Foucault’s original intervention to subvert 
it through new genealogical exercises lest we come to convince ourselves 
that “biopower” denotes some transhistorical form of modern power and 
subjectivity.
energopower
As a power concept, energopower draws attention  toward the impacts of fuel 
and electricity upon the domain of the anthropo liti cal, including biopower, 
capital, and all its other force clusters. This line of thinking is by no means 
entirely new. I have argued elsewhere that anthropology and the  human 
sciences have been punctuated by periods of very generative thinking about 
energy, particularly around times when  there  were widespread perceptions 
of energy transformation and/or crisis.45 In the 1940s, for example, the com-
ing into being of atomic energy precipitated both cornucopian and dysto-
pian thinking about new energic plenitudes, their luxuries and dangers.46 
In the 1970s, the reor ga ni za tion of the geopolitics of oil and the experiential 
crisis of the “oil shocks” helped stimulate another period of thinking about 
energy, but one that was largely eclipsed again in the 1980s as Reaganism, 
neoliberalism, and finance capitalism stole center stage with promises of 
a return to prosperity and security.47 Still, the technocratic modernization 
narratives of the 1950s and 1960s  were irreversibly disrupted in the 1970s, 
and feminist and post- Structuralist critiques of technoscience  were the first 
tremors of the broader antianthropocentric turn that the  human sciences 
are experiencing  today.48 As global warming, climate change, and other 
anthropocenic phenomena became more actively mediated and more epis-
temically pre sent in the first de cade of the twenty- first  century, energy has 
once again begun to spark at the margins of social theory.49 Two theorists in 
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par tic u lar have helped to give shape and content to the ethics and epistemics 
of what I am terming “energopo liti cal” analy sis.
The first is energy futurist Hermann Scheer and his call for a decentral-
ized “solar economy.”50 Scheer was one of the chief architects of Germa-
ny’s Energiewende (renewable energy transition) and co wrote Germany’s 
much- imitated feed-in tarif law that forced German utilities to guarantee 
long- term purchase agreements for renewable energy to create stability and 
incentives for solar and wind power producers. The efect of this policy in-
tervention was an unexpectedly rapid shift  toward renewable energy pro-
duction in Germany. In large part thanks to the stimulus initially provided 
by Scheer’s feed-in tarif legislation, in 2017, of the 654.1 terawatt- hours of 
electricity in the German national grid, 16.1  percent came from renewable 
resources and 15.1  percent from wind power alone.
However,  there was im mense po liti cal re sis tance to Scheer’s plan in the be-
ginning, and his analy sis of the vari ous obstacles that rapid renewable energy 
transition faced helps to surface how energy infrastructure— particularly fuel 
supply chains and electricity transmission systems— exert a massive, hidden 
influence over po liti cal and economic systems. Scheer pointed to the adap-
tation of global and national economies to the “long supply chain” infra-
structures characteristic of fossil and nuclear fuel resources. Scheer viewed 
twentieth- and twenty- first- century globalization as largely driven by the 
extraction and control of  these fuels. He observed that long energy supply 
chains are, in their material nature, inefficient and thus demand allied infra-
structures of translocal domination to guarantee unimpeded flows of critical 
resources. This domination imperative has deeply informed geopolitics even 
when it is masked by nationalist discourses of security and well- being, by 
post/neo/colonial missions of civilization and development, and most re-
cently by the utopian logic of a self- regulating market.
Solar energy— whether in its direct form of insolation or in the indirect 
forms of wind and biomass— has the physical advantages, Scheer argues, of 
ubiquity and superabundance, thus allowing for more efficient and decen-
tralized short supply chains that are also more susceptible to demo cratic 
po liti cal control: “Shorter renewable energy supply chains  will make it im-
possible to dominate entire economies. Renewable energy  will liberate so-
ciety from fossil fuel de pen den cy.”51 Recognizing that reliance upon fossil 
and nuclear fuels has driven the world  toward anthropocenic ruin, Scheer 
challenges the assumption that it is impor tant to maintain large- scale power 
grids and pipeline systems at all. He calculates that even energy- intensive 
modernity can be maintained purely on the basis of small- scale solar, wind, 
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and biofuel resources given con temporary technologies. The re sis tance to 
infrastructural transformation thus has less to do with the fear of blackouts 
or “energy poverty”— although societal paralysis and devolution continue to 
be conjured to delegtimate renewable energy transition— but rather  because 
of a more basic but also invisible codependence between our con temporary 
infrastructures of po liti cal power and our infrastructures of energy. This is 
to say that translocal high- voltage grids and fossil fuel infrastructures— both 
products of early twentieth- century po liti cal and industrial concentration 
that was enabled, in turn, by the burning of fossil fuels— evolved over the 
course of the twentieth  century. They became primary instruments for 
the monopolization of po liti cal authority, thus constituting what I term an 
energopo liti cal apparatus reinforcing both the inertia of a par tic u lar organ-
ization of fuel and a par tic u lar organ ization of state- based po liti cal power. 
This convergence generated an energo- material path de pen dency, according 
to Scheer, one that resists the imagination of alternatives to the long- chained 
fossil- fueled status quo. For to imagine an alternative to “the grid” is, in es-
sence, to imagine an alternative to centralized po liti cal authority, bureau-
cracy, and “the state” as well.
Scheer’s analy sis shows how a power concept like energopower has the 
capacity not only for critical traction on past and con temporary entangle-
ments of fuel, electricity, and po liti cal power, it also has the capacity to pro-
voke discussion as to how emergent energic infrastructures could contribute 
to the development of new forms of modern po liti cal and social experience. 
Scheer’s insistence on locally sourced, owned, and managed electricity echoes 
 today in a surge of community- owned renewable energy proj ects world-
wide. And, as we see in chapter 1, such initiatives belong to Mexico’s aeo-
lian politics as a community- owned wind park in Ixtepec strug gles to come 
into being against the energopo liti cal apparatus and inertia of the electricity 
parastatal, cfe (Comisión Federal de Electricidad), as well as the interests 
of transnational green capitalism, which has claimed the lucrative Oaxacan 
wind market for itself. In all such instances, “energopower” gives us a way to 
join together discussion of emergent postneoliberal po liti cal potentialities 
with the energic forms of “revolutionary infrastructure” that  will necessarily 
enable them.52
The other  great inspiration for “energopower” comes from Timothy Mitch-
ell’s prescient and influential Carbon Democracy proj ect.53 No stranger to 
biopo liti cal analy sis, Mitchell digs deeply into the history of carbon energy 
to surface the de pen dency of modern demo cratic power upon carbon en-
ergy systems: first coal,  later oil, and now natu ral gas. Much like Scheer, 
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Mitchell begins with the con temporary dependence of modern Northern 
life upon massive energy expenditure. He then retraces the way that the 
harnessing and organ ization of fossil fuels has  shaped the trajectory and 
forms of modern po liti cal power. Mitchell shows, for example, how the con-
solidation of social democracy in the late nineteenth  century crucially de-
pended on the materialities and infrastructures of coal that allowed miners 
to establish chokepoints in fuel flows, which exerted im mense pressure on 
dominant po liti cal and cap i tal ist institutions  until they eventually acceded 
to  labor reforms.54 He then links the biopo liti cal norms of twentieth- century 
Keynesian welfarism to a regime of expertise that characterized oil as an 
inexhaustible and increasingly inexpensive resource that was capable of fu-
eling the endless growth of national economies. This was certainly true in 
Mexico, where Lázaro Cárdenas’s nationalization of Mexico’s fossil fuel re-
sources helped propel major biopo liti cal investments in the midtwentieth 
 century. Mexico also benefitted from the oil shocks of the 1970s as the coun-
try became a key partner in the global North’s efort to reestablish secure 
flows of fossil fuels. Still, in Mitchell’s argument, “growth” and “economy” 
ultimately reveal themselves to be tokens of petroknowledge, whose appar-
ent truthfulness was owed to a midtwentieth- century geopolitics of neoim-
perial control over the  Middle East and its subsoil resources.55 When that 
control ruptured with the formation of opec, the foundation of Keynesian 
biopo liti cal authority dis appeared rapidly. Growth declined radically across 
the global North, and a dif er ent configuration of life and capital— the one 
normally glossed as “neoliberalism”— exploited the crisis to assert its domi-
nance. Although  those politics consistently vowed a resurrection of Keynes-
ian growth patterns, the historical rec ord shows  those promises to have been 
deliberate or accidental lies.56
In keeping with Mitchell’s and Scheer’s analyses, the re nais sance of fi-
nance capitalism  after the 1970s can be viewed as an efort to maintain 
value flows through the channels grooved by Anglo- American petrohe-
gemony (not mention, of course,  earlier colonial and imperial relations), 
an “oil standard” replacing the “gold standard.”57 But rentier financialism, 
unsurprisingly, lacked Keynesianism’s investment in biopo liti cal devel-
opment. Finance was, in the end, a more obviously parasitical method of 
extracting and consolidating value and one that perhaps could be judged 
weaker in terms of the energies it commanded directly. Keynesianism, as a 
state- centered po liti cal order, had the machinics and materialities of indus-
trial petropower at its disposal, which allowed for massive proj ects of infra-
structural and capital development, regardless of what purposes  those proj-
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ects  were meant to serve. Finance capitalism, on the other hand, could only 
indirectly access the centralized authority of the state and the powers of indus-
try. In its core practice, it had to make do with the electric speed of informa-
tion transfer and the opportunities for arbitrage that  those created. Of course, 
as finance more securely positioned itself as the central ner vous system of glo-
balization, it was able to re orient and minimize biopo liti cal priorities through 
the leverage of debt and the constant threat of capital withdrawal.58 Although 
finance capital is by no means intrinsically hostile to infrastructure— the in-
ternet is an excellent example— its relationship to public infrastructure is at 
best ambivalent and more often directly or indirectly critical. We have seen 
that tension revealed of late in a wave of integralist infrastructural nostalgia 
for a period before finance capital became ascendant.
The neoliberal disarticulation of the energopo liti cal capacities of the 
global North was masked by the incremental pace of the dissolution of pub-
lic infrastructures, by the popu lar utopias of internet and real estate  bubbles, 
and by fear- and warmongering designed to maintain attention elsewhere.59 
But this masquerade existed only for the global North. In countries like 
Mexico, neoliberal policy regimes and structural adjustment policies led 
swiftly and obviously to misery for entire nations, especially for  those strata 
that had gained prosperity through the exercise of Keynesian biopolitics. 
The financial crisis of 2007–9 gave the North a taste of what the South had 
been experiencing for three de cades already. It left the dominant ideologi-
cal order discredited even though it left the  actual institutional apparatus of 
finance relatively untouched. Now, almost a de cade on,  there is a feeling of 
living in ruins, both infrastructural and imaginational.60
Perhaps  those ruins  will prove to be the fertilizer of something  else,  whether 
the return to fossil- fueled national glory dreamed of by Trumpists and Brex-
iteers or the solar emancipation aspired to by Scheerians the world over. 
What ever intermediary forms of postneoliberal life we are now witnessing, 
the eschatology of the Anthropocene suggests that the further pursuit of 
growth as prosperity— whether Keynesian, neoliberal, or other wise— points 
only deathward. This double bind remains powerfully suppressed since even 
our ready- made idioms of revolution tend to depend on massive energic 
magnitudes.61 The North has not yet found a way to imagine low- energy 
prosperity, freedom, and happiness. My argument is simply that energopo-
liti cal analy sis ofers a dif er ent set of analytical attentions than  those of bio-
power and capital and, as such, may help enable us to tell dif er ent stories 
and imagine dif er ent  futures.
Introduction 19
It is in this spirit that this volume is titled Energopolitics. I do not mean 
to suggest that energopower is the most impor tant of our conceptual min-
ima. Rather, I put forward energopolitics as a general proj ect of inquiry, as a 
hashtag if you  will, for a conversation that I believe would be worthwhile to 
pursue in greater depth. If Mitchell’s proj ect ofers a deep and rich po liti cal 
history of a specific trajectory of energic materiality and infrastructure con-
ditioning anthropo liti cal emergence, then “energopower” ofers a more 
general power concept that can serve to bring into juxtaposition many 
such cases of enablement, including the study of wind, land, and power 
ofered in this volume. It is hopefully clear from my discussions of capital 
and biopower that rethinking them as power concepts focused on enable-
ment helps to unlock their own energopo liti cal storylines as well. Fi nally, 
terminologically speaking, “energopolitics” joins together the modality of 
“pouvoir” with the Aristotleian ἐνέργεια (enérgeia, “activity”),62 which was 
 later redefined by modern physics as “work,” most often as the capacitation 
for (mechanical) work. Although I find a narrow definition of “energy” 
as “work” conceptually disabling in many re spects, combining “energy” 
in its capacitational sense with “pouvoir” creates a kind of double mo-
dalization in the term “energopolitics” that helpfully gestures  toward the 
multiple and nested modes of enablement that I am seeking to map in the 
ethnography.
more minima: desire, ontopower, . . .
Such multiplicity suggests the need to broaden the set of conceptual minima 
beyond a conventional triad. In brief: please do. This set should remain open 
for addition and exploration. Two additional concepts that I have found 
valuable in this analy sis are the psychoanalytic (Freudian) concept of “de-
sire” and Brian Massumi’s Deleuze- inspired “ontopower.”
I find the ontopower concept valuable less in terms of the militariza-
tion pro cess that Massumi has recently documented at length and more in 
terms of the concept’s gesture  toward a force cluster of afective “living pow-
ers” that exceed but also inform  human po liti cal power.63 The winds of the 
Isthmus of Tehuantepec, for example, are ontopo liti cal, as anyone knows 
who has turned a corner and been knocked to the ground or has seen trac-
tor trailers flipped over on the highway between La Ventosa and La Venta. 
 Those winds are not reducible to any proj ect of  human po liti cal imagination 
or organ ization, although  human beings have long sought to capture their 
powers,  whether with words and songs or, more recently, with blades and 
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turbines. Across the world, aeolian ontopowers have come to have a special 
allure for anthropo liti cal proj ects of renewable energy development. But, at 
best,  those proj ects seek to harness a force they know cannot be controlled 
or administered fully.
In the Isthmus, binnizá (Zapotec)  people have historically equated the 
winds with the cosmological force of life itself, bi, and when Chris tian ity 
came, the north wind ofered enough of a challenge to the power of the di-
vine that it became known as “the dev il’s wind.”  Today, istmeños re spect the 
power of el viento viejo (the old wind) at least as much as they re spect local 
po liti cal power and certainly more than the translocal po liti cal power of 
the Mexican state. El viento is not a power that hides away, seeking to exert 
influence from afar; it is experienced more as a medium that courses around 
locals at all times, by turns irritating with gust- borne gravel and ofering 
relief from subtropical swelter.
Freudian desire (Wunsch), meanwhile, may be less obvious as a power 
concept, but in the context of thinking about pouvoir/enablement, desire 
ofers a very valuable and specific insight. As I have written at greater 
length elsewhere,64 Freud’s late neurology and early metapsychology  were 
strongly influenced by thermodynamics and electrical research, articulat-
ing a model of psychic operation as a largely homeostatic energy system 
managing exogenous and endogenous stimuli to maintain a tolerable load 
of excitation. The relationship between primary pro cess and secondary 
pro cess is the crucial dynamic. The primary pro cess represents the psychic 
apparatus’s efort to reduce excitation that has been created by unconscious 
charging of memories into hallucinatory identifications. The psychic ap-
paratus strains, irrationally to its core, to repeat past acts of need satisfac-
tion, reducing pains of want through the pleasures of imaginary discharge. 
In other words, one searches always for that excessive plea sure of infantile 
satisfaction, drawing available objects and subjects into one’s field of desire 
even when it is not clear that they can ofer any fulfillment whatsoever. 
To reduce this innate hallucinatory tendency, the primary pro cess is inter-
rupted by a secondary pro cess of social- environmental conditioning that 
seeks to channel the search for plea sure instead through the intricacies of 
language and custom. The fact that the secondary pro cess must continuously 
seek to repress and deflect the primary pro cess creates a fundamentally 
entropic condition in the psychic apparatus. In instances of psychosis, neu-
rosis, and dreaming, Freud believes we see how the weakening of second-
ary defense mechanisms allows the energy flows of the primary pro cess to 
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more directly influence the systems of consciousness and perception in the 
form of hallucinatory imagination.
The concept of desire contains this drama within itself. On the one 
hand  there is a mad pursuit of plea sure and fulfillment, on the other a con-
stant attempt to temper and deflect the urgency of pursuit  toward thoughts 
and be hav iors that can be reconciled with our fundamental sociality in 
the form of social norms and, indeed, reason. But the primary pro cess 
remains primary. It is the volcanic power of hallucinatory identification— 
unconscious belief that the pursuit of one’s pre sent objects of desire  will 
result in repetition of the excessive plea sure of past satisfaction— that pro-
pels us forward. Desire remains perpetually unfulfilled  because of its past 
orientation: it rejects the possibility of unknown forms of  future satisfac-
tion and plea sure. Instead, it constantly tries to commensurate and ma-
nipulate con temporary encounters to suit its (again, mostly unconscious) 
memory archive. It is thus pos si ble to view desire as endless and eternal 
and, as Žižek writes, to see its ultimate function as self- reproduction: “Desire’s 
raison d’etre . . .  is not to realize its goal, to find full satisfaction, but to 
reproduce itself as desire.”65
In this re spect, I find the concept of desire invaluable in accounting for 
the apparent paradox that the global North continues to utilize ecologi-
cally toxic magnitudes of fossil fuels despite some level of rational aware-
ness that this is not a good  thing. This is precisely the paradox of desire: 
a backward- looking investment in past plea sure always seems to trump 
consciousness and reason precisely  because the  future has no memories to 
ofer. Such desire continues to enable itself in pursuit of the past pleasures 
of carbon modernity. Likewise, when governmental actors and renewable 
energy activists, including the Hermann Scheers of the world, promise that 
a clean energy transition can be accomplished without loss and without 
sacrifice, one sees  there, too, an attempt to define the  future in terms of 
a memory archive constituted by the energic abundance of petropower. 
Even as we work to shift rationality  toward a critical and transformational 
engagement with the Anthropocene, the concept of desire teaches us to 
re spect the primary pro cess that  will do anything in its power to pull the 
 future into the gravitational orbit of the past. It is a humbling reminder of 
the limits of reason to steer us  toward a  future that does not repeat the past. 
Somehow, we also have to create memories of the  future that we hope to at-




We  these minima laid out, let us move from concepts to ethnography. As 
outlined in our joint preface, Cymene and I believe Mexico to be one of 
the richest and most rewarding cases of the ecological, social, and po liti-
cal complexities of renewable energy transition across the world  today. My 
ethnographic strategy in this volume is to structure the pre sen ta tion of our 
fieldwork in such a way as to locate  those situations, encounters, and rela-
tions where the conceptual minima are absolutely necessary to understand 
what unfolded in the course of our research. But I also spend a  great deal 
of time exploring the abundant force clusters within southern Mexico that 
cannot be derived from concepts like capital, biopower, and energopower. 
We have termed the full ecol ogy of  these clusters surrounding wind power 
development “aeolian politics” as a way of defamiliarizing wind power as a 
more conventional object of contestation or salvation.68
Southern Mexico’s aeolian politics include, for example, a complex and 
contested history of land tenure in the region around Juchitán, whose lega-
cies exert a constant influence over wind power development.  There is the 
brokerage and lobbying work of ngos and fixers and  unions.  There are proj-
ect developers and financiers constantly laying groundwork for securing 
generous financial returns on their investments.  There are the clientelist net-
works and corporatist machinations of the Mexican po liti cal parties, in par-
tic u lar the pri (the Institutional Revolutionary Party) and prd (the Party 
of the Demo cratic Revolution), which often seem much more vital than the 
governmental bureaucracy they inhabit.  There are the logics of caciquismo 
(boss politics) and student/teacher/peasant/worker/fisher opposition move-
ments operating in the isthmus, whose princi ples both inform and exceed 
the po liti cal parties.  There are historical tensions between Mexico City and 
Oaxaca City, between Oaxaca City and the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, and 
between the istmeño towns and the surrounding countryside, all of which 
must be taken into account.  There are historical rivalries between the bin-
nizá (Zapotec) and ikojts (Huave)  peoples whose lands, seas, and winds are 
all afected by wind parks.  There is a federal government that is anxious 
about waning petropower and climate change, a state government that is anx-
ious to perform its own sovereignty, and a vulnerable parastatal electricity 
utility ( cfe) that is trying to stave of privatization.  There is the infrastruc-
tural inertia of an electrical grid system that has been optimized for fossil- 
fueled thermoelectric energy supply.  There are the electrical engineers and grid 
administrators whose expertise is likewise optimized to manage baseload 
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thermoelectric supply and who are skeptical of wind power for its intermit-
tency.  There are legacies of settler colonialism and racism that shape both 
the logic of governmental intervention as well as conceptions of local and 
indigenous sovereignty.  There are the promises and entitlements of the Mex-
ican Revolution, which have not been forgotten.  There are alliances and dis-
junctures between federal and state bureaucracies in Mexico. And not least, 
 there is the power of the wind itself, which howls and “jams corncobs in 
your nose” as the binnizá poet Victor Terán writes. In their cross- drafts and 
swirls,  these many forces provide aeolian politics with its turbulent vortex.
This is also no closed set, but all  these forces belong to the maxima of 
an adequate anthropological analy sis of wind power development in south-
ern Mexico, and they are given their due in the chapters that follow. The im-
portance of local, regional, and national scales of enablement vividly reminds 
us that anthropology of po liti cal power in the Anthropocene  will always need 
to look beyond conceptual minima to comprehend its scenes of engagement. 
Fieldwork speaks terroir to pouvoir, highlighting the modal multiplicity of 
enablement that inheres in any situation of  human life and endeavor.69
For the same reason, I have or ga nized the ethnographic narrative as a 
journey between key places that we visited in the course of fieldwork to show 
how the po liti cal terroir varies substantially from site to site, destabilizing 
glosses like “po liti cal culture” or “wind power development” or “southern 
Mexico” while reinjecting diference and locality into them. Often in what 
follows, we  shall see that the politics of land in the isthmus play an espe-
cially salient role in constituting local terroir. The isthmus contains at least 
three distinct land tenure regimes: the bienes comunales of ancestral indig-
enous communities, the bienes ejidales (ejidos) granted to landless peasants 
 after the Mexican Revolution, and a heterogeneous array of forms of private 
land owner ship— sometime de jure and more often de facto. None of  these 
 legal regimes  were designed with the facilitation of energy “megaprojects” in 
mind. Proj ects of wind power development that seek to shepherd the isth-
mus from an agrarian past to a postindustrial  future have thus had to navi-
gate this uneasy terrain, seeking to satisfy communal and private  owners 
without incurring the animosity of neighbors and inciting factionalism.70
Our passage begins in Ixtepec (chapter 1), where an ngo and a group 
of comuneros (indigenous communal landholders) sought to create Latin 
Amer i ca’s first community- owned wind park, Yansa- Ixtepec, on commu-
nal agrarian land. Had it succeeded, this proj ect would have ruptured a cozy 
arrangement of transnational capital, biopo liti cal aspiration, and energopo-
liti cal infrastructure that has put Oaxacan wind power into overdrive in 
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the past several years. The chapter surfaces the alternate po liti cal and social 
imagination wedded to Yansa- Ixtepec and the way it gave voice not only to 
dif er ent biopo liti cal expectations but also to a desire to reconnect to land 
and to strengthen indigenous sovereignty. We also explore at length the ac-
tors and infrastructures that strenuously opposed Yansa- Ixtepec’s efort to 
come into being.
We then move east to La Ventosa (chapter 2), a town nearly wholly en-
circled by wind parks that have been constructed in the dominant private- 
public partnership ( ppp) model. We examine the logic and history of that 
model in detail but also the reasons that La Ventosa became its epicenter. 
Caciques (bosses) control the town, it is said, abetted by influential party- 
political networks and relationships with transnational energy companies; it 
was the bosses who de cided that wind power was La Ventosa’s  future. Dreams 
of broader white- collar prosperity for the town compete with machinations 
to expand po liti cal influence and to secure substantial rentier incomes. 
Walking the streets of La Ventosa for a house- by- house survey of commu-
nity opinion, we came to understand the deep ambivalence that most La 
Ventosans feel about the rapid transformation of their lived environment, 
this “development” that  will shape their community for de cades to come.
The Pan- American Highway takes us upland from the Isthmus of 
 Tehuantepec to Oaxaca City (chapter 3), where we find a state government 
in disarray concerning wind power. The Oaxacan state finds itself cut out 
of the developmental loop by alliances between federal government agen-
cies, transnational developers, and istmeño po liti cal leaders. Yet  these same 
forces blame the Oaxacans for their failure to manage the rising tensions and 
vio lence surrounding the wind parks. As the government strug gled to gov-
ern, we witnessed its agents participating in a variety of forms of “performa-
tive sovereignty” designed to proj ect more secure control over the  future of 
wind power development. However, the growing recourse to characterizing 
the isthmus as an eternal indigenous other, beyond the mestizo state and 
nation, could also be taken as a frank admission that it might be beyond the 
capacity of the Oaxacan Valley to influence, let alone control, what happens 
in its historically renegade province.
Heading farther northwest, we eventually come to the locus of national 
po liti cal power, Mexico City (chapter 4), where we met the agents of bio-
power, capital, and energopower most closely affiliated with designing and 
enabling wind power development in the isthmus. We met a caravan of ac-
tivists, a seasoned journalist on the energy beat, several engineers from the 
parastatal electricity utility, the deputy minister of electricity, the director of 
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the federal energy regulatory agency, a transnational banker with millions 
invested in istmeño wind parks, and a former Oaxacan governor and party 
kingmaker who has become a fixer for the wind industry. We came to realize 
the extent to which (a)  these agents and their agencies often work at cross- 
purposes to one another— thus shattering the often- mediated image of a 
consolidated federal po liti cal policy regarding wind power development— 
and (b) how  little most of them know about the isthmus, its residents, and 
their reasons for supporting and opposing the parks.
Fi nally, we return again to the isthmus, our passage ending in the cen-
ter of aeolian politics, Juchitán (chapter 5), where alternative  futures of ist-
meño wind power burn brightly in conflict with one another. We discuss 
how con temporary aeolian politics have been informed by a long history of 
Juchiteco re sis tance to foreign powers and how the history of land tenure 
and class conflict in the isthmus overshadows thinking about wind mega-
projects  today. We met the leaders of the local po liti cal factions and social 
movements that or ga nized themselves both for and against the parks. And 
we discovered how the intrigues surrounding wind and power filtered down 
from elite machinations into the barrios. One way or another, Juchitecos be-
lieve they  will be the ones to decisively determine the trajectory of istmeño 
wind power  going forward.
And now, with thanks for your readerly patience, theory stands aside and 
invites ethnography to do its work.
This page intentionally left blank
1. Ixtepec
August 18, 2012. The view as we  ride into the hills north of Ixtepec is stun-
ning. As we clear the ranchland outside of the city, moving through the 
ubiquitous smoldering garbage dumps whose acrid white smoke marks the 
margins of urban life in the isthmus, a densely verdant landscape folds in 
upon the road. Sergio and I have to duck frequently to avoid being swept out 
of the bed of Juan’s truck by low- lying branches. When we do not have to share 
our passage with packs of Brahman cows shouldering ner vously against us, 
Juan drives quickly, and we dig our fin gers into the worn wooden railings to 
hold on. In the hills, brilliant sunlight scatters through the trees’ leaves; the 
air is lush. We begin passing through rivulets that transform the road into a 
sparkling mirage at a distance. When we hit them at speed, both  water and 
color spray into the air as hundreds of tropical butterflies take flight.
Sergio is drinking it all in. “I always feel so happy when I come up  here.”
With the wind rushing around us, it is a marvelously Titanic moment. 
And in truth, it is the happiest I have ever seen him. For all is not well with 
his bold proj ect to orchestrate the first community- owned wind farm in 
Latin Amer i ca.
Sergio confides loudly over the noise of the truck and the wind that he is 
afraid that the Mexican national electricity utility, the Comisión Federal de 
Electridad ( cfe),  will not even allow them to bid for grid access  because the 
current tender model requires massive bank deposits and letters of credit. 
“This is a poor indigenous community. They  don’t have millions of dollars 
lying around to stake as collateral,” he explains. And then, even if they are 
allowed to bid, Sergio worries that they may not win the competition  because 
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although Sergio and his collaborators in the Ixtepecan bienes comunales 
(communal estates) have “ambitious social development goals” in mind, cfe 
is required by federal law to purchase energy at the lowest unit cost.
Social development is the theme of our trip into the hills this after noon. 
We are visiting the Ixtepecan township (agencia municipal) of El Zapote 
(population 809) to help cement local support for the proj ect. Sergio ex-
plains that El Zapote borders on the footprint of the planned park and that 
some Zapotero farmers use land that the proj ect needs to lease.
Juan tells us  later that the Zapoteros’ true interest in the wind park had less 
to do with land rents, let alone clean energy, than with getting  running  water 
for the village, making electricity more constant and reliable, and developing 
better transport linkages since the villagers had few vehicles of their own.
Indeed, as we near the village, the roads metamorphose from asphalt to 
gravel to dirt, and we pass many men and some  women walking the other 
way, likely headed the several kilo meters into town on foot. The promise of 
infrastructure is, in other words, said to be the Zapoteros’ true desire. Or 
perhaps more accurately, in El Zapote—as in many parts of the isthmus, 
long ignored by governmental programs of biopo liti cal development, often 
circumvented by flows of transnational capital— there is no way to clearly 
separate aspirations for improved infrastructures of life from  those of en-
ergy. The Ixtepecan plan to fuse community- owned clean energy and social 
development pre sents  these entangled dreams in a particularly vivid way.
“This  Isn’t Denmark”
Sergio is handsome, wiry, intense, and proj ects tireless optimism. He was 
born in Spain and speaks Spanish with a peninsular accent as well as perfect 
En glish.  After studying in Germany and the UK and spending several years 
 doing community organ ization work in South Asia and Latin Amer i ca, in 
2006 he ended up working for the Nordic Folkecenter for Renewable Energy 
in Ydby, Denmark, part of the World Wind Energy Institute network, where 
he became increasingly interested in how renewable energy could be har-
nessed as a tool for community development.
It was also a boom time for the wind industry globally, Sergio remembers. 
“Before the 2008 crash,  there was so much more demand than supply that 
it was difficult for smaller players like communities to get access to the tech-
nology they needed.” So he founded the Yansa Group with the ambition to 
export the Danish model of “community wind” production to rural com-
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munities in developing countries in order to help de moc ra tize access to re-
newable energy expertise and technology and to serve as a power ful tool for 
community integration and development.1
While in Denmark, he heard about the “wind rush” in Oaxaca through 
members of his  family (his  mother is Mexican), but he also learned of the 
rising re sis tance and vio lence surrounding wind park proj ects. He travelled 
to Oaxaca briefly in 2008, spoke with residents of several communities likely 
to be impacted by wind parks, and then travelled to Mexico City to meet 
with the president of the industrial lobbying organ ization amdee,2 which 
was spearheading wind development in Oaxaca.
“Nowadays  they’ve got a more polished message, but back then, what I 
was hearing from them was  really outrageous, blunt, even racist. They viewed 
the communities as villains, ignorant  people ruled by small leaders who 
wanted bribes and  were stopping pro gress. I told him that in other parts of 
the world, like Denmark, communities  were being engaged more construc-
tively as partners in wind development.”
The president scowled at him, and the meeting soured to the point that, 
according to Sergio, it ended with a thinly veiled threat: “I  don’t know what 
 you’re  going to do with all this information, but I’d be careful about what you 
wrote. This  isn’t Denmark. Anyone can fall of his  horse  here.”
But Sergio was in no way dissuaded. He relishes confrontation with the 
forces of industry and government, which he sees to be deforming and cor-
rupting the course of wind development in Mexico. So he started traveling 
frequently from his apartment in Mexico City to the isthmus, connecting 
with some of the activists working against the wind parks, who in turn had 
networks in the communities that  were being impacted.
“One of the first  things was to try to shift their perspective on wind energy. 
For a lot of  people it had become something evil; it meant giving your land to 
Spaniards. I told them that this  wasn’t the way it was in some other countries. 
 There could be community- owned wind energy, even in Mexico. At first, they 
thought I was out of my mind. But I kept repeating it and repeating it.”
By chance, then, one of the activists happened to share a bus  ride with a 
comunero from Ixtepec, who told an in ter est ing story about how their co-
muna was trying to convince cfe to let them build a community wind park.3 
The electric com pany needed to use Ixtepecan land in order to build a new 
substation to evacuate all the electricity being generated by wind parks to 
the high- voltage arteries of the national grid. Spending an estimated $116 
million on the proj ect, cfe was making the largest federal infrastructural 
investment in the region since the 1960s. When cfe presented the comuna 
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with its substation plans, some voiced the idea that Ixtepec should get a com-
munity wind park in exchange to raise revenue for the city.
Sergio explained, “ There  were a  couple of visionaries  there, and they  were 
able to at least convince cfe to pay for them to meet with con sul tants on 
community development.  After  those meetings, the comuna representatives 
drafted a plan for a community wind park and tried to get cfe to agree to it.”4
But cfe’s response was, “You guys are out of your mind, you’ll never find 
the money for that, so we  won’t reserve space on the grid for you.”
“And cfe  didn’t.” Sergio went on. “But the idea  didn’t go away, and when 
my activist friend told them that  there was this crazy Spaniard  running around 
saying that community wind parks  were pos si ble, it clicked, and we met, and 
have been working together since 2009.”
Sergio positively contrasted the po liti cal location for community devel-
opment in Ixtepec with that of the district capital, Juchitán, the epicenter 
of the wind rush. “Much of the wind development in the isthmus is taking 
place on land that traditionally belonged to Juchitán’s bienes comunales. But 
with the rise of cocei and the po liti cal vio lence of the 1970s and 1980s,5 the 
comuna leadership was broken and  hasn’t reformed for de cades. But the land 
is still legally communal. So, in a sense, all  these contracts that are being 
written to lease land around Juchitán for wind parks are completely invalid. 
But in Ixtepec you have an unbroken comuna tradition.”
“And the other  thing that’s in ter est ing about them,” he says, “is that in the 
1960s some of the students who helped the farmers stave of land occupations 
actually  were admitted into the comuna in thanks. Usually comuneros in 
the isthmus are from families who have been farming their plots for genera-
tions. In Ixtepec you have  those comuneros but then also a leftist intelligent-
sia,  lawyers and engineers, and they are the ones  really pushing for a wind 
park.”
Other observers and participants drawn together by the power of the 
istmeño wind like to credit Sergio as the hero, or antihero,  behind the Ixtepe-
can wind park proposal, but he consistently defers credit from himself and 
Yansa to the comuna. Sergio was, in his own words, simply “a catalyst.” Of 
course, it is quite pos si ble to view Yansa as not only enabling the realization 
of spontaneously generated community interests and agendas but also as 
ideologically shaping  those interests and agendas through a par tic u lar ex-
pertise of “development.”6 Such expertise is further inflected in this case by 
belief in the capacity of green energy to produce new po liti cal and social re-
lations.  There is no doubt, as a wealth of anthropological research on ngos 
elsewhere has demonstrated,7 that ngos exert power ful “performativity,”8 
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changing conditions and relations through their expert intervention. Yansa 
indeed cultivated an energo- bio- power/knowledge that absorbed local in-
terests and knowledges and decisively honed them  toward a par tic u lar in-
frastructural realization and social  future. And as we  shall see  later on in this 
chapter,  there  were many Ixtepecans who rejected the idea that the agrarian 
comuna represented their “community” at all. But the general criticism that 
ngos tend to impose po liti cal ideologies of their own in development pro-
grams, while well taken, also does not scratch the surface of the subtle flux of 
local power relations— including, notably, Sergio’s close friendship with his 
allies in the Ixtepec comuna,  those allies’ slightly awkward relationship to 
the “normal comuneros,” po liti cal factionalism within the asamblea, and the 
asamblea’s alienation from the broader population of Ixtepec— relations that 
also inflected, accentuated, and negated, by turns, the Yansan imagination.
And for our part, befriending Sergio was certainly catalytic for our field 
research since he helped us massively in terms of making contacts across the 
isthmus, especially among  those opposed to the status quo of Oaxacan wind 
development. He also became a partner in many of our more in ter est ing 
adventures through the windy landscape of southern Mexico. All of which 
helped us to appreciate how Sergio’s impact in the contentious po liti cal field 
of wind power development in the isthmus has been more extensive (and 
elusive) than many  will ever know.
The Yansa Model
Having arrived in El Zapote, the asamblea gathers on the veranda of what 
appears to be the only public building in town, aptly sheltered by the abun-
dant shade of an old white sapote tree. Its hard green ovoid fruits litter the 
ground between us as we set up plastic chairs in a rough circle. About twenty 
Zapoteros gather, older men wearing broad campesino hats, older  women in 
vividly embroidered Zapotec dresses, younger men and  women in jeans and 
T- shirts. Our  daughter, Brijzha, investigates the nearby unpaved road while 
the other  children explain to her which ants she can poke with a stick and 
which are the “snake killers” to stay away from.
The agente municipal introduces himself softly and then turns the floor 
over to Sergio for his pre sen ta tion. Although the main agenda for this meet-
ing concerns el agua ( water) and transporte (transportation) and how to or-
ga nize the  labor and funding to get them  running in the township,9 Sergio 
begins by reading the minutes from a previous meeting focused on “making 
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sure that  women are participating fully in the pro cess of establishing a com-
munity wind park and that their concerns are added to the social goals of 
the proj ect.” And the last third of the meeting is a devoted to a more detailed 
pre sen ta tion of Yansa’s proposals for fines sociales (social aims) based upon 
their community consulta (a consultation involving 148 interviews in 2012).
Among other questions, interviewees  were asked, “If you had 100,000 
pesos to invest and had to choose between the areas of culture, education, 
jobs, environment, recreation, and health, how would you distribute it?” The 
results averaged out to 11  percent culture, 23  percent education, 26  percent 
jobs, 12  percent environment, 9  percent recreation, and 19  percent health.10 
Following  these priorities, Yansa is suggesting an emphasis on increased op-
portunities for work (by paving roads, creating public transportation links, 
and putting in telephone lines), education (by creating a primary school 
and ofering grants for older  children to study elsewhere), health (through a 
clinic but also a recreation area), and fi nally for desarollo comunitario (com-
munity development) “to promote a harmonious, sustainable life in El Zapote 
taking into account both the necessity of ensuring  human rights for all and 
sustaining the natu ral environment.”  These points are acknowledged by the 
attendees’ nodding. They also closely correspond with Yansa’s published vi-
sion of their social development targets for the community wind park.11
The resources for social development would come from a unique partner-
ship model that Yansa had designed to connect the ngo, the comuna, devel-
opment banks, and social investors. The basic ele ments of the partnership 
 were or ga nized as follows: assuming that Yansa won a cfe tender for grid 
access, they would immediately form a community interest com pany (Yansa- 
Ixtepec cic), which would own the wind park and negotiate a land lease 
agreement with the comuna (which would continue to “own” the land upon 
which the wind park was built).12 The estimated cost of building the park, con-
sisting of thirty- four 3 megawatt turbines (production capacity of 102 mega-
watts total), is $200 million. Construction funds would be raised through 
a mix of 70–80  percent development bank funding and 20–30  percent so-
cial investment funds (which would be willing to accept a below- market 
return on their investments to achieve specific social targets. In a moment 
of gloomy bravado Sergio once assured us that he could raise  those funds “in 
a heartbeat if we had a contract with cfe.  There are so many investors out 
 there waiting for opportunities like this one”). As many construction jobs 
as pos si ble would be given to comuna members. Once the park was opera-
tional, per Mexican law, Yansa- Ixtepec cic would sell its electricity to cfe 
for the next twenty years. Sergio estimated the total annual surplus from the 
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park ( after servicing debts and interest payments to banks and investors) as 
around 50 million pesos per year ($3.81 million).
That surplus would be divided fifty- fifty between Yansa and the comuna. 
Yansa would use its half as seed funding for further community wind park 
proj ects elsewhere in the world. As Sergio explained, “The social investors 
 don’t want to fund a one- of. They would rather invest in a proj ect that could 
grow and have a broader impact.” The comuna’s half would be further di-
vided into approximately 3 million pesos in payments to the campesino pos-
esionarios (possessors) whose plots of land would be directly afected by the 
park (the individual payments  were estimated between 45,000 and 105,000 
pesos annually, depending on size of plot and impact of development) and 
an annual contribution of 5 million pesos to a pension fund for comuneros 
over the age of seventy. The neighboring townships of El Zapote and Car-
rasquedo would each be allotted 250,000 pesos annually to ofset the impact 
of the park on their lands and to help them reach their own development tar-
gets. The remaining, approximately 16.5 million pesos per year (about $1.25 
million), would go into a community trust (fideicomiso) responsible for in-
vesting in social development proj ects like  those outlined above.
Sergio saw establishing the trust as a vital aspect of Yansa’s work. “We 
want to make sure the  whole community sees the benefits of the proj ect, 
not just the old men who traditionally run the comuna.” To this end, Yansa 
outlined the composition of the trust such that at least seven of the thirteen 
trustee positions would have to be held by  women and two by members of a 
youth forum (that Yansa had also helped to create). Only two trustees would 
be elected directly by the comuna, thus, in theory, dissolving the comuneros’ 
ability to consolidate resources from the park for their own benefit.
Again Sergio said, “A very impor tant concern is what happens to the rev-
enue from the proj ect.  There are worries that it  will create further in equality 
by making a few  people rich at the expense of  others. So this proj ect, yes, 
is about building a wind park, but it’s also about helping to strengthen and 
improve life in rural communities.”
The Yansa model thus deliberately sought to decentralize traditional 
institutions of po liti cal authority like masculine domination of the bienes 
comunales. Sergio did not say this loudly, preferring to focus on the en-
franchisement of “vulnerable populations” like  women and youth instead. 
For the most part, however,  these po liti cal goals seemed to be uncontroversial 
in our conversations with comuneros. Perhaps this was  because a sufficient 
number of younger and female members of comuna families supported 
the initiative, perhaps  because the provisions  were lodged deeply enough 
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in planning documents that  were largely indecipherable to Ixtepecan 
campesinos, or perhaps  because it was simply unthinkable that something 
as insubstantial as a wind park proposal could challenge the deep grooves 
of traditional institutions and relations of po liti cal authority.
When the “normal comuneros” spoke to us about the wind park, their 
interest tended to gravitate  toward two issues: What kind of work might they 
receive during the construction phase of the proj ect? And what kinds of rent 
payments they  were likely to receive thereafter?
The presidente of the comuna, Baldomero Rosano, an old farmer, expressed 
the view of some that it remained unclear what Yansa was  really ofering them. 
 People generally detested cfe, but their rental payments for  running transmis-
sion lines over comuna land  were clear or at least familiar. They brought in good 
money. “But with Sergio, it still  isn’t clear [what he  will pay. It’s] still not. . . . 
And the  people  don’t accept that. Some are complaining. . . .  They are waiting 
to hear the amount of the payment. What  will Sergio pay? What  will he pay?”
Uprising
The very next morning we receive our first real taste of the subtlety and 
precarity involved in exercising po liti cal authority in the isthmus. A meeting 
with a few dozen posesionarios went well the previous after noon. Sergio was 
optimistic.  There  were questions of clarification, especially regarding the 
direct payment structure. But  there  were no major challenges to the Yansa 
proposal. This morning is the pre sen ta tion to the full meeting of the comuna 
with the hope that they  will ratify the proposal and, more importantly even, 
agree to send delegates to Mexico City to help Sergio put pressure on cfe to 
allow Yansa to bid on the open tender in October.
Sergio says, “cfe wants it to look like this proposal is just some foreign 
ngo’s idea so they can marginalize us. We need to bring comuneros to DF 
to show them that  there is an indigenous community  behind this proj ect.13 
That’ll be tougher for the government to ignore.”
When we arrive at the comisariado building, just down the street from 
Ixtepec’s city hall, at first we think we have the meeting time wrong.14 The 
street is filled with open- bed pickup trucks and a few tractors. Comune-
ros and a few comuneras are rapidly streaming out of the entrance, and the 
area in front is choked with  people, some gathered in small groups around 
men who are holding forth in raised voices, some joking with each other, 
 others having whispered conversations on the side. We wait  until the exodus 
Ixtepec 35
subsides and then cautiously elbow our way inside, greeting comuneros we 
recognize from previous meetings, hoping we  will find someone who can 
explain to us what has happened.
We make it into the main auditorium. Filled with vividly blue chairs that 
are normally quite comfortable, right now the room is intense with emotion, 
talk, and bodies, the ceiling fans whirring the hot air around. We see Juan 
and Vicente, who shake their heads and gesture  toward the podium at the 
front of the room, where Sergio stands looking a  little stunned.
We ask him what happened,  whether we missed the meeting.
“No, it never got started.” Sergio goes on to explain how during the call-
ing of the roll (a pro cess that usually takes about two hours since more than 
eight hundred names are read aloud), a rival group of comuneros challenged 
the current leadership with not announcing a payment of 5,000 pesos for 
electricity transmission, efectively accusing them of having pocketed the 
money. “Many comuneros still mix up the wind park issue with electricity 
transmission rents more generally, so  these guys  were able to convince a lot 
of  people that we  couldn’t talk about the wind park  until this other issue had 
been resolved. And so they instigated this walkout.”
The uprising had been staged by what Sergio describes as a “dodgy bloc,” 
a group of squatters on comuna land (affiliated with the Ixtepecan mayor’s 
 family and the prd party) who want to challenge the current comuna ad-
ministration (members of the Confederación Nacional Campesina, cnc, 
the peasant organ ization of the pri party) in an upcoming election.
FIGURE 1.1.   Meeting of the Ixtepecan comuna
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Their dodginess did not stem solely from their squatting. The isthmus has 
a long, albeit contentious, tradition of land occupation dating back to the 
Mexican Revolution. At least in Ixtepec, we  were told, if squatters occupied 
unused land and worked it, they could generally eventually count on a suc-
cessful application to enter the comuna. But  these par tic u lar squatters  were 
also alleged to have connections to a mining com pany that was wishing to ex-
plore for gold in the area. In any event, it had been a skillfully staged sandbag-
ging since many comuneros— including, in this case, all the main supporters 
of the wind park— tend to avoid the tedium of the roll call and show up for 
the meeting two hours late, when the real business begins.
Sergio is frustrated, calculating the fallout. “Honestly, the proj ect is in jeop-
ardy. Three years of work have gone into this, and every thing depends on what 
happens in the next month.” Not only  will he have to convince cfe to change 
their rules for the tender but now he has to cancel a month’s worth of meet-
ings with social investors since he  will not be able to produce an agreement 
letter from the comuna to show them. “I  can’t believe they would let a five- 
thousand- peso issue derail this when  there are millions at stake for them.”
By now we are standing in the foyer of the nearly empty comuna hall. 
The door to the comisariado’s office opens, and we are quickly ushered in. 
The office is small and dusty but air- conditioned. A broken clock, an ancient 
desktop computer, last year’s calendar, and especially the faded bienes co-
munales flag from 1956 all cry out for allochronic rendering.15 But the energy 
in the room is utterly  here and now.
 There are ten of us packed in, and only the presidente, Baldomero, is 
seated, lividly angry and refusing to make eye contact. He drums his fin gers 
on the green felt of the desk, occasionally shuffling through the member list 
in front of him.
The comuna secretary and trea surer dominate the discussion instead. 
They are in damage control mode, slightly defensive that they did not man-
age the confrontation more efectively.
“Is  there any way we can count the meeting from yesterday as the official 
vote instead?”
“No, we  didn’t have a quorum of the general assembly.”
The secretary says they know los gritónes (loudmouths) are “playing a 
game” but they still debate how best to defuse them.
“An official report from the trea surer?”
“ They’ll never accept that.”
Some think  these critics may be trying to delay action in the hopes of win-
ning the November election in order to position themselves to get money 
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from the Yansa deal. They discuss how and when to put out the convocatoria 
(call) for a new assembly meeting on the Yansa proj ect. Two meetings would 
be best, owing to la sicología de la gente (the psy chol ogy of the  people), the 
first to “calm the spirits,” the second to make the vote happen. Another prob-
lem is that the asamblea has a lot of other business to cover. In the end, they 
decide they cannot schedule the first meeting  until September 23, more than 
a month away.
Sergio flinches and raises the point that the cfe tender ends on  October 4, 
leaving them very  little time to act.
To reassure him somewhat, they agree to send two or three persons with 
him to Mexico City to request that cfe allow Yansa- Ixtepec to bid in the 
tender. However, they reject Sergio’s proposition that they sign a statement 
in support of the park proj ect as the comisariado  because “that could easily 
be misinterpreted  later as a sign that we had already grabbed some money 
from this proj ect  behind the back of the community.”
Every one is a  little frayed by now. They find some catharsis in taking 
turns excoriating cfe for creating conditions that exclude community wind 
park proj ects in the first place.
Daniel, the comuna  lawyer, says, “cfe wants to maintain their mono poly, 
that much is clear. If our wind farm is built,  they’re afraid it would help to ex-
pose all their corruption and excess costs they pass on to us. That [exposure] 
is what our screamers  here actually want to happen, but they  don’t  really 
know that’s what they want.”
Someone  else ventures that cfe may even be encouraging its employees 
in the city to undermine and divide the comuna. “What cfe wants in the 
end is that every one pays their high costs so that they are practically the only 
ones with wealth.”
Another declares, “ We’ll take it to Congress if we have to!”
Rhetorical questions are reeled of, all aimed at the absent presence, cfe.
“Why  aren’t you letting us even participate,  isn’t that discriminatory?”
“Is this the best the Calderón government can do? Why  isn’t  there a com-
munity wind farm of this size anywhere in Latin Amer i ca?”
“ Aren’t you violating international as well as national laws?”
The hatred of cfe runs deep throughout the isthmus.16 As elsewhere, so 
many of the desired con ve niences of modern life (artificial light, tele vi sions, 
air conditioning) make  people dependent on  those who provide electricity.17 
And that energopo liti cal de pen dency is only deepening as  house holds add 
new appliances, even in the poorest parts of Mexico like the Isthmus of 
 Tehuantepec, which in turn increase utility bills and financial precarity.18
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Understanding the depth of negative afect requires thinking in terms of 
the clientelist po liti cal and economic relations that still predominate in this 
part of Mexico. In the logic of caciquismo, for example, one could at least ex-
pect some top- down re distribution of resources if one worked loyally for the 
cacique’s network. The po liti cal party networks also ofer ways of translating 
the available power of  labor into comparatively scarce currency. In  either 
model, a poor farmer could, for example, pledge votes and the presence of 
his body on blockades and in rallies in exchange for other kinds of support 
and resources. But cfe only exchanges electricity for currency. It accepts 
only the form of value that is already in such short supply.
The power com pany was thus a deceiver, we heard again and again. It 
brought light; promised pro gress, mobility, and modernity; and then made 
that pro gress contingent upon further impoverishment, blacking out dreams 
and further condemning el pueblo to hopeless marginality.19 Part of the bit-
terness also had to do with the fact that cfe was, more than the army (whose 
physical presence was highly consolidated along highways and in urban 
centers), more than the parties (which  were strongly rooted in local po liti-
cal networks), the routine infrastructure of translocal administrative power 
(e.g. “the state”) in southern Mexico. And no  matter whom we spoke with 
outside of cfe, it epitomized the negative reciprocity of that state: always 
taking, never giving.20
The secretary states flatly, “I’m for this wind proj ect to break the corrup-
tion of cfe.  They’ll fight us  because it is an example of how we are changing 
our life.”
The meeting dissolves, and we catch Sergio for a few minutes before he 
leaves.
He remarks offhandedly (but in En glish) that the current group of comis-
ariados is a  little corrupt (“At first they used to suggest ways we could benefit 
them, but we just ignored that, and  after a while they  stopped asking”), but 
the group of challengers is “totally corrupt,” so he still feels that Yansa is 
working with the right  people.
But what, we ask him, about all that just happened.
“I’m  really pissed of that they allowed such a weak argument to stop the 
meeting,” he says. “Too many uninformed  people dominated the discussion, 
and the  people who  were informed  didn’t show up  until it was too late. Daniel, 
for example, could have explained the issues in a way that would have got 
us past this. Ultimately, they have to take responsibility and get their side of 
 things in order. Yansa  can’t get involved in managing the internal politics of 
the comuna.”
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And yet the  future of Ixtepecan wind power depends on the success-
ful navigation of  those politics. Bruised but unbowed, Sergio vows to keep 
working on the prob lem of cfe, hoping that his allies  will be able to get the 
comuna solidified  behind the proj ect.
The Visionaries
Much of that responsibility would fall on the shoulders of Yansa’s two closest 
allies, Daniel and Vicente, who belonged to the small group of comuneros 
who had been pursuing the possibility of a wind park even before Yansa 
arrived. Both are retired professionals in their midfifties, both deeply dis-
turbed by the federal government’s neglect of Ixtepec and the isthmus, and 
both very animated by issues of social justice and particularly indigenous 
rights. Both hoped to use wind power to change life in Ixtepec, making new 
opportunities available, especially for youth.
Vicente spent most of his life working as a chemical engineer for the Mexican 
parastatal oil com pany, Pemex, but returned to Ixtepec  after his retirement and 
found himself depressed by the lack of possibilities for el pueblo. Vicente was 
also a phi los o pher, a historian, a collector of pre- Hispanic artefacts, a maker 
of mezcal de nanche that only became more sweetly potent as our conversa-
tions with him continued. He quoted Hermann Hesse and Karl Marx and 
told us that more than anything, Ixtepec needed opportunities to thwart the 
indolencia of large sections of the population.
“What is the prob lem with life  here?” we asked him over a breakfast of 
nopales and queso oaxaqueño accompanied by mugs of thickly clotted atole.
“Are you familiar with the concept, ‘neoliberal’?” he asked.
All too well, we replied, laughing.
“Well,” he continued, “ people  here live on miracles. What has happened 
is that we live in a false economy. Why false?  Because if you stop paying 
the teachers, nothing moves; the vendors sufer  because  there is no money 
circulating. And then if you  stopped paying the soldiers, a week  later the 
 people would be  dying from hunger.  There’d be nothing left except  water to 
drink. We produce nothing.”
This was a theme that Vicente returned to again and again, Ixtepec as a 
 dying agrarian community, one no longer able to produce enough food to 
sustain itself, captive to market forces far beyond their control.
He was not the only person to tell us, “ There are only three jobs in Ixte-
pec: teacher, soldier, and market vendor.” And only the first two jobs brought 
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new resources into the community in the form of government wages. The 
vendors  were less extractive than metabolic, sustaining themselves on the 
recirculation of meager fragments of capital.
Dalia, Vicente’s wife, said she recalled perfectly the night Vicente came 
back from meeting with other comuneros and said he wanted a commu-
nity wind park for Ixtepec. “He wanted development for the  people so they 
would have employment and less vio lence, so they would have more happi-
ness. I was so happy he had a positive plan.”
Vicente ofered us his own critique of alienated  labor. He told us, “What 
 we’re always thinking about is potencializar las capacidades. To potential-
ize our capacities in a manner that can generate opportunity, opportunity 
that is more than one of  these opportunities  people have now. The plan is 
potencialización.”
He explained, “It’s the diference between chamba [job] and trabajo [work]. 
When I work, I’m working physically as well as intellectually. When I do a 
job, I’m  doing it mechanically and  don’t care about the outcome  because that 
makes no diference to me. For myself, I’m looking neither for jobs nor for 
work, I have a decent pension and  children who  won’t have to depend on me. 
But I want opportunities for them. And I want opportunities for all.”
Continuing, Vicente said, “This park could reach many, many  people. 
This is why I’m putting basically all of my time into the proj ect. Some  people 
think Sergio’s paying me to work on it. But he’s not.  There are some who 
just  can’t imagine that this proj ect is without compensation [sin dinero]. The 
reason why I’m  doing this work is that so many  things are converging in this 
proj ect, so many  things that are afecting me.”
For Daniel, afects  were converging too. But for him, it was as much 
a  matter of reckoning with pasts as imagining alternative  futures. Daniel 
was the grand son of a rancher and a farmer; he fondly recalled visiting his 
grand father’s lands as a child. Now  those lands belonged to him.
“But along that road,” he said, “where  there used to be ranch  after ranch, 
 there are now only four remaining. And you know how many  people still 
live out  there? Just one. Even I  don’t live  there  because I have so much  going 
on in town.”
In his retirement, he had taken up growing sorghum again, ten acres, 
and that taught him how much the infrastructure of irrigation had collapsed 
over the years as fewer and fewer farmers worked to maintain it. And other 
infrastructures  were in decline as well,  those that linked land and language 
and ethnicity. Daniel spoke diidxazá (Zapotec) in his youth even though 
he worked in Spanish throughout almost all his professional life. He was 
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teaching his grand son diidxazá now, taking him out to places around the 
isthmus where diidxazá was still the primary spoken language.
Although Daniel was always quick to joke and chuckle, the undermin-
ing of indigenous rights in Mexico deeply troubled him. He saw the núcleos 
agrarios (agricultural centers) that formed bienes comunales, núcleos like 
the Ixtepecan asamblea, as having inalienable entitlement to their land. This 
was, for him, more than a moral claim, it was a black- and- white  matter of 
both Mexican and international law.
“The Salinas government in ven ted a procedure,”21 he explained, “allegedly 
to regularize the núcleos agrarios in Mexico, but  really for promoting the 
privatization of land. But this procedure addressed the ejidos, which  were 
social forms, products of the Mexican Revolution and not comunidades 
de bienes comunales, which exist factually and rightfully as descendants of 
the first  peoples of the Amer i cas. Or, rather, they never  really took the time 
to consider the diference between a comunidad and an ejido. Ejidos can 
now elect to privatize themselves, but not, as a  matter of law, comunidades.”22
Daniel understood this was a controversial claim, an appeal to an inter-
pretation of the Mexican Constitution in which the rights of indigenous 
communities superseded  those of the settler nation.
He spoke with admiration of the Zapatistas in nearby Chiapas. “Maybe they 
 haven’t done such a  great job with development, but  they’ve kept alive their 
right to autonomía.” His was,  needless to say, not the dominant constitutional 
interpretation communicated to us by participants in wind development in 
the isthmus. But it was a crucial feature of Daniel’s worldview. In his  legal prac-
tice, Daniel had done significant work with núcleos agrarios across Oaxaca to 
help them better understand their constitutional rights.
“The issue,” he said, “is that núcleos agrarios need to take advantage of 
their resources, but they  don’t have the money, let’s say, to create a com pany 
of the kind that would be able to make productive or lucrative use of their 
resources. But  here we have a possibility through the generation of electric-
ity to create a com pany that would truly benefit the greatest pos si ble number 
of members of a comunidad and not simply tiny segments of them.”
He went on, “What we want is to be an example  here in Mexico, but also 
in Latin Amer i ca, of an indigenous community organ izing itself, and col-
laborating directly, according to the agrarian legislation of Mexico, with a 
foundation, Yansa, to create an association, a community interest com pany, 
working in our collective interest.”
He saw so many potential uses for the funds: “We could improve roads, 
construct reliable sources of  water supply for our ranches, create educational 
42 chapter one
opportunities for our  children, pensions for the older comuneros, find real 
work for  people.”
When Daniel spoke of the significance of the Yansa- Ixtepec partnership, 
his Evangelical faith also came to inflect his language. It was a  matter of 
coming up with more justo (just) forms of development. It was a  matter 
of goodness (bondad). The partnership was itself bondadosa, an act of kind-
ness. “No wind com pany anywhere in the world would come  here and ofer 
their expertise in exchange for our land and agree to share  every peso we 
make equally. None.”
Daniel’s aversion to the dominant model of wind development found ex-
pression in the courageous pro bono  legal work he did on behalf of the co-
muneros of San Dionisio del Mar to prevent the construction of the Mareña 
Renovables wind park. That story is told in the other volume of this duograph.
Daniel summarized his motivation quite clearly one morning over break-
fast in Oaxaca City: “The real winners from the wind parks right now are in 
more or less this order, (1) the governor, (2) the politicians, (3) the companies 
that sell construction materials, (4) the private landholders, (5) the  unions that 
get the construction contracts, and (6) the scraps for every one  else.”
When we arrive back in Ixtepec in late September for the next asamblea, 
we find that Daniel, Vicente, and the comisariados have done their work well. 
Even the mercurial leader of the gritónes, Isaias, has been brought on board. 
Internal factional politics aside, it seems he shares an intense distaste for 
both cfe and the international wind developers who are at work elsewhere 
in the isthmus.
But the situation has become more complicated for other reasons. Sergio 
has just learned that cfe refused Yansa- Ixtepec’s application to bid in the 
October tender. The rationale was that they lacked the requisite cash in 
the bank and letters of credit to produce a credible bid.
Sergio is disappointed but not surprised. “Of course, nowhere in Mexican 
tender law is  there any requirement for this kind of money in the bank. cfe 
is just creating new laws itself.” If lawmaking belongs to the domain of po-
liti cal power in the Lockean sense, cfe has revealed energopower’s capacity 
to colonize that domain for its own con ve nience.
The assembly is a long and complex one. Clarifying the question of the 
payments for the electrical towers takes a long time; many voices weigh in. 
The comisariado strug gles to maintain order, and the discussion frequently 
dissolves into shouting. Some chide the leadership that they are under taking 
a “public function” that requires full transparency. One senses that the 
oratorical groundwork is being laid for  future po liti cal campaigns.
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Then  there is an unexpected interruption from an older  woman who 
pleads for the restitution of land she vacated over thirty years before when 
her husband, a soldier, was stationed away from Ixtepec.  After five years, 
unoccupied land reverts to communal use, and her land, buildings and all, 
has been taken over by someone  else. But now that her husband has died 
and her  children are grown, she wants to return home to Ixtepec. By the 
end of her plea, she is in tears, but many speak against her claim (“Thirty 
years gone!”). In the end, it is agreed that she can be given a dif er ent plot 
of land. Almost all the impor tant arguments concern land. Land is the basis 
of the comunidad, it is patrimony, and at least in this auditorium, it is the 
ultimate source of value. Terroir— here, literally “soil and its capacities”— 
propels politics.
The asamblea are tired, distracted, and cranky by the time Sergio is al-
lowed to make the announcement that cfe has de cided not to allow them to 
bid in the tender. Attention refocuses quickly; the auditorium goes still but 
then begins to rumble as Sergio walks them through this latest outrage. How 
cfe has excluded the comunidad from even competing to access a substa-
tion that lies on their own land. How cfe has already given away the rest of 
the access to six foreign companies (“four of them Spanish”). How it is de-
manding $7 million up front and 548 million pesos in the bank to participate 
in the competition. How they want the tender winner to also pay to prepare 
the land for a new wind park in nearby La Mata  because it saves cfe money.
“In accordance with the laws of Mexico, every thing that cfe is  doing is 
illegal, violating the constitution, violating agrarian rights, the internation-
ally recognized rights of indigenous communities and campesinos, violating 
even its own norms.”
Sergio asks the asamblea how they want to respond, and someone yells, 
“¡Hay que demandarlos!” (Let’s sue them!)
The crowd stirs further as Sergio discusses some of the forms of collective 
 legal action that could be taken, including amparo, a provision of Mexican 
law that allows individuals and groups to seek protection from unconstitu-
tional abuses of the government to defend civil rights as outlined in the first 
twenty- nine articles of the Mexican Constitution.
“¡Lo vamos a hacer!” ( We’re  going to do it!), someone  else shouts.
Isaias then stands up and asks permission to speak. Hardly pausing, he 
launches into a partly handwritten, partly improvised, thoroughly firebrand 
manifesto criticizing the authorities of cfe, the government, politicians of 
all levels, as “antipatrióticas” who are  doing dirty business with foreigners, 
heaping abuses on the pueblos of the istmo.  Here is a taste of it:
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The Mexican government  doesn’t follow or recognize the international 
treaties  because the gringos, sorry, the gachupines [Spaniards] are giving 
them money hand over fist, starting with the secretary of the  interior, 
who gives them concessions, permission, and authorizations that 
streamline the  whole pro cess. They jump as quickly as the Spaniards 
want them to.  They’re mad  because  they’ve come to loot us and  we’ve 
taken the time we need as a community [pueblo] to analyze our situ-
ation and build our rescue plan [propuesta de salvamento], to address 
the sharpening social, cultural, po liti cal, and economic crisis generated 
by the devastating policies of the state that results in violations of the 
 human rights of  people in the region and in the country. Nowadays gov-
ernments are used by violent capital who buy the  wills of authorities 
who then threaten or do not hear what the compañeros tell them about 
their needs. They assault, deceive, and corrupt the  people. Compañeros, 
we are in a situation that has caused conflicts inside and outside of our 
communities.  These proj ects mean the dispossession and destruction of 
our environment, flora and fauna, all with the complicity of the federal 
government and the municipalities too.
Isaias switches into diidxazá, shouting, “We  won’t be misled mules, each 
animal  running in its own direction!”
This provokes widespread laughter, whoops, and hollers of recognition, 
“¡Paleros! ¡Paleros! ¡Somos Paleros!” (Leaders! Leaders! We are leaders!)
And fi nally, bringing it home, he ofers a proposal: “ Either we have a 
community wind park  here or no park at all.”
Rounds of assent follow.
 People start to get up and drain out the back of the auditorium. But Sergio 
is still pensive, a  little bewildered perhaps by all the shouting. And, every-
thing is on the line.
He calls out to the retreating asamblea, his right hand raised in a tentative 
thumbs-up, “So you agree to adopt compañero Isaias’s resolution?”
“Yes! Yes! Yes! Yes!”
Squatter Grid
Daniel, Sergio, and  others in the asamblea had begun planning  legal strategy 
long before cfe actually turned them away. But the ten days following the 
asamblea  were feverish as they developed an efective case against cfe. We 
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accompanied Daniel and Sergio to Oaxaca City to consult with an indig-
enous law specialist at the Oaxacan Ministry for Indigenous Afairs. The 
specialist advised them that a complaint focused on being denied access to 
infrastructure was weaker than one focused on the subversion of their con-
stitutional right to use their land the way they saw fit.  There  were other  legal 
options, of course, but he confirmed Daniel and Sergio’s sense that amparo 
was the right strategy. “It’s faster, it’ll put pressure on cfe to deal with you. 
El amparo tiene mas cajones.” (The amparo has bigger balls.)
In his role as the asamblea’s  lawyer, Daniel moved quickly to draft two 
amparo complaints against cfe on behalf of the comunidad, one address-
ing each of the public tenders that cfe was ofering at the time, Sureste I 
Fase I (200 megawatts) and Sureste I Fase II (100 megawatts). Daniel sub-
mitted  these complaints to the Sixth District Federal Court in Salina Cruz, 
naming the three members of the comisariado as the complainants. In the 
complaints, Daniel stated that cfe’s actions had  violated five articles of the 
Mexican Constitution, one article of the American Convention on  Human 
Rights, eight articles of the Agrarian Law, and five articles of the Indigenous 
and Tribal  Peoples Convention of 1989.23
In a video interview with us for purposes of documenting the  legal strug-
gle, Daniel summarized the asamblea’s  legal argument as follows,
The cfe and other authorities approached the asamblea of the bienes 
comunales with a request to study the possibility of building a new sub-
station, the largest in Latin Amer i ca, for the new wind parks. And for 
that they needed forty- two hectares of land.  Because  there was some 
hope that this could generate jobs, of which  there are few opportunities 
 here, the asamblea gave cfe the authorization to do the studies for the 
viability of constructing this substation. But the cfe  didn’t just do the 
studies. It actually went ahead and occupied the land and began to 
construct the station even though it still  didn’t have that authorization. 
They never presented the results of  those studies to the asamblea. And 
furthermore they deceived the community in their pre sen ta tion by 
saying we would have the opportunity to build a wind park. But then, 
when the opportunity arose to compete for access to that substation, 
cfe closed the door and said “no vas a entrar” [you may not enter] 
 because you  don’t have money. So this was a case of exploitation and 
theft [despojo] on two grounds. First, the illegal occupation of our land 
by the substation and, second, by refusing us the right to even compete 
for access to the substation.
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In addition to cfe, the complaint targeted the Mexican federal environmen-
tal ministry, semarnat, for having granted the cfe the right to cambio del 
uso del suelo (change of land use) on the forty- two hectares based on an 
environmental study that was itself performed, according to the complaint, 
on an illegal basis.
It was an argument with a factual basis in that cfe had apparently never 
signed an  actual contract with the Ixtepecan assembly concerning the plan 
to build the substation.  There was also no formal expropriation of the forty- 
two hectares by the state. The electric com pany had simply, as Daniel put it, 
occupied the land and begun building. A squatter substation.
This might seem like a startling oversight. However, this was a context 
in which the agencies of the Mexican federal government and their corpo-
rate partners in wind development seemed generally uninformed about, or 
simply impatient with, bienes comunales decision- making procedures. Any 
issue involving cambio del uso del suelo typically required at least two as-
semblies to be convened to discuss the issue, and then it had to produce, in 
the presence of a notary, a majority vote of all current registered comune-
ros.24 Dubious procedures and suspect notaries became critical issues in the 
Mareña case as well. And more than this, the image of cfe occupying indig-
enous land with its squatter grid was power ful and paradoxical, a cunning 
use of mestizaje nationalism that appeared to contradict the settler sover-
eignty of the Constitution.25
Still, Daniel confided in us, he was doubtful that any  legal strategy would 
produce the outcome they wanted in the long term. “Our best hope is that it 
forces some kind of po liti cal compromise.”
The next week brought an impor tant  legal victory for Yansa- Ixtepec. A 
judge in Salina Cruz issued an order of suspension to cfe on October 11, 
2012, on the Sureste I Fase I proj ect, demanding that the tender pro cess cease 
while the evidence for the comunidad’s amparo claim was assessed. This was 
the first judicial injunction ever issued concerning a wind park in Mexico.
Then, the next week, Ixtepec’s representative in the federal chamber of 
deputies, Rosendo Serrano Toledo, the  brother of Ixtepec’s mayor, announced 
his support of the Yansa proj ect, arguing that the current model of wind 
power development “feeds social conflict . . .  while, by contrast, the commu-
nity wind model guarantees the control of pueblos originarios over the natu ral 
resources of their territories and gives the communities a central stake in the 
proj ects, allowing wind energy to become a motor of prosperity.”26
 These events did not go unnoticed in the broader field of Oaxacan wind 
power. We happened to have cofee with a se nior man ag er of one of the 
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major Spanish wind development companies about a week  later, and he 
launched into an unsolicited tirade against Yansa, telling us they “ were rip-
ping  people of ” since their numbers did not make sense. “How can they 
ofer  people 50  percent of their profits from electricity sale when the market 
rate in the isthmus is closer to 2  percent? Something is very fishy about that.”
But what happened next—or rather, what did not happen— was an early 
lesson for us in the material contingencies of po liti cal power, specifically 
in how an energy- supplying parastatal could operate as its own sovereign 
“state.” Simply ignoring the judge’s suspension order, cfe proceeded with 
both tender pro cesses.
Daniel and Sergio attended a meeting at cfe in Mexico City on Octo-
ber 30 in which the several companies that had been allowed to bid in the 
tender presented their economic plans (including the critical data point 
of the production price of electricity per kilowatt hour). At the beginning 
of the meeting, Daniel stood up and waved a copy of the judge’s suspen-
sion order, saying that the tender could not proceed. But he was told by the 
presiding se nior cfe official that the com pany had not been informed of any 
suspension order and that they would certainly not accept a hand- delivered 
FIGURE 1.2.   Ixtepec Potencia substation
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document from him. The tender meeting proceeded with no recognition in 
the minutes of Daniel’s challenge.
Electricity, capital, and biopower  were working in smooth concert in 
Mexico that day. Far away in the isthmus, President Calderón he li cop tered 
in to a carefully orchestrated inauguration of the Piedra Larga wind park, 
an industrial self- supply proj ect for the Mexican baked goods  giant Bimbo 
located near Santo Domingo Ingenio. A caravan of several dozen protest-
ers was intercepted miles away by a blockade that had been or ga nized by a 
group of supporters affiliated with the construction  unions.
Calderón stepped out of his he li cop ter and was greeted only by rows of cfe 
employees in matching crisp white shirts and blue cfe baseball caps and by 
radiant flower- adorned  women in all the bright colors of Zapotec dress. He 
spoke of his passion for renewable energy, of extreme weather events and the 
real ity of climate change, of the importance of addressing climate change for 
all humanity, of the job creation the parks would bring the isthmus, of the 
economic revenue from the land rents, of the new capital investments and 
infrastructure proj ects that would follow. He recalled his first visit to the isth-
mus and how he had wondered why “we had only  these tiny parks built by 
cfe where the machines looked like scarcely more than fans. . . .  How can 
Oaxaca have only two megawatts of production when it is one of the most 
impor tant areas in the world in which to generate wind? . . .  Now Oaxaca 
has converted that promise into a real ity, it has become a protagonist of elec-
tricity generation for our country.”
FIGURE 1.3.   President Felipe Calderón at Piedra Larga
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As Calderón walked back to his he li cop ter, he nearly stepped on a taran-
tula. He paused and took a photo like a curious tourist. The trailing cfe en-
gineers took pictures of their president stooping down, holding his camera 
at arm’s length. And then Calderón returned to the sky, having said nothing 
at all about the possibility of community wind power.
High Voltage
Daniel filed a new complaint in Salina Cruz, stating that cfe had  violated 
the suspension order for Sureste I Fase I. The judge issued an investigation 
of cfe’s failure to comply. A dif er ent judge, meanwhile, turned down the 
amparo against Sureste I Fase II on the grounds that indigenous communi-
ties had no  legal interest in the production of electricity. Daniel moved to 
appeal, but a few weeks  later, on November 22, cfe issued the announce-
ment that it had completed its tender pro cess for Sureste I Fase II and had 
awarded the 100 megawatts of grid connection that Yansa- Ixtepec had 
hoped for to Impulsora Nacional de Electridad ( ine), a filial of the Italian 
com pany enel Green Power. Their bid of $0.0412 per kilowatt- hour had 
come in below competing bids from Acciona, Aldesa, Elecnor, Iberdrola, 
and Isolux Corsan.
But through some of alchemy of pressures— from the judge, the federal 
deputy, the new  lawyers Sergio had recruited to the cause in Mexico City—
in December, cfe fi nally began to respond to the amparo for Sureste I Fase 
I, and the case entered the discovery phase.
On one car  ride to Salina Cruz to submit evidence, Daniel joked, “I say 
 we’re in the evidence phase, but cfe  isn’t.  They’re just denying that any evi-
dence exists.”
We accompanied Daniel on other trips around the isthmus in the weeks 
that followed, but our attention to the Ixtepecan amparo was being torn away 
by the gathering maelstrom surrounding the Mareña Renovables proj ect.
When we  were able to refocus again on Ixtepec, we thought it impor tant 
to talk to someone at cfe about the controversy surrounding the substation. 
We began to haunt the main cfe administrative center in Juchitán, sitting 
in a lot of waiting rooms, talking to staf, cold- calling vari ous directors and 
subdirectors, all with  little success. Eventually we  were able to set up an in-
terview with an ingeniero (engineer) named Nucamendi, the head of the 
Transmission Division for the region and man ag er of Ixtepec Potencia, the 
region’s major cfe substation.
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On a February day thick with smoke from the seasonal brush fires sur-
rounding Juchitán, we showed up at the Transmission Division headquarters, 
a bustling modern office hidden away on the second floor of what looked 
from the outside like an abandoned factory. Nucamendi greeted us, shaking 
his head. He spoke kindly but said that he had requested permission from 
his jefe in Chiapas to give the interview and been turned down. “Your ques-
tions are sensitive. I would like to talk to you but no se puede.”
He thought an engineer named Cervantes over in the Distribution Divi-
sion might still be allowed to speak. But we  didn’t make it any farther than 
Cervantes’s secretary, who told us firmly that “cfe has nothing to do with 
renewable energy.”
“But what about the grid and power lines?”
“No, we have nothing to do with energy,  others are supplying it.”
“But without cfe,  there’s no electricity, right? You are the distributor.”
“That’s a dif er ent way of thinking about it.”
The com pany’s way of thinking about themselves appeared to be as a 
purely technopo liti cal ser vice infrastructure. But we marveled in the weeks 
that passed over their exquisite skill in thwarting our  every efort to speak 
to someone, never by saying no, but always suggesting yet another someone 
who was always in a meeting, out of town, or visiting an installation some-
where. It became a weary  running joke.
Eventually, we ended up with the director of the two cfe- run wind parks 
(La Venta I and La Venta II) a friendly ingeniero named José Manuel Benitez 
Lopez. Somehow he was far enough removed from the conflict that he was 
never warned not to speak with us. His office was a small bungalow down 
a cul- de- sac in the com pany’s main campus. On the shelf  behind his desk, 
a small model of a Spanish galleon, a glass model of a large hv electrical 
tower, and a white plastic model of a wind turbine  were casually (but to us, 
provocatively) juxtaposed. When we asked about what was happening with 
the amparo in Ixtepec, he simply threw up his hands and said he had no 
idea. It  wasn’t his department.
But he told us more about the substation from cfe’s perspective. Ixtepec 
Potencia was the biggest substation in all Mexico, maybe even in all Latin 
Amer i ca. “This place takes up forty hectares. It’s huge. Un monstruo, eso.” 
(It’s a monster.) Part of the reason for its size was that it was also one of the 
most technologically advanced substations that cfe had ever constructed. 
It included two transformer banks of 440/115 kilovolts and three of 400/230 
kilovolts, with a total capacity of 1.875 million volt- amperes. It also brought 
400 kilovolt high- voltage power lines, switchgears, and busbars into the 
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isthmus for the first time. But most of the power would be used elsewhere, 
north  toward the substation at Juile and then on to the northwest  toward 
Mexico City.27 To help manage and regulate grid voltage, cfe had also in-
stalled a state- of- the- art Static Var Compensator ( svc) at Ixtepec Potencia, 
which promised near- instantaneous response to changes in system voltage.28
“It’s sort of like a battery, but not  really a battery,” Benitez explained. 
“But it’s very impor tant since it is connected to the wind parks and the in-
termittency of wind energy is challenging from the point of view of grid 
management.”
The substation at Ixtepec was thus a first foray of cfe into creating what 
has been termed a “smart grid,” able in this instance to incorporate fluctuat-
ing electricity sourced from renewable energy smoothly with baseload ther-
moelectric supply. In southern Mexico, which produces twice the electricity 
it consumes,  there is no real fear that on less windy days  there  will be power 
outages.
He sighed, “We can basically shift over to the hydroelectric power from 
Chiapas at any time. The  people  don’t care where the electricity comes from. 
They just want the light on when they hit the switch.”
Benitez also characterized Ixtepec Potencia as an infrastructural investment 
that belonged entirely to cfe, a key node in the largest federal investment in 
FIGURE 1.4.   Map of the southern Mexican grid showing wind parks
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the isthmus since the Transisthmus Highway was built in the early 1950s. But 
we heard whispers throughout government and industry that cfe had made 
a deal with private wind developers to cofinance the construction of the sub-
station, possibly in exchange for preferential grid access. If true, this would 
have made the “open season” (temporada abierta) of bids and contracts into 
yet another deceptive cfe per for mance with the winners predecided.29 No 
one we spoke to at cfe in Mexico City would confirm this arrangement, but 
in the isthmus, the rumor was widespread. The substation, like other Ixtepe-
can squatters perhaps, was simply holding its ground, working, and waiting 
for eventual recognition and ac cep tance.
We  later confirmed that developers  were responsible for  doing the grid-
work of getting the electricity from the point of production to the high- voltage 
transformers in Ixtepec.  Because of the parks, the grid was expanding, its metal 
tendrils creeping across the isthmus, humming with wind- generated current.
Twenty years from now, Benitez explained, the wind parks, including 
all the new transmission infrastructure, would revert to owner ship by cfe. 
“But of course,” he chuckled, “the life span of a turbine is something like 
twenty years.”
Tristepec
“Anyway,” Raul Mena shrugs, “even if it  were to happen, this park proj ect 
would only benefit the comuneros anyway.  There’s no community interest in 
this proj ect. Ixtepec has maybe twenty- five or thirty thousand  people living 
 here, and the comuneros are only a small part of that, less than a thousand. 
It’s herencia [legacy], lineages of ancianos, old men from old families. When 
the substation was built, all the construction work went to the comunero 
families. But the majority of families in Ixtepec  don’t have land  because 
we arrived  later. So we  don’t care about this wind park. It  won’t bring us 
anything.”
Raul’s  sister, who works in city hall, nods along with him, “ They’re not 
exactly secret over at the bienes comunales, but it’s  limited who participates. 
Ellos son cerrados.” (They are closed of.)
Raul belongs to the ranks of the educated and underemployed young 
adults of Ixtepec. He has not migrated to the North or sought to leave the 
country. But with proud resignation and a  little bitterness, he lets it be 
known that  there is  little in Ixtepec— “Tristepec” he jokes— for  people like 
him. Again, the flux of infrastructure has played its part. In 1907, when Por-
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firio Díaz’s railway to Guatemala was built through Ixtepec, the city became a 
hub for traveling merchants, commercial interests, and immigrants (gringo, 
Eu ro pean, Arab, Asian) seeking markets,  labor, and influence in the isth-
mus. But then in the 1940s, a power ful mayor in Juchitán, Heliodoro Charis, 
made sure that the Trans- American Highway went through Juchitán instead 
of Ixtepec, and that established Juchitán as the commercial and po liti cal 
center of the region once again (see chapter 5). Ever since, Ixtepec has been 
in decline. The railroad endured, but it no longer brought promise to Ixte-
pec. It brought only a train known as la bestia (the beast), which was famous 
in the Mexican media for its transport of thousands of illegal mi grants from 
Central Amer i ca into Mexico each year— new prey for the cartels— thus, it 
was sometimes called el tren de la muerte (the train of death). A few Central 
Americans stay in Ixtepec, mostly in homemade shelters near their tracks, 
their possessions in small backpacks. In Juchitán, they are blamed for most 
of the street crime. But that is not Raul’s feeling about the mi grants: “They 
 don’t come looking for trou ble. And  there is nothing for them  here  either. 
Mostly they move on.”
Neither Raul nor his friend Isabel, a local teacher, believes that the wind 
park ofers a way forward  either. They are  under the impression that Yansa 
is a for- profit investor like any other and assume that what ever resources the 
proj ect brings in  will be retained by the comuneros.
It trou bles Isabel that  there is no plan to reactivate agriculture in the re-
gion. “You  can’t eat money; it does nothing for productivity.”  There have 
been shortages of corn in the region already  because, “the farmers are getting 
lazier and growing easier crops like sorghum and peanuts instead.” Invest-
ment in agriculture would be better than building wind parks. “Agriculture 
is a general benefit,” she says. Or perhaps education.
But Raul points out that Ixtepec already has a lot of schools, so many that 
it imports students. The prob lem is not too  little education; it is “the lack of 
employment.”
Isabel notes that “our professionals  here are the  children of campesinos, 
 people who worked hard to advance themselves.” But now  there is no local 
industry and few white- collar jobs.
Raul sighs grimly. “All that  people dream of  here is to become a teacher, 
work for Pemex, the army, or cfe.” Raul says that Ixtepec is malinchista,30 
that it has been that way for de cades, and that the race for wind parks is 
merely more desperate imitation of a way of life that is not istmeño. It is 
“like the cement we build with, which is wrong for the climate and detracts 
from the beauty of the town.” Then he waves his hand, “But still, if the park 
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brings infrastructure  here, then that’s fine, even if  there is no plan for the 
community.” Raul’s sense of “community” is clearly very dif er ent from that 
of the Ixtepecan comuneros, signaling how deeply alienated some citizens of 
the Ixtepecan municipio feel from the agrarian commons.
Adán Cortez works for cfe but in the office where  people pay their bills. 
He has a comfortable office with air conditioning. He comments, “The  people 
from Yansa speak well. They say every one is  going to benefit. But  those who 
own the land are only a segment of the population. All thirty thousand of us 
 don’t get to vote in their asamblea. I grew up  here. My grand father worked 
for the railroad, and my  father as a journalist. But we have no land.”
So he is against the proj ect?
“No. Look,  there is just a lot of disinformation and mistrust. The  people 
who know something are saying let’s wait and see. Let’s see if they do some-
thing concrete, maybe create a computer learning center or a library for the 
youth, maybe when they rent the machinery to build all this, maybe if we 
come to them and say, ‘Could we just borrow that to do this  little job at my 
 house?’ That sort of  thing.”
Dreams hang in the air in Tristepec. Talk centers on aspirations for more 
work, for development, for greater access to recursos (resources). Often, out-
side the comuna, renewing land and agriculture seems the most promising 
way forward. Even among the Ixtepecan professional classes, agrarian ide-
ology exerts a power ful force— desire looking backward, as is its way— with 
many seeing  future prosperity through a return to the earth. Yet the communal 
land tenure system dating back to the Mexican Revolution is actually part of 
the prob lem. The urban middle- class Ixtepecans say that the land is controlled 
by the ancianos in the comuna,  people without education and imagination.
We ask Raul to whom the Ixtepecan wind belongs, and he says, “To us! To 
all of us  here! It’s not like terreno [land] but it is partly of the tierra [earth].” 
We have the same slippage in En glish between “land” and “earth,” undoubtedly 
owed to our own agrarian legacies past. But Raul is making a more specific 
point— the wind is not like the land of the comuna; it is not something that 
can belong to just some Ixtepecans. The wind carries earth within itself, 
lifting fine particulate  matter from the bienes comunales and scattering it 
through the city. The wind hints at the possibility of a broader redistributive 
commons, echoing the yearning of  those outside the comuna for a  future 
enabled by local soil.
One eve ning Vicente kindly arranged a focus group of sorts with several 
of his neighbors at his ranch  house outside of town. Daniel dropped us of, 
and as we prepared cofee and waited for  people to drop by, Vicente showed 
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us, with obvious pride, the trees he was carefully nurturing on his property 
one by one: mango, coco, platano, moro, xiguela, papaya, zapote, almendra, 
and granata. Dozens of saplings  were growing in plastic jugs. We tasted some 
of the fruits, intensely flavorful and very dry, like the land before the rains 
come.  There was some discussion of how to remove a mating pair of iguanas 
that had settled  under the corrugated roof. Vicente showed us some ancient 
artifacts he had recovered nearby, including a carved stone that he said was 
of a kind that was often tied to a stake in front of a chieftain’s  house.
As the neighbors arrived, Daniel left, and Vicente made himself scarce 
with the excuse that he needed to  water his plants. He explained  later that 
this was to give his neighbors privacy to speak openly since they knew he 
supported the proj ect. The rest— Antonio, Florentino, David, and María 
Isabel— settled into the warmth of late- afternoon sun, drinking cofee, shar-
ing bread made from rice flour and cinnamon. They  were from comunero 
families that participated in farming and ranching to survive. They felt that 
Yansa was a good organ ization but that the situation with cfe was muy deli-
cado (very delicate). “cfe may be very strong, but they are working against 
the  people of Mexico.”
The presence of cfe was real, the monster on their land. The wind park 
was elusive, speculative. No one seemed certain it would ever come. We 
talked about the stories associated with the land around Ixtepec and they 
told us of a laguna encantada (enchanted lake) just three kilo meters from 
where we  were sitting, which used to brim with magical entities dating back 
to pre- Hispanic times: fish and multicolored  horses and even a golden comb 
that would lure the desirous into its  waters. Now the lake is a dried basin, 
with many of its spirits having fled eastward, “ toward Guatemala.”
We asked them  whether  there  were any legends concerning the wind in 
Ixtepec. They looked at each other searchingly for a few minutes, but no one 
could think of a story about the wind.  There  were no stories that could hold 
the wind to the land.
And then, his green eyes wide, David said, “Well, out east near La Venta, 
they say the wind can blow over trucks.”
Endless Impasse
The Sureste I Fase I tender was cancelled by cfe on March 6, 2013. They 
gave no explanation, admitted no wrongdoing, suggested no reconciliation. 
Nothing was  really solved as far as Yansa- Ixtepec was concerned. It was still 
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unclear who would eventually get  those last precious 200 megawatts of ac-
cess to Ixtepec Potencia.
In May we met with one of the  lawyers in Mexico City who was working on 
the case. We asked him to tell us what cfe’s response to the amparo had been.
He said, “Their response has been nothing  really. [It has been] completely 
technical,  whether an amparo can be issued on  these grounds or not. I think 
they are scared of touching the  human rights issue, they  don’t want to go 
anywhere near that.”
When we met Sergio for lunch the last time in Mexico City, he remained 
optimistic that some sort of po liti cal resolution could still be found. He 
recalled that, early on,  there had been informal talk of granting Ixtepec a 
special exemption for a community park even if it did not fit the dominant 
development paradigm. “Even if it was only a gesture, it would still be a 
way of enfranchising Mexico’s indigenous communities more substantially 
within the pro cess of renewable energy development.”
Recently, he had been speaking with officials in the ministry of energy, 
sener, and found they  were sympathetic to him and had their own (quiet) 
doubts about how wind development was unfolding in the isthmus, particu-
larly in the wake of the spectacular failure of the Mareña Renovables proj ect. 
Mareña gave Sergio an excellent opportunity to promote Yansa- Ixtepec as 
an alternative to the dominant autoabastecimiento model (industrial self- 
supply, see chapter 2).
 There  were smart  people at sener who understood, he said, that they 
needed to develop a new model of community engagement. The prob lem 
remained cfe: “They are just thinking about this as an engineering prob-
lem; the social issues  don’t  matter to them.” And then, of course,  there  were 
the clout and momentum of the foreign companies seeking to make money 
from the winds of the isthmus and the Mexican politicians and regulators 
who held private- public partnership as an article of faith for the  future of 
Mexican electricity generation.
We had a meeting with a se nior man ag er of one of the transnational firms 
investing in istmeño wind parks shortly before we left Mexico. When we 
mentioned that Yansa- Ixtepec was one of our case studies, he laughed.
“Oh, Sergio, he’s a promoter, promoting  things that are difficult to achieve. 
He’s caused a lot of noise over at cfe.  There are  people like that who like 
to promote  things but  don’t have the resources or the know- how to achieve 
anything.”
We found that Sergio was always portrayed in the business and invest-
ment community (and often among government officials) as  either an 
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opaque po liti cal operator or, as he himself suspected, a madman, the Quix-
otic counterpart to his sober industrialist Spanish countrymen, pursuing 
mirages in the light and heat of southern Mexico. Time  will tell.
When we left Mexico in July 2013, the amparo concerning Sureste I Fase 
I was not yet resolved.31 At the time, Daniel told us he was optimistic that a 
judgment would be imminent. In June 2014 the case remained unresolved. 
“One more month,” Daniel told us. “ There’s no turning back.”
 After hearing  little news in 2015, we spoke to Sergio again by phone in 
July 2016. He reported some dramatic twists and turns but no end in sight to 
the impasse. Having still never formally responded to the community wind 
park proposal, cfe returned to the Ixtepecan comuna in the summer of 2015 
with a request to lease five thousand hectares of the Ixtepecan bienes comu-
nales to build two new private wind parks totaling 585 megawatts as well as 
new transmission capacity to evacuate electricity.
Sergio thought this was an indication that cfe was planning an increase 
of possibly three times the number of istmeño wind farms in the  future. The 
com pany “had  people on the ground for months, trying to convince comune-
ros one by one, trying to get them to sign.” But Sergio observed that this kind 
of influence peddling was illegal  under the terms of the new energy- reform 
law, with its guarantees for informed consent and social impact assessment 
such that “no com pany is allowed to enter into any kind of contract without a 
social impact evaluation conducted together with the community. Only then 
can  there be a land lease.” Sergio felt certain that such an evaluation pro cess 
would resolve in  favor of the community wind park as it had in the past. “But 
they  didn’t do any evaluation with the community. They  were just trying to 
get contracts like always.”
Events took a still- darker turn in the fall of 2015.  After a failed attempt to 
circumvent the authority of the comisariado and to have the five thousand 
hectares transferred directly to cfe’s control by the Procuraduría Agragria,32 
cfe backed a group of comuneros affiliated with the cnc (the Confeder-
ación Nacional Campesina, an organ ization of ejidatarios and comuneros 
affiliated with the PRI party), whom Sergio viewed as “highly corrupt,” in the 
November 2015 comisariado elections. They won the election in part through 
the installation of an irregular system of individual voting in place of a com-
munal assembly decision and in part through the disor ga ni za tion of the 
anti- cfe camp (which ran four dif er ent sets of candidates).
When cfe returned again to make a pitch for their five thousand hect-
ares, one of the spokespeople let it slip that cfe had, in its view, already 
completed the social impact evaluation for the proj ect.  After much  legal 
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wrangling,  those in  favor of the community wind park secured documents 
that cfe had sent to sener, asking that the normal consultation pro cess 
be waived since, according to cfe’s argument, although Ixtepec was indig-
enous, it lacked the “sujeto social colectivo” (collective social subject) that 
would make such consultation pos si ble and necessary. The request was 
approved.
Sergio explained that, in essence, Ixtepec’s energopo liti cal value had be-
come such that the proj ect could not be allowed to collapse: “Ixtepec has 
become too critical for them in terms of the infrastructure for this plan to 
fail. They are planning to build three gigawatts of new high- voltage lines di-
rectly from Ixtepec to the Valley of Mexico. Still, the majority of comuneros 
find the new leadership very suspect, and cfe has not yet been able to secure 
a single hectare of land.”
Sergio fumed about the lack of transparency in this “reformed” pro cess of 
securing land leases for large energy proj ects. “It’s completely in the hands of 
the government and the companies, and as always, the communities are left 
out. If cfe  hadn’t accidentally admitted that a social impact evaluation had 
taken place, we’d never have found out what they  were up to.”
 Were he and his allies tempted to give up on the Yansa- Ixtepec proj ect?
“Not at all,” he assured us. “With at least a doubling of the number of 
wind parks in the isthmus coming, this has become a regional issue. And 
other communities have already expressed interest in the community wind 
model. So  we’re working to bring all  these communities together across the 
isthmus to prepare a collective amparo application to challenge not so much 
cfe’s flawed social impact evaluation as the ruling from sener to allow cfe 
to proceed with the proj ects. This is our front line now, organ izing regionally 
to challenge the pre sent course of wind development.”
And  there the story rests for now. The  future of aeolian politics in Ixtepec 
remains unknown, with the community partnership model brightened by 
occasional rays of hope but beset overall by lengthening shadows of doubt.
What do we learn from the case of Yansa- Ixtepec and the failure, for the 
moment, of community wind power in Mexico? Yansa- Ixtepec gives us a 
glimpse of how new energopo liti cal potentialities are struggling to come into 
being in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec (and not only  there).33 Yansa- Ixtepec 
follows the charge of Scheerian thinking, seeking to harness renewable en-
ergy sources to transform and improve the social and po liti cal conditions 
of humanity, to bring justice and empowerment to long- marginalized in-
digenous communities in the postcolonial world. But instead of finding the 
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high- voltage infrastructure of national enablement, Yansa- Ixtepec’s vision 
has been kept of grid in more ways than one.
This chapter has mapped the forces that have intervened to block a new 
developmental model for wind power in southern Mexico: a policy regime 
thirsty for foreign capital and investment (but only as guaranteed and man-
aged by “reliable” corporate partners); the desire of international capital 
and its agents to propagate themselves in a lucrative and low- risk way; 
the energopo liti cal authority and vast bureaucracy of a parastatal electric-
ity mono poly; the enduring vitality of colonial clientelist legacies of po liti-
cal power, agrarian legacies, and ideologies that represent land as the true 
source and optimal form of value; a regional history of marginality to the 
biopo liti cal institutions and imaginations originating in Mexico City; racial 
and ethnological discourses of “ungovernability”; and, not least, the ques-
tion of what  really counts as “community” in a place like Ixtepec, where the 
lands of a núcleo agrario have come to include a municipality of former and 
current mi grants, an army base, scores of pawn shops and market vendors, 
unemployed intellectuals, and even a substation.
The case of Ixtepec captures the new horizons of energos and bios that are 
becoming thinkable  today as well as the resilience of extant infrastructures, 
institutions, and lifeways that inject paralytic compounds into the po liti cal 
imagination, making the nonrepetition of the pre sent appear to be a fantas-
tic unrealistic desire. Ixtepec shows us the oscillating life- and- death drives 
of aeolian po liti cal imagination: images of revolutionary breakthroughs and 
alternative  futures coexisting with repetitions of habit and tradition. It gives 
us a glimpse of the turbulence that gathers along the edges of flows of en-
abling pouvoir as they swirl around sites of rapid energy development. And 
 because it is still not clear  whether Yansa- Ixtepec  will never be or  whether it 
is simply not yet, it even captures something of the paradoxical quality of life 
and the experience of time in the Anthropocene. We do not know  whether 
what passes for the inevitability of the moment  will endure or  whether a 
revolutionary transformation of the con temporary is yet pos si ble.
From the not yet we move next to an intense situation of the right now—
to La Ventosa, an istmeño community that, in the space of our fieldwork be-
tween 2009 and 2013, came to be almost entirely encircled by wind turbines.
2.  La Ventosa
July 21, 2009. A call from Fernando rattles us awake shortly before four in the 
morning. He’s been up all night drinking red wine “with the Spaniards” and 
now wants to come right by and pick us up. Something impor tant is happen-
ing in the isthmus. This call is a complete surprise; we are disoriented and, 
frankly, hung over ourselves from the mezcal that we thought was  celebrating 
the end of our first research trip to Oaxaca. We beg for more time, but Fernando 
insists that it is now or never. So at 5:30 am we are huddled downstairs, wait-
ing in the dark. A midsize Ford pulls up not long thereafter. Fernando and his 
driver welcome us with more cheer than seems acceptable  under the circum-
stances. Fernando Mimiaga Sosa, the director of sustainable energy and stra-
tegic proj ects for the state government of Oaxaca, is tireless in his promotion 
of wind power.
Compressed into the back of his car, we ask what is happening.
“It’s an issue with the Iberdrola proj ect;  there are some doubts about pay-
ments having to do with afectationes (impacts), and so I need to go  there to 
meet with them together with another official— you know [he laughs] I have 
no time for myself any more. I’m always on the run. I’m up all night with one 
group of Spaniards and then I get a call that I have to resolve this conflict 
between another Spanish com pany and the dueños de la tierra ( owners of 
the land).”
The highway from Oaxaca City to the Isthmus of Tehuantepec is the 
Carretera Panamerica, and it is spectacular. Once we leave Oaxaca Valley, 
incredible vista stacks upon incredible vista as we wind our way through 
the Sierra Madre down to Jalapa del Marqués and Tehuantepec. Agave cacti 
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grow wild, thick, and dangerously beautiful on the steep mountainsides. The 
curvas (switchbacks) of the two- lane road are nauseating  until we get used 
to them. Still feeling the flush of wine, Fernando closes his eyes and sings 
along to the radio.
But  today seems a bit too fringed with possibility for rest. And despite the 
alleged urgency of getting on the road,  there are detours and side adventures 
along the way. We stop by Fernando’s favorite mezcalero, driving down a dirt 
road to a cinderblock hut in the mountains, and the man shows us the fire 
pit for roasting the piñas of agave, his mule- powered grinding wheel, the 
barrels of fermenting mash, and the copper still that finalizes the pro cess. 
Fernando loads a five- liter gas canister filled with the latest batch into his 
trunk. In Jalapa we stop by the bright- orange compound Fernando is build-
ing for his girlfriend and meet his young  daughter. Both of Fernando’s sons 
are grown and work with him on wind development. One of them tells us 
 later that their  father is spending a lot of time  here in Jalapa. They are not 
entirely happy about the arrangement, but they accept it.
Between stops we talk for a while about wind power in Oaxaca. Fernando 
works for the Economy Ministry, so he says he views this mostly in terms of 
development. Oaxaca is the second- poorest state in Mexico, he reminds us, 
and the isthmus is one of the poorest parts of Oaxaca.
“What afflicts us  today? That we need to develop our productive capacities 
in all re spects. We need development. And that’s the idea  behind this wind en-
ergy. This is about developing the zone through electricity. It’s very  simple. The 
 owners of the land,  whether individuals or nucleos, have an impor tant re-
source that can be developed to help generate other kinds of advancement.”
Local resources plus translocal capital investment equals development, 
which in turn equals jobs, economic growth, infrastructural improvements, 
new educational opportunities, and improved health ser vices. This is the 
calculus of neoliberal politics that undergirds private- public partnerships 
( ppp) as a model of social development throughout much of the world  today.1
Fernando admits that “the indígenas (indigenous  people)  don’t get as 
much for their land as they would in Spain or Germany or the United States. 
But the reason for that is not  because the companies are cheating them but 
 because  there are no subsidies for this type of energy as  there are in Eu rope. 
And we  don’t have the same kinds of excellent technical conditions for the 
grid that you do in the United States. So, overall, it’s more expensive to 
develop the resource.” He says that the  going rental rate for uso de tierra is 
six thousand pesos per hectare,2 and that is augmented if  there are roads and 
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MAP 2.1.   Core wind development zone, Isthmus of Tehuantepec
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“So let’s say a rancher leases twenty hectares to a wind park,” he specu-
lates. “That’s 120,000 annually for the land, and if  there’s a turbine  there too, 
it would bring him up to around 140,000 [$10,700]  every year. That’s a huge 
asistencia [help]  because in this area, they  can’t  really grow anything well 
 because of the wind; it’s just subsistence agriculture. This is win- win.  There 
are no losers in this development. And it is also wonderful for the state. Now 
Oaxaca is becoming something new, the place in the country that is generat-
ing renewable energy.”
But what about  those in the isthmus who are criticizing the wind parks? 
we ask.
“ There are  people out  there who say, ‘Oh the Spanish, they are recoloniz-
ing us, just like five hundred years ago.’ OK, you have to re spect their posi-
tion. Their sentiments are genuine. But it’s not true what they are saying. The 
prob lem is that often  there is no pro cess of communication. One of the trag-
edies of this modern world is that you can just put your information, true or 
false, into an email or on the internet; you can make statements about  things 
that are right or wrong, and  others  will read them and be influenced by lies. 
In this modern world,  there’s no longer enough of  people sitting heart- to- 
heart like we are  doing  here and coming to understand  things.
As we near Juchitán, Fernando begins pointing out the win dow, sketch-
ing an alternative modernity with his fingertips. He gestures  toward green 
ranchland beyond the road that is destined to become wind parks. He names 
the park proj ects in development as we drive. He also mentions a fledging 
master’s program in wind energy at the unistmo (the Universidad del 
Istmo) in Tehuantepec.
“It’s a seed [semilla], something to sow. We want to develop more educa-
tional opportunities and jobs for educated  people in the region. We’d like to 
create a city of knowledge [ciudad de conocimiento]  here. Advancing educa-
tion is impor tant for both the companies and for our universities.  Today we 
send our young  people north to pick your strawberries and lettuce. In the 
 future, they  will go and run your wind parks.”
It is a moving image of green energy building white- collar prosperity, en-
gendered by a perfect marriage of private sector capital and expertise, the 
managerial talents of the government, and the abundance of istmeño re-
sources and desires for a better life. Fernando’s eyes  water with possibility. 
Our conversations with Fernando over the next several years convince us 
that he is utterly sincere in his belief that his work to orchestrate wind power 




In the early after noon we arrive, fi nally, in La Ventosa, some seventeen kilo-
meters to the northeast of Juchitán. Fernando describes La Ventosa as a co-
munidad indigena, an indigenous community, poor, but one where  people 
understand the benefits that this kind of development can bring.
La Ventosa sits  toward the western side of the central wind corridor in the 
isthmus. The last federal census listed the population as forty- two hundred, 
but our La Ventosan friends tell us the real population is now closer to six 
thousand or even seven thousand. Many older La Ventosans are monolingual 
diidxazá (Zapotec) speakers, but the youn gest generation is bilingual, verging 
on monolingual in Spanish: “Some never speak Zapotec, they only listen.” La 
Ventosa sits at a fork where the highway to Matias Romero branches of the 
Carretera Panamerica. Farther down the highway to the east are the first two 
istmeño wind parks, La Venta I and La Venta II, both publicly financed parks 
operated by cfe. Meanwhile La Ventosa has become the epicenter of the new 
wind development model, privately financed autoabastecimiento (industrial 
self- supply) proj ects. The highway between La Ventosa and La Venta is fa-
mous for the fiercest winds in the isthmus, for gusts more than seventy miles 
per hour that topple massive semitrailer trucks  almost casually. The local 
newspapers in the winter are filled with photos of their crumpled forms.  There 
are places in the area, zonas de turbulencias, where no one would dare to put a 
wind turbine for fear it would be mangled by shearing.
The quality of wind is one of the reasons that autoabastecimiento wind 
development began in La Ventosa. But from a technical standpoint,  there 
is excellent wind throughout the southern isthmus. Indeed, the wind in La 
Ventosa can be too strong for conventional wind turbines; they are often 
shut down when the wind reaches peak force to protect the equipment and 
the grid. La Ventosa represented an optimal location to pi lot the new model 
for three other distinctive reasons.
First, in a region known for its fierce po liti cal divisions and conflicts, par-
ticularly concerning the disposition of land, for the past three de cades La Ven-
tosa has represented one of the most stable po liti cal strongholds of any party 
(in this case, the pri) anywhere in the isthmus. Party leaders have also been 
openly friendly to transnational private investment since Miguel de la Madrid’s 
presidency (1982–88), and three pri governors of Oaxaca played impor tant 
roles in shaping the pro cess of wind power development in the isthmus.3 La 
Ventosa was thus a promising terrain for investment that came complete with 
reliable po liti cal allies operating efficacious local patronage networks.
FIGURE 2.1.   Fernando’s favorite mezcalero
FIGURE 2.2.   Trucks on the road between La Ventosa and La Venta
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Second, although a considerable amount of the land around La Ventosa is 
bienes ejidales, it is an ejido that voted to parcel itself  after the early-1990s land 
reforms  under President Salinas. This meant that its constituents could now 
privately contract portions of ejidal land for their own benefit.4 Together 
with an older group of po liti cally or ga nized, pri- affiliated pequeños propi-
etarios, this meant that a considerable amount of the land surrounding La 
Ventosa existed in something approximating a private- property regime, a re-
gime more contested and simply uncertain elsewhere in the core wind zone.5
And third, La Ventosa is home to one of the most enthusiastic and long- 
standing proponents of wind development in the isthmus, don Porfirio 
Montero Fuentes, a local pri and Evangelical Christian leader who is rou-
tinely described in the local news media as the town’s cacique.6 Montero 
 rose from a relatively undistinguished  family background to po liti cal promi-
nence in La Ventosa largely as a result of his grassroots po liti cal campaign 
against the cocei uprising in Juchitán.
According to local historian José Lopez de la Cruz, “It was the 1980s, 
and Porfirio talked a lot about how the reds would come and steal our land 
from us.7 And then cocei did actually try to occupy a large plot of land in 
La Ventosa, which belonged to an administrator from Juchitán. I remember 
Porfirio leading a group of armed men down the street, with guns, sticks, 
and machetes, and they eventually drove the coceiistas of.”
Somewhat ironically, Montero celebrated his victory by taking the major-
ity of the administrator’s land for himself and his allies. Now a significant 
landowner, Montero had become involved in organ izing the cane workers 
of La Ventosa and was eventually made the Oaxacan state representative for 
the pequeños propietarios in Mexico City. This helped him gain access to 
the translocal networks of the pri and to become involved in development 
planning for the region. Back in the isthmus, he cemented power in sev-
eral ways: by accumulating more land,8 seeking to control local politics, and 
building an Evangelical Christian organ ization, Cristianos en Movimiento, 
which was active in both local and state politics. In the late 1990s he also 
began to host La Gran Fiesta, the largest annual Evangelical meeting in the 
isthmus at his Rancho la Soledad south of La Ventosa.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the site of  today’s meeting concerning 
the Iberdrola proj ect is being held on the veranda of Montero’s church, Tem-
plo Evangelico Pentecostes La Nueva Jerusalen on the eastern edge of town. 
All around are half- constructed homes and cement poles marking out land 
plots. This area of La Ventosa is known as the Colonia Porfirio Montero. 
Fernando leaves us waiting with his driver while he assesses the situation, 
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circling the assembled  people, poking his head in  here and  there to listen, 
and shaking a few hands. Shortly thereafter, someone waves us over.
Montero, tall, broad shouldered, wearing a light plaid shirt and jeans, 
dominates the porch of the templo upon which the gathering is taking place. 
He is leaning springily over  people’s shoulders, joking, cajoling, channeling 
the moment. It is an impor tant event  because the com pany is distributing 
written estimates of what they intend to pay each of the dueños and ejida-
tarios for the impacts (afectationes) to their land.
Montero is preaching trust in the com pany. “And in the president of the 
Republic!” someone  else shouts out.
Montero shrugs. All afectationes  will be paid for in the proper amount, 
they have his word.
Two representatives from Iberdrola are sweating, not only  because of the 
heat, and seem happy to let Montero run the show. Neither speaks a word of 
Zapotec. Fernando and an undersecretary for po liti cal relations hover in the 
background. In the end, their presence seems mostly symbolic. When Mon-
tero ends his speech with an invitation for every one to sign the registry to 
show that they received their estimate,  people begin to move  toward the  table.
Fernando looks visibly relieved and smiles. “It’s an act of good faith,” he 
tells us. “ There  will be time for them to review the details and raise ques-
tions, but the good faith is impor tant. It’s  going to be a long pro cess.”
FIGURE 2.3.   Porfirio Montero Fuentes
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The undersecretary nods along saying, “The job of the government is to 
maintain equilibrium between the parties.”
The deputy to the state congress for the region teaches us a few words of 
Zapotec and says confidently, waving his hands around, “This  here is  going 
to transform this town completely, when the wind parks come.”
But the equilibrating mission of  these agents of federal and state power, 
 here as elsewhere, grinds against long- standing grievances and suspicions 
in the isthmus that government is incapable of  doing anything other than 
feathering its own nest. Montero, for example, expressed his own doubts.
“We should be getting paid fairly,” he said. “Look, we have no prob lem 
with  these companies. It’s the government that is making us fight them. At 
the last meeting we had with the landowners, and Iberdrola, the com pany, 
said, ‘Why  don’t you ask your government for more support?’ And we said 
to them, ‘No one  here wants anything to do with the government. They de-
ceive us.’ For ten years, I’ve been telling [the government] that they need to 
create a committee to regulate what is  going on down  here, and no one has 
listened to me. Why  can’t we be paid closer to the price that the government 
is paying [for electricity from the producers]?  We’re the ones producing the 
energy. . . .  When you look at the generation that is  going into their substa-
tion, we are only making about 1.5  percent. Listen, it’s a dirty business.”
Interestingly, Montero does not want to be paid by hectare of land but by 
megawatt, 100,000 pesos per megawatt. “This is what we are proposing to 
FIGURE 2.4.   Wind turbines, La Ventosa, 2013
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them.”9 He is moving from the logic of land to that of energy. But only half-
way  because he still views wind as a fixed material resource, much like land.
“It can be low, medium, or high, but the wind is always blowing,” he said. 
Thus, he does not want to hear about variable payments but insists on a fixed 
one, “the same for all of us.”10 And he does not care  whether that brings him 
a bad reputation “back in Spain.”
He feels no one gives him the credit he deserves for the success. “I was the 
one who brought the companies  here, I was the iniciador (initiator) of all of 
this  because I’m someone who likes development. And I was the one who 
told them how the aire [air] is  here.”
But, again, he has no prob lem with the companies. “This is a marriage. It’s 
the government that is  going around beating on us. We  don’t want a divorce 
from  these companies.”
His latest plan is to convince the government to allow him and his allies 
to build a wind park that  will sell directly to cfe as an in de pen dent power 
producer. It is not unlike what is being  imagined in Ixtepec, just absent 
community owner ship and the detailed social development mission. For 
Montero, it is about payments and business. But also about spirit. Since 
2010, more and more wind turbines have been appearing in the promotional 
and archival imagery of La Gran Fiesta.
FIGURE 2.5.   Promotional image, La Gran Fiesta 2017
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Already bleary, we face more interviews throughout the day. We tour 
the La Venta II park, realizing for the first time just how massive  actual tur-
bines are when we stand under neath them, watching their blades cut the 
sky, thwup, thwup, thwup. The government officials we speak with uniformly 
deny the existence of  viable agriculture in the region. The parks are, at least 
in their minds, displacing nothing of value, conjuring prosperity from the air.
The only prob lem, the  future mayor of Tehuantepec tells us, is the pres-
ence of líderes (po liti cal leaders) in the isthmus. “ There are always líderes 
who want to start a movement against the government, against investment, 
basically against private capital.  Here,  those types abound.” But he assures 
us that they are  really just local po liti cal operatives who want a cut of some-
thing. Right now they are trying to negotiate a deal with the leader of the 
truck  drivers’  union in order to build the new substation in Ixtepec.
 There is an in ter est ing conversation with a Señor Velasquez, who used to 
work with Fernando in government and at his consulting firm and who has 
gone on to help Spanish firms like Iberdrola and Preneal manage relations 
with the propietarios. “The truth is that I have a good job, but a complicated 
one,” he says. “I’ve seen the empresas [companies] arrive to promote  things, 
and then propietarios not honoring their contracts. Often they  don’t read 
the contract, they want you to explain it to them, and then every thing’s fine. 
But you need more than goodwill  because even though the companies may 
talk nicely about la buena convivencia [living well together], in the end, this 
is a signed contract. Maintaining the proj ect is thus more about commu-
nication than permits and contracts.  There are eighty- four propietarios in 
La Ventosa, no more than that. But getting  those eighty- four to agree on 
anything is difficult. Some are from rival families, some belong to dif er ent 
[po liti cal] parties, and I have to convince them to convivir [coexist].”
Some hours  later, we end up relaxing with Fernando in the crisply air- 
conditioned Café Santa Fé at the crucero (crossroads) in Juchitán. The Santa 
Fé is a curiously unassuming nexus of local aeolian politics; if its walls could 
talk, they would tell of thousands of wind- related deals that have been 
hashed out at its  tables (see chapter 5).
Occupying a corner  table, Fernando pulls out a laptop to show us a pro-
motional video his office has just produced to educate  people across the isth-
mus about the benefits that wind development  will bring. The video opens 
with an old farmer and what we presume to be his grand child staring out at 
a vast field of straw. Then  there is a  woman in traditional ikojts dress and a 
bare- chested fisherman casting a net down at the surf. Both stare at the cam-
era confrontationally as if they are sick of their lot in life. Then a highway 
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filled with traffic. Then a brightly lit modern building where three young 
 people in casual dress smile confidently. Then a football field at night where 
 children in bright uniforms wave flashlights in a circle imitating the rotation 
of a wind turbine. The entire video is a blur of crossfading images of moder-
nity, nature, infrastructure, and youth, whirring like the turbines that appear 
throughout. At the end, a dif er ent farmer and grand child point at a turbine, 
turn  toward the camera, and smile, happy in their secured  future. The course 
of development and modernity is relentless, uplifting, harmoniously bridg-
ing nature and culture, a perfect marriage of biopower and energopower, all 
enabled by the invisible (and undepicted) hand of capital.
Autoabastecimiento: A Love Story
How did the industrial development of wind power in the Isthmus of Tehu-
antepec begin? Why did autoabastecimiento become its dominant paradigm? 
 These are questions that are easy to answer in broad conceptual brushstrokes 
of “capital,” “development,” and “energy.” But they are surprisingly complicated 
and contingent when one begins to probe more deeply, not least  because so 
many dif er ent actors and institutions played roles, sometimes coordinated, 
and sometimes worked at cross purposes. Certain narratives and memories 
resonate,  others drown each other out, still  others have been lost to the wind. 
And then  there are questions that no one seems able or willing to answer.
Autoabastecimiento is a love story, that much seems clear. It is about cap-
ital, ever desirous of new opportunities for its own propagation, finding in-
creasingly open doors and welcoming arms in the Mexican state. It is about 
that state’s own desire to attract the enabling power of capital but to do so in 
such a way that would at the same time bring wealth, opportunity, health to 
its citizens and extend vital infrastructures of governmental power like grids 
and roads. Flirtation begot passion, which led, in turn, as Porfirio Montero 
might have it, to marriage. And marriage is an exchange relationship unto 
itself, perhaps not exactly what  either lover fantasized, yet (they hope and 
tell themselves) an enduring re/productive partnership.
The romance unfolded largely in the 1990s and 2000s. But some key ele-
ments predated it. In isthmus communities in the core wind zone, some 
recall that extranjeros (foreigners), government officials, and researchers 
began to appear periodically in the 1970s to talk to them about develop-
ing wind parks. The 1970s  were, it is widely known, a critical, paradoxical 
energopo liti cal moment across the world.11 The formation of opec and the 
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oil shocks rapidly destabilized the carbon- political order that had thrived 
in the  middle of the twentieth  century, exposing the vulnerability of the ex-
ercise of po liti cal power and biopolitics upon the basis of secure energopo-
liti cal infrastructures and flows. States anxiously sought to reestablish the 
image of po liti cal autonomy and sovereignty— from other states but also, 
importantly, from fossil fuels—in part through new proj ects of fossil fuel 
development and in part through greater experimentation with energy con-
servation and investment in nuclear and renewable energy forms.
Mexico was, by and large, a beneficiary of the oil shocks. As a nonaligned 
country that was friendly to the global North and, more importantly, as a 
non- opec member with massive oil reserves, Mexico found its oil heavi ly 
in demand  after the early 1970s, which helped spur a quadrupling of Pemex’s 
production capacity by the end of the de cade. Moreover, all profits  were 
retained by the Mexican state  because of the 1938 nationalization of oil. A 
Mexican petrostate was by no means conjured from thin air in the 1970s, but 
it was the period in which Mexico transitioned from a net importer to an 
exporter of oil. Oil revenues quickly became essential for the fluid operation 
of Mexican statecraft.12 With so much attention focused on oil in the 1970s, 
it perhaps makes sense that wind power remained at best in the peripheral 
vision of the Mexican state.
Yet  there was decisive activity all the same. In the early 1970s, Mexico was 
a leader in the G-77 bloc of developing nations in the United Nations and was 
instrumental in the 1975 unido (United Nations Industrial Development 
Organisation) Lima Declaration. The declaration essentially argued that in-
de pen dent industrial growth was the priority for the developing world given 
the “per sis tent and marked tensions to which the pre sent international eco-
nomic situation is subjected.”13 Among other specific recommendations, 
Lima advocated that developing countries build their electricity indus-
tries, support rural industries, and stimulate pro cesses of applied scientific 
research.14 A few years  later, a research team led by Enrique Caldera Muñoz 
of the Instituto de Investigaciones Eléctricas ( iie) began researching wind 
potential in the isthmus and published a preliminary study focused on La 
Ventosa in 1980.15 From 1979 to 1983, Caldera’s team also worked collabora-
tively with wind energy researchers from several other countries  under the 
auspices of the Organización Latinoamericana de Energía ( olade) to pro-
duce a first provisional atlas of technical wind capacity across Latin Amer i ca 
and the Ca rib be an.16
Given surging oil revenue, the context of Lima, and the fact that  Caldera’s 
team was working in a research unit of the Mexican Ministry of Energy 
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( sener), it seems highly likely that any serious discussion of a program of 
wind development in the late 1970s or early 1980s would have focused on a 
public- financing model. The public model would have brought the program 
 under the auspices of cfe— since the nationalization of electricity in 1960, 
cfe was the only entity legally capable of producing, transmitting, and sell-
ing electricity in Mexico. But our interviews and archival research yielded 
no sign that  either cfe or sener had formulated any concrete proposal for 
wind parks during this period beyond acknowledging that Oaxaca had ex-
ceptional resources. A rare study of the early years of Mexican wind energy 
laments the missed opportunities of the 1980s: “At that time, very few  people 
believed that the wind could become a source of energy for generating elec-
tricity at any significant level.”17
The win dow of opportunity for a public model of wind power develop-
ment also passed quickly. The global oil glut of the early 1980s generated 
widespread social and economic crises in Mexico with sagging Pemex rev-
enues, high unemployment, and 100  percent annual inflation for most of the 
de cade.18  There was very  little new public infrastructural investment of any 
kind during the presidency of Miguel de la Madrid (1982–88),19 who also led 
what has subsequently become known as the “neoliberal turn” of the pri 
party and the Mexican state  toward reducing public spending, privatizing 
public industries, opening markets, and attracting international capital.20 
Caldera strug gled to find funding for an anemometric study of wind capac-
ity but, with the help of conacyt,21 he was eventually able to set up five 
mea sure ment stations in the isthmus between 1984 and 1986. Their results 
 were quite promising, especially at the La Venta and La Ventosa stations. The 
average annual wind speed was 9.3 meters per second, with top speeds in 
the winter around 30 meters per second.22 But the data had no signal in the 
po liti cal turmoil encompassing Mexican statecraft for the next several years 
 until the neoliberal turn had established itself more securely.
Exposing Mexico’s lucrative energy sector to international capital has 
long been an objective of neoliberal reformers in the Mexican government.23 
But it is an objective that has been hampered by the national sentiments as-
sociated with fossil fuel resources, so much so that even  after nearly thirty 
years of Mexican neoliberalism, genuine profit sharing from Pemex’s fields 
remains highly po liti cally contentious  today.24 However, the Mexican elec-
tricity sector proved comparatively easier to open to foreign capital. Presi-
dents Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988–94) and Ernesto Zedillo (1994–2000) 
pushed hard, and with some success, to open the sector to private interests, 
at least in terms of electricity generation.25
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Salinas founded the Comisión Reguladora de Energía ( cre), a new en-
ergy regulatory body to, among other  things, promote and manage private- 
public partnerships in electricity generation.  These partnerships came in 
a number of types, but the two most salient  were (1) in de pen dent power 
production ( pie), where in de pen dent electricity producers sold directly to 
cfe, and (2) “power generation for self- sufficiency,” or autoabastecimiento, 
in which large electricity users (like industrial concerns and even Pemex) 
could enter into long- term purchase agreements with in de pen dent electric-
ity producers for fixed electricity prices while sometimes owning a stake in 
the production com pany as well (with cfe acting solely as a medium for the 
transmission of electricity across its grid).26 In its twenty years of operation, 
cre has, by its own accounting, been able to privatize approximately one- 
third of electricity generation in Mexico (according to a January 2014 report 
from cre, cfe accounted for 62.7  percent of generation, pie for 21  percent, 
and autoabastecimiento for 8.7  percent).27 Privatizing electricity generation 
allowed the federal state to extend infrastructure (see chapter  1) and ex-
pand capacity while circumventing the cash- strapped and often- recalcitrant 
bureaucracy of the public utility (see chapter 4). But love, unlike desire, is 
properly a two- way street. Bankers in Mexico City told us that  because of 
cfe’s very high electricity tarifs, a private investor in the wind sector, de-
pending on when it entered a proj ect and for how long it invested, could 
safely expect a 10 to 20  percent return on investment, a very lucrative, low- 
risk arrangement.
As the main love story took shape in the 1990s, other, more idiosyncratic 
partners emerged as well. For example,  there was the colorful Carlos Gott-
fried Joy, who claims to be one of the “ fathers of Mexican wind energy.” 
Gottfried, an engineer and environmentalist, founded a small wind turbine 
firm in the late 1970s that was based in Mexico City but oriented  toward 
export to the growing US market for wind power. The firm failed, in part 
 because of the reliability of his turbines, but Gottfried claims that the ex-
perience inspired him to bring wind power to Mexico.28  Later a millionaire 
 after taking over the electrical equipment com pany cofounded by his  father, 
Gottfried developed the idea of building a Mexican market for the turbine 
generators and other electrical ele ments manufactured by his com pany and 
its partners. With co- investment from Enron Wind, Gottfried founded the 
first Mexican wind power development com pany, Fuerza Eólica, in the early 
1990s and won a tender from cfe to build a 1.5 megawatt pi lot municipal 
wind park on the Cerro de la Virgén in Zacatecas. The proj ect collapsed “in 
a practically Kafka- esque way” according to a con temporary newspaper 
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 account,29 with much fin ger pointing over debts and a very public 1997 court 
case in which Enron was caught trying to manipulate the case’s outcome via 
the Clinton administration. Eventually cleared of charges, Gottfried returned, 
unbowed, in 1998 to receive the first two cre permits for autoabastecimiento 
wind parks, including the first for Oaxaca.30
Meanwhile, collaborating with the Danish firm Vestas, cfe was eventu-
ally able to build its 1.5 megawatt pi lot park, La Venta I, which went into 
operation in 1994. The data from the park seems to have impressed even the 
skeptical cfe. By comparing energy production data from La Venta I with 
1,600 other identical turbines placed elsewhere in the world, cfe and Vestas 
concluded that in its first year of operation, the park operated with a plant 
capacity of 51.7  percent,31 a figure surpassed by only one installation in New 
Zealand. The cost of electricity compared favorably with thermoelectric in-
stallations elsewhere in Mexico ($0.04 per kilowatt- hour). The outstanding 
technical data began to draw attention to the isthmus, whetting appetites for 
investment.
Although perhaps not the most efective developer of wind parks, Gottfried 
appears to have been skilled at assembling a lobby of industrial interests to 
sponsor autoabastecimiento proj ects from which they would in turn receive 
guaranteed electricity supply. The late 1990s was a period during which the 
po liti cal and industrial interests  behind Mexican wind power began to con-
solidate, with all eyes on the prize of harnessing the winds of Oaxaca. Diódoro 
Carrasco, the governor of Oaxaca at the time, told us that he did not recall 
anyone mentioning wind parks to him when his term began (1992) but that 
by the end of his term (1998), “it was becoming a topic.”
In 2000, working in the government of Carrasco’s successor, José Murat, 
Fernando Mimiaga began actively promoting the development of the wind 
corridor.32 In addition to his governmental work, Fernando and his sons 
founded an ngo, the Fundación para el Desarollo del Corredor Eólico del 
Istmo y para las Energías Renovables, which acted as both an advocacy and 
consulting entity.33 The fundación helped the government coor ga nize seven 
international colloquia beginning in 2000 for the “public promotion of in-
vestment opportunities in wind energy.”34 Fernando claims that he brought 
fourteen foreign companies to the isthmus in 2000–2001 alone to explore 
investment opportunities.
Forces rapidly began to assem ble to remove the remaining barriers to 
privately financed wind power. President Vicente Fox’s efort in 2001 to re-
define electricity from a public ser vice to a commercial ser vice failed. But 
cre unveiled a model contract the same year for connecting in de pen dent 
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renewable energy producers to the grid. In 2002, sener prompted cfe to 
begin planning a second public park with technical assistance from a private 
energy developer (Iberdrola) and financial assistance from the un’s Clean 
Development Mechanism. Not long thereafter, in August 2004, at the tony 
Pacific resort of Huatulco, the lobbying organ ization Asociación Mexicana 
de Energía Eólica ( amdee) was founded, with Carlos Gottfried unanimously 
elected as its first president. Both amdee and the Fundación take credit for 
pushing the state government of Oaxaca to undertake a program to “regu-
larize land tenancy” in the isthmus in order to reduce investor risk and for 
designing a new grid and substation model that would allow electricity from 
the wind parks to be evacuated from the isthmus. They collaborated closely 
on  these proj ects with a number of state and federal agencies ( cfe, sener, 
semarnat, segego) and with local advocates like Montero, who also de-
scribes himself as the person who convinced the state government to give 
property  owners a more secure title to their land during the governorship 
of Ulises Ruiz (2004–10).35  These pro cesses did not unfold without contro-
versy. Both amdee and the Fundación have also been accused of cartelism 
and corruption by opponents of private sector wind development,36 specifi-
cally for parceling out plots of land in the isthmus to developers with  little or 
misleading consultation with residents.
In 2003, the US National Renewable Energy Laboratory ( nrel), working 
with the Oaxacan state government and sener, published a comprehensive 
wind atlas of Oaxaca,37 which confirmed and extended the  earlier findings 
from La Ventosa. The isthmus was now internationally recognized as having 
some of the best technical wind resources anywhere in the world. Fernando 
told us that the nrel report helped greatly to “strengthen the po liti cal  will 
to break the barriers impeding development.” The last piece of the puzzle 
was Calderón’s 2008 Ley para el Aprovechamiento de Energías Renovables 
y el Financiamiento de la Transición Energética ( laerfte), which not only 
forced sener to set binding targets for renewable energy development but 
also gave cre increased authority to oversee the development of the renew-
able energy sector  free from the bureaucracy of cfe.
The wedding preparations  were completed. What tran spired between 
2009 and 2012— when we returned to Mexico for the main phase of our field 
research— was something of a honeymoon period. More than thirteen wind 
parks came on grid in the isthmus during  those three years with more than 
1.2 gigawatts of new capacity, ten of them autoabastecimiento proj ects.
But why autoabastecimiento and not pie, which some developers told 
us was much easier to manage (since  there was only one purchaser, cfe, to 
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deal with instead of several)?  Because Mexican industrialists and banks  were 
interested in having a lucrative owner ship stake in wind park proj ects and 
 because vari ous large corporations in the mid-2000s wanted to be able to 
advertise that they  were investing in renewable energy at a time of mounting 
public concern about climate change.  Those desires  were further fueled by 
the promise of credits for certified emissions reductions ( cers).
As one banker put it, “In the good old days before the market collapsed 
and they became essentially worthless, cers could actually amount to per-
haps 7   percent of the total investment,” more than $30 million for a 200 
megawatt park. Thus the aspiration to protect the bios of planetary life was 
intertwined with the logic of profit and also with a more purely energo-
politi cal interest in ensuring steady energy supply.
A friend of ours, a Mexico City– based journalist with many years of ex-
perience covering the energy sector, explained, “A lot of  people  here still 
remember the old days when  there  wasn’t enough electricity and cfe would 
sometimes just shut a factory down without warning. . . .  And the industrial 
electricity prices  here are still 30–40  percent higher than they would be in 
the United States. That makes the self- supply model attractive. It reduces 
risk in terms of both price and supply.”
The Iberdrola proj ect in La Ventosa was, as noted above, the first of the 
new privately financed wind parks to be consummated. Like many  others, 
it was many years in the making. At the time it received its cre permit in 
2002, Iberdrola was not named as a partner. The application was made by a 
group called Parques Ecológicos de México ( pem) consisting of industrial 
concerns (including Pemex, Cementos Apasco, Hylsa, and Volks wagen) 
seeking to self- supply with clean electricity. In November 2004 it was an-
nounced that Iberdrola, at the time the second- largest electrical utility in 
Spain, had purchased the proj ect, its first wind park outside of Spain, and 
would make pem its Mexican subsidiary. The newspaper La Jornada wrote 
a needling editorial describing the seven- million- peso payment Iberdrola 
made for the park as a pittance, suggesting that this was more evidence of 
cre’s mission to divide “las rebanadas del pastel” (the slices of the cake) of 
the Mexican energy sector among hungry international suitors.38
That hunger endured when we returned to the isthmus again in the sum-
mer of 2012. It was now clearer than ever that wind power development in 
southern Mexico was a lucrative enterprise. But it was also becoming a more 
hotly contested one. Conflicts  were multiplying to the south of Juchitán 
about the planned use of communal land in the Mareña Renovables and Gas 
Fenosa park proj ects.39 And even in La Ventosa, a town in which so much 
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had indeed changed, with turbines vis i ble in all directions, opinions difered 
considerably as to  whether what was happening was helping la comunidad 
or only a handful of landowners.
Guidxhi Ra Riale Bii
Local history dates the founding of La Ventosa to November 23, 1846. The 
land the town now occupies was still virgin forest with just two unpaved 
paths cutting through the area. Along one of  these paths came Felipe López 
Lucho and Marcela Martínez de Córdoba (he born in Spain, she in Mexico) 
looking for new grazing grounds for their  cattle. They settled by a tributary 
river known as Lagatero Viejo north of the current town center, and “not 
being deterred by  either the strong winds that broke branches nor the per-
sis tent howling of the coyotes,”40 the young  couple raised nine  children and 
hundreds of  cattle on their ranch. It was thirty- five years before the next 
 family moved to the region, and then over the following thirty years, a small 
nucleus of families slowly gathered, creating “a poliform culture consti-
tuted of Zapotecs from Juchitán, Ixtepec, and El Espinal, Zoques from Chi-
malapas, as well a plurality of persons originating in Tabasco, Chiapas, and 
 Veracruz, . . .  who adapted themselves to the dominant Zapotec culture and 
customs of the region.”41 They ranched, farmed a local variety of maize called 
zapalote chico, and hunted iguana, armadillo, deer, quail, and rabbit. They 
gathered cascalote seeds and made charcoal to sell in Ixtepec. The Zapotec 
name for La Ventosa, proudly emblazoned on many of its taxis and motos 
 today, is Guidxhi Ra Riale Bii, “the place where the wind is born.”
La Ventosa seems to have remained a loose- knit settlement  until the first 
La Ventosan vela cele brations took place in the first de cade of the twenti-
eth  century, marking its consecration as a true istmeño pueblo.42 Lacking 
a church, La Ventosans celebrated their velas in Juchitán instead  until 1926, 
a period in which the ties between La Ventosa and Juchitán  were intimate 
but also contentious. The Mexican Revolution was highly polarizing when it 
came to the isthmus, as elsewhere in Mexico, leading to a general opposition 
between the elites of Juchitán and their networks who supported the Con-
stitutionalist cause of President Ventusiano Carranza (known locally as the 
partido rojo, red party) and the lower classes of Juchitán and the surround-
ing region (known as the partido verde, green party), leading to a number 
of uprisings and armed conflicts between 1910 and 1920. When Oaxacan 
governor Juárez Mata sent troops to occupy Juchitán in 1911 to quell the 
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Chegomista uprising, the resulting vio lence and instability sent many fami-
lies fleeing to resettle in surrounding villages like La Ventosa. La Ventosans 
remember the governor sending soldiers to burn their homes too, claiming 
that the town was puros ladrones (nothing but thieves). In 1919–20, when 
 future general Heliodoro Charis or ga nized the verde San Vicente uprising 
in the marshes south of Juchitán, he attracted La Ventosans to the cause of 
unseating the rojos and their Carrancista allies from power in the region.
When Charis occupied the town hall in Juchitán (the same day that 
 Carranza left office in Mexico City), he began the pro cess of uniting the rival 
po liti cal factions  under his charismatic authority.43 The caudillismo and 
“Zapotec sovereignty” that Charis asserted over the region throughout the 
next four de cades  were certainly felt in La Ventosa,44 as  were the major in-
frastructural proj ects that he brought to the region as mayor of Juchitán and 
as federal deputy: the building of the highways; the establishment of wells, 
 running  water, and a sewage system in the 1950s; and not least, the gradual 
electrification of the town. The charcoal trade for which La Ventosa was well 
known throughout the isthmus diminished as other kinds of fuel became 
available. And new roads meant mi grant  labor to the sugarcane fields of 
FIGURE 2.6.   The place where the wind is born
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Veracruz or the cotton fields in Chiapas. The re distribution of national oil 
wealth in the 1970s brought new federal irrigation proj ects to the region and 
a sugar refinery in nearby El Espinal. Laborers returned to La Ventosa and 
began growing rice and sugarcane.
Wealth flowed. “Think about this,” one resident recalled. “ There  were 
thirty- three cantinas in  those days for a town of maybe two thousand  people. 
And so  every weekend the town was filled with drunks.”
Porfirio Montero and his parents converted to Evangelical Chris tian ity 
during this era, and Montero began to build his wealth and influence among 
the sugarcane growers. Adobe and palapa  houses rapidly dis appeared and 
 were replaced by cinderblock and concrete structures. But the boom was not 
long lasting. Rice cultivation did not fare well and ceased. The sugarcane was 
hit by a major rot that wiped out nearly all the local fields. “In the 1990s,” a 
resident recalled, “ people went back to ranching again, and from that, cheese 
making.  There was nothing  else for them.” The fierce winds made it chal-
lenging to grow a marketable crop other than sorghum. Like so many other 
pueblos in the isthmus, La Ventosa experienced short periods of tantalizing 
prosperity interrupted by long periods of strug gle for subsistence.
Another kind of strug gle that defined life in La Ventosa was the strug-
gle for autonomy from Juchitán. Charis’s influence cast a long shadow; he 
contrived to make La Ventosa a township of Juchitán in the early 1950s, the 
legality of which is still disputed by some. Moreover, Charis kept po liti cal 
parties out of La Ventosa since he viewed the parties, and particularly the 
pri, as threats to his personal authority.45 Even the federal government was 
loath to intervene in Charis’s domain.
That changed almost immediately  after Charis’s death with the plan (or 
imposition, some would say) of the Don Benito Juárez García Dam near 
Jalapa del Marqués, a town northwest of Juchitán. The dam was a federal 
development proj ect whose main ambition was to create an irrigation sys-
tem designed to allow tens of thousands of hectares of land in the isthmus 
to receive adequate  water for more intensive and profitable forms of agri-
culture. In the years before the dam was built, land speculation swept across 
the isthmus, encouraging the wealthier smallholder peasants (including de-
scendants of the pre- Revolutionary caciques) to accumulate land. Specula-
tion had vari ous efects including consolidating estates, swelling the ranks of 
landless peasants, and creating sharper class distinctions between landed and 
landless peasantry.46 In par tic u lar, the po liti cal leaders of Juchitán exploited 
the new conditions by assembling small plots into massive private landhold-
ings for themselves. The federal government recognized the potential for 
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serious po liti cal unrest and intervened with two federal decrees designed to 
limit speculation in the traditional bienes comunales of Juchitán. The first 
decree, in 1964, held that the vast (64,000 hectare, 247 square mile) bienes 
comunales  were now ejidal owing to the inclusion of some 28,000 hectares 
in the irrigation zone. However, the infelicitous wording of the decree also 
seemed to deny any possibility of smallholder property, which caused the 
smallholders, in turn, to or ga nize po liti cally against the state. The second 
decree, in 1966, reinstated smallholder titles in the form of issuing some 
25,000 permits to pequeña propiedad on the ejidal land. But the decree left 
the relationship between possession and owner ship of land rather murky.
Shortly thereafter, cocei, a po liti cal movement with deep roots in the 
landless peasantry, formed using land occupation as its chief po liti cal tactic, 
seizing what it viewed as inalienable communal lands back from the landed 
peasant class.47 Land tenancy suddenly became a burning po liti cal issue in 
the isthmus, and absent Charis’s caudillismo, old lines of po liti cal conflict 
shone brightly again. The federal and state governments faced of against 
the istmeños, the elites of Juchitán against the elites of its townships, the 
campesin@s and fisherfolk against the commercial and po liti cal class.48 In La 
Ventosa, a town born with no ancient núcleo agrario but instead as a loose- 
knit community of homesteaders, the pri  were able to enlist many local 
landholders, particularly the influential founding families, in defense of the 
logic of smallholder private property. But Juchitán itself was soon riven by 
fierce conflicts between the pri and the Juchiteco elite on the one hand and 
on the other  those who wished to recuperate, through violent confrontation 
and occupation if necessary, communal land lost to privatization. From the 
early 1970s to the early 1980s, the pri- cocei  battles became legendary and, 
some would argue, nationally significant, as Juchitán became the first city in 
Mexico to vote the pri out of office, reinstantiating a long- standing reputa-
tion for ungovernable violent indigeneity (see chapter 5).
In La Ventosa, the old po liti cal distinctions between rojo and verde  were 
reactivated. Montero invoked the language of international communist con-
spiracy to discredit the “red” coceiistas and mobilize his smallholder allies. 
What also resonated in La Ventosa was the idea of throwing of the yoke of 
Juchiteco power in any form. A landowner who considered himself po liti-
cally unaffiliated said, “It’s always a clash [choque] with Juchitán. They are a 
disaster, a disaster. The mayors  there  don’t do anything for us, but they still 
try to influence the citizens  here.”
In 2012 we wander the streets of La Ventosa admiring new brightly col-
ored homes and cars. The road next to the  house we have rented is being 
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paved courtesy of Iberdrola and the agencia government. A second wind 
park, Electricidad del Valle de México (ninety megawatts), operated by the 
French firm edf, has started production partly on La Ventosan land, chan-
neling more money to local propietarios. But the politics of land and value 
echo across the de cades. The priistas from La Ventosa and Juchitán are now 
battling over the money generated by the wind parks, specifically, over the 
administrative fees that wind developers pay for the change of land use, 
which go directly to the municipio in Juchitán rather than to the agencia.
The comisariado of La Ventosa’s ejido,49 Pedro Castillo, acidly reckoned 
with the injustice of that situation. “Thanks to this foreign investment, we are 
breathing, we are flowering  here,” he said. “But only  little by  little, con lucha 
[with strug gle]. All the impact is happening  here in La Ventosa.  Shouldn’t all 
the economic benefits be coming  here as well? Well,  because of the law, the 
change of land use can only be decreed by the mayor of Juchitán, Dr. Daniel 
Gurrión. But day  after day, night  after night, for twenty- five years, it is we 
who  will be hearing the sound of the turbines droning. Not Gurrión, who 
lives seventeen kilo meters away. I  don’t find that acceptable. We should be 
getting 100   percent of the money that is now being paid to Juchitán. Our 
FIGURE 2.7.   New homes, La Ventosa
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agente municipal [Hageo Montero], was able to cut a deal fi nally to get 
50   percent for La Ventosa of the prob ably eight or nine million pesos the 
companies are paying for permission.” Prosperity beckons, yes, but still with 
so many questions, doubts, and prob lems encircling it.
Pedro is animated, his forearms chopping up and down, “I told Geo 
[Montero], I said, ‘Fine, cut that deal with him, tell Gurrión no prob lem.’ 
So  he’ll sign the document. And then when [Montero] has the check in his 
hands, [ we’ll] blockade the highways. And demand 100   percent.  Doesn’t 
 matter who pays it. The state government can pay it. Or we are staying  here, 
staying right  here.”
Pedro sinks back on his couch— comfortable, modern, leather— with his 
arms straight out, palms down. “That’s what I would do if I  were a mili-
tant priista. The government  doesn’t understand words; it only understands 
fists. All  these politicians, they live from deception of the  people.”
“It’s 8.5 on a Scale from One to Ten”
A kind and generous friend, Rusvel Rasgado, helps us to get situated in La 
Ventosa when we arrive back in the isthmus in 2012. We wish to talk in more 
depth to the  people who have rented land for wind development. And we 
also want to complete a full community opinion survey of all  house holds 
on how they view the impact of the parks. Thin, handsome, and charm-
ing, Rusvel is a local journalist who covered the wind parks from early on. 
Increasingly he has been able to augment his writing with broadcast work 
as a local reporter for the Mexican national broadcaster, Televisa. He was 
born and lives in La Ventosa together with his wife and  children. Among his 
many cousins is agente municipal Hageo Montero, son of Porfirio. Rusvel 
makes a call, and we are on our way.
The agencia building is modest but centrally located. A few police officers 
are standing around outside. We are ushered right upstairs to Hageo’s office. 
It is strikingly bare, containing only a desk, three chairs, and a cabinet sag-
ging  under stacks of yellowing documents. On his desk is a worn paperback 
copy of the federal penal code and,  under it, a Bible.
Hageo is a quieter, gentler presence than his  father. He tells us that like 
every thing  else in the world, for example, building a  house, the wind parks 
have good and bad impacts. “ There has been a lot of change in the community. 
I now see young  people who are finishing their studies in Juchitán as electrical 
engineers who are working for the companies now in very impor tant posts. 
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They have taken courses in Spain, in Tijuana. They are building  houses that 
are better than their parents’. They are making the most of this.”
Fernando Mimiaga’s dream is coming true, at least for some. And Hageo 
sees general social benefits as well. “At a global level,  we’re helping to gener-
ate clean energy.” And locally the idea is to do one major proj ect (obra) per 
year as a partnership between the agencia and the com pany. This year they 
are a paving a street. Next year they  will open a new cultural center, “where 
 there  will be classes for  children to learn to play guitar, to learn to draw, 
where they can hear lectures.”
Hageo remembers the days when  horses rather than cars  were the domi-
nant form of transportation in La Ventosa. But he says the land has always 
been inservible (useless)  because of the wind. They could only farm in the 
months when it abated, “ really only May, June, and July.”  Children could see 
no  future in agriculture and ranching— “It’s hard work; they want to be doc-
tors now or engineers”—so they  were leaving the region, and no one was car-
ing for the land. But now, he says, they are returning  because of “el eólico” (as he 
puts it) and even fighting with each other and their parents over inheritances. 
Hageo returns to  these fights (pleitos) more than once in our conversation; 
 these rifts within families and across generations seem to trou ble him. He 
also finds the Spaniards somewhat enclavado (closed of). “They  don’t like to 
put our  people in the best jobs, they keep  those for themselves.”
But  little by  little, they are trying to overcome that; he has a nephew now 
who is highly placed at a park. And meanwhile the construction phase of 
the parks brings a lot of work to the community, particularly to  those who 
own trucks and work in the construction  union. So they are planning to 
build two new parks with the Spanish firm Gamesa, Dos Arbolitos (sev-
enty megawatts) and El Retiro (seventy- four megawatts).50 Hageo is not sure 
about the environmental impact of  these parks—he won ders at the quantity 
of concrete being poured into the soil. But he grins a  little when he talks 
about his  cattle. “I think they like the turbines for the shade they give. I see 
them clustered out  there all the time, moving with the shadows as the sun 
comes across the sky. The noise  doesn’t even seem to bother them.  They’re 
eating well.”
Our interviews with other propietarios turned up a range of thoughtful 
responses to the parks. All spoke warmly of the new recursos (resources) 
that the parks brought, of the potential for economic and social development. 
Logics of kin and land had spurred in ter est ing contractual innovations, some 
of which seemed to be unique to the isthmus. We discovered, for exam-
ple, that  because the rental contracts  were negotiated individually with the 
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smallholders, some of them had been able to make special deals with the 
companies, including long- term employment for their  children or grand-
children, good white- collar jobs that would keep them close to home. We 
also discovered that istmeños had innovated a new kind of land payment 
for derecho del viento (right of wind), a kind of easement for the wind that 
passed over one own er’s land en route to a turbine positioned on another 
own er’s land.51  These kinds of extra payments, wind developers and bankers 
in Mexico City would  later tell us, helped to keep the peace in a contentious 
po liti cal environment.
José Lopez de la Cruz is another of Rusvel’s cousins and the town historian. 
He created La Ventosa’s only documentary film and is revered as an authority 
on local culture. He screened the film for us in a garage he had assembled for 
his bright- red Volks wagen Bug from materials recycled from the wind parks, 
including foam transport spacers used for moving turbines by truck and 
planks of wood emblazoned brightly with a blue Vestas logo. He explained to 
us that when the parks  were first proposed,  there was re sis tance and conflict.
“The politicians from  here, they wanted money. So they played with 
 people, deceived some of them, told them that the wind proj ect was not 
FIGURE 2.8.   José Lopez de la Cruz
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 viable. Then, when the first private wind park was announced,  people came 
from Matias Romero and marched  here against it,52 but  these  people had no 
relationship to the lands of the isthmus.”
Overall, he assured us, La Ventosans had taken a long- term view of 
the proj ect’s benefits. “In truth, we  here  were always in  favor of the proj-
ect  because we knew that this was something that would benefit every one 
directly or indirectly. First, obviously, it would benefit  those who had land. 
That’s logical. But then it would come to  those who had businesses, and then 
to  those who sell food, and then to  those who sell food at night, all of them.”
And migration had ceased, indeed reversed. “The only bad  thing I can see 
about the parks is that the housing rents  here have shot up. It used to be so 
cheap to rent a home.”
Other propietarios highlighted vari ous social issues that they felt kept the 
development pro cess from being a pure boon to the community. We inter-
viewed José Luis Montaño on his veranda as late after noon turned  toward 
dusk, speaking  until he had to reach up and switch on the incandescent bulb 
hanging over us. In his late fifties, Montaño had three plots of land (predios) 
and described the coming of the parks as a bendición (blessing), not least 
 because the companies  were fi nally able to help them secure land titles  after 
a long history of conflict over land tenure. He walked us through that history 
in detail but described himself as a  simple campesino, someone who grew 
up knowing only the farming and ranching of his  father and grand father. It 
FIGURE 2.9.   José Luis Montãno.
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was hard, tiring work. And then the wind parks came. He talked softly, often 
searching the sky.
“The advantages? Well, I suppose one of them is that the land rental cov-
ers one’s needs. You  don’t need to work the land. To wake up in the very early 
morning [madrugada] to care for the crops.  There’s less risk, if the crops 
fail. . . .  They’ve improved the roads. The town has changed a lot.”
How? we asked.
“The streets have been paved . . . ,” he trailed of for a moment. “Health care, 
well, I  won’t lie to you, that that  hasn’t improved, and it should be a priority. 
The majority of  people  here  don’t have it. We need a real hospital  here like in 
Juchitán, not just a health center. Too many  people have to travel for care or go 
without care. So I think that health cannot wait. It cannot wait!”  Whether the 
government or com pany provided the health care mattered less to him. “Our 
health is the most impor tant  thing. It’s the first gift God gives us.”
Montaño also noted that the wind parks have led to stratification even 
among landholders. “Some of the ones with more turbines, five or seven, 
might have an access point from the road for the maintenance of the tur-
bines. And they threaten to close that of  unless the com pany pays them 
a certain amount. But not every one has that ability to close  things of, not 
every one can pressure the com pany in that way. It’s not just.”
Still, in terms of La Ventosa’s overall experience with the wind parks, 
he said as he grinned in the twilight, “It’s 8.5 on a scale of one to ten.”
Cain López Toledo is likely the most critical voice we hear among the 
landholders. He says bluntly that he feels life was better before, when  people 
worked together in the campo (countryside). “So much money divides 
 people, and it’s divided our  people.” The money only goes to  people like him 
who have land.  Others may get a  little out of the construction phase or into 
their business, but he feels that is very  little.
And the easy money from the rents has made the landowners floja (lazy). 
“ There are  people who just live on the rents now. For me, I live from my  cattle. 
I have my ranch. I grew up in the campo, and I like my life in the campo. . . . 
Now, well, our way of life has already changed into something that is dif er ent.”
He waves of  those who complain about the negative efects of turbines 
on his land, and he has no prob lem working with the com pany. The prob-
lem is the rising in equality among  people. As we are getting up to leave, he 
tells us how much he enjoys the local corn, the zapalote chico—it grows fast 
when the wind is low; its stalks are short, but the corn is so sweet and white. 
But as fewer and fewer  people farm in the region, the price of the corn has 
been rising, and it is harder to get the local corn. “And for the poor  people who 
88 chapter two
live  here, the  people who have nothing, it’s getting harder and harder to live 
 here. With the corn costing six, seven, eight pesos a liter, maybe even more, for 
this corn, our native corn.”
Every one Comes Apart
In March 2013, as we begin to walk the streets of La Ventosa, clipboards in 
hand, knocking on the doors of  houses both prosperous and  humble, speaking 
with  people both animated and disinterested by our questions, a more complex 
landscape of local opinion begins to take shape. As part of a more comprehen-
sive survey proj ect, Cymene and I personally visit eighty  house holds, repre-
senting 370  people, or about 5  percent of the estimated population of the town. 
Whereas with the landowners we had spoken mostly to older men,  here we 
have a chance to listen to younger men, the majority identifying as obreros 
(laborers) and campesinos, as well as a  great many  women: vendors, store 
 owners, cooks, and amas de casa (house wives). It quickly becomes clear that 
opinion is highly divided about the impact of the parks now four years  after 
Iberdrola’s Parques Ecológicos de México began operating.
We ask interviewees to recall how they felt when they first heard about 
the proj ects,  whether they thought it would be something good for La Ven-
tosa and for their families specifically.
In the beginning  there was hope, expectation. Several, 38.8  percent, say 
they remember feeling that the wind parks would be good for the town, and 
43.8  percent say they expected a positive benefit for their  family in par tic u-
lar. Fewer recall anticipating negative impacts (33.8  percent and 26.3  percent 
respectively). It is striking that a significant percentage of respondents 
(30  percent) felt that the development would be sin importancia (of no con-
sequence) for their families, and all of  these say it was  because they lacked 
land.  Those who remember hope associated with the parks tell us they 
hoped for pro gress and cheaper electricity but, above all, for new recursos 
and sources of trabajo (work) in a town that ofered few opportunities.  Those 
who expected nothing good from the parks cite a wider range of concerns, 
ranging from negative health and environmental impacts to the expectation 
of more fights over land and, of course, more highway blockades.
When we ask  whether the parks brought the benefits they had hoped for 
four years ago, only 20  percent say yes, 60  percent say no, and the remaining 
20  percent say en parte (partly) or express no opinion. Of  those we inter-
view, 26.3  percent say their families received direct benefits from the wind 
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industry in the form of a land contract or work. Of  those directly benefiting, 
just over half (52.3   percent) rate their experience with the companies as a 
“good” or “excellent” experience. Another 28.6  percent rate their contact as 
“so-so” and 19  percent as “bad” or “very bad.”
When we ask  whether the companies and the government provided 
enough by way of obras for the good of the town, we encounter strongly 
negative opinions. Only 25  percent say that the companies are  doing enough 
by providing paving. “It’s not nothing with this wind that whips the dust up 
into your eyes.” But 66.3  percent opine that the companies should be  doing 
more; the obras are a misería (pittance), or  things that had been promised 
like a new school never appeared. The paving was done on the cheap, with-
out drainage, so that when it rains,  there is more flooding than before.
Still, the worst criticism is reserved for the government. Only 13.8  percent say 
the government has done enough for the community whereas 83.8  percent 
say it has not. “The government? They never do anything for us.  Here se falta 
mucho” (we are lacking a  great deal).
But the percentages only trace the surface of the ambivalence regard-
ing the parks  here in the birthplace and heart of autoabastecimiento wind 
development. Why does dissatisfaction run so deeply? We are fortunate 
that several families invite us out of the branch- bending wind and into their 
homes, to sit with them and talk in more depth. Some are ardent supporters, 
 others ardent critics, and their thoughts put flesh on the numbers.
The supporters tend, by and large, to be families that own land that was 
contracted or who received work from the parks in the construction phase 
or, more rarely, in the operations phase. They do not tend to speak at  great 
length of the contribution of wind energy to the  battle against climate change, 
but they do talk about modernity and pro gress, about how  children can 
now aspire to jobs as engineers. The paving of roads was welcome, and they 
expect more obras to come, just as Hageo promised. The parks are a blessing, 
a change, yes, but a change for the better, as one can see in the quality and 
scale of the new  houses being erected in the community, in the abundance 
of new vehicles, in the national importance of the town as the center of a new 
industry.
 Those who are critical of the impacts on the community tend not to be 
critical of the wind parks themselves but rather of how the income from the 
parks is not being redistributed more widely. Countless individuals express 
some variation of the sentiment, “ There are no benefits for  people like us.”
Some say they believed they would receive something: “At least that the 
electricity would be cheaper, but if anything, it’s become more expensive.”
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 Others say they never had any such expectation: “No one  really had much 
hope who  didn’t have terreno (land) in the first place.”
All agree that the wind parks are contributing to greater in equality be-
tween the dueños and every one  else. Few blame the companies directly for 
this situation, although we do sometimes hear the language of the segunda 
conquista (second conquest of Mexico by Spain).
More blame the government (local and federal) for allowing it to happen 
through their neglect and abandonment of the town. “ Those who govern 
are the only ones who benefit. I’ve heard that only 1.5  percent of the profits 
goes to the campesino.”
But the agents most often singled out as the cause of the lost opportuni-
ties are the po liti cal líderes, principally Montero and the priistas, but also 
Mariano Santana of cocei, exercising influence from afar in Juchitán. They 
are the ones making sure that only their families and allies profit, building 
magnificent estates for themselves. They are the ones who made sure only 
their  people and  unions received construction and maintenance work. They 
are the ones who used the money to tighten their grip on the town.
One man sighs to us, “Aqui tenemos caciques lamentablemente” (unfortu-
nately, we have caciques  here).
And not only do the caciques keep the money for themselves, they incite 
vio lence and the disruption of everyday life by organ izing their allies in in-
numerable strikes and blockades in what seems to all an endless game for 
influence and money.  People speak openly of votes bought and sold (for six 
hundred pesos an election). Perhaps a few older La Ventosans vote out of 
conviction, but the  great majority of votes, it is said, can be purchased or, 
more accurately, rented.
The wealth of the dueños also attracts unwanted attention from outside. 
We hear stories about petty criminals from Juchitán and Matias Romero, 
even from as far away as Veracruz, coming to town to steal from homes or 
to break into cars or to plot the kidnapping of dueños. A sense of insecurity 
abounds, and some say delincuencia (delinquency) has been on the rise too.
Victor, a teacher, takes us into his home, and his  mother makes us de-
licious tortillas on her comal. Victor’s wife proudly shows us the Zapote-
can traje (dress) she has been sewing by hand for the past six months. They 
are not critical of the wind parks per se but of the efect their money has 
wrought on the community.
“My country is a very nice place, muy solidario, but when money is in-
volved, it’s like a bomb  going of.” Victor laughs. “It’s like Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki; every one comes apart.”
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Elsewhere, we hear a few truly chilling stories, like the one about an in-
trafamily dispute over a hectare of land for which a rental contract is being 
sought. A man is said to have or ga nized the rape of his cousin in order to get 
her to back away from her land claim.
On the western fringe of town, across the highway, where most of 
the homes are very  humble, some  little more than shacks, we talk with 
families that live closest to the turbines. The wind seems to blow with 
special ferocity  here as, seeking shelter from gust- borne gravel, we run 
from  house to  house. Residents tell us about birds killed by turbines that 
have fallen into their  water source and contaminated it. They hope we can 
confirm or disconfirm local rumors that the turbines might cause cancer 
and infertility. Sometimes the turbines are described as fans that blow the 
air more violently, extracting moisture from the soil, rendering it barren. 
Sometimes the turbines are said to suck the vitality from the air, leaving 
it weak and unable to scatter seeds properly. In a moment worthy of Cor-
mac McCarthy, a desiccated puppy head skips down the road in front of 
us, wretchedly driven on by the howling wind. Such are the dark reckon-
ings on the edges of town, fringed with anxiety and uncertainty, turning 
FIGURE 2.10.   The edges of La Ventosa
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biopo liti cal modernity’s promises of long life, pro gress, and abundance 
inside out.53
Winners and Losers
But it must be said,  there are still many families that appear quite content 
with the course and impacts of wind development. And  there are  others who 
shrug, saying that  there is no turning back now anyway and that La Ventosa 
 will have to make the best of it, come what may.
“This wind,” Jose Luis Montaño says, “is hard, and it raises  people with 
strong backs.”
As a successful professional tied by blood and marriage to the Monte-
ros, Rusvel is guardedly optimistic. We sit in his courtyard, chatting while 
our  children play. We learn about a lovely Zapotec custom wherein a mar-
ried  couple’s names merge, their  house hold being referred to by their given 
names joined together. Rusvel jokes that we would be called “Mingomena.”54
Rusvel’s veranda is packed full at the moment with dozens of sofas, or-
phans of a tractor trailer that el norte had blown of the road some miles 
east of town. Rusvel is one to speak quietly and guardedly about the po liti-
cal conditions in La Ventosa. Like a good journalist, he listens well. And, 
he mentions occasionally, but only when we meet him in Juchitán, that the 
reign of the Monteros and the marriage with the Spanish companies is not 
to every one’s liking. He, too, has questions.
“For example, this paving of the streets.  These are fairly  simple obras,” 
he says. “They could be aiming for something much more impor tant, like 
building a primary school. For years, the com pany has promised to build 
it, but nothing has happened yet. . . .  Another example is the fact that the 
 whole town is encircled by turbines now. And I’m looking at this and saying 
to myself, How is the town  going to grow?  There are rules about building 
homes closer than five hundred meters to the turbines. It’s not  going to be 
pos si ble to grow the population much more than it is  today.”
Imprisoned by their own good fortune, even the supporters feel that 
something is still missing in La Ventosa. But perhaps the gap between hope 
and real ity is being paid down in installments.
In July  2013, shortly before we leave Mexico, the Bacusa Gui (firefly) 
cultural center opens in La Ventosa. In the local press coverage  there is an 
image of Daniel Gurrión, mayor of Juchitán, sitting between Porfirio and 
Hageo Montero in the front row of the ceremonies.55 Special awards are 
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given to Montero cousins Rusvel Rasgado López and Jose López de la Cruz 
for their distinguished cultural contributions to the community and for 
“elevating the name” of La Ventosa.  There is no mention of cosponsorship 
from Iberdrola— whatever contribution they made to the event has been ab-
sorbed into the logic of clientelist power. A  children’s orchestra plays, deli-
cious food is served. This is Guidxhi ra riale bii, where the wind is born and 
now harvested.
La Ventosa can certainly be viewed as a tremendous success story for 
wind power globally. A developer in Mexico City once proudly described 
the area around La Ventosa and La Venta to us as the “densest concentration 
of terrestrial wind parks anywhere on the planet.” From a certain distance, 
La Ventosa appears to epitomize how a world- class resource can— provided 
inputs of transnational capital and expertise, with canny government media-
tion smoothing out cultural and po liti cal frictions— rapidly achieve multiple 
goals: improving local economic opportunities and infrastructure, meeting 
national energy transition targets and biopo liti cal aspirations for develop-
ment, and addressing the global challenges of decarbonizing electricity 
transmission and remediating climate change. Win- win- win, as we heard so 
often from wind power advocates in the isthmus.
But our closer examination of the origins and impacts of autoabastec-
imiento wind development reveals that, even its winningest form, the fanta-
sized perfect marriage of energopolitics and biopolitics is rarely such a  simple 
and agreeable relationship. For one  thing, the interests of capital always make 
it a threesome. And then  there is the fact that the greatest beneficiaries of 
wind power are  those who  were already winning in La Ventosa. Every one 
else— the landless, the jobless— senses the score being run up and their own 
losses mounting. What actually constitutes the aeolian politics of a place like 
La Ventosa involves so many agents, forces, and relations beyond the typical 
stakeholder categories of the ppp contractual imagination like “the govern-
ment,” “investors,” and “landowners.” As we have seen, aeolian politics in La 
Ventosa cannot be understood apart from deeper histories of red and green 
politics in the region and especially the fiery politics of land tenure. The 
deep mistrust of state and federal governance also permeates autoabastec-
imiento relations, as does the relative efficacy of caciquismo and the diverse 
networks of po liti cal líderes. With Fernando Mimiaga and his sons, the 
distinction between government agency and nongovernmental advocacy is 
blurred by still further forms of patronage and, some would say, corruption. 
And then  there is the electropolitics of the grid, the infrastructural politics of 
roads and blockades, the class politics and concerns about vital extraction, 
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failing agriculture, and deepening in equality. All this and more belongs to 
Guidxhi ra riale bii.
We now have a taste of the terroir of the isthmus, finding quite disparate 
po liti cal conditions and fortunes in towns that are only twenty kilo meters 
apart. The next phase of our journey leads us back up the switchbacks of the 
Carretera Panamerica  toward Oaxaca City, where we seek intimate engage-
ment with the more remote constellations of pouvoir— state government, 
federal government, and transnational capital— that claim to be steering the 
course of istmeño wind development.
3.  Oaxaca de Juaréz
September 6, 2012. For three months we have been searching for the person 
responsible for managing renewable energy development in the state of 
 Oaxaca. It has involved several conversations, dozens of phone calls and online 
searches, and visits to nearly  every major government building in Oaxaca 
City. All that has led to us waiting in an empty office in the Oaxacan Ministry 
of Tourism and Economic Development (STyDE). Not literally empty;  there 
is a desk, a small  table, three chairs, and a computer. But  there is no evidence 
that this office has ever been occupied. No nameplate on the door, no books 
on the shelves, no intimate clutter on the desk. No blinds even to shield us 
from light and heat of the Oaxacan sun. It all seems a bit surreal, and we 
laugh ner vously as we wait. In the regional news media, the governor and 
other po liti cal elites continue to praise Oaxacan wind development for the 
hundreds of millions, even billions, of pesos of investment it is bringing into 
the state economy. And on our previous visits to Oaxaca, Fernando Mimiaga 
Sosa and his allies left the impression that the Oaxacan state government 
was a major force in steering the course of wind development.
We wondered, From all that to a vacant office in less than three years? 
What had happened?
This chapter examines the relationship between the Oaxacan state gov-
ernment (particularly its bureaucratic apparatus and po liti cal parties) and 
wind development in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. In contrast to the po-
tent and occasionally turbulent powers that we found at work both in the 
isthmus (chapters 1, 2, and 5) and in Mexico City (chapter 4), the capacities 
of biopo liti cal, capital, and energopo liti cal enablement within Oaxaca City 
96 chapter three
seemed  limited, even absent. And yet we knew from our experience with 
Fernando that  matters had been other wise as recently as 2010. The appar-
ent vacancy of state governmental engagement with wind power in 2012–13 
presented us with an intriguing and often- frustrating riddle.
What we came to discover is that we had overestimated the influence of 
state government over istmeño wind development during our preliminary 
research trips in 2009 and 2010  because we conflated the work of Oaxacan pri 
party networks with the authority of certain offices (particularly Fernando’s) 
in the state bureaucracy. Given Oaxaca’s history of more than eighty years 
of unbroken pri governance, the  mistake was understandable. At the time, 
and in the “institutional- revolutionary” logic of the pri party- state,1 party- 
political influence and the charismatic power aforded to certain well- placed 
party members was fused as seamlessly as pos si ble into bureaucratic author-
ity.2 It was an unspoken truth that the party and its charismatic leaders gov-
erned the bureaucracy rather than vice versa. That is,  until the period of 2006 
to 2010, when the scandal- clouded governorship of Ulises Ruiz faced the rise 
of a strong anti- pri social movement ( appo) spearheaded by the Oaxacan 
section of the Mexican teachers’  union ( snte).3 The violent repression of 
appo by the state police force helped to generate the urgency to fi nally bring 
a fragmented field of opposition parties and movements together  behind the 
candidate whom Ruiz had defeated in 2004, Gabino Cué Monteagudo. Cué 
ran again for the governorship of Oaxaca in 2010 against pri candidate Eviel 
FIGURE 3.1.   The office of the coordinator of renewable energy, State of Oaxaca
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Pérez Magaña and narrowly won amid widespread accusations that the pri 
had (again) attempted to rig the ballot boxes in their  favor. As the apparatus 
of pri governance (if not pri influence) rapidly dissembled in late 2010, 
 there  were many po liti cal vacuums left in its wake, among them the state 
government’s involvement in wind power.
No One’s in Charge
Such is the opinion of Fernando Mimiaga Sosa and his sons. We meet them 
again in Oaxaca City in the summer of 2012 at a health food restaurant called 
100% Natu ral on the southern end of Llano Plaza. Fernando generally seems 
well, perhaps a  little thinner and more weathered than in the past, but in good 
spirits overall. We chat about the con temporary state of the wind industry and 
joke about our previous trips to the isthmus. He and his sons are now working 
on their fundación (see chapter 2) full time. “It’s become more of a business 
now, of course,” he mentions with a significant smile.  After he leaves to attend 
another meeting, the younger Mimiagas, Júlio César and Fernando Jr., make a 
pitch to us to hire the foundation on as external con sul tants for our nsf grant.
We explain that our grant is not  really of the scale to permit the hiring of 
outside con sul tants, but they go over the key points of the pitch anyway. The 
foundation remains very well connected, they say, both in the federal and 
state governments as well as with stakeholders in the isthmus. They can help 
us make  those connections, and they have an archive of original documents 
related to the negotiation of land contracts.  Those documents would be a 
gold mine from our perspective, but this is clearly a pay- to- play ofer, which 
we politely decline.
Fernando Jr. speaks at length of how impor tant the foundation has been 
to the organ ization of wind power development. “My  father was  really the 
first one to have a vision for what could be done with the wind  there. And 
we put together the first plan on how cfe could expand the electricity grid 
in a way that would convince investors to come. We presented that plan in 
2004 and 2006, and eventually the regulatory commission, cre,  adopted it 
and made sure that the plan, including the new substation in Ixtepec, hap-
pened.” The foundation, he says, even became involved with organ izing the 
financing of proj ects, helping to ensure, for example, that standby letters of 
credit  were available to help attract investors and developers.4
Leaning in over the  table, Júlio César interrupts his  brother’s rendition 
of their legacy to focus on the obstacles wind development  faces now. “The 
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prob lem is that when my  father left office, no one took over his portfolio. 
That is, his portfolio was spread out over, I  don’t know, three, four, five, six 
 people. And  these  people  don’t coordinate with each other, so, basically, no 
one’s in charge. . . .  There’s no common vision, and that’s a prob lem. Right 
now  there seems to be a major push in the state government on solar energy. 
I applaud that, of course. They are  doing vari ous studies. But we hear it from 
reliable sources that this government is not very interested in wind energy. 
Why, we  don’t know.”
It seems that the handof between administrations was not particularly 
smooth, at least as far as wind power was concerned. And subsequently the 
Mimiagas have been almost completely frozen out by the Cué administra-
tion (or perhaps they felt it not in their interest to open their networks of 
influence too generously to the agents of another cluster of po liti cal parties).
Fernando  Sr. tells us  later that he feels he has been made a scapegoat 
for the incompetence of the current administration, particularly as po liti cal 
unrest around the wind parks intensified in 2013. He says, with a genuine 
tremor of injury, “Now  people say that I’m the one who created all  these 
prob lems down in the isthmus. But you two know that that simply  isn’t 
true.” What is most striking to us in the summer of 2012, however, is that the 
Mimiagas seem honestly not to know exactly who took charge of Fernando’s 
portfolio  after he left office.
Júlio César waves his hand at the question. “I’m sure you if you look at 
the [government] website you can find a list of the actors involved. What 
you  really need to know is that they are coming at this with perspectivas muy 
partiales [highly par tic u lar perspectives]. They  don’t have a general vision 
for the region of the isthmus or for the state of Oaxaca.”
Since the Mimiagas can no longer help us to gain access to the state gov-
ernment, we next try a friend of a friend, Gaby Blanco, who is one of Cué’s 
administrative assistants and works with him on a daily basis. We hoped she 
might be able to schedule us a meeting with Cué himself, but owing to the 
now- annual summer ritual of teacher’s  union strikes,5 the Palacio del Gobi-
erno on the Zócalo is being blockaded, and Cué is working from another 
location trying to resolve the situation. Instead, Blanco meets with us to share 
what she has learned in her two years working at Cué’s side.
Blanco epitomizes the young, professional cosmopolitanism that we 
come to recognize as Cué’s desired public image for his sexenio,6 in which 
he has made transparency and accountability—as far as we can tell, quite 
sincerely— the watchwords of his administration. She is flawlessly bilingual 
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and refreshingly candid about the hopes and impasses Cué  faces in trying to 
undo the legacy of Oaxacan priismo.
When we ask her to what extent she thinks wind power development is 
a specific priority for Cué, she says she can only recall one meeting the gov-
ernor has had. A del e ga tion from the lagoonal fishing town of Santa Maria 
del Mar visited Cué to appeal for his help in ending the road blockade of a 
neighboring community (San Mateo del Mar) over a territorial land dispute. 
To accomplish this, they asked that Cué publicly endorse the wind farm 
proj ect whose developer had promised to build a new road to connect them 
to the mainland. Blanco is somewhat vague on the details, but she is describ-
ing what would  later come to be known as the Mareña Renovables proj ect.7
We ask  whether the governor endorsed the proj ect, and she equivocates 
slightly.
“On paper, they have an ideal model,” she says. “But then we also had 
complaints from San Mateo. This is a place where, let’s say, to receive a hun-
dred dollars would be a big deal, and suddenly the com pany was giving the 
municipal authority thousands of dollars all at once. The prob lem was that 
since then, the authority has not shared with the community how they are 
spending that money.  There’s a lot of mistrust and division. . . .  The munici-
pal authority and the agrarian authority are pointing fin gers. But we  later 
found out the agrarian authority was also receiving money from the com-
pany.” She shakes her head. “The governor’s attitude was, ‘Why  can’t you just 
work this out? The proj ect looks  great. This other community needs its road. 
Let’s get it moving.’ I was thinking to myself: If this is just one case, then the 
 whole situation down  there has to be a disaster.”
And this was the only meeting the governor has had about wind develop-
ment thus far?
“I’m aware of the list of proj ects that he has chosen to build his legacy. 
Wind energy  isn’t on his list of legacy proj ects. He does dedicate some time 
to it. He does talk to investors about the wind sector, and we have agree-
ments with usaid. But I think this topic is moving slowly.”
We then ask to what extent environmental proj ects as a  whole are a prior-
ity for the administration. Blanco removes from a desk drawer a substantial 
 binder containing the legacy proj ects and quickly pages through that.
“Originally  there  were over a hundred potential proj ects submitted by 
his ministers. Then he consulted with usaid and undp on feasibility and 
financing and fi nally narrowed the list down to thirty- two that  we’re actu-
ally working on. The ministers  were given a certain amount of time, around 
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six months, to  settle into their positions. But by now, all thirty- two proj ects 
should have time lines, action plans, and be in development.”
The proj ects are color coded by their states of pro gress. She traces a fin ger 
along the relevant column. Only two proj ects are colored red, meaning they 
are stalled in the design phase, “no con sul tants or engineers hired, nothing.” 
One of them is titled “Desarollo Integral del Istmo” (holistic development of 
the isthmus).
“I honestly just think this minister has dropped the ball.”
She locates three proj ects on the legacy list that involve sustainability 
 issues, two of them focused on Oaxaca City specifically. The first is to make 
transportation in Oaxaca City cleaner.
Blanco says, “He’d like to improve air quality, but the real challenge is all 
the illegal taxi concessions granted by the previous regime. We have way too 
many taxi licenses  here. You know they  were po liti cal instruments, right? 
 Every election year, the pri would hand them out. . . .  Then we also have a 
proj ect aiming to clean up the two rivers in town and to create green spaces 
around them, and then  there is the big dam proj ect, Paso de la Reina,8 and 
that’s it in terms of sustainability- related proj ects.”
We say that we imagine it is difficult to balance sustainability demands 
against other pressing  human needs for infrastructure and care. Still, wind 
development seemed to have a lot of momentum  behind it in previous ad-
ministrations, no?
Blanco agrees, and although she has  little to say about the legacy of the 
Mimiagas, she also seems somewhat surprised at how  little attention has re-
cently been paid to wind power. In the end, she reasons that not only had the 
ministry in charge been lax in putting together a strategy but the official who 
had nominally been managing wind development was not entirely competent.
Our interview with Blanco ends on a somewhat wistful note— echoing 
the criticism of the Mimiagas— about the state government’s inability thus 
far to develop a comprehensive wind development plan for the isthmus. 
“Right now, the wind companies work with the federal government to get 
their permissions from the vari ous ministries, and they work with the local 
governments [municipios]. But they should be working with us too. That is 
to say, we should have a plan, we should be helping them.”
She thinks  there are  others in the government who can tell us more about 
the state’s involvement with wind power development, more than the name-
less renewable energy director who might or might not already be in the 
pro cess of being relieved of his duties anyway. Blanco strongly recommends 
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that we speak next with Oaxaca’s director of public investment, Adriana 
Abardia, whom she describes as “one of the most experienced and skilled 
and competent administrators that we have anywhere in the government.”
We meet Abardia about a week  later at a stylish, Spanish- run restaurant 
near Santo Domingo Cathedral, a huge tree dominating its partially cov-
ered courtyard. She laughs brightly and often during our two- hour meeting. 
She was born in Oaxaca but had long given up on Oaxacan politics before 
Cué came to power. The chance for fundamental reform lured her back  after 
eleven years in Mexico City. Her job did not even exist before her appoint-
ment. Now she has been tasked with creating regulations and evaluation 
mechanisms for public investment in development proj ects.
“For example,” she says, “when I worked for the secretary of  water, we 
 were paying for one hundred wastewater treatment plants, but only twenty 
of them  were operational. It was highly po liti cal. But that was an unaccept-
able burden on public finances.”
She says she has developed a reputation within the administration for 
being cutthroat with traditional entitlements. “They call me Kill Bill  behind 
my back,” she laughs, “Like I’ve got a katana for them.”
Sipping on a beer, she says that being in government has been the hard-
est eigh teen months of her life. “I love this city, and I’m a  little romantic and 
believe some  things could change. You know the saying: ‘Yo soy feliz, pero 
no estoy feliz’ [I’m a happy person, but not happy right now]. Many days are 
 really bad. But at least the state now has the  will if not the tools to improve 
 things.”
The prob lem with wind power, she tells us, is that the state government 
essentially has no  legal jurisdiction over it. “We have no direct investment in 
wind power at all. And what happens is that companies come to us, or more 
often, they just go straight to the municipalities, find partners, and  settle 
 there. It just leaves us out of the game.”
We ask what authority the state has to tax foreign wind companies.
“Essentially none,  because we  don’t have a state law yet to regulate wind 
power development. Currently, the payments all go to the municipalities for 
land use or to the federal government for permits.” In general, she explains, 
state governments have  little authority to levy taxes in Mexico. “Ninety- five 
 percent of our bud get comes from a federal disbursement system, which 
makes us incredibly dependent upon Mexico City. And you only get more 
[funding] if you collect more taxes for them. So [tax collecting] is what we 
have to concentrate on.”
102 chapter three
She supports wind power, she says, “but I also believe the parks are hav-
ing a serious environmental impact. The oil the turbines use goes right into 
the soil. Can it be cleaned? Who’s  going to pay for it?”
She speaks in terms of pareto optimal solutions and game theory. “I do 
believe in wind power. But what are the available games? Who’s the winner, 
the communities or the companies? Let’s mea sure it. You can think what 
you want about the  people in the isthmus, that  they’re lazy and just want 
money from the companies. But they are acting this way  because they are 
in a game.”
She likes the idea of community- owned wind parks even more. “We need 
our  people to own  things and have their share, not just rent our lands. The 
government should put capital into it to remove risk. If we had public funds 
or credits, cheap credits, that would be good. But we  can’t do a wind park 
entirely as a public investment; it’s not feasible and not right. We need the 
private sector’s sense of efficiency and profitability.9 We  don’t have that  here.” 
She cites her own pi lot program to give her staf performance- based pay as 
an example. “When they do something well and receive a check, they are 
very suspicious, ‘Why are you paying me more all of a sudden?’ ”
She likes the idea of Oaxaca entering the industrial supply chain of wind 
power most of all. “We have to get into the supply chain. Other wise we are 
just land providers and rent receivers. No more than that.”
At nine  o’clock, Abardia has to return to work for a  couple more hours 
before  going home for the day. We express admiration for her dedication. 
Before parting, she leaves us with two further impediments that the state 
 faces in developing a better wind power strategy.
First of all,  there is a trust issue. “Many  people think we are the same cor-
rupt government as before, and to be honest with you, I’m not sure that  we’re 
not. I’m not sure  we’re not corrupt anymore.”
And second is the prob lem of administrative competence. “The coordi-
nator for renewable energy we appointed was a complete disaster. He’s gone 
now, but we have nobody on it.”
Logical Creatures
The vacuum surrounding renewable energy in the state government endured 
a while longer. Another round of phone calls in August fi nally revealed that 
a new Coordinador de Energías Renovables (coordinator of renewable en-
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ergy) had been appointed, Sinaí Casillas Cano. That information led us to 
the aforementioned empty office.
Casillas had no background in government, and we could find no pub-
licly available information about him beyond his Facebook page, which was 
dominated by pictures of his wife and  children and testaments to his Evan-
gelical faith. It featured status updates like “Love for Christ is not every-
thing, it’s the only  thing” and “My identity comes from God.” But he had 
also posted, “Blockade a store, a government office, a street,  etc.? No! That is 
a  union strategy of strug gle. It is blockading the  future of our  children and 
the  future of Oaxaca. Anyone who  can’t see that is an  enemy of Oaxaca.” 
In the midst of the fiercely contested Mexican presidential election of 2012, 
Casillas’s social media also made no secret of his distaste for the pri and 
their candidate, Enrique Peña Nieto, whom he assailed with vari ous posts 
accusing him of corruption, lies, ignorance, and disinformation.
When Casillas fi nally arrives, he apologizes for having kept us waiting, 
squints at the vacant desk, and then motions us over to the small  table.  Casillas 
is friendly and speaks frankly, although he relates  later that his ten years 
working as a journalist have left him cagey about making public statements 
and having  those misinterpreted. Like the other members of Cué’s govern-
ment we have met, Casillas seems somehow too young for his position. 
Nonetheless he demonstrates a good grasp of the difficulties facing him in 
his job, in par tic u lar the need to address in some way the mounting conflicts 
surrounding wind power in the isthmus. It is a situation, he says, “that can-
not be denied.”
Shaking his head, he laments the ignorance (desconocimiento) surround-
ing renewable energy in general in Oaxaca and specifically wind energy. 
“This ignorance afects all segments of society. That is, it’s not just an igno-
rance of less educated  people, it’s a general state of ignorance. And what has 
been lacking, obviously, is work by the state government and the companies, 
timely and strategic work, to raise awareness and create knowledge about 
what this form of energy could represent for  people living in the region.” 
We have heard such sentiments before and  will hear them many times again 
from dif er ent voices representing the state and federal governments. Any 
re sis tance to wind power is rooted in a lack of understanding or awareness 
of its potential benefits. Once experts inform the  people as to the beneficios 
(benefits), they  will inevitably come around.
Yet Casillas is also not an apologist for the status quo. He is not naïve, for ex-
ample, about inequities in the distribution of benefits in the autoabastecimiento 
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model. On another occasion, he admits to us quietly that the Yansa- Ixtepec 
model is “prob ably the best pos si ble scenario” even if he is doubtful that it 
can ever be realized. For now, he assures us that STyDE has a plan to set 
 things on a better path, to get the state government more actively involved 
in managing wind development in the isthmus.
As he explains the plan, he picks up a piece of paper and sketches out 
three squares in a triangular pattern. In one box, he writes the names of 
actors in wind development (academics, municipios, ejidos, companies, 
ngos). In a second box, he writes themes that  matter to vari ous stakehold-
ers (social development,  legal framework of land tenancy, environmental 
impact). And in the third box, he writes the names of state and federal gov-
ernment agencies that should be involved in managing wind development 
( cfe, STyDE, segego, sai).10
The objective is to create a new state- level reglamento (regulatory frame-
work) for renewable energy development whose content would be de-
veloped through an esquema participativo (participatory scheme). But it 
quickly becomes clear that the only participants in this scheme  will be the 
government and academic researchers. Los académicos, Casillas explains, are 
the specialists in the themes that  matter. “It’s not  going to revolve around 
the other groups of actors. That is to say, we  don’t want debates.  We’re not 
interested in more debate  because they already debate a lot and in a very 
disorderly way.”
Order is a recurrent theme in Casillas’s narrative, as is the puntual (fast, 
efficient) use of time. A Protestant ethic, Oaxacan style.11 Giving vari ous 
stakeholders the opportunity to further debate one another, he opines, 
would only waste time. In order to undertake meaningful action, the gov-
ernment needs facts, presented in an orderly way.
“We have to do very timely content work. The academics  will obviously 
have their opinions about  these themes, as do all the other actors.  Those 
opinions  will result in adjustments to our laws and to the formation of this 
reglamento. This  isn’t  going to be some kind of forum promoting renewable 
energy; this is  going to be trabajo muy puntual (very efficient work), whose 
objective is a carefully structured regulatory policy whose contents  will 
be developed in an orderly participatory way, with a proper structure.”
Still, Casillas is convinced that all  these academics  will be able to channel 
the vari ous interests and perspectives of dif er ent stakeholders in such a way 
as to allow the government to develop a regulatory framework with broad 
legitimacy. If the reglamento does not have legitimacy, he says gravely,  there 
is no point at all in  going through the exercise.
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“We cannot silence  those  people who are opposed to the proj ect [of wind 
development]. They are opposing it for some reason, for better or for worse. 
And likewise, we  can’t simply listen to  those who support the proj ect  because 
they only represent half the story.  Those who are in  favor have a truth that 
is very clear and precise to them, but  those who are against also have a truth 
that surely has a razón de ser” (reason to be).
He speaks glowingly of the documentos (documents) that the esquema 
 will generate, each of which  will bring  those reasons for being into com-
prehensible and actionable truth forms;  after a while, the plurality of docu-
mentation fades, and Casillas shifts to speaking of a single documento, a 
compendium of truth that begins to sound a bit like another sacred text.12
“Right now  there are some who are only negative, negative, negative, 
without a real justification, no? Then  there are  those who are strictly in  favor 
but never think about the prob lems. The document we want to generate  will 
have all of this balanced. Honestly, not every one  will like it, this document, 
this reglamento, but it is the only way that investment  will take place in an 
orderly fashion, that communities  will receive benefits and understand what 
 these benefits  really consist of.”
Casillas even reiterates the Mimiagas’ vision of a city of experts rising 
from the arid plains of the isthmus, a biopo liti cal vista of white- collar pro-
fessional opportunities extending the horizons of Oaxacan  children. “We 
can imagine how within twenty or thirty years, the impor tant  human re-
sources of  these companies, the technicians,  will be Oaxaqueños. Even if 
right now we  don’t occupy  those positions, it’s our vision.”
The one wrinkle— not an insignificant one— that emerges  toward the end 
of the conversation is that the state government has no funding to undertake 
its plan of action. Casillas says STyDE is discussing possibilities for funding 
the plan with usaid, with iadb (the Inter- American Development Bank), 
and even with the World Bank. “Honestly, it’s not just the state administra-
tion of Oaxaca that lacks funding. None of the state governments in Mexico 
would have sufficient resources to take on this type of proj ect.”
Still, Casillas ends the interview on an optimistic note. Even though 
 locating funding may be challenging, he thinks that their plan is sound and 
necessary. Only the regulatory role of the state government can guarantee 
that community interests and developer interests  will be balanced in the 
long run. Tension  will be reduced, benefits  will spread to all. Again, his 
idiom reaches for the divinity of reason and order: “We  aren’t demigods, but 
we are logical creatures  after all. This is a logical plan and one that we think 
 will work.”
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Sinaí Casillas Cano exudes conviction and seriousness. We leave his office 
sympathetic to the spirit of the intervention but also wondering  whether the 
change, if it comes,  will be too  little too late. With so many wind park proj ects 
already contracted and  under construction, with the evacuation capacity of 
Ixtepec Potencia nearly filled, with no funding or  actual timeline for the par-
ticipatory esquema confirmed, could a new state governmental reglamento 
 really combat ignorance let alone retroactively address the tensions that have 
emerged from existing conocimiento (knowledge) of experiences with wind 
developers, their contracts, and the turbines proliferating across the Oaxacan 
landscape? Could state governmental regulation truly undo the capitalcen-
tric logic of autoabastecimiento wind development? Could it transform the 
energopo liti cal enablements of grid infrastructure and electricity provision 
in such a way as to allow the government’s biopo liti cal aspirations to flourish?
And more than this, Casillas’s hands are tied by the character of Mexican 
federalism itself, which, as Abardia noted, allows its states precious  little fi-
nancial autonomy. A Mexican po liti cal analyst estimated in 2005 that the 
Mexican federal government collected 95  percent of the total revenue in the 
country even though state and local governments made 48  percent of public 
expenditures, leaving “state and municipal governments with a very small 
margin of action and flexibility for the  future definition of their expendi-
tures.”13 Without the right to levy corporate taxes to support their regulatory 
eforts, for example, Mexican state governments had to  either beg Mexico 
City or, in this case, international aid organ izations for the right to proceed.
Casillas, though himself a native of Ixtepec, admits that he has not had 
the opportunity to personally travel through the isthmus, to the towns af-
fected by wind development, to hear about expectations, experiences, and 
concerns firsthand. His directorate seems to consist only of himself, which 
doubtless makes the image of a host of externally funded academics bearing 
truth to his door so attractive. Even as Casillas speaks of the widespread 
ignorance of the promise of renewable energy, he strug gles against his own 
ignorance as to what is unfolding in the isthmus, a lack of knowledge evi-
dently owed less to lack of interest than to lack of resources and perhaps to 
lack of status within the administrative hierarchy.
Having made the rounds of the state bureaucracy, we saw clearly that 
Cué’s government had a relatively weak grasp on the administration of wind 
power.  There  were good intentions in Oaxaca City, a commitment in princi-
ple to renewable energy generation and distant visions of prosperity associ-
ated with wind power.  There was also considerable desire to claim jurisdiction 
over the harvesting of the isthmus winds, to play a salvational role in unit-
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ing communities and companies in a common purpose, to exert balance, 
purpose, and design over a pro cess that seemed particularistic and chaotic 
from the vantage point of the Oaxacan Valley. It was a tantalizing develop-
mental opportunity, perhaps the best one the isthmus had ever seen. Yet the 
Oaxacan state, through a combination of  legal, financial, and spatial impedi-
ments, had scarcely any role in governing it.
Since, however, “the state” has many ele ments in Mexico as elsewhere,14 we 
thought it would make sense to return to the pri party, whose networks had 
so successfully brokered the autoabastecimiento development scheme in the 
first place. To what extent had Oaxacan priismo and its priistas been able to 
maintain their hold over wind power even  after the rupture of their party- state?
L@s Diputad@s
This question pointed us to the pri party headquarters in Oaxaca City, an 
unassuming tangerine- hued compound in the upscale Reforma neighbor-
hood. We are able to meet with the current and former chairs of the Oaxa-
can state congress’s Comisión Permanente de Fomento de Energía Renov-
able (Permanent Commission to Promote Renewable Energy), Rosia Nidia 
 Villalobos and Francisco García López, both pri representatives of isthmus 
constituencies. We know that both Villalobos and García are power ful and 
controversial po liti cal figures who are frequently accused of corruption by 
opponents, yet they remain resilient in their high- ranking positions within 
both state- level and regional pri networks. García acts also as the coordinator 
of the pri del e ga tion in the state congress; a  little over a year  later, Villalobos 
 will become mayor of Salina Cruz, the largest city in the isthmus. Beyond this, 
the Permanent Commission is the most obvious sign of Oaxacan congressional 
attention to renewable energy.
Large glossy prints of presidential candidate Enrique Peña Nieto on the 
campaign trail greet visitors to the party headquarters. We are given  bottles 
of  water labeled “61st State Congress” and are asked to wait in a conference 
room. A short while  later, Villalobos, García, and three of their deputies 
join us. The meeting begins with a slight edge of wariness, but once cofees 
have been distributed and our intentions clarified to their satisfaction, the 
conversation becomes friendly and lively.
They explain to us that their commission has existed since 2010 to make 
sure that the state congress maintains a strong focus on renewable energy 
development. It has not been easy, however. Villalobos blames the Cué 
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government for a lack of coordination and communication with the congress 
and federal government and for assigning renewable energy a low priority 
in the ministry of economic development. This lack of coordination has left 
developers unsuccessfully trying to inform comuneros and ejidatarios about 
the benefits of their proj ects and allowed ngos focused on “social conflicts” 
to enrich themselves by “generating inconformity for no reason at all.”15
It quickly becomes clear that their knowledge of the local po liti cal nuances 
of wind development is considerably greater than that displayed by our other 
interlocutors in Oaxaca City. One of their deputies, Joaquin, seems particu-
larly well informed. He explains that  there are a variety of prob lems in the 
isthmus related to wind development that have to be addressed. How sorghum 
production is declining as agricultural lands are being fallowed in  favor of 
wind turbines is one issue. Discrepancies in rental contracts are another. 
Joaquin discusses how the first rounds of land contracts set rental rates at 
less than half of what they are now, which has led to protests and highway 
blockades.
“So we feel that our initiative has to seek to normalize this. We also have 
to normalize the kind of assistance that companies give communities. It’s 
been the case that some just give money to the mayor, to the commissariats, 
maybe ten million pesos in some cases. What they do with the payments 
is up to them, and some do good  things, and some  don’t. That has generated 
a lot of inconformity as well.”
García interrupts to praise the former governor, Ulises Ruiz,16 for having 
done more than any other government in Oaxacan history to help regular-
ize land tenancy, ofering to waive fees for land registration to help acceler-
ate the pro cess of defining private- property owner ship. The prob lem, in his 
view, is that the current government has not taken this area of development 
very seriously; it has dissolved the power ful position occupied by Fernando 
Mimiaga Sosa (“not often credited, but a real visionary”) and fractured it 
among several other offices.
García says he is strongly in  favor of wind development for how it has 
brought new wealth to the isthmus. “Look at someone like Porfirio Montero. 
He bought land left and right, rented it to the companies, and now he is very 
successful. He even has built his own com pany, Poder Istmo.” But he is will-
ing to admit that  there  were prob lems in the early days with land specula-
tion, with foreign companies like Preneal “coming in like coyotes, hoarding 
land, acting like monopolists, then  later selling to other companies.” That led 
to a lack of trust with some communities who did not know with whom they 
 were  really dealing.
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And, Villalobos weighs in,  there have been prob lems with the distribu-
tion of benefits beyond the landowners. “This so- called second conquest 
that one hears easily and often in the isthmus, it describes encountering 
Spaniards in the restaurants, in the gas stations, all the efort that has been 
expended to renovate  houses for them, to build new  houses and  hotels. 
 There is another side, of course. In La Venta, for example, this was essen-
tially a forgotten town. Now it has a main street that has been paved, the 
schools have benefitted, the new  houses and cars,  there are  people with 
means now. But not every one. That is the prob lem, that it has not been pos-
si ble to translate  those benefits beyond  those who own land. The beneficio 
comunitario [community benefit] is still very small. And it is worth noting 
that the mayors make a good business of the permits for change of land use 
and construction.”
Truly an istmeño priista at heart, García singles out the former cocei 
mayor of Juchitán, Héctor Sánchez López, and his network as a group that 
allows itself to be purchased by companies. “They have an obtuse vision of 
their role. Instead of using  those funds for social development in the com-
munity, such ‘leaders’ just keep the companies’ payments for themselves.”
Joaquin, echoing Abardia and Casillas, mentions that the question of 
payments also raises the question of the limits of state authority: “An impor-
tant issue is that any contract concerning the production of electricity is 
 under federal authority. It’s a national question, involving cfe. So we have 
to be careful not to interfere.”
On the other hand, any agreement (convenio) regarding social development 
would be made with the municipios and thus falls  under local authority. “[In 
the state government]  we’re in a very delicate position, we  can’t be seen to be 
invading la competencia federal [federal jurisdiction]. So we are looking care-
fully at federal law, particularly the law on renewable energy, to see  whether 
 there are lineamientos jurídicos [ legal guidelines]  under which the state gov-
ernment would have jurisdiction, frankly, the power to promote more wind 
development in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. This is still  under discussion.”
Villalobos informs us that the Permanent Commission has in mind to 
or ga nize its own set of forums, three of them over the next year. “One to 
hear from academics, intellectuals, and students; another from comuneros, 
ejidatarios, and mayors; and then fi nally a third forum for developers and 
companies.” The first forum  will be sponsored by a university; the third by 
a wind com pany, possibly Iberdrola; and the second  will be or ga nized by 
 García himself and  will take place in Juchitán. “ These forums represent three 
distinct visions, and we want them all to participate and to speak with us.”
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Our interview ended with a warm invitation to attend all three forums. 
In the months that followed, we bumped into García from time to time in 
Oaxaca City, and the invitations  were repeated. However, none of the fo-
rums ever took place. We  were curious why  until we interviewed another 
Permanent Commission member some months  later, Margarita García García 
of the Citizen’s Movement Party, who let it slip that the Permanent Commis-
sion had never even held a single meeting.
For her, the commission “unfortunately did not have a real agenda,” nor 
did it have any funding. She believed that forums would help a  great deal, 
but she doubted the leadership of her fellow diputad@s.
“It’s a huge prob lem that we have so  little contact with the citizens  there 
[in the isthmus].  There is so much ignorance, . . .  but my sense is that  those 
in the pri  don’t  really want to know anything,  because they are the ones 
said to be selling the lands and helping the companies to enter without 
explaining to anyone what benefit the  people  will get. It’s the same every-
where. . . .  In the isthmus, more than anything, they lie about how long 
the contracts are for.  These are  humble  people. And when they see a  little 
money, they want to take it. But it’s not  until a year or two  later when the 
[turbine] towers go up that they  really begin to understand the finality of 
what has happened.”
Highlighting the inefficacy of the Permanent Commission is not to doubt 
that the pri party continued to exercise considerable authority over Oaxacan 
wind development. In the isthmus anyway, the pri networks  were potent, 
and their caciques and operators  were capable of creating and removing 
roadblocks (sometimes literally) to proj ect development (see chapter  5), 
especially when they worked in concert with their subsidiary construction 
and transportation  unions. We had also witnessed the efficacy of the Mim-
iagas’ organ ization at work in 2009 (see chapter 2) and knew that several 
of their operatives in the isthmus had  later been rewarded with impor tant 
positions in regional government or had gone to work for wind developers. 
The pri had been playing the game of corporatist patron- clientage in the 
isthmus for de cades and, even in the face of impressive oppositional net-
works like cocei and prd, they remained skilled at it.17 Indeed, across the 
isthmus, Francisco García López, known often by his local nickname “Paco 
Pisa,” was considered an impor tant po liti cal promoter and fixer for the wind 
companies. In the heat of the Mareña Renovables conflict in late 2012 and 
early 2013, a journalist told us his sources  were telling him that García was 
receiving one to two million pesos monthly to help the developer defuse the 
mounting re sis tance to their proj ect.18
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What is doubtful is that, in 2012 anyway, priismo found institutions of 
state government to be their most efficient vehicle for the exercise of po liti cal 
authority over wind power development. Fernando Mimiaga had occupied 
a position in the Oaxacan governmental bureaucracy, but it is notable that 
he also exerted significant authority through party and personal alliances 
in the isthmus. That said, his bureaucratic position had obviously meant a 
 great deal,  because he faded into the background relatively soon  after being 
forced from his office in 2010. So perhaps it was the broader rupture in the 
pri party- state organ ization in 2010 that caused his patronage network to 
fall into disarray. Without the existence of stabilizing transregional party- 
political channels, the extant  legal frameworks, as Joaquin put it, left state 
government in “a very delicate position,” navigating between federal and 
local jurisdictions concerning electricity, corporate income, and land. The 
delicacy of state po liti cal and financial authority within Mexican federalism 
only reinforced this condition.
One could interpret the existence of vacant renewable energy offices, 
curiously ghostly participatory schemes and permanent commissions, and 
proliferating speculative forum proposals simply as symptoms of transi-
tional or neglectful governmental practice, but they suggest also an impor-
tant mode of po liti cal theater.  These seemingly hollow po liti cal practices 
resonate with the destabilization of late liberal po liti cal ontologies elsewhere 
in the world.19 And in this re spect, they say something not only about the 
structural efects of Mexican federalism and the hallucinatory character 
of pretensions to sovereignty absent the right of taxation but also about a 
broader phenomenon that Michael Bobick terms in another context “per-
formative sovereignty.”20 Bobick argues— building upon his analy sis of the 
“unrecognized state,” Transnistria— that sovereignty is “not simply an attri-
bute of a state, but a pro cess that is performative in nature. . . .  Per for mance 
is the defining feature of statehood.” One might add that where normative, 
“legitimate” politics is restricted or  limited, the performative dimension of 
sovereignty becomes all the more intensified. As we have seen, Oaxacan 
state sovereignty was also phantasmatic in this way, at least in terms of its 
 doings and sayings with re spect to wind development.21
As wind development accelerated from 2009 to 2012, the weakening in-
tegrative capacity of priismo revealed just how  little sovereign authority the 
Oaxacan state actually possessed, how  little capacity it had to govern what 
its po liti cal functionaries generally agreed was a wonderful opportunity for 
the second- poorest state in Mexico to make good on biopo liti cal promises of 
development in one of its poorest regions. As  things stood, if prosperity came, 
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the Oaxacan state would scarcely be credited with it; if alienation and con-
flict ran rampant, the state would be blamed for its failure to mediate con-
tentious politics and to maintain the rule of law.  There was a palpable sense 
of paralysis that hung over our interviews and conversations in Oaxaca City. 
From that paralysis came the distinctive proleptic fantasies of sovereign 
authority discussed above, overcoming “so  little contact” with the citizens 
of the isthmus, generating truthful documents, constituting legitimate rule 
through the veridicality of expert authority, making sure that la comunidad 
fi nally saw benefits equitably distributed. Aeolian politics, in other words, 
had become a pivotal site for the imagination and per for mance of Oaxacan 
state sovereignty in 2012–13.
A particularly fine example of such performative sovereignty in action 
was the one forum on renewable energy that did take place in Oaxaca City 
during the period of our field research, the Segundo Foro Internacional de 
Energías Renovables (Second International Forum on Renewable Energy, or 
fier). This event was not only a testament to the state government’s eforts 
to proj ect its “ordering” capacity over the rising tensions in the isthmus— 
seeking thereby to supplant  these with a carefully orchestrated image of in-
exorable and beneficent technocratic achievement— but also of how the 
unruly turbulent forces associated with istmeño wind could shred such 
sovereign per for mance and lay its fundamental artifice bare.
Of Smoke and FIER
The courtyard  behind the sixteenth- century Templo de Santo Domingo de 
Guzmán is buzzing with activity. Young men in suits dodge around purpose-
fully carry ing  binders. Young  women in silk blouses and slacks chat in small 
groups nearby.  There are perhaps 150  people, many of them well- dressed 
university students, sitting on folding chairs  under a large white tent, casu-
ally looking at programs or holding them up to deflect the oblique light of 
the morning sun. The setting, Oaxaca’s Jardín Etnobotánico, is stunning, a 
magnificent cele bration of the botanical diversity and civilizational depth 
of Oaxaca by artists Francisco Toledo and Luis Zárate and ethnobiologist 
Alexandro de Ávila. The jardín contains more than seven thousand plant 
specimens, representing the full climatological spectrum of the state; the 
garden’s design and installations reference the cultural diversity of Oaxaca’s 
indigenous  peoples and their pre- Columbian heritage. The imperial heritage 
of Oaxaca is indexed as well, particularly the stands of Opuntia cacti used 
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traditionally to cultivate cochineals, beetles that  were ground to release their 
carminic acid, the basis of a prized scarlet dye. In centuries past, Oaxacans 
 were forced to ofer that dye as tribute to Aztec emperors and the Spanish 
crown.22 Not far from the tent, Toledo’s sculpture La Sangre de Mitla drips 
cochineal- dyed red  water over a large slab of Montezuma cypress. As part 
of the iconic templo complex, the jardín materializes—as much as any one 
space could— the biotic, historical, and cultural texture of Oaxaca as an en-
tity, sovereign and singular.
Every one is awaiting the imminent arrival of Governor Cué to inaugurate 
the Second International Forum on Renewable Energy ( fier). When he and 
his entourage of functionaries are seen rounding the corner of the templo, the 
organizers quickly begin to assem ble into an informal welcome line, which 
Cué dutifully zigzags across, shaking hands and exchanging greetings. Cué 
is, as befits his public image, dressed a  little more casually than some, in a 
navy blazer and tan slacks, a light- blue shirt open without a tie. He spies 
Eduardo Andrade, the director of Iberdrola Mexico, standing next to Por-
firio Montero and engages them briskly but warmly. Montero slaps Cué on 
the back, and  after Cué turns away, Andrade slaps Montero on the back. 
Brotherly afection fills the air. Cué works his way to the front of the audi-
ence, several photog raphers on his heels. Some in the audience hold up their 
tablets and smartphones to capture an image as he passes by.
 There are several short speeches of welcome before Cué’s. The governor 
is introduced by the rector of the Universidad Tecnológica de los Valles 
FIGURE 3.2.   Second International Forum on Renewable Energy (fier), Oaxaca City
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Centrales ( utvco), Julián Luna Santiago. The utvco is the primary or-
ga nizer of fier and, though a partnership with University of Freiburg in 
Germany, received daad support to help fund the event.23 Luna Santiago 
proudly announces to the governor that they are welcoming experts in re-
newable energy from Germany, Brazil, China, Colombia, the Philippines, and 
Romania. Perhaps seeing double, he informs the governor that the audience 
is composed of three hundred university students who are studying  careers in 
vari ous aspects of renewable energy. Luna Santiago then speaks of the moral 
imperative of the Kyoto Protocol, of the looming dangers of climate change, 
of a planet that has warmed 0.76 degrees Celsius in only a de cade. Becom-
ing more animated, he gestures to the assembled international experts in the 
front row, inventing an entirely new adjectival lexicon for renewable energy.
“We have to listen to our older  brothers in adapting to tender energy 
 [energías blandas], to healthy energy [energías saludables].  Today we work to-
gether with youths with new ways of thinking. Above all, we are analyzing this 
potential that we have around La Ventosa, how we can adapt what we have in 
the waist [cintura] of Mexico. Above all, I want us to stop talking only about 
how Oaxaca is one of the five states with the greatest solar irradiation and to 
start saying also that we have this favorable wind, above all, for friendly en-
ergy [energías amigables], for energy that  will not contaminate. We stand  here 
 today in the very cradle of Oaxaca de Juaréz to change, to set the foundation, 
to place a new rung on the ladder of development of this country.”
FIGURE 3.3.   Gabino Cué speaking at fier
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Brisk applause follows, and Cué advances to the podium, radiating his 
own friendly energy.
 After thanking the organizers and assembled dignitaries, Cué launches 
into a brief prepared speech.  Here is the heart of it:
My dear friends, since the beginning of the industrial revolution, 
 humanity has confronted the degradation of natu ral resources to the 
point of risking the equilibria of ecosystems and the  future of our next 
generations. It is thus of the greatest importance that society transi-
tions to the generalized use of clean, renewable energy. In Oaxaca, 
as  others have already mentioned, we are putting  great force  behind 
 developing the multiple advantages and benefits of wind energy in the 
Isthmus of Tehuantepec, a geographic zone of world- class strategic 
importance in terms of wind energy production and development. We 
are opening new opportunities for investment and employment within 
a framework of legality and consensus, respecting the restrictions of 
local ecosystems and the decisions of local communities themselves.
To date, the wind corridor in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec generates 
more than 938 megawatts across eleven parks, and seven companies 
have installed 685 turbines covering an area of eight thousand hect-
ares, having invested close to $1,900 million.  There are currently four 
further parks in development that  will begin operating in 2013 and 
contribute a further capacity of 462 megawatts, via 339 turbines, on a 
surface area of three thousand hectares, with an additional investment 
of $864 million.
Cué goes on to speak of his government’s commitment to respecting all 
Oaxaca’s cultures and identities and traditional ways of life as well its natu ral 
resources and biodiversity. In closing, he pauses, looks at the audience for a 
moment, and then decides to go of script to underscore where his govern-
ment stands on wind power.
“I know that this is a very sensitive topic in Oaxaca right now. We have 
discussed it, and the government of this state would do nothing, it would 
promote no proj ect at the expense of our naturaleza [natu ral environment] 
if it  were to put our communities at risk or our environment or our biodi-
versity.” He pauses again, then continues, “We know that  there are certain 
concerns in some sectors of the population, but we  will be the first to be 
vigilant that this type of investment  will contribute to the strug gle against 
climate change and that it  will be generous to the welfare of our commu-
nities. And obviously we  will make certain that it  doesn’t go against our 
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environment or against our good communal coexistence” (nuestra buena con-
vivencia comunal).
More applause follows. Cué has testified to the biopo liti cal and ecopo liti-
cal commitments of the state government; he has ofered a portrait of loss-
less flow between the attraction of foreign investment, the planetary strug gle 
against climate change, the preservation of natu ral biodiversity, and the im-
provement of communal welfare. Above all, he has performed the legitimacy 
and sovereignty of the post- pri Oaxacan state; the state that listens, reflects, 
re spects; that operates consensually, transparently, and vigilantly. The audi-
ence responds. Most seem to want to believe him. We want to believe him.
Cué departs before the panels begin, stopping briefly to hold an impromptu 
press conference at the side of the tent before waving to the assembly and leav-
ing the jardín quickly. In his absence, something feels lacking, and cracks 
quickly start to become vis i ble in the image of pro gress, unity, and legiti-
macy that the governor so ably conjured.
First of all, an announcement is made that due to the nonappearance of 
several speakers, the three panels  will be condensed into two. The first panel, 
“Challenges of Renewable Energy in Emergent Economies,” bears  little re-
semblance to what has been promised in the program. The representatives 
from cfe and enel Green Power are not  there, and the minister of STyDE 
has sent Sinaí Casillas to read a prepared statement in his place. They are 
joined by a German professor of management studies, a state diputado for 
the pan party (the National Action Party), Isaac Rodríguez Soto represent-
ing the Pochutla district of the Costa region of Oaxaca, and Mayor Dan-
iel Gurrión Matías of Juchitán. The surprise guest on the panel is Jonathan 
Davis Arzac, the executive chairman of the Macquarie Mexican Infrastruc-
ture Fund, who is in Oaxaca City to launch an aggressive public relations 
campaign in support of Macquarie’s embattled Mareña Renovables proj ect 
in San Dionisio del Mar.24
The talks begin well, with the German professor saluting Mexico’s initia-
tive and assuring the assembly that they are making wise investments in their 
 future. In Germany, with all its renewable energy, he notes proudly, electricity 
prices are declining.25
Casillas then reads from his sheaf of papers, adding more statistics but 
other wise staying very close to Cué’s inaugural narrative. He laments that 
only 24  percent of electricity in Mexico currently comes from “air, sun, and 
 water,” compared with 76  percent from fossil fuels. “The government of this 
state considers the development of renewable energy to represent a  great 
opportunity for corporate investment but also a  great possibility for many 
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communities in this state who can reach a better form of social and eco-
nomic development. . . .  Renewable energy represents the best possibility 
for many communities to develop their capacities. . . .  The beneficiaries are 
three: the communities, the companies, and our environment.”
Every thing about Davis Arzac, from his name to his suit, is chilango.26 
But he speaks softly, rev er ent ly, almost pleadingly, so that the Oaxacan audi-
ence  will accept the legitimacy of his proj ect. He identifies the investors, the 
vari ous permissions the proj ect has received, the many successful negotia-
tions with landowners that have already taken place. He thanks  every level 
of government for “incredible support, indispensable support.” He notes the 
one million tons of carbon dioxide that the proj ect  will ofset each year. But 
he reserves his most impassioned commentary for the communities who 
 will benefit through direct and indirect employment, whom his com pany 
views as partners, who  will also benefit through the sale of energy.
“We are a com pany that understands that success for a business like ours 
truly depends on the population feeling comfortable [with us] and that we 
are respectful of the environment. That is, it would be suicide to try to do 
something other than this. We  wouldn’t last even two years in operation! . . . 
What we need to have is the community by our side, and we can, all of us, 
live together in peace and in a harmonious manner. We can achieve a com-
mon good and make an impor tant leap forward in terms of development in 
 these communities.”
So far, so good, but with Mayor Daniel Gurrión’s speech, diferences of 
interest become amplified. Gurrión, the scion of a power ful Juchitán con-
struction empire and one of the most power ful pri clans in the isthmus, 
is smooth and charming. Although trained as a dentist,  there is something 
about his way of speaking that is reminiscent of a boxer: he embraces, feints, 
darts, hits, moves on.
He says this is a time when entrepreneurs and  people in government need 
to be talking more about “responsibility.” Gurrión gestures to Davis Arzac 
and says that Macquarie is one of the responsible companies, and he enjoys 
working with them, even with all the prob lems they are facing. But what 
bothers him, he says, is that no one is talking about what municipalities are 
paying for electricity ser vice. “I am paying, what, a million and a half for 
public lighting in Juchitán? And everywhere you look around town you see 
wind turbines. Something is wrong with that.” He says that el tema social 
(the social question) has been neglected  under the government of Calderón, 
and he hopes it  will be a priority for the next government. “I’ve been trying 
to convince the Ministry of Energy to let us have two turbines just for the 
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city to help solve this prob lem. Can you imagine what it’s like having to pay 
cfe a million and a half?  Every month! But talking with the government 
goes nowhere. So far, they are deaf to us.”
Diputado Rodríguez speaks next, and he responds somewhat defensively 
to Gurrión. In addition to the federal legislation promoting renewable energy 
development, he says, the state of Oaxaca actually has a regulatory law dating 
from the final months of the Ruiz administration (in 2010), a law of coordi-
nation for the promotion and sustainable use of renewable energy sources. 
Unfortunately, he says as he throws up his hands, this statute has not been 
efectively implemented, in part  because as a law of coordination, it requires 
voluntary participation from the companies, the federal government agencies, 
and the local government, which is difficult to or ga nize, especially when all 
 these partners are thinking solely in terms of their own interests. “But what 
is certain,” he says, “is that we have to create an equilibrium between private 
enterprise, all three levels of government, [and] society, with individuals, with 
the commissariats of bienes comunales and bienes ejidales, [and] with local 
authorities.” To this end, he thinks that wind companies’ current federal and 
municipal payments need to be redesigned so that the state receives payment 
as well “since, in the end, it is us who is responsible for keeping the peace when 
something goes wrong.” He also criticizes the companies for headquartering 
in Mexico City, which drives all the local tax revenues  toward the capital, 
meaning “all the economic growth is happening  there and not in municipali-
ties that need it.”
The question- and- answer period becomes a lightning round of further 
indictments of the government and the companies. Porfirio Montero— who 
is, aside from Gurrión, the only istmeño involved in fier in any formal 
capacity— comments from the audience that the government presence is so 
 little that it “could drown in a teacup” in the isthmus, that despite all the 
money  going to la federación, as he puts it, the poor municipios receive next 
to nothing. Looking meaningfully at Gurrión, Montero mentions that no 
part of what is paid to the municipios for change of land use ever makes 
it back to private landowners like him. Calderón is to blame, but so is the 
mayor of Juchitán.
Gurrión fires back at Montero that it is the law in Mexico that companies 
have to pay their tax to the municipality in which they are operating,  simple 
as that. But Gurrión then takes advantage of having the microphone to 
go on the ofensive again against the companies, wondering why they do not 
pay an annual license fee to the city, as a bank or even a poor street vendor 
would.
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Rodríguez speaks up in defense of the government, saying that all  these 
“bad vibes and resentment” about the government are  really misplaced. The 
government is trying, and the Oaxacan government in par tic u lar has been 
innovative with their coordination law, given that they lack real jurisdiction 
 under federal law.
In the next round of questions,  people won der why this fier event was 
never advertised in the isthmus and why so few representatives from the 
isthmus have been given a place on the program. Carlos Beas, the firebrand 
leader of ucizoni— a Magonista istmeño activist organ ization that has been 
fighting cfe, wind power, and other megaproyectos in the isthmus for years— 
says that “something smells rotten in the isthmus.”27  After ten years of wind 
development, what benefit are  these communities  really receiving? Their elec-
tricity bills are still very high. “In La Venta  there are two hundred turbines, 
but the school  doesn’t have reliable electricity. The ejido of La Venta has ceded 
land to wind turbines that used to provide thousands of tons of food for the 
region. Now a transnational cement maker gets the benefit of their produc-
tivity.” His voice rising, he warns of ethnocide against indigenous  peoples in 
the isthmus, particularly the Huaves. He warns of spreading misery. “This is 
a moment when  those of us in Oaxaca, in the isthmus, need to ask ourselves 
whose interest the generation of wind power is  really serving.”
A Huave leader of the San Dionisio opposition movement then stands to 
denounce the Mareña contract as a document signed by their mayor  behind 
the pueblo’s back without consultation.
FIGURE 3.4.   Questions and answers, fier
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A second Huave man stands, his voice trembling, to ask Davis Arzac ex-
actly how much money he is giving to the federal government, to the state 
government, to the municipal government of San Dionisio and how much 
to el pueblo ikojts (the Huave  people).
The mood is getting anxious, and the bright young men and  women 
organ izing the event are flitting around, shuffling paper, and attending to 
their smartphones with greater intensity. The side conversations erupting 
throughout the crowd rise to a level that makes it a challenge to hear the 
speakers. But Davis Arzac answers at length and in mea sured tones.
He assures the second speaker, Pedro Orozco, that the community  will 
receive 1.5   percent of the net profits of the sale of electricity and that the 
com pany has worked together with “community leaders” to develop a plan 
of infrastructural enhancements of health, sanitation, and transportation 
that  will benefit the entire community. “This is much more, fifteen or twenty 
times more, than what could be done for the pueblo without our investment.”
Orozco does not seem satisfied. “But to conform with the laws would 
mean that we would have had to have signed a contract. Is  there no hope of 
stopping this? Do you intend to proceed by force if necessary, bringing vio-
lence to our pueblo?”
Davis Arzac says, more forcefully than before, “I cannot agree with the 
way you are describing the situation. And I can assure you that we have 
never had, and  will never have, the intention to proceed with force.”
By now a pall has fallen over fier; the per for mance of unity has fully 
dissolved into accusation, suspicion, and a sense of injury on all sides. Cué’s 
discourse is revealed to be a mirage. Even the supporters of wind are turning 
on each other, looking for positional advantage, testing strategies for ex-
tracting more resources from the  others. fier is perhaps the most au then tic 
repre sen ta tion of the turbulent istmeño wind anywhere in the sunny plains 
of the Oaxacan Valley. Late in the day, the German professor drily jokes to 
no one in par tic u lar that he is “learning a lot about the politics of energy in 
Mexico  today.”
Casillas says  little, but shifts frequently in his seat, wincing; the man whose 
cargo (office) it is to oversee wind power development in the state government 
seems unwilling or incapable of bringing order to its unruly participants.
Over the next few days, the Oaxacan news media that covers the fier 
forum publishes accounts that focus on the governor’s statement, on the 
development statistics ofered by vari ous experts, and meanwhile wholly 
ignore the tensions that emerged both among the speakers themselves and 
between the speakers and the audience. This is not unusual for po liti cal 
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coverage in Oaxaca, but against the backdrop of spiraling conflicts concern-
ing wind power in the isthmus, it reminds me of my days studying the East 
German press, when successful governmental action was the ever- reliable 
“news from another planet.”28
Governing the Ungovernable
In front of the civil hospital in Oaxaca City,  there is another remarkable 
sculpture, the Fuente de las Siete Regiones (fountain of the seven regions), 
commissioned by Oaxacan governor Alfonso Pérez Gazga and created col-
laboratively by architect Octavio Flores Aguillón and celebrated artist Carmen 
Carrillo de Antúnez, which was inaugurated in 1957. The overt purpose of 
the fountain followed the logic of the annual Guelaguetza festival, a manifes-
tation of both the deep time of cultural heritage and the unity- in- diversity 
of the indigenous  peoples within a superordinate cultural entity, “Oaxaca.”29 
But also like the Guelaguetza, it is hard to ignore the spatio- political mes-
sage of the Fuente. On a central pedestal is a bronze male dancer from the 
Danza de la Pluma— which is, not incidentally, the closing per for mance of 
the Guelaguetza, representing the war of conquest between the Spanish and 
Aztecs— who towers above six bronze female figures placed equidistantly 
along the edges of the fountain, each representing in her garments and acces-
sories one of the regions of the state (Cañada, Costa, Istmo, Mixteca, Sierra, 
and Tuxtepec). The danzante (dancer) materializes the po liti cal imagination 
of the Oaxacan Valley, a (masculine) survivor of the deadly conquest, who is 
still indigenous (Zapotec) to the core and whose cultural power has brought 
the rest of the indigenous  peoples of Oaxaca into an orderly po liti cal con-
stellation. The figure resonates with the Oaxacan state we have encountered 
in this chapter,  doing its best to dance its desires into being. Interestingly, 
though, the feminine figure representing the istmo is lifting her skirt and 
walking, head held high, out of the fountain, her back turned  toward the 
danzante, as though she is done with his per for mance. This, too, resonates.
In bringing this chapter to its conclusion, it is impor tant to recognize that 
however hollow or performative the bureaucratic, gubernatorial, and con-
gressional dimensions of Oaxacan statecraft proved to be,  there  were other 
Oaxacan governmental entities involved in the politics surrounding istmeño 
wind development, although in less vis i ble and often half- willing ways.
For example, in February  2013 we met twice with the Oaxacan minis-
ter of the interior, Jesús Martínez Álvarez, whose ministry, segego, had 
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been tasked with trying to resolve the conflicts associated with the Mareña 
Renovables proj ect, which at that point  were reaching peak intensity in sev-
eral communities around the Laguna Superior. We heard from the minister 
the by- now- familiar theme of how state government was caught mediating 
between the jurisdictions of federal and local authorities. It was fairly clear 
that Martínez found such mediation to be an unfortunate waste of his time. 
His chief aide pulled us aside to explain that the situation was “very delicate, 
very complicated,” and exhausting for the minister, given that all sides of 
the conflict “ were telling a dif er ent story” about what was  really  going on. 
In our conversations, Martínez was clearly still working through his own 
feelings on the Mareña case. He blamed the com pany for a number of stupid 
moves, but he felt generally favorable about wind power as a developmental 
tool in the isthmus, and he expressed his opinion that the environmental 
and social risks raised against it  were being overblown.
FIGURE 3.5.   Fuente 
de las Siete Regiones, 
Oaxaca City
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Martínez attributed most of the blame for the trou bles in the isthmus to 
two organ izations, ucizoni and apiidtt (the Asamblea de Pueblos In-
dígenas del Istmo en Defensa de la Tierra y el Territorio), an organ ization 
whose leadership was closely connected with the radical wing of the Mexi-
can teacher’s  union cnte 22 (Coordinadora Nacional de Trabajadores de la 
Educación, section 22).  These ngos, as the minister described them,  were 
led by outsiders to the region and existed more or less to intensify social 
conflicts. Martínez returned to the ngos several times in our conversation; 
they  were clearly roving constantly on the edges of his thinking. At once an 
obvious opponent and a scapegoat for the growing re sis tance to wind power 
in the isthmus, the ngos’ militancy and their popu lar resonance (which was 
not insignificant) both troubled the mediating work of the state government 
and served as yet another reminder of the limits of its legitimacy to govern. 
Both ucizoni and apiidtt claimed to support indigenous interests and 
sovereignty against the mestizo party- political order. As such, they sought 
to patrol and police the limits of valid po liti cal intervention by Mexico City 
and Oaxaca City into the afairs of the indigenous communities of the isth-
mus. And given that, in some communities that  were opposed to the Mareña 
conflict, the constitutional recognition of indigenous communities’ right to 
govern themselves  under traditional law (according to usos y costumbres) 
was  either being actively exercised (e.g., in San Mateo del Mar) or forcefully 
proposed (e.g., in Álvaro Obregón),30 the question of the limits of the sov-
ereign authority of mestizo repre sen ta tional politics and liberal demo cratic 
order was unavoidable.31 The constitutional capacities for indigenous au-
tonomy created a po liti cal infrastructure that allowed not only indigenous 
municipios but also activist organ izations like ucizoni and apiidtt to 
challenge the authority of Oaxacan po liti cal elites.
Martínez did not seem personally suited to spectacular displays of sov-
ereignty; his performativity was low key and circumspect. He wondered 
 whether convincing the com pany to help clean up the raw sewage prob-
lem in the lagoon would help to appease angered fisherfolk; he wondered 
 whether investing resources in cleaning out the irrigation canals from the 
1960s would create enough jobs to siphon away support from the re sis tance; 
he mused above all about how to outmaneuver the ngos to bring seemingly 
intractably opposed sides together for real negotiations. The ngo leaders 
had no legitimacy in his mind, although he seemed to re spect their tactical 
acumen. To paraphrase Sara Ahmed, Martínez viewed the ngo leaders as 
having “too much  will,” and he frequently accused them of opposing proj ects 
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simply for the purpose of “being oppositional.”32 He seemed entirely cer-
tain that without the blockages created by external interests, he was capable 
of finding a resolution in which every one would receive some clear benefit 
from the proj ect, which would allow it to advance.
Yet, over the next few months, it became clear that segego’s experiments 
 were no more capable than local authorities and party- political networks 
of convincing the re sis tance to remove their blockades. As the standof 
between the government and the re sis tance became more intractable and 
sporadically violent in March and April 2013, it was rumored that the state 
police chief was advocating for greater use of force to remove blockades and 
to jail protestors. Martínez, on the other hand, was rumored to be commit-
ted to pursuing further negotiations. We knew that the com pany wanted to 
avoid bloodshed at all costs, especially now that the conflict was receiving 
international media attention.33 This left dif er ent ministries within the state 
government at cross- purposes and seemingly undermining each other.
In the end, the stalemate cost Martínez the second- most- powerful office in 
the state. He resigned in mid- April 2013 and, in what was likely a parting 
gesture of frustration, his resignation letter to Governor Cué was published 
by the news organ ization Noticias.34 In it, Martínez Álvarez suggests that he 
no longer has Cué’s full confidence, highlighting his experience that “issues 
already solved had been reactivated by internal interests, many of which 
sought to injure me but worse still . . .  [and] are damaging to the govern-
ment and the population. I do not wish to serve as the excuse why many 
prob lems that have solutions are being left unresolved.”
That same spring, a Oaxacan po liti cal magazine featured a cover image of 
Gabino Cué boiling in a vat labeled “Oaxaca,” which is fired by anarchy and 
corruption and stirred by an obscene savage, whose loincloth lists, among 
other affiliations, “cnte 22” and “parque eólico.” In the background, a field 
of wind turbines can be seen rising out of a distant jungle. The crude carica-
ture ofers the other side of the colonial danzante and his mistresses.  Here, 
we find “ungovernable” masculine indigeneity resisting and stultifying the 
good governmental and developmental intentions of the Oaxacan Valley. The 
image has many overdeterminations: the centripetal forces of federalism, 
the infrastructural inadequacies magnifying spatial and cultural distance, 
the constitutional guarantees of indigenous autonomy, the per sis tence of 
communal land regimes, the fierce networks of po liti cal loyalty and rivalry, 
and perhaps even the climatological comforts and serene colonial inertia 
of Oaxaca City. All  these forces contribute to this portrait of the Oaxacan 
state government as a sacrificial victim to anarchic, corrupt forces beyond 
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its control. Somehow  these turbines rising from the jungle transmogrify 
wind power into a wild indigenous weapon, a further mysterious instru-
ment through which the eternal indigenous other can taunt a beleaguered, 
failing mestizo state.35
 These  were the aeolian politics of the Oaxaca Valley, and their oscilla-
tion between sovereign desire and absent efficacy added yet more question 
marks to the win- win- win calculus being put forward by the agents of bio-
power, capital, and energopower during the main period of our field re-
search. In the end, despite brief cameos at events like fier, capital preferred 
to reside in Mexico City and, to a lesser but still- significant extent, in the 
isthmus itself.  Those who plotted the  futures of fuel, energy, and electricity 
in Mexico also gave Oaxaca City a wide berth. Even  those with the resources 
to bring development, health, and rights to the isthmus found  little purpose 
and traction in the Oaxaca Valley. That left Oaxaca’s statecraft very much in 
the mode of stagecraft, at least as far as wind development was concerned. It 
FIGURE 3.6.   Gabino 
Cué in hot  water
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was certainly not impossible that with the pri’s return to the governorship 
of Oaxaca in December 2016, Fernando Mimiaga Sosa, or another like him, 
would ascend to a position that, in a reformed pri party- state, would be able 
to exert more influence over the aeolian politics of the isthmus.36
But since that story has yet to unfold, we must now follow the main 
trunk line of Mexican electrical infrastructure northwest to another valley, 
Anáhuac, also known as the Valley of México, and to the federal capital, 
Mexico City. In a national politics largely defined by centralized po liti cal 
authority, we seek the knot of capital, energopolitics, and biopolitics that 
understands itself to govern the development of Mexican wind power in the 
isthmus and elsewhere.
4.  Distrito Federal
October 17, 2012. The caravan ambles confidently down Tres Picos Boule-
vard in Polanco, passing none other than Hegel Street, the megaphones on 
the white, bruised, spray- painted cnte truck enjoying a rare moment of 
 silence  after hours of thundering criticism and demands throughout the 
heart of Mexico City.  There have already been stops in front of the offices 
of the Inter- American Development Bank, the Mitsubishi Corporation, and 
Coca- Cola femsa. All the leading activists against the istmeño wind parks 
are in the pro cession: Carlos Beas from ucizoni, Rodrigo Peñaloza from 
apiidtt, Alejandro López López and Mariano López Gómez from Juchitán, 
and Isaúl Celaya from San Dionisio del Mar. Our friend Sergio from Yansa 
is  there too (see chapter 1); although obviously not opposed to wind power, 
he sees a common  enemy in the corporate autoabastecimiento proj ects and 
thus supports the antieólico re sis tance quietly, on the side. In addition  there 
are dozens of other istmeños representing the ikojts pueblos of San Dionisio 
and San Mateo del Mar and from the binnizá communities of Álvaro Obregón, 
Juchitán, Santa María Xadani, and Unión Hidalgo.
Once we reach the front of the Danish Embassy, an unremarkable building 
in the slate gray of northern Eu ro pean skies, the San Mateans and apiidtt 
hastily unfurl their “No al Proyecto Eólico” banners to  either side of the 
entrance. Beas, in a dark suit and purple shirt, stalks the background, scowl-
ing, positioning his photog raphers and videographer.  Others rush to affix 
smaller handwritten protest signs to the embassy, and loudspeakers roar to 
life as a series of speakers inveigh against wind development in the isthmus 
and call upon the Danes to show themselves to receive the caravan’s documents 
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of protest against the participation of Vestas, a Danish firm, in the Mareña 
Renovables proj ect.1
Some fifteen minutes  later, a willowy representative of the Danish gov-
ernment emerges, and  those gathered press in  toward him. The tension that 
has crackled at other stops is less intense in this encounter. Rodrigo, clad in 
a periwinkle Che Guevara T- shirt, is the bellwether; at times he tenses his 
jaw and shouts at the representatives who are sent out to listen to their de-
mands. When they do not ofer their names, he raises his voice to condemn 
the lack of re spect being shown to the communities of the isthmus. But per-
haps placated somewhat by this representative’s air of Scandinavian formal-
ity and politeness, Rodrigo speaks remarkably quietly, and his hand gestures 
are eco nom ical. The Dane says  little but listens quietly and attentively to 
Isaúl’s narration of the threat that the proj ect poses to the community and 
of the death threats and attacks that have been personally directed  toward 
him by the proj ect’s supporters. The Dane thanks them for their statements, 
receives the documents from Rodrigo with a nod, and dis appears back into 
the embassy.
As the caravan begins to reassemble and to roll on  toward lunch, we 
hover near the journalists who have moved in from the margins to get state-
ments, listening to their dialogues. We know some of them already from 
other events in Oaxaca City and the isthmus; among them is Rosa Rojas, 
who has written an excellent series on wind energy for La Jornada. But  there 
FIGURE 4.1.   Protest caravan against Mareña Renovables, Mexico City
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are new figures as well, even including a few representatives of the interna-
tional press. A tall man who speaks Spanish with an American accent draws 
our attention; he is Laurence Ilif, who covers Mexican energy for Dow Jones 
and the Wall Street Journal. We chat with him for a few minutes, and some-
how it comes out that he grew up in Santa Cruz, California, and went to the 
same high school as Cymene. He says that he has been following the Mareña 
story for a while now and invites us to lunch to tell him more about our 
research in the isthmus.
Electric Crisis
It is several months before we are back in Mexico City again in May 2013, 
and by then most of the investors in Mareña have quietly written of their 
investments in the troubled proj ect. Postmortem analyses from well- placed 
insiders are circulating though it is still several months before the official 
cancellation of the proj ect in January 2014. Nevertheless, we take Laurence up 
on his ofer and meet him at Milo’s, an upscale bistro in Condesa, one of his 
favorite haunts in the neighborhood. A long- term foreign correspondent, 
Laurence has covered virtually  every major energy story in Mexico over 
the past de cade and has interviewed key actors throughout the hierarchy of 
Mexican energy administration, up to and including President Vicente Fox. 
Though he specializes in coverage of Mexico’s parastatal petroleum com-
pany, Pemex, Laurence is an interested observer of all aspects of Mexican 
energy. He finds the conflict over wind development intriguing and says he 
does not fully grasp where the depth of dissatisfaction is coming from.
“I mean green energy is a good  thing, right?  Aren’t  these communities 
getting anything from  these proj ects?”
He nods as we explain the low land rents; they are no surprise to him.
To the accusations of corruption, payofs to mayors, and so on, he laughs. 
“That’s how they built Cancún too.” And then, more seriously, he adds, “The 
kickback culture in Mexico is pretty well developed. Ten  percent is standard 
on most big proj ects. Raúl Salinas, Carlos’s  brother, used to be known as 
‘Mr. Ten  Percent.’ ”2
While talking through the complex interests and intrigues of isthmus 
wind development, our conversation keeps circling back  toward the carbon 
center of gravity in Mexican energopolitics. In par tic u lar, we find ourselves 
discussing Mexican president Enrique Peña Nieto’s much- anticipated en-
ergy reform, which promises controversial changes to the development of 
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Mexico’s subsoil fossil fuel resources. It is a huge po liti cal issue in Mexico at 
the moment and one that is attracting considerable attention in the interna-
tional press not to mention the hungry eyes of oil and gas exploration and 
ser vices companies across the world.3 The prospect of privatizing even part 
of the petroleum exploration and development on Mexican territory would 
be a historic event and a terrific windfall for the industry globally. Only fifty- 
seven wells have been drilled on the Mexican side of the Gulf of Mexico as 
opposed to the sixteen hundred wells on the US side that yielded twenty- 
six billion barrels by 2014.4 Add to that the potential for new enhanced oil- 
recovery ser vices to boost the flagging production of Mexico’s existing 
fields and the possibility of new pipelines bringing liquid natu ral gas south 
from rich shale plays in Texas and Oklahoma. In coverage of the reform, 
talk of Pemex’s inefficiency and technological inability to develop Mexico’s 
petroleum resources is used to justify a new teleology wherein eighty years 
of petronationalism fi nally cracks open, revealing mouthwatering profit op-
portunities to global capital.
The prospect of energy reform brings together this volume’s analytics of 
energopolitics, capital, and biopolitics in a particularly vivid way. Although 
energy development is often interpreted, including by anthropologists,5 as a 
phenomenon driven foremost by capital’s relentless search to propagate itself, 
to call to life its machinic apparatus of productivity, the domain of the biopo-
liti cal is also never far removed from discussions of Mexican petroleum.6 
This is not simply  because subsoil sovereignty was a critical infrastructure 
of post- Cárdenas Mexican nationalism; in the neoliberal era proponents of 
liberalized energy production argued that it would strengthen the national 
economy through new job- generating foreign investment. Capital, bio-
power, and energopower are  imagined to stream fluidly together to stabilize 
and modernize Mexico’s “carbon democracy.” We have heard it before: win- 
win- win. And where better to examine this confluence than in Mexico City, 
where the sovereign power and governmental apparatus of the nation- state 
are most pervasively enabled by the concentration of capital, po liti cal insti-
tutions, and media?
This chapter examines the aeolian politics of Mexico City, but it  will quickly 
become evident that  these politics seem dematerialized, at least in compari-
son to other chapters in this volume.  There is less wind and soil  here than 
elsewhere— protests, yes, but no blockades; expert talk and knowledge 
abound, but material infrastructures of energic and po liti cal enablement 
are often less vis i ble than one would wish. This is in part a  matter of research 
methods that, mostly of necessity, focused more on formal interviews with 
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busy elites in relatively austere work environments. But it also reflects the 
magnitude of the epistemic, cultural, and spatial distance of Mexico City 
from the Isthmus of Tehuantepec (which, in local chilango discourse, was 
undiferentiated from Oaxaca). Aeolian politics  were normally treated as 
technical, financial, and administrative prob lems and solutions in DF; it 
was routinely striking to us how  little intimate contact and knowledge our 
interlocutors had with and of the isthmus, a place whose purported cultural, 
social, and racial diferences  were objects of fascination and derision. This is 
the po liti cal terroir of the administrative capital of “Mexican” wind power.
Mexico City is more than just a capital that administrates some preexist-
ing set of  people, places, and powers; the city is itself a massive machine for 
the realization of “Mexico,” a boiler room that absorbs all available pow-
ers of  labor, mind, and materials— resources that are drawn from across 
the nation- state and from far beyond— seeking to orchestrate and export 
nation- scale imaginations like “national economy” and “national culture.” It 
is surely true that all capital cities undertake this coordinating and circula-
tory activity to some extent and that urban elite parochialism greases the 
engines of universality across the world. But in Mexico City in the year 2013, 
the artifice of Mexican- ness was acutely vis i ble. As drug cartels and their 
war machines challenged sovereign lands and borders, creating biopo liti cal 
and necropo liti cal administrations of their own,7 and as uprisings in south-
ern states like Chiapas, Oaxaca, Guerrero, and Michoacán spawned new au-
tonomous zones beyond the control of police and army, at times it seemed 
as though it was only in DF, and then truly only in certain neighborhoods 
like Polanco and Condesa, that the elite neoliberal imagination of Mexico as 
globalizing nation- state was truly secure.
Laurence helpfully draws our attention away from the much- mediated 
fragility of Mexican rule of law and state sovereignty and  toward the hum-
ming engine of the Mexican petrostate, which has for de cades now helped to 
give shape and substance to the nation as a  whole. Laurence is not unironic 
in his diagnostics of Mexican petro- statecraft and clearly enjoys poking fun 
at Pemex (for their poor safety rec ord and lack of familiarity in advanced 
exploration and production techniques), at sener (for “sometimes just 
making  things up” in their energy analyses), and at cfe (for their gener-
ally dilapidated state, epitomized by their building on Río Ródano, “where it 
looks like the air conditioners are  going to fall out of the win dows on top of 
you”).8 But, on the  whole, he seems to feel that the Mexican petrostate, even 
absent an energy reform, is more robust than it is often given credit for in 
the international press.
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“Mexico’s not in such a bad position,” he says. “It’s true that production 
has dropped a lot in the past de cade, but it’s leveled of now at around 2.6 
million barrels per day. That’s still more than Venezuela and Brazil.” He ex-
plains that in Mexico, “even though the Cantarell field has dropped from 
two million to 400,000 barrels per day, the kmz field of Campeche is now 
up to 850,000, and the most impor tant  thing is that the oil is super cheap 
to produce, only three dollars per barrel, meaning that with  these high oil 
prices, they are raking in huge profits. Even with the production drop, 2011 
was Pemex’s most profitable year on rec ord. And, you know, most  people, 
including me sometimes,” he laughs, “like to hammer on Pemex and cfe, 
but  there’s electricity in most of the country, and when it goes down, it gets 
repaired pretty quickly. It’s not always super clean and nice, but it works, and 
it  doesn’t go out of business like Enron.”
More than this, Laurence emphasizes, Pemex brings in huge revenue to 
support the government. “Pemex has $160 billion in sales a year and is able 
to turn a $50 or $60 billion profit and gives 90  percent of that back to the 
government in the form of taxes. Pemex provides 35 or 40  percent of the rev-
enue  going into the federal government.9 And then if [the government] needs 
cash quickly,  they’ll force Pemex to float bonds in New York so that they can 
demand six months of tax payments up front. Basically, Pemex is like a bank 
for the government. They  won’t starve them, but they keep them very skinny.”
He notes that the Mexican po liti cal elite are also trying to think past the 
petrostate. Extracting such a high percentage of Pemex’s profits has ham-
strung the parastatal in terms of being able to equip themselves technologi-
cally to undertake more complicated and risky forms of oil production such 
as deep- sea exploration and enhanced oil recovery, which are becoming in-
creasingly routine across the world as older fields become exhausted. More-
over, petro- statecraft is vulnerable to market shifts; production declines are 
one  thing, but if the oil market  were  really to bottom out, billions of dollars 
would fail to appear in the trea sury, and a state already struggling to meet its 
responsibilities to its citizens would find itself in dire straits.10
Laurence also confirms that climate change is increasingly becoming a 
theme in Mexican politics, “particularly for Calderón’s government; every one 
I interviewed  there loved to talk about renewables.” Laurence thinks, how-
ever, that the government’s exit from fossil de pen dency  will not run through 
a massive renewables campaign but rather through the gradual displacement 
of an oil- driven economy by its manufacturing sector. “Manufacturing is 
 doing  really well  here now,” he says. “The car industry alone prob ably brings 
twice as many dollars into the economy as Pemex does when you look at 
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all the investment, the jobs, and taxes. It has a  really good  ripple efect. In 
Puebla, you know, it’s all about Volks wagen. And the electronics industry 
is  doing well too.  These industries are relocating from China to Mexico 
 because of the lower transport costs for getting goods to the North. . . .  It’s 
just a more sustainable situation than relying so heavi ly on Pemex.”
But this diagnosis brings Laurence to what he views as the real energy 
crisis looming in Mexico. It concerns not oil so much as electricity. “Mexico 
 really needs to do something about electricity. If you are  going to build up 
the manufacturing sector, you need cheap energy to make it competitive, 
and right now, electricity rates for businesses are very high in comparison 
to other countries. The way electricity rates work in Mexico is that for basic 
electricity, just lights and very basic appliances,  there is an extraordinary 
level of subsidy, 80 or 90   percent.” He reiterates, “Basic electricity is very 
cheap in Mexico. But then, to ofset that subsidy, higher- end domestic use 
and commercial use gets very expensive.11 Basically, cfe relies on overcharg-
ing their commercial customers to undercharge their residential custom-
ers. But they are losing commercial customers in droves now, which means 
fewer and fewer  people to pay for their subsidies.”
The aspiration to provide cheap basic electricity to the entire Mexican 
population maintained the Keynesian- revolutionary spirit of Cardenismo. 
A year before signing the well- known decree to nationalize Mexican oil 
production in 1938, President Cárdenas founded the Comisión Federal de 
Electricidad with the purpose of “organ izing and directing a national sys-
tem for electric- power generation, transmission, and distribution, based on 
technical and economic princi ples, on a non- profit basis, for the purpose of 
obtaining the greatest pos si ble output at minimum cost, for the benefit of 
general interest.”12
Cárdenas did not, however, act to nationalize the private, foreign- owned 
electricity companies that had been operating a variety of regional power 
systems in Mexico, with uneven technical success, since the Porfiriato.13 
The first de cades of cfe focused instead on expanding grid and power 
plant infrastructure in order to bring electricity to the many parts of Mexico 
that the foreign companies had neglected.  These companies, particularly 
Mexican Light and Power (MexLight) and the American and Foreign Power 
Com pany (afpc),  were allowed to operate  until 1960, when President López 
Mateos fi nally decreed the full nationalization of electricity. However, in the 
1940s and 1950s, the Mexican government set electricity tarifs low so as to 
reduce the domestic costs of consumption, a development- oriented policy 
that led to significant prob lems for the profitability of the companies.14
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Mid- twentieth- century priismo sought to harness both electricity and 
capital in ser vice of its populist biopolitics of modernization and develop-
ment. Yet it created enduring tensions between corporate industrial interests 
and cfe in terms of priorities in the provisioning of electricity.
Laurence recalls that in the old days, “cfe would just kick companies of 
the grid with no warning when they  were  running low on electricity supply.” 
And yet cfe was still regarded as an exemplary utility next to the much- 
maligned Luz y Fuerza, which had been created from MexLight’s operations 
servicing Mexico City and surrounding areas. It seems that priista corpo-
ratism and a strong and activist  union, the sme, operated largely outside the 
control of the rest of the governmental apparatus.
Laurence laughs, saying, “Luz y Fuerza was a black hole of corruption. 
In Mexico City maybe 35  percent of the electricity was being stolen, and the 
employees  were totally complicit in it.15 I lived in a Luz y Fuerza neighbor-
hood, and the installers would come around and tell you how much you 
could bribe them so that your meter  wouldn’t run.” Years of heavy operational 
losses, emergency payments from the federal government to keep the lights 
on, and constant conflict with the sme resolved to the spectacular conclu-
sion of President Calderón sending out a thousand federal riot police to shut 
down Luz y Fuerza on October 10, 2009, transferring all operations to cfe, 
fi nally realizing the Cardenista program of a unified national electricity grid 
some seventy years  after the fact.16
The crucial Salinas- era amendment (1992) of the Ley del Servicio Público 
de Energía Eléctrica (Public Electricity Ser vice Law, or lspee)— which 
allowed for private sector participation in power generation, including 
cogeneration and self- supply programs (see chapter  2)— was intended to 
address, at least in part, industrial and commercial concerns about main-
taining reliable, afordable electricity ser vice.
As Laurence puts it, “At some point, the big companies  were so frustrated 
with cfe that they began investing in their own power- generation proj ects 
to guarantee ser vice, to reduce costs.17 But  these are mostly big companies 
involved in building power plants, companies like Cemex. For smaller busi-
nesses that  don’t have that kind of capital, the electricity costs are still pretty 
crippling for them.”
The solution? The movement  toward decentralized power production 
seems unlikely to slow down; indeed, Peña Nieto’s energy reform  will seek 
to accelerate it, creating new incentives for in de pen dent power production.18 
It also seems unlikely to Laurence that cfe  will be allowed to remove its 
subsidies to residential customers anytime soon. It is a sensitive issue, and 
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cfe lacks the authority to set its own rates; that belongs to the Ministry of 
Finance and Public Credit, which is famously, according to Laurence, moti-
vated by “po liti cal as well as market considerations.” The only real move for 
cfe is to try to bring costs of electricity generation down and to pass  those 
along to its preferred customers in manufacturing. A carbon- fueled solution 
beckons, driven by the geography of fuel and the logic of market price.
“I’m pretty sure that lng [liquid natu ral gas] is  going to be a big part of 
their plan, Laurence says. “Think of all that cheap gas available now in the US. 
And Mexico has amazing gas resources too if it could develop them. Mexico 
uses a lot of lng already, but it’s importing it from Nigeria.” He laughs. “Can 
you imagine that? So the Mexicans are working as fast they can to build pipe-
lines to bring all that cheap gas across the border down to Mexico.”
An energy correspondent for Bloomberg we  later interviewed confirmed 
Laurence’s sense of  things, saying, “When I interviewed the energy minister 
four years ago, all the talk was about renewables. Then, when natu ral gas 
prices started to go down, that completely challenged the economics of their 
plans. Now the only  thing  people are talking about is gas.”
The prediction appears to be coming true. Less than two years  later, in 
March 2015, Laurence reported on the first major foreign investment in 
 Pemex’s history. It is a deal with private equity investors BlackRock and First 
Reserve, who have ofered $900 million for a 45  percent stake in a pipeline 
proj ect to bring US natu ral gas to Mexico.19 It appears to be only the first of 
many such proj ects to come.20
The chairman and co- ceo of First Reserve is quoted speaking approv-
ingly of how the Mexican energy reform has opened up huge opportuni-
ties for international investors in energy infrastructure proj ects: “If you take 
pipelines, for example, [all of] Mexico has 10  percent of the natural- gas pipe-
lines that the state of Texas has.”
In 2013, Laurence told us that the electricity crisis prob ably did not bode 
well for wind power. “Per kilowatt- hour, wind is still pretty expensive com-
pared to natu ral gas or coal so I’m sure  there are some  people over at cfe 
who are hoping they  don’t have to incorporate too much of it.”
La Comisión
From our time in the isthmus, we are already aware that cfe’s afects con-
cerning wind power are complex and at least somewhat contradictory (see 
chapter 1). We are  eager to learn more about them during our time in DF. 
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And, fortuitously, the closed doors and evasiveness we faced in Juchitán are 
replaced by many representatives who seem more than willing to explain 
the exigencies of the grid and electricity to us.
We begin in the first of many cfe buildings around Mexico City, this one 
a modern office complex on the Periférico Sur. We meet with Francisco Díaz 
and Francisco Barba, both of whom work for the Direccion de Proyectos 
de Inversion Financiada (Directorate for Financed Investment Proj ects), 
focusing on the environmental impacts of cfe’s new power plant develop-
ments. Interestingly, we talk less about climate change and the impact of 
dif er ent types of energy development on vari ous animal and plant species 
and more about how wind power impacts the environment of the grid. The 
Franciscos seem hesitant about wind power, largely  because of the prob lem 
of intermitencía (intermittency).
“OK, the principal prob lem with this form of energy, la eólica, is that from 
the perspective of the Administration of Energy,  there’s a type of energy we 
call ‘baseload’ [energía base],” Francisco Díaz explains. “Above all, this is ther-
moelectric energy where you supply it with combustible fuel, and it works 
just like a motor. It’s muy constante [very constant]. Geothermal is that way 
too. But with all other sources, even hydroelectrics, output  will depend on the 
rains of the previous year. So in a dry year, you might not have enough sup-
ply to meet demand. It is the same way with las eólicas [the turbines]. You 
might have a peak supply and an average supply. But  those are just num-
bers. In real ity, the supply is constantly fluctuating between highs and lows. 
And for that reason, in most cases of wind energy, you need to build extra 
thermoelectric support installations just to guarantee the supply of energy, a 
constant flow of electricity.”
“Baseload” is a thermoelectric imaginary, one that has coevolved with 
the fossil- and nuclear- fueled infrastructure we know as “grid.”21 Baseload 
thinking naturalizes a situation of endless, constant electrical supply equili-
brated to endless constant demand.22 It gives voice to the energopower of 
steady thermoelectric generation, feeding a stable, efficient infrastructure 
of current, all conducted with a capital- centered market imaginary tightly 
wrapped around it like insulation.23 This logic does not sufer intermittency 
lightly; any risk or disturbance of flow is viewed as a threat.24 Thus, not 
only in Mexico does one find the perverse argument that  there should be 
more fossil fuel installations for each kilowatt- hour of renewable energy 
brought onto the grid to guarantee reliability.25
We probe deeper, asking about Mexico’s ambitious clean electricity targets.
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“Yes, well, for the most part,” Díaz says, “this was a po liti cal decision of 
the government, de alto nivel [at a high level], and the Ministry of Energy 
[sener] defined it.  Those of us who work for cfe, it is our job to carry out 
what sener tells us. But  we’re not in a position to explain to you the logic 
 behind their decision. To be clear,  we’re OK with the decision, nos encanta 
eso, [ we’re delighted by it], but we  can’t explain the reasoning to you.”
They do not sound encantado but rather troubled about the charge that 
has been given to them.
When we ask about the Kyoto Protocol,26 they note matter- of- factly that 
Mexico is among the Annex B countries, which are not required to under-
take emissions reduction. They say that only five or six hundred of cfe’s 
ninety- eight thousand employees work on environmental issues. It is not a 
central consideration of la comisión’s work  because of the existence of the 
Environmental Ministry, semarnat.
When we ask about how cfe seeks to reconcile local environmental 
 concerns against the global environmental concerns such as climate change, 
Fernando Barba mentions the small amount of the Mexican population still 
not served by electricity (less than 2  percent). “ Because, as Hernán Cortés once 
said, our land is like wrinkled paper,  there still remain distant communities 
where it is very difficult to serve them conventionally. And in some cases, solar 
panels have gone in to guarantee a certain degree of development, to allow 
them to power their radios and tele vi sion, even a motor or a refrigerator.”
It sounds as though Barba is about to say that renewable energy has 
impor tant applications in such outlier cases, but it turns out that his point is 
exactly the opposite. “And [the  people in  these communities] they say that 
they want energy that serves them [constantly], sometimes they protest up 
to the highest authorities that they want true electrification.” Even on the 
fringes of Mexico, in the areas most in need of development, Barba argues, 
 people  will reject renewables in  favor of the truth of the grid.
Jesús Ortega works in one of cfe’s oldest buildings, the very one on 
Río Ródano with the precarious air conditioning units. A half- century ago 
this was the primary administrative center of cfe; in 1960 it was radiant 
and festooned with a bright- red banner, seven stories high, celebrating the 
 nationalization of electricity. Its edifice is now predictably more weathered, 
its interior faded, epitomizing both the resilience and the exhaustedness of 
Cardenismo. And yet the building brims with activity.
Ortega is a subdirector in Coordinación y Distribución (Coordination 
and Distribution), which helps ensure that cfe’s clients receive the energy 
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they need. He apologizes that his group in Distribution is only tangentially 
involved in renewables and mostly in the form of solar photovoltaics. Now 
cfe has plans to extend the grid to all communities of more than fifty  people 
(it used to be one hundred  people). For smaller communities, they have 
tried a pi lot plan to set up solar pv (photovoltaic) panels to provide “basic 
energy.” But, shaking his head, he too relates that la gente no tiene confianza 
( people lack confidence) in this form of energy. They  were angered when the 
pv panels ceased to function and blamed cfe for it. And then  there is the 
question of cost. He estimates that a kilowatt- hour generated by solar en-
ergy costs five or six times that of a kilowatt- hour produced by conventional 
carbon sources. “ We’re not in the position to pass  those costs along to the 
consumer as happens in other countries.”
His colleague, Mauricio, drops in, dressed in a dapper tan suit.  After lis-
tening for a while, he interrupts to say that renewable energy is most cer-
tainly “a pillar” of the national energy plan, but it is  really part “of the policy 
of expanding electricity generation and coordinating participation in invest-
ments to the expansion of electricity supply.” By this, he is referring to the 




temporadas abiertas [open seasons] that cre and cfe have created to ex-
pand private participation in electricity generation.27 That has led to 1.5 giga-
watts of wind power in the isthmus already, and he believes it  will go up to 
four gigawatts when the program is complete. “It brings together the vision of 
the state with the vision of the permisionarios [permit holders].” He cautions 
that the prob lem of intermitencia means that it  will be impossible to envi-
sion an electrical grid focused “one hundred  percent” on clean energy. Still, 
Mexico has renewable resources that should be developed, and he speaks 
approvingly of the consciencia social (social conscience) demonstrated by 
countries such as Germany, saying that it is sometimes worth the higher cost 
for clean energy. “The world has to use less hydrocarbons, and that is true for 
Mexico as well.  We’re already a net importer of liquid natu ral gas.”
Both Jesús and Mauricio agree that we need to speak with  people in the 
Directorate of Planning who assess  future demands on the grid and plan ex-
tensions and improvements accordingly. A few interviews  later, we find our-
selves in a boardroom at the new cfe headquarters on Paseo de la Reforma 
speaking to Ramón Villagómez Altamirano. Maps of the grid and cfe gen-
eration plants adorn the walls. Villagomez is extraordinarily kind and gen-
erous with us, staying long  after the appointed end of the meeting to make 
sure we understand cfe’s relationship to renewable electricity generation.
Villagómez is worried, above all, about the cost of Calderón’s 2011 law 
that mandated that Mexico have 35  percent of electricity production coming 
from nonfossil sources by 2024. “We have to be aligned with  these national 
goals, but it has a huge cost, a huge cost,” he says with a certain degree of res-
ignation, “and I want to be clear that  these goals are po liti cal, not technical. 
 There is no way cfe would have recommended this.”
About 22   percent of Mexico’s electricity capacity comes from hydro-
power, and that is considerable; however, only 4.6   percent comes from all 
other renewable resources combined (including nuclear power). A radical 
expansion of wind power is one scenario, and he says that  there are three 
areas in Mexico with excellent technical wind capacity: Baja, Tamaulipas, 
and of course the Isthmus of Tehuantepec.
“But even if we developed all of that wind capacity,” he says, “even with 
our best eforts, we  couldn’t meet  these targets.  There are natu ral restric-
tions.” He says that cfe has explored other scenarios, and they feel that the 
only way to conform to  these po liti cal goals would be to build several new 
nuclear power plants. But “in our country, as in most countries in the world, 
 people reject nuclear energy.  There is a lot of seismic activity, and we’d have 
huge prob lems if we de cided to build a nuclear plant near a big city.”
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According to cfe’s calculations, meeting the obligations of the 2011 law 
via wind power alone would cost an extra $3.79 billion annually and $2.4 
billion even if nuclear energy  were included. Villagómez says that they have 
thus concluded that “the plan is unrealistic and not eco nom ically  viable” and 
that they are lobbying, together with sener, for a change to this legislation 
in Congress, aiming at a more gradual transition, with 2050 as the target. 
They are hopeful that President Peña Nieto  will be more receptive to this 
message than President Calderón was.28
But, we ask, does cfe feel threatened by the energy reform, which seems 
aimed  toward further advancing the private- public partnership model and 
opening the possibility of allowing the private sector to sell electricity as well 
as generate it?
FIGURE 4.3.   Map of the istmeño grid, cfe
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 “Yes, it is a threat. In 1992 the federal government de cided not to in-
vest in further expansion of electrical infrastructure by itself. All further 
expansion would come through working with private partners. And in only 
twenty years, private generation is now one- third of the national supply. 
cfe, meanwhile, has no more money for grid expansion.” Villagómez seems 
pained by this admission, which, in all honesty, comes as something of a 
revelation to us even  after years of studying Mexican wind power. With no 
more public funding dedicated to grid expansion, Mexican electropower 
had already been made contingent upon flows of international capital in 
ways that rehearsed the con temporary reform of Pemex and petropower.
Villagómez says thoughtfully, mournfully, “We are worried about the 
privatization of electricity even if they  can’t commercialize energy yet. The 
federal government de cided to invest in social development rather than in 
our growth potential, but how can we achieve growth without federal re-
sources? So,  we’re very aware of this prob lem, and one idea is to ask the 
government for in de pen dence,  because we are so highly regulated that we 
 can’t compete with the private companies. What we say is we want liberty of 
management.”29
His statement captures cfe’s paradox in a nutshell. The federal govern-
ment wishes to tether cfe’s capacities of energopo liti cal enablement to the 
state’s biopo liti cal mission— allowing social development through electrifica-
tion, guaranteeing highly subsidized electricity to much of its population—at 
the same time that it is also sacrificing cfe’s autonomy, infrastructure, and 
 future to attract foreign capital.
Pemex’s  future was also being threatened in the context of the energy 
reform, “but  there is a very big diference between  these two parastatals, cfe 
and Pemex,” Villagómez says, laughing. “Pemex pays huge, huge taxes to the 
government. So the government treats us very diferently.”
In Mexico City we learned the extent to which cfe’s engineers and ad-
ministrators felt victimized by the invasion of “po liti cal” motives into the 
“technical” world of the grid. The talk of “market” and “economy” was some-
thing of a suture meant to pin together the two other wise seemingly incom-
mensurable worldviews. But it was clear that cfe’s employees felt deprived 
from full participation in market logics as well. Their concerns about the 
economic costs of renewable energy transition  were not being taken seri-
ously by the government; they  were blamed for greed and inefficiency by 
consumers but not even allowed to set their own tarif rates. Calderón had 
just authorized a change to the tarif system that had cost cfe a further four 
billion pesos per year.30
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La Comisión— so hated and feared for its power throughout the isthmus—
looked much more precarious in DF, especially on the eve of energy re-
form. Everywhere their expertise seemed called into question, their efficacy 
inhibited. The  future of the grid that sustained them had been taken away 
from cfe. We came to won der  whether cfe’s intransigent ambivalence to 
wind power also had something to do with that forestalled  future. Wind 
power might very well become a significant part of Mexico’s electrical  future, 
but none of that energy would be supplied by cfe; it would not be part of 
their “growth potential.” Instead, private producers would profit while cfe 
would be left managing the engineering challenges of maintaining a grid 
that had to cope with increasing intermittency. Aeolian politics in Mexico 
was part of the weathervane pointing  toward cfe’s diminishment and per-
haps eventual abandonment. For once, it seemed we had encountered a win- 
lose proposition.
SENER
The advice from cfe, that they could not illuminate the po liti cal rationale 
 behind Mexico’s commitment to an accelerated renewable energy transition, 
led us to the Ministry of Energy, sener. It was an especially tense time. The 
shockwaves of the Mareña fiasco and the Ixtepecan amparo (see chapter 1) 
 were beginning to be felt in the Ministry of Energy during the summer of 
2013. Meanwhile, the po liti cal situation in the isthmus was becoming very 
grim. In the space of just a few weeks, new blockades had been set up against 
Gas Natu ral Fenosa’s 234 megawatt Bií Hioxo proj ect in the Playa Vicente 
area of Juchitán; the offices of the antieólico community radio station, Radio 
Totopo, had been attacked; leaders of the apiidtt and appj (Asamblea 
Popu lar del Pueblo Juchiteco)  were receiving death threats, and some went 
into hiding;  there  were even reports of “Zeta- looking” toughs covered in 
tattoos making the rounds and threatening  people who  were opposed to the 
wind parks.
In the end, we  were able to arrange two meetings with sener’s new dep-
uty minister of electricity, María de Lourdes Melgar Palacios, and her as-
sistant, Ana María Sánchez Hernández, the first of which was brokered by 
Sergio Oceransky, who was actively lobbying Melgar to support the Ixtepec 
community wind proj ect.
Melgar begins the first meeting rather apologetically, saying, “Normally 
sener concentrates more on long- term and big- picture energy planning, 
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but when I arrived in office I found  these very serious social prob lems in 
the isthmus that needed to be addressed.” She senses growing opposition to 
the proj ects and knows that  there needs to be more dialogue with the com-
munities. But her question is how to achieve it. Most of the remainder of 
the conversation is spent with them asking us to share our impressions and 
recommendations based on our field research.
Sergio chimes in occasionally, advancing his agenda, pointing out that 
the previous government allowed  these conditions to fester through a lack 
of oversight and regulation of the  whole industry: “To take Playa Vicente as 
an example, the former mayor of Juchitán, Mariano Santana, allowed a lot 
of communal land to be privatized in order that this park proj ect could 
move ahead.  There are a lot of  people in DF who knew exactly what was 
 going on.”
Melgar replies, “Playa Vicente has been much on my mind lately,” and 
then pointedly criticizes the situation she inherited. “The lack of supervision 
over the  whole pro cess is the most scandalous  thing to me. Once  these proj-
ects get permits to interconnect to the cfe grid, and once semarnat issues 
the environmental permits,  there is absolutely no oversight over how  these 
proj ects are constructed and operate. It’s a scandal.”
Melgar feels that both the federal and state governments “ haven’t been 
 doing their homework” about this development pro cess, and she confides 
that the minister of energy is “ really worried about this at the federal level.”
Meanwhile, at the Oaxacan state level,  there are dif er ent power ful po-
liti cal actors vying with one another to steer the pro cess from  behind the 
scenes. “Oaxaca is in such a strange situation in that you have not one but 
three governors actively involved in the [wind] development pro cess. One 
of the other governors approached the minister [of energy] recently and said 
that he could ‘take care’ of the conflicts if the minister would authorize him 
to do so.31 And the minister said to me, ‘Just what this needs, another gover-
nor.’ ” Melgar laughs, but rather mirthlessly.
Before we depart, Sánchez mentions their intention to take a weeklong 
trip down to the isthmus to talk to all sides involved in the conflicts. They 
confess that they are planning to go undercover, perhaps posing as journal-
ists or as researchers (“like you two”) in order to get more truthful responses 
to their questions.
The image of a high- ranking sener administrator touring the isthmus in 
disguise— whether out of concern for truth or safety— says much about the 
informational, po liti cal, and spatial disjunctures between Mexico City and 
its distant provinces. Notwithstanding, we  were very curious to hear about 
144 chapter four
what she learned on her trip and to ask what her plans  were for addressing 
the lack of federal governmental oversight over the wind proj ects.
Our second meeting, in July 2013, is, sadly, disappointing in its content, 
with an atmosphere that is by turns enervated and tense. We are kept waiting 
for more than two hours and instructed (twice) not to use our video camera. 
Although we hope to get at least an audio statement on the rec ord, Melgar 
and Sánchez seem very uncomfortable at the idea, so we drop it. Melgar ab-
sently toys with her smartphone while Sánchez does more of the talking. The 
visit to the isthmus, it turns out, only lasted thirty hours in the end, and if 
disguises  were used, that goes unmentioned.
We ask whom they talked to and what they learned.
They answer vaguely that they talked to many dif er ent groups and have 
realized that  there is a need to define procedures more clearly and to articu-
late “the correct form of development. We  can’t simply focus on the business 
position  because that  won’t be sustainable for long from a social standpoint. 
Other groups need to feel that their interests are being addressed as well.”
They also learned that  there are a  great many tensions in the isthmus 
that have nothing directly to do with the wind parks. Development in the 
isthmus should be not just about wind development; the government needs 
to have to a balanced regional development plan. The bottom line is that, 
in terms of managing wind development, “we  don’t know which esquema 
[scheme]  will be the most useful.” Melgar mentions her personal commit-
ment to renewable energy development and notes that wind development 
is growing in other Mexican states now—in Baja, in Puebla, in Yucatán—as 
though to say that even setbacks to istmeño wind development  will not deter 
Mexico’s energy transition.
Walking us back  toward the elevator, Sánchez speaks a  little more freely, 
giving more insight into how at least some at sener are thinking about the 
conflicts. “It’s too easy to say that it’s just the social movements that  don’t 
want  these proj ects. It’s also structural. That’s why government needs to re-
define how the development pro cess is designed and managed,” she says. 
“By consultation, you  can’t just mean talking to the landowners! You have 
to consult with the  whole community. [And]  there has to be a pro cess of the 
difusion of information first, and then a consultation pro cess afterward so 
 people can raise concerns and objections. That should be the fundamental 
structure. It has to go through phases.”
This would sound very encouraging to  those many istmeños we met who 
 were concerned about— but not necessarily ideologically opposed to— the 
mushrooming of wind parks across the region. But again, as with STyDE in 
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Oaxaca City, it felt as though  these considerate second thoughts about con-
sultation  were appearing too late to help defuse the conflicts brewing around 
proj ects that  were already being built or already in operation let alone to sig-
nificantly inflect the dominant paradigm of wind development in the  future.
In a hopeful sign, in January  2014, Melgar’s office or ga nized a private 
informational meeting for all the renewable energy firms operating in the 
isthmus, focused on el derecho a la consulta indígena (the right of indige-
nous consultation), with the objective of “guaranteeing the development of 
proj ects with a focus on social sustainability, re spect for  human rights, and 
strict observance of international norms.” A month  later, Melgar was trans-
ferred, very likely promoted, to become deputy minister of hydrocarbons 
for sener. But sener’s commitment to the princi ple of consulta appears 
to be ongoing.
In early 2017, on the page of the sener website devoted to “Sustainable 
Development” was the following text: “In relation to the participation of 
communities in the pro cess of making decisions about the execution of 
[electricity generation] proj ects, the Subsecretariat of Electricity promotes 
strategic actions to guarantee that the operation of the electricity sector in 
Mexico responds to the princi ples of sustainable development. In 2014, the 
Subsecretariat developed timely interventions in the  matter of  human rights 
and social sustainability.”
The text goes on to explain that the Subsecretariat has initiated an “inter-
institutional relationship” between sener and several other federal agen-
cies to help implement  human rights and the right of prior consultation of 
indigenous communities.32 Details are few as to what this interinstitutional 
relationship involves substantively. But the mention of a certain planned 
wind park gives a clue as to the origins and purpose of this initiative: “In ac-
cord, the first stage of a pro cess of indigenous consultation has been realized 
for the construction and operation of a wind farm proj ect in the Isthmus of 
Tehuantepec, which  will have a generating capacity of close to 300 mw.”33 It 
sounds like Mareña reloaded, but this time beginning with a consulta and 
pursuing “the correct form of development.”
As time would tell, the proj ect in question was indeed a reformation of 
the Mareña Renovables wind park, now called Eólica del Sur and planned 
to be built on land belonging to both Juchitán and the neighboring town 
of El Espinal. In February 2015, sener or ga nized a consulta in Juchitán to 
pre sent the proj ect to the indigenous community and invited, among other 
observers, the former United Nations special rapporteur on the rights of 
indigenous  peoples, James Anaya. Anaya has published his reflections on 
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the event,34 which ofer a detailed and balanced report on the deficiencies 
of the consulta.
Although Anaya ofers warm praise for the “quality and dedication of 
sener’s team” in the face of a difficult task, he notes that it is not in the spirit 
of un Convention 169 to ofer a fully formed proj ect to an indigenous com-
munity for ac cep tance or rejection. Rather, the spirit of Convention 169 is 
for governments and companies to work together with indigenous commu-
nities at all stages of a given proj ect’s formation. He views the form of the 
proj ect as beneficial mostly to the com pany, and he criticizes the proposed 
distribution of benefits as “inequitable” and the informational methodology 
of the consulta as “in efec tive.”
But Anaya’s worst criticism is saved for the attitude of the representa-
tives of Eólica del Sur: “During my visit I perceived that the [com pany’s] 
staf views the indigenous population as inferior, their traditions and cul-
tural practices as backward and their understanding of a right to commu-
nal owner ship of the land and the wind as having no place in the modern 
world that they are promising. Operating personnel do not seem to grasp 
the po liti cal context and the risks of investing in a historically oppressed 
population, which still seems to be waiting to see the benefits of more than 
fifteen years of wind development, often times which has taken place  under 
unfavorable conditions for the Zapotec population.”
CRE
The last stop in our tour of the federal governmental agencies involved (at least 
nominally) in regulating istmeño wind power development is the Comisión 
Reguladora de Energía or cre, which was established in 1995 to essentially act 
as the permitting and regulatory agency overseeing the growth of Mexico’s 
private energy sector. Over time, cre was granted additional authority in 
the electricity sector, especially in the definition of norms of renewable energy 
and natu ral gas use. The agency is widely regarded among developers not only 
as a regulatory agency but also as a broker and go- between that manages 
and optimizes relationships between investors, developers, and cfe. As one 
wind developer explained to us with a knowing nod, “cre is more of a fa-
cilitator than a regulator in the traditional sense.”
With fewer that two hundred employees, cre is not a large agency, but 
one feels a stark contrast in its offices from  those of cfe and sener. The 
jeans and short- sleeve shirts at the latter are replaced by business suits for all; 
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colorful ties and boardroom- worthy cosmetics finish of gender- normative 
ensembles. We meet with Alejandro Peraza, cre’s director of electricity and 
renewable energy. On the wall  behind his desk are a series of vintage photo-
graphs of a hydroelectric dam  under construction; on his bookshelves are 
several model wind turbines.
Peraza is calm and afable and a true believer in autoabastecimiento, 
waving of any idea that this course of development could be injurious to 
 either cfe or the nation. “Our  drivers are two: the high cost of public ser vice 
electricity and the quality of our renewable resources.” At cre, he says, “we 
 don’t believe in subsidies, we believe in business [negocio],” and that atti-
tude has led to large investments in renewable energy development without 
financial incentives from the government. They have even done away with 
intermitencia, he claims, by creating a “virtual energy bank” which tracks in 
real time the price of energy added to and consumed from the grid. “When 
generation drops, when intermittency occurs, I simply go to my bank ac-
count and withdraw my ‘money’  there. But, of course,  there is no monetary 
transaction; it’s all a  matter of energy.”
Although this is clearly not the aspect of intermitencia that trou bles 
grid engineers, it is a shrewd bit of financial wizardry that helps to iron 
out fluctuations in payments. Peraza thinks highly of Mexico’s chances to 
meet Calderón’s clean electricity targets, particularly as they begin to pursue 
more small- scale proj ects (less than thirty megawatts) that can be developed 
quickly, efficiently, and with fewer environmental risks. He predicts that re-
newable energy  will lower rather than raise the cost of electricity in Mexico 
in large part  because it  will bring in more efficient international partners and 
reduce reliance on cfe’s expensive public ser vice. He does not acknowledge 
that the high cost of that public ser vice is also paying for high domestic 
electricity subsidies.
It is Oaxaca that is worrying him. “ There is real trou ble in Oaxaca now 
that  can’t be papered over.  We’re hoping to have five gigawatts of wind power 
in production by 2017 or 2018. It’s very intense development activity. And 
obviously we are worried about the difficulties now.” The Oaxacans both fas-
cinate and irritate him. As the conversation proceeds, he gets increasingly 
reflective and speculative about what to do about los oaxaqueños.
It is a cultural and historical prob lem above all, he feels, driven by their 
affinity for usos y costumbres, “which essentially means  there are zero rules, 
just what ever they say their customs are.” He sputters, “Or they have— some 
of them have— they’ll have a piece of paper, handwritten, that says for four 
centuries they have owned this land. This society, Oaxacan society, is very 
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committed to their internal rules. They might sign a contract with a com-
pany one day and then the next day decide, ‘No, we  don’t want that contract 
 after all.’ And on the other side, none of the companies have been prepared 
for  these kinds of negotiations; they think that they can negotiate in Oaxaca 
the same way they do in New York, but Oaxaca no es lo mismo, Oaxaca no es 
lo mismo” (Oaxaca is not the same).
The quality of the wind is so good, though, that prospective investors 
continue to arrive even as the po liti cal terrain becomes more and more risk- 
laden. Peraza finds this la men ta ble and ultimately beyond his jurisdiction to 
solve. “We have no  legal powers to solve the prob lem of social participation. 
It is not the same trying to do a wind proj ect in Oaxaca as in Tamaulipas. In 
Tamaulipas they are fighting to have the parks  there, opening the door wide 
to investors, likewise in Baja California, Zacatecas, but when it comes to 
Oaxaca, every thing has become very complicated.”
The prob lems are, he is sure, ultimately driven by money, by the Oaxacans’ 
desire for money. The prospect of all that investment is creating po liti cal con-
flict and competition among them. He swivels in his chair, musing, “I  don’t 
know, perhaps we should just promise to give the money to the  women. 
Studies have shown this is a good idea. The  women use payments for public 
works, for pavement, for  water, for drainage. But if you give it to the men, 
 they’ll spend the money looking for a prettier muchacha.”
The Banker
From Peraza, we gain impor tant letters of introduction to the communi-
ties of financiers and developers engaged in istmeño wind development. The 
conversations and settings range from a literal smoke- filled room of mascu-
line corporate privilege at the wind industry advocacy group amdee to the 
bright, airy offices and pitch- perfect Euro- cosmopolitanism of edf Ener-
gies Nouvelles. Above all, amdee seems committed to informing us of the 
unstoppable forward momentum of the private wind sector. They represent 
fifty- six dif er ent corporate interests who have been undeterred by “minor 
setbacks” like Mareña, which is “just one case among dozens of successful 
examples,” they assure us.
Thomas Mueller Gastell, the Mexico country director for edf- en, laments 
the negative publicity Mareña has generated more openly, “since, through the 
media, it creates unfortunate ste reo types. That all wind developers are bad 
just like all Americans are spies and all Muslims are terrorists.” Still, Mueller 
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feels optimistic about the  future of wind development in Mexico. “The re-
sources are so good in Oaxaca that even without government subsidies, they 
 will be developed. The strength of Eu ro pean wind needs subsidies, but not 
the Oaxacan wind.”
By far the most fascinating of  these contacts is the Banker, who, at his 
request,  shall remain nameless. Of all our interviews across Mexico— short 
of Porfirio Montero, the supercacique of La Ventosa— the Banker is the per-
son who exudes the most confident sense of command over Mexican wind 
development. He flawlessly voices the logic of capital—of  people, land, and 
permits bought and sold— with an offhand pragmatism. It is  little won der 
given his investment portfolio. His institution has invested in a number of 
istmeño wind parks at dif er ent stages of development. He personally com-
mands more than $200 million of investment capital in renewable energy 
proj ects; he has a staf of a dozen in Mexico City and a network of more than 
a hundred agents managing community relations in the isthmus. His group’s 
annual profit target is $12 million, which  will increase to $25 million in 2016. 
In some proj ects he earns a modest 1 or 2  percent annual return on his in-
vestments over ten years or more. In  others, he can manage a 100  percent 
return in just three years. It all depends on the nature of the proj ect and at 
what stage his group enters and exits the investment. The Banker speaks 
frankly, in detail, and with an occasional wicked sense of deadpan humor.
Unlike Peraza, the Banker knows how to manage the Oaxacans: “The 
mantra of working in Mexico as a foreigner is patiencia, dinero [patience, 
money]. . . .  Other wise you can quickly go crazy.” The only real prob lem 
he  faces in Oaxaca is the evacuation infrastructure to bring his electricity to 
market. That is why developers are looking for proj ects elsewhere in Mexico: 
the existence of a larger grid and more consumers closer to the point of 
production. Ixtepec Potencia, he confirms, was financed by private investors 
like him who sought to sell wind- generated electricity to cfe as part of the 
first temporada abierta (open season). “Oaxaca is a sparsely ser viced part 
of the country, and the existing infrastructure was already saturated, so we 
had to build new infrastructure for the 1,800 megawatts of new generation 
they had planned.” And  there  will still be more infrastructure to come. The 
second temporada abierta in 2011–12 also required that applicants commit 
to providing (in total) $150 million of new grid extension and enhancement 
proj ects.
“cfe are such bastards,” the Banker chuckles. “That included reinforc-
ing the ring around Mexico City, something that cfe should have paid for 
themselves.”
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Developing a wind park in Oaxaca has, according to the Banker, become 
a rather routinized pro cess. At least he clearly leaves  little to chance when 
his money is at stake. “From greenfield to operation, it takes nine years. In 
Oaxaca it’s all about land. One megawatt of wind occupies ten hectares. So a 
two- hundred- megawatt wind park is two thousand hectares. That’s three or 
four hundred  people I need to convince.”
“Now, land tenancy is a complicated  thing in Oaxaca,” he continues, “and 
you’ll sometimes find four guys associated with one land plot. I mean, tech-
nically it’s illegal, but it’s common. The point is that  you’ve got hundreds of 
 people to convince, and you have to convince them in the most  human sorts 
of ways, so it can get quite expensive. Obviously, you need to have locals  doing 
this. They need to know how  these  people think. I am completely aware that 
I am the absolutely wrong person to go and talk with  these guys.” Invoking 
Star Trek, he explains, “I  don’t speak Klingon, and they speak Klingon. That 
is, it’s not just that they speak Zapotec, it is that they have a cultural outlook 
that is completely alien to me, and for me to try to engage them would only 
get me into trou ble. So instead I rely on an extensive local team. We have 
a hundred  people scattered across our dif er ent proj ects  there.  People who 
 were raised in the region, who speak Zapotec; the landowners know their 
 fathers. Even then, it  doesn’t always work.”
We ask the Banker how he finds  people for his local team.
“Well typically,” he responds, “I  don’t put my money at risk in the earli-
est stages, so someone  else has already bought some  people for me to work 
with, and then the connections are handed over. The point is that the first six 
years of proj ect development is just about getting contracts for the land and 
 doing the wind mea sure ments. But you  can’t get the land without conveying 
a clear sense of when [the posesionarios]  will be making the big money. And 
the Oaxacans, bless them,  don’t give a damn about percentages,” he explains. 
“They always want the flat rate. So you have to pay them a bit more up front 
even if you do better on the back end of the deal. It’s expensive to get the land 
contracted and held, and  there’s a massive inflationary cycle  going on now as 
the best land gets scarcer. Right now, just to give you a sense, to keep a two- 
hundred- megawatt proj ect idle costs about $1 million a year in payments.”
The Banker normally starts to get involved in proj ects about four to five 
years in, when analysts begin to calculate what he terms the “economic 
 viability” of a proj ect. He says this pro cess has become im mensely easier since 
the federal government instituted a universal willing cost (known in Mexico 
as porteo postal, or postage stamp) for use of the cfe grid. The porteo postal 
means that wherever a park is located and wherever the customer plans to 
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use the energy,  there is a straightforward payment per megawatt of trans-
mitted electricity, which is inflation indexed and visibly posted on the cre 
website.
“Before this,” the Banker says, “you had to pay cfe to undertake a spe-
cial interconnection study that cost tens of thousands of dollars, and  there 
was no way to predict how they would calculate the marginal cost of trans-
mitting energy. It could be anywhere between one dollar per megawatt and 
thirty dollars per megawatt.  There was no transparency; it was a ludicrous 
situation.”
 After economic viability is proven, next comes the permitting phase. 
“The big permit is the environmental permit, but it’s largely bought and paid 
for. I’ve heard of delayed permits but never rejected ones. Then  there is the 
archaeology permit, the transport permit, the license from the municipality. 
That’s a very expensive one,  you’ve got to pay for the mayor  after all, $5,000 
per megawatt.”
We talk a  little more about the contentious issue of municipal license fees in 
Juchitán right now. He reminds us with a smile that “in Mexico, mayors only 
get elected once, and only for three years, so their pension fund  can’t wait.”
The Banker sees  little mystery in wind park development, and despite 
all the talk of conflict in the isthmus, he even doubts that it is all that risky 
if the pro cess is gone about the right way, that is, if money is invested far 
enough in advance and wisely to ready the terrain for development and if 
the Klingons are allowed to speak to other Klingons who understand them 
and whom they trust.
“It’s a clear, tedious, and expensive pro cess.” He sighs, very much business 
as usual.
Given his detailed modeling of its contingences, we expect him to say that 
financial experts like him are the ones truly governing wind development in 
the isthmus. But when we put that question to him directly, he shakes his 
head.
For him, cfe is still the key player. “cfe is by default the driver of this 
pro cess  because they are a technically bankrupt organ ization with one 
resource— transmission capacity— which they guard jealously. They give 
you nothing for  free. If you have a self- supply proj ect, fine. Then you  will 
be building new trunk lines for them.”
He sits up a bit in his chair. The topic of cfe animates him more than 
the Oaxacans. “ There’s a reason why they are behaving this way. You have to 
understand the economic situation of cfe,” he explains. “They have a total 
income of 330 billion pesos annually. Half of that is spent on subsidizing 
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their residential sector.” More than 98  percent of their residential customers, 
he says, receive “a 70   percent discount of the real cost. That’s cfe’s big-
gest investment,  really their only major investment. They  don’t have funds 
for other investments. The average  house hold consumption of electricity in 
Mexico is 1.4 megawatt- hours per year. National demand is two hundred 
terawatt- hours, growing 4   percent a year. A  house hold should be paying 
four thousand pesos a year real cost, but with the subsidy, they pay two hun-
dred pesos  every two months. That’s a nice deal. But to do that, cfe has to 
overcharge their commercial customers.” To illustrate his point, he says, “In 
southern Texas, a con ve nience store  will pay half [for its electricity] what a 
con ve nience store pays just across the border.”
What is not driving wind development in Oaxaca, in the Banker’s opin-
ion, is any environmental mission. “What is your motive for renewable 
energy, anyway? Green? Nah. It’s nice, but it’s not the motive.” He explains, 
“I see two types of companies. With one type, being green is the goal indi-
rectly. A com pany like Walmart’s board is telling them to green their image 
by making some investments. But for the majority, tarifs are the real moti-
vation.  There is remarkable volatility month to month in cfe’s tarifs. It is 
often plus or minus 4  percent; 7  percent is the rec ord in the past year. And 
you  can’t hedge Mexican electricity prices. You only hedge by entering into 
a twenty- year fixed- price contract. So if your com pany uses a lot of electric-
ity, and you want to know your long- term costs better, it’s a good idea; you’ll 
prob ably save money.”
It is late in the day, and the Banker leans back in his chair, his eyelids 
heavy, his words slightly slurred  because of a fatigued tongue. “Let me 
give cfe credit where credit is due. If theirs was an efficient model, then it 
 wouldn’t be so profitable for me to sell electricity.” But he recognizes, more 
so than  others with whom we have spoken, why cfe would also seek to 
delay, resist, and impede private sector energy provision. “If cfe loses too 
many of  those commercial customers they need to overcharge, if they are 
lost to the private sector, then cfe  will  really be in the shit.”
Forever an Obscure Object of Desire
In our last few weeks in the capital, we endeavor to track down Oaxacan 
politicians who are working in Mexico City. We feel anxious to complete the 
work  because the well- known Mexican volcano Popocatépetl has recently 
reawakened and is ominously beginning to send forth steam and ash.
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We meet first with Carol Antonio Altamirano, the former mayor of 
Asunción Ixtaltepec, a town on the road between Ixtepec and Juchitán, who 
currently serves as a federal diputado for the prd party. At his suggestion we 
meet at the Sanborn’s in Parc Delta, which possibly serves the worst cofee 
in the world. We arrive to find Altamirano, who is dressed sharply in a grey 
suit, pink tie, and striped shirt, staring at a plate of nearly finished eggs. He 
is irritated at the waitress for not having cleared them away already. A few 
snippy exchanges  later, he  settles back into his public persona. He becomes 
animated, fidgety even, taking demonstrative sips of  water, leaning in closely 
to enact familiarity.
The wind parks are much on his mind. He says emphatically that although 
the situation is worsening (agudizado), the  great majority of the  people in the 
isthmus still want the wind parks. “The  people want investment, and this 
type of investment  doesn’t have a bad environmental efect. But they want 
their traditions of decision- making respected— they  don’t want invest-
ment through payofs— they want re spect for their land, and above all, they 
want to receive a significant share of the benefits.”
He laments, as do so many of the other politicians we have spoken with, the 
lack of a government agency to coordinate wind development on the ground 
in the isthmus. “Instead, it is just the companies handing out information, and 
of course, it is their vested interest to get  people to sign their contracts.  There’s 
a lack of transparency between the companies and the communities.”
The worst  thing, however, is the actitud de soborno (bribery mentality) 
that drives the  whole sector: so many proj ects proceed through payments in 
cash and trucks to mayors.35 Ultimately, it is counterproductive. “ People in 
the isthmus are very jealous. When the com pany gives someone a truck, that 
ofends every one  else. So the more money that flows in, the more protests 
arise. It’s a vicious cycle.”
The cycle has deep historical roots, he admits. “The isthmus has been poor 
for so long that rapid influxes of money break the tela social [social fabric]. 
 There have always been social divisions in the isthmus, always.  People are 
accustomed to divisiveness in the isthmus. But in the old days, the conflicts 
 were without killings. The wind parks  were like the match that enflamed the 
situation.”
Altamirano raps his knuckles confidently on the  table, saying that he has 
just drafted a new law for discussion in the federal chamber of deputies to 
help improve the situation. It has three parts: (1) to impose a 6  percent tax 
on gross electricity sales, (2) to send  those tax revenues directly to the muni-
cipios afected by the development, and (3) to guarantee that  those revenues 
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 will be used directly for social proj ects. In other words, it  will be impermis-
sible for the funds to go  toward indirect administrative costs, thus prevent-
ing resources from being siphoned away by politicians for other purposes.
“This plan  will not only benefit communities directly, but it should also 
help put an end to the bribery. Indeed, I think it may even save companies 
money in the long run.”
Interestingly, he seems completely unaware of the existence of the Yansa- 
Ixtepec community wind park proposal even though it would be sited in his 
legislative district.  After a few minutes’ discussion, however, he seems all 
for it, musing, “Perhaps we need a further reform that  will incentivize com-
munity wind parks so that for  every two parks built by Iberdrola,  there  will 
be a community park.”
In the weeks that follow, we look expectantly for a news report from Mexico 
City regarding Altamirano’s proposed legislation, but we find no coverage at 
all. It appears to have died  behind closed doors— yet another failed dream of 
aeolian governmentality.
Our last meeting of this set is with Diódoro Carrasco, the former governor 
of Oaxaca, who is still a po liti cal kingmaker for his pan party. We approach 
the interview with  great anticipation and a  little trepidation. The rumor is that 
(current Oaxacan governor) Gabino Cué is Carrasco’s disciple, that the former 
owes his governorship to the latter’s networks. Carrasco’s consultancy is also 
rumored to be working for vari ous wind park proj ects in the isthmus, keeping 
 things moving smoothly. Some say Carrasco is even on retainer for Mareña, 
putting pressure on Cué to use vio lence if necessary to move the proj ect along.
Laurence Ilif has warned us about Carrasco too: “He did some  really 
oppressive  things when he was governor. I remember Vicente Fox telling 
me  after he became president that one of the first  things he had to do was 
to  pardon all the  people Carrasco had thrown in jail in Oaxaca.  There  were 
three thousand  people in jail just for eating iguana!”
We are scheduled to meet Carrasco at his consultancy office in the Centro 
Histórico, not far from the Diego Rivera Museum. The office is strangely 
ragtag. It lacks a sign of any kind; the gray carpet is worn and rumpled. The 
air is stale, and fluo rescent lights buzz and flicker. We are at a conference 
 table awaiting him when his assistant, Paulina, flutters in to tell us that 
he  will meet us in his private office instead, just down the block. Carrasco 
has been delayed by a meeting with— wait for it— Gabino Cué. We hurry 
 there, excited by the prospect of bumping into Cué as well. Unfortunately, 
though, we just miss the sitting governor. But obviously just: Cué’s cigarette 
smoke still hangs in the air, and a butt still smolders in Carrasco’s ashtray.
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This office is more what we had expected of Carrasco given his reputa-
tion. It is large, richly decorated, and perhaps unintentionally postmodern 
in its decorative menagerie of temporal dislocations. To our right is a tv 
playing We Are the ’80s at a moderately annoying volume. A copy of Bill 
Clinton’s Mi Vida is prominently displayed on the neighboring bookshelf 
among a host of art and antique books. The  table we are sitting at is glass and 
contains an inset shelf of weathered medals. Next to the couch is a vintage 
L. C. Smith & Bros. typewriter encased in a Lucite cube.
If Carrasco is the predator he is reputed to be, then he is nonetheless 
a smooth and charming one. He is a good storyteller, combining colorful 
meta phors and dramatic tales with occasional poetic and paranoid twists. 
Leaning back on his leather couch, he says that the isthmus has been “an 
obscure object of desire” forever, at least since the days of Porfirio Díaz. It 
was a pos si ble site of what became the Panama Canal. North American 
and Eu ro pean companies came from the around the world, hungry for the 
riqueza (riches) that the isthmus ofered. “It’s a very special place both in 
terms of Oaxaca and Mexico.”
But the other side of the cultural richness of the isthmus is that it has 
always fought against Mexican mestizaje. “It has this parallel history of con-
flict, of being permanently at war. They fought the Arabs who came with the 
railroads, they fought the French, they even fought [Benito] Juárez. Oh, how 
they hate Juárez in the isthmus.” Carrasco laughs. “And then came cocei, 
the biggest movement of its kind in Mexico, and they fought the pri.”
In the isthmus they have always been “very autonomous and very war-
like,” he says, and for that reason, it does not surprise him that  there is so 
much crime  there as well. He says  those who traffic drugs and persons 
have deep networks in the region. All the development schemes planned 
for the isthmus since the Mexican Revolution have not amounted to much. 
Wherever factories  were built, they  were lost to po liti cal conflict, blockades, 
strikes.
Still, when it comes to wind power, he is an optimist. “It’s such a terrific 
resource. The government  won’t keep making  mistakes about it. The  future 
looks marvelous,” he says confidently.
During his sexenio as governor (1992–98), Carrasco does not recall any 
talk from the federal government about using wind power as a development 
instrument. “But  under Calderón,  things changed, it became a priority, and 
that’s a good  thing. Unfortunately,  there was a lack of regulation, and com-
panies have done too  little to benefit the communities.” Ultimately, however, 
Carrasco places blame on Oaxacan liderazgo, on organ izations like ucizoni 
156 chapter four
that sponge up money, prestige, and legitimacy from international activist 
groups and attack any megaproject they can.
“They say  these proj ects violate the sovereignty of indigenous  peoples, 
and while some of their points are valid,  others  aren’t. And they never ofer 
a positive alternative; it’s always a discourse of negation with them.” He says 
that when his administration was planning the Trans- Isthmus Highway 
twenty years ago, the same groups  were saying exactly the same  things.
He notes that the proj ects that have taken place on mostly private land 
have fared quite well. Even Mareña might have made it if  there had been a 
 little more mantequilla (butter) at the beginning.
“Carlos [Beas of ucizoni] says it’s  going to kill the fish, but I’d rather lis-
ten to a marine biologist,” he says, laughing. And then he reiterates his own 
discourse on deficiency, “The companies need to have better social plans. 
And the government should have been regulating them more strongly.”
Fi nally, he leans in to share a secret theory about the re sis tance. “ Here 
is my secret theory that I cannot prove. The parks that have  really encoun-
tered prob lems are all next to the ocean. Maybe the prob lem is that someone 
 doesn’t want legitimate development along the shore  because that would 
prevent illegal traffic from using it.” He leans back, smiling broadly. “I  can’t 
prove that, but that’s my hypothesis.”
As we get up to leave, it feels as though  there is still smoke lingering in 
the room, a trace also, in the Derridean sense,36 of the absent istmeño other, 
standing in for the diversity of Mexicos that are not Mexico City: the re-
gions, the indigeneities, the war machines, the distant dreams, and materials 
without which the lavish national and cosmopolitan life of DF could not 
exist.
This chapter has explored the forces and impasses, the powers and con-
tingencies, of energy, infrastructure, finance, and state governance in the 
nexus of all Mexican flows: the Distrito Federal. Through the granular testi-
mony and experience of key actors involved in the management of biopower, 
capital, and energopower, the monolithic and harmonic qualities of  these 
ensembles of enablement have been dispersed. We see instead their internal 
contradictions and dense, turbulent entanglements with one another. They 
enable and disable one another in complexly knotted formations.37
The federal government inhibits cfe’s ability to extend its own grid as a 
means of luring more foreign capital to its imperiled proj ect of national de-
velopment. Yet the only reason the capital  will come is  because cfe’s electric-
ity tarifs are so high, which is, in turn, an efect of the biopo liti cal mission of 
subsidized residential electricity. Foreign capital would seem to be the lead 
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puppeteer of the  whole drama, and yet it is being stalked and manipulated 
by a jealous parastatal seeking to prevent its own dissolution in the pro cess 
of energy reform. Capital is likewise being challenged by “very autonomous 
and very warlike” critics, even being bled by its “allies” in a region at the edge 
of the rule of national law. The federal government might also seem to hold 
superordinate power in that it has created the policies, both Cardenista and 
neoliberal, that appear to constitute the rules of the game for the nation’s 
electric  future. And yet that government knows all too well the fragility of 
its petro- statecraft in a time of peak oil and climate change and its inability 
to outmaneuver or silence the Carlos Beases of the world as they undermine 
and disrupt the already- strained alliances between cfe and foreign capital.
 There was no more common sentiment we heard in the course of re-
search than that the government was not in control of what was happening 
in the isthmus; its biopo liti cal promises so often seemed to fall on deaf ears 
 there that even its energy ministers  were forced to travel incognito in search 
of answers. Fi nally, the grid itself—so essential to Mexico’s pre sent and to 
Mexico’s  future, channeling hundreds of terawatt- hours a year, with demand 
only growing— faces a dynamic geopolitics of fossil fuel supply on one hand 
and the intermittency of renewable energy on the other. This is not even to 
mention the challenges of infrastructural maintenance and extension and 
the estimated 15 to 20  percent of generated electricity sacrificed in technical 
and nontechnical losses, three to four times the equivalent loss in the United 
States or Eu rope. The grid was certainly not capable of delivering on the 
promise of the Mexican postpetrostate by itself.
What  future configuration of energopolitics— taking this term now in its 
broadest sense of “energy politics,” aeolian and beyond— could guarantee 
the national health and wealth desired by government; the expanding prof-
itscape desired by capital; the responsive, lossless infrastructure desired by 
the grid? That  future deserves greater discussion. And to the extent that it 
involves wind power, we must return to where Mexico’s wind is being har-
vested, where contracts are being signed and contested, where turbines and 
blockades are rising, where blades and machetes and protest marches are 
already in motion. We must return to the front lines of tension and strug gle 
over the  future of istmeño wind to better understand the aeolian po liti cal 
potentialities that are being set into motion  there. Our final journey is thus 
to Juchitán, the semimythical, autonomous, and unruly po liti cal hub of the 
isthmus, where all the sovereign powers and visions of Mexican national 
imagination often seem like the drifting smoke and eve ning incandescence 
of Popocatépetl, a remote and curious spectacle.
5.  Guidxiguie’ (Juchitán de Zaragoza)
It would take  great deal of time to describe to you the state of immorality and disorder 
in which the residents of Juchitán have lived since very ancient times. You know well 
their  great excesses. You are not unaware of their depredations  under the colonial regime 
and their attacks against the agents of the Spanish government. You know that during 
the centralized government they mocked the armed forces that the central power sent 
to repress their crimes, defeating and causing damage to it, making fun of its leaders, 
and scorning the local authorities. You have been witnesses to  these scenes of blood and 
horror. — benito juárez, Governor of Oaxaca, addressing the State Congress (1850)
Juchitan contains about 10,000 inhabitants, being the most populous community in 
southern Mexico. Its inhabitants have the reputation of being a very unruly set, turbu-
lent politicians and revolutionists. In the south, no po liti cal movement is made without 
weighing its opinion in the balance of success, which nearly always turns in favour of 
the side the Juchitecos are on. They have been in Oaxaca often, as well as in Tehuante-
pec, enforcing their opinions at the point of the bayonet. — gustav ferdinand von 
tempsky, “Mitla” (1858)
Juchitán, the second town on the southern division of the isthmus, is situated on the 
left bank of the Dog River, 4 miles from Espinal, and 18 miles from Tehuantepec. It 
possesses three stores but very few substantial buildings. Its inhabitants, in number 
nearly 6000, are industrious and laborious; at the same time they are a warlike  people, 
and meddle in all po liti cal strug gles; which occur constantly in this unhappy country. 
— m. g. hermesdorff, “On the Isthmus of Tehuantepec” (1862)
The juchitecos are renowned as the most ferocious, untamable fighters in Mexico when 
it comes to the defense of their own rights against petty tyrants. They are proud of their 
unbroken rec ord of loyalty to the  causes of democracy, equality and justice throughout 
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the turbulent history of Mexico. . . .  Juchitecos never call themselves mexicanos or even 
oaxaqueños; they are first and always juchitecos. — miguel covarrubias, Mexico 
South (1946)
Tecos Valientes
March 10, 2013. In the bright light and rising heat of late morning, friends and 
supporters of the Asamblea Popu lar del Pueblo Juchiteco (appj) are gather-
ing in the square that commemorates the  Battle of Juchitán on September 5, 
1866.1 That  battle remains legendary in the city  today: the men and  women of 
Juchitán— many armed with  little more than machetes, palos, and stones— 
rallied to drive an invading force of 2,500 well- armed French troops out of 
the city, slaughtering hundreds as they retreated through rains and swamps 
 toward their garrison in Tehuantepec.2 The  battle ended the French inter-
vention in the isthmus and also helped to extend an already well- seasoned 
Juchiteco reputation for fierceness in  battle against “petty tyrants” and foreign 
invaders.
 People are gathered in small groups chatting; the mood is upbeat and 
charged. The appj is the newest of the asambleas (popu lar assemblies) that 
have formed in response to el proyecto eólico (“the wind proj ect,” as it some-
times called), in this case specifically to resist the Gas Natu ral Fenosa wind 
park proj ect being built in Playa Vicente.3 Two weeks ago, on February 25, 
they inaugurated their re sis tance by means of a blockade along the highway 
between Juchitán and Playa Vicente, cutting of one of the major access roads 
for equipment and construction personnel to move.  Today is the asamblea’s 
first major march and rally, and many of the most active members of the 
re sis tance to wind development, the inconformes or antieólicos, as they call 
themselves, are circulating. Alejandro López and Mariano López Gómez, 
who have often been identified in the local media as the leaders of the move-
ment (though they fervently disown the title “leader”), are  there talking to a 
group of men from Álvaro Obregón. Carlos Sánchez, a founder of commu-
nity radio station Radio Totopo,4 who is known locally as Beedxe’ (jaguar), 
is speaking with some compañeros from ucizoni, including Nacho, one 
of Carlos Beas’s lieutenants, whom we have met on several other occasions. 
The organizers of the local #YoSoy132 chapter are pre sent as well.5 But the 
majority of  those gathering, perhaps numbering two hundred and growing, 
seem to be normal working- class Juchitec@s— men,  women, and  children of 
all ages, many obviously campesin@s, fisherfolk, and obreros.
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We talk with the Álvaro Obregón del e ga tion for a while. Although this 
march is nominally focused against Gas Natu ral Fenosa, the standof with 
Mareña Renovables is still very much on  people’s minds in Juchitán. A fish-
erman named José tells us that every thing is very calm at the Álvaro block-
ade now. The com pany and the police are staying away.
He shrugs, “Maybe  they’ve given up. I  don’t know.”
Nacho shakes his head. He thinks this is all just part of Mareña’s strategy. 
“They  won’t try force again for a while  because they failed last time.  They’ll try 
diplomacy instead and involve the politicians. They are already talking about 
 doing a public consulta [consultation], but it’s just more deception. If they do 
it,  they’ll be sure to conclude  there is no opposition to the park proj ects.”
He goes on to tell us that the Mareña conflict has been accentuating a rift 
within the Cué regime between the allies of former governors Carrasco and 
Murat. The Murat faction wants a diplomatic solution; the Carrasco faction 
is reputedly ready to use vio lence to displace  those protesting the park and 
blockading the access roads. “So  we’ll see.”
Nacho shrugs. He says, “ucizoni is just working to keep the communi-
ties informed and morale high and to alert  people not to participate in any 
false consultas.”
Around eleven  o’clock the group begins to assem ble into parade form. 
A line of  children lead the way, holding up handwritten yellow- and- white 
signs with slogans such as “We  were never consulted and do not want the 
proyecto eólico. Get out Union Fenosa!”; “We are building autonomía not 
wind parks”; “Out with the po liti cal parties and the leaders who sell our 
patria”; and “Viva Juchitán, death to the bad government, no to the proyecto 
eólico.” They are followed by a campesino holding a large Mexican flag. 
Other, larger antieólico banners follow, as do more  children with signs. A 
small red Ford with an enormous speaker strapped to its roof leads chants 
in Zapotec and Spanish, for instance the ever- popular “Zapata vive, vive! La 
lucha sigue, sigue!”6 Some men  ride bicycles and motorbikes; some  women 
carry sticks and machetes,  others carry  children. We are even joined for a 
while by another flag carrier on  horse back.
And so we march through the heart of Juchitán to the Zócalo and the 
Palacio Municipal, the ucizoni members handing out colorful posters to 
passersby, which read, “No al Saqueo Trasnacional!” and depict a caricatured 
red- haired Spanish conquistador, with a Mareña flag fluttering  behind him, 
ofering a hand mirror to three istmeño campesinos in exchange for their 
land.7
“And where have I heard that before?” one of the campesinos muses.
FIGURE 5.1.   Antieólico march, Juchitán
FIGURE 5.2.   Antieólico march, Juchitán
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By the time the parade pauses at the Palacio, its numbers have perhaps 
doubled. Several speakers take turns denouncing Gas Fenosa and the wind 
parks in general. But just as much venom is directed  toward the po liti cal 
parties and their local leaders, “ these cowards and traitors, who have de-
ceived the  people and sold the land of Juchitán to the foreign invaders.”
The march proceeds into the heat of the after noon through the Séptima 
Sección (seventh district), the heart of indigenous, working- class Juchitán, 
where the men fish and the  women clean and sell fish. It, too, is a social 
space of legend, the crucible of countless uprisings, relentless in its radiation 
of indigenous identity and sovereignty, a place where, we have been told, 
“middle- class Juchitecos are afraid to go.”
On the way, we discover  there is another anthropologist among us, 
Melanie McComsey, a PhD candidate from the University of California San 
Diego, who is  doing her dissertation research on bilingualism in Juchitán. Mel-
anie confesses that she did not  really know what the march was about, but two 
of her neighbors in the Séptima asked her to attend. She senses that the neigh-
borhood is very divided over the parks. Many of the fisherfolk are strongly 
critical of the parks, but  there are vocal supporters as well, including a  woman 
FIGURE 5.3.   Anti- Mareña caricature
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whose aunt lives in La Ventosa and rented her land to the wind companies and 
who has instilled a lot of proeólico thinking in her niece. And then  there are 
 others who took money from Gas Fenosa early on who now feel guilty about it.
Around two  o’clock we arrive at the point on the highway where the road 
branches of east  toward Playa Vicente. About fifty meters before that, we 
pass five pieces of wood neatly spaced across the road. While the chunks of 
wood are sizable, they are not so big as to prevent car traffic. This is a sym-
bolic boundary as much as a physical barrier.
Ten meters past that,  there are a number of vehicles, some of which are 
more permanent ele ments of the blockade, which can be moved into po-
sition quickly.  There are also vehicular trophies from previous skirmishes 
with the wind companies in Álvaro and Juchitán, including a large Caterpil-
lar tractor and a white  Toyota truck emblazoned with the logo of a Veracruz- 
based geotechnical ser vices com pany. Other vehicles are  there for the occasion, 
including one that is dispensing plates of food to the tired marchers.
As the wind whips around us, men take turns hammering away at the truck 
with palos while the crowd watches and eats lunch. First the win dows are 
broken, then the front windshield is caved in. The front bumper is pulled partly 
of.  There are some calls from the crowd of “¡Fuego! ¡Fuego!” but we come to 
understand from chatting with other marchers that a decision has already been 
made that the truck is too valuable to burn. At the least, some of the men want 
to strip it of its engine before burning it. Some boys throw rocks at the truck’s 
FIGURE 5.4.   Blockade of the Gas Fenosa proj ect
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already- caved-in win dows, which ricochet dangerously, earning the disapproval 
of an older  woman, who chases them of, much to the mirth of their friends.
Just when the older men seem to have tired of battering the truck, a wiry 
young man wearing sunglasses, a tight blue shirt, and jeans rolled to midcalf 
seizes the largest palo available, a rusted metal bar more than half his height. 
Wielding it with both hands and cursing in Zapotec, he deals the truck 
such blows as it has never felt before, launching himself of the ground with 
some of his strikes. It is a magnificent per for mance of the guerrero (warrior) 
Juchiteco.8 A dozen or so swings  later, one of the older men decides the 
truck has had enough and disarms his young comrade, tossing the palo into 
the truck’s bed without further ceremony.
“ These Scenes of Blood and Horror”
Both essentialist and constructivist readings of Juchiteco ferocity are tempt-
ing. On the one hand, it is not just in Oaxaca City and Mexico City that 
one hears frequent talk of the fierce, ungovernable istmeños of whom the 
FIGURE 5.5.   Battered truck
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Juchitecan warrior is the exemplary figure. This subjectivity is actively in-
dexed and performed locally as well. The image of Juchitán as a city of 
heroic freedom fighters— home of the last pure Zapotecs, of the Amazon- 
like matriarchs who invert the patriarcho- colonial hierarchy, of  people who 
have never accepted the imposition of any foreign power  whether imperial 
or governmental or cap i tal ist—is an identitarian discourse that echoes in 
the restaurants and cantinas, in the mototaxis, at the velas, in the market, 
everywhere across the bustling city of seventy thousand  people. Sometimes 
it is invoked ironically or with detached amusement; but it is also very often 
articulated sincerely as a way of making sense of the peculiar po liti cal (dis)
order of the city, which remains openly, if unevenly, defiant of Mexican and 
Oaxacan authorities. The Juchitecan po liti cal elite  today, regardless of fac-
tion, seem entirely ready to strike bargains with external powers over land 
and resources in order to bring themselves revenue and leverage. On the 
other hand, their status exists in a delicate ecol ogy of neighborhood- level 
and  labor  union po liti cal networks that militate against national and trans-
national elite alliances, occupying land and blockading roads as a constant 
friction against flows of capital and influence.9
At the same time, many scholars in Mexico and elsewhere have rightly 
observed that ethnotypes of lawless and violent indigenous disposition 
elaborate a colonial politics that validates both the surveillance and repression 
of indigenous  peoples and the law, justice, and modernity of settler gover-
nance.10 As Povinelli has argued, even more recent postcolonial politics 
of “multicultural” governance— which promise recognition of indigenous 
subjectivity within the confines of national law and culture— continue to 
police and hierarchize tolerated and nontolerated modes of indigeneity.11 
Mexico’s mestizaje nationalism has exemplified this paradox since the revolu-
tionary Constitution of 1917,12 a document that promises extensive po liti cal 
entitlements to Mexico’s indigenous  peoples, including rights to ancestral 
land and to self- governance. Yet  these entitlements have always borne the 
mark of settler paternalism,13 have been at best partially institutionalized, 
and have always coexisted with both violent and nonviolent suppressions 
of indigenous culture, identity, and authority. Indeed, in a certain sense, 
Mexican mestizaje nationalism foreshadowed the contradictions of multi-
cultural recognition well in advance of other settler liberalisms.14 Juchitán’s 
par tic u lar position on the fringe of colonial and postcolonial empires helps 
to illuminate  those contradictions and to make sense of how indigenous 
resistencia (re sis tance) and refusal has come to be made the ethnological 
soul of the city.15
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That soul has been many centuries in the shaping according to historical 
and archaeological accounts. Zapotec presence in the isthmus is generally 
dated to the mid- fourteenth  century as part of a migration/invasion that 
was likely driven by violent encroachment from Mixtec (and  later, Aztec) 
populations into the Valley of Oaxaca. The Zapotecs, in turn, warred with 
and partly displaced the Huaves, Chontales, and Zoques, who already in-
habited the isthmus. Between roughly 1350 and 1450, Zapotec civilization 
had two major po liti cal centers among its city- states, with the fortress at 
Guiengola (just north of con temporary Tehuantepec) coming to rival and 
eventually surpass Zaachila’s prominence in the Oaxacan Valley.16 In 1490 
the Zapotec lord Cosijoeza moved his capital from Zaachila to Guien-
gola, in part at least  because of pressure from Aztecs and highland Mix-
tecs, which completed the transfer of po liti cal and cultural authority to the 
south.17 Still, the pull of the isthmus was likely as strong as the push from 
the valley. The resource- rich southern isthmus was already a trading center, 
and Tehuantepec had established economic importance, supplying the rest 
of Oaxaca with salt. Historians and archaeologists of precolonial Oaxaca 
suggest that the Aztecs’ move to dominate the Oaxacan Valley at the turn 
of the sixteenth  century and to extend their empire as far as Tehuantepec 
was motivated principally by a desire to guarantee control over the Central 
American trade routes passing through the isthmus.18 Still, it is remem-
bered in Juchitán that Guiengola never fell to the Aztecs’ siege, and only a 
marriage between the Aztec and Zapotec ruling lineages ended the conflict. 
Only two de cades  later, the Spanish invasion rapidly unmade the Aztec em-
pire, and so it remains the local sentiment in the isthmus that they  were 
never truly subjects of the Aztecs.
The Spanish arrived in the isthmus soon thereafter, chasing gold and war. 
Hernán Cortés’s brutal lieutenant Pedro de Alvarado arrived in Tehuantepec 
in 1522— fresh from leading the destruction of Tenochtitlan less than a year 
beforehand— and or ga nized the Christian conversion of the last Zapotec 
kings of Guiengola— Cosijoeza and his son, Cosijopii— along with nominal 
Zapotec ac cep tance of Spanish hegemony. But the local authority of Zapotec 
caciques remained relatively undisturbed insofar as they  were willing to as-
sist the Spanish in their eforts of wealth extraction; Cosijopii, for example, 
remained the cacique of Tehuantepec  until his death in 1563.19 Cortés quickly 
identified the isthmus as one of the most potentially profitable parts of New 
Spain, and he maneuvered to have the encomiendas awarded to him when 
he was granted the position of Marquis del Valle centered  there. In addi-
tion to gold and silver mining, by 1528 Cortés had built in Tehuantepec the 
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largest shipbuilding enterprise anywhere in New Spain to help export the 
livestock raised on his several haciendas marquesanas.20
As elsewhere in the Spanish colonies, disease, corvée  labor, resource 
 extraction, and Chris tian ity had massive efects on precolonial cultures, 
forcefully dissolving precolonial social institutions; challenging worldviews, 
cultural practices, and languages; and helping to generate el indio as a 
composite subject of salvation,  labor, and vio lence.21 Based on rec ords of in-
digenous tributaries to the Spanish crown, John Tutino calculates that  there 
was an 85  percent decrease in the indigenous population in the isthmus be-
tween 1520 and 1570, a population that would continue to shrink  until the 
 middle of the seventeenth  century.22 Yet, at the same time, the Spanish cul-
tural presence remained  limited in the isthmus, which reduced the pressure 
of assimilation. As many of the Spaniards’ colonial economic ventures failed 
over the course of the sixteenth  century, the direct exploitation of istmeño 
resources abated as well. Tutino writes:
By 1560 the force of the conquistadorial incursion into the Isthmus 
had diminished. The placer deposits of gold  were not generating profit. 
The shipyards  were closed. Other interests guaranteed that Acapulco 
would become the principal Pacific port north of Panama. For a time, 
heavy cargos  were transported ocean- to- ocean across the Isthmus, but 
in fifty years, even this previously impor tant sector became a vestige 
of its former self. The region became increasingly marginal, and the 
heirs of Cortés renounced their  legal rights over Tehuantepec almost 
without protest.
Following the abatement of the conquistadors’ intervention in the 
Isthmus, a  limited Spanish presence and a much- diminished indig-
enous population remained. In the city of Tehuantepec  there was a 
royal judge and some Dominican friars, and they  were surrounded by 
a small Spanish community. In 1598 this enclave included only twenty- 
five families. It grew to about one hundred families in the first de cades 
of the seventeenth  century but never supported a very large Spanish 
population. In 1742  there  were no more than fifty Spanish and mestizo 
families in all of Tehuantepec.23
Over the course of the seventeenth and eigh teenth centuries the repar-
timiento system of forced  labor became, as elsewhere in Mexico, the domi-
nant form of social relation between the Spanish/mestizo and indigenous 
populations of the isthmus.24 In it, los indios  were expected to deliver periodic 
tribute to the local Spanish alcalde mayor, a “creole functionary” position of 
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the type described by Benedict Anderson.25 According to historian Judith 
Francis Zeitlin, the alcaldes mayores of Tehuantepec typically demanded 
three repartimientos of manufactured clothing during their two years in of-
fice. This seems to have been tolerated by the Zapotecs; tributary relations 
to northern lords  were familiar, dating to the late Aztec period. But when 
individual alcaldes and their indigenous cacique allies intensified their de-
mands, vio lence often ensued.
The paradigmatic case was the Rebellion of Tehuantepec in 1660, when 
unusually harsh repartimiento demands for cotton cloth led to a protest by 
several thousand in Tehuantepec.26 The Casas Reales  were set ablaze; the al-
calde mayor, don Juan de Avellán, was stoned to death along with a cacique 
ally; and the local indigenous authorities  were removed from office.27 For 
more than a year, Tehuantepec stayed in open rebellion against the crown 
 until the forces of Oaxaca City and Mexico City  were able to capture the 
leaders of the rebellion and subject them to a variety of brutal punishments.28
The vio lence surrounding repartimiento was real and dramatic. Yet histo-
rians argue that repartimiento was not simply a relation of naked oppression 
but was also imbued with a complex moral economy involving notions of 
acceptable tribute and patronage. At least some Spanish religious and secu-
lar authorities  were also concerned about abuse of Native  labor power. The 
istmeños in turn contested Spanish authority continuously throughout the 
repartimiento era and seemed to maintain a strong commitment to tradi-
tional po liti cal communalism.  There  were many cases of indigenous cabildos 
(councils) being overturned when it was felt that they had become too 
complicit with the Spanish.
As the indigenous population fi nally began to rebound in the early eigh-
teenth  century, demands for indigenous po liti cal and economic autonomy 
became stronger. Another major riot in Tehuantepec in 1715 led to increased 
anxiety about Native revolt, extending to the viceroy himself. Fearing also 
that the Natives might simply flee their pueblos to avoid further taxation, 
the viceroy allowed the indigenous po liti cal leaders of Tehuantepec more 
voice in selecting their local cabildo authorities.29 As elsewhere in Mexico, 
the scarcity of  labor and the fragility of its domination also lent Oaxaca’s 
indigenous  peoples some agency in their negotiations with the crown.30
Tehuantepec was indisputably the locus of Spanish- indigenous relations 
and conflict in the isthmus during the seventeenth and eigh teenth centuries. 
Its status as a center of colonial administration, the presence of the only 
Spanish and mestizo enclaves of any size in the southern isthmus, and the close 
working relationship between indigenous and Spanish authorities eventually 
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made Tehuantepec relatively state oriented and po liti cally conservative rela-
tive to neighboring communities in the isthmus. By the time of Mexican in-
de pen dence, it was clear that Juchitán— a growing market hub benefiting 
from its proximity to the ranching haciendas, the salt flats, and abundant 
hunting and fishing resources as well as from longer distance trade from 
Chiapas and Central Amer i ca— had become the more animated center of 
Zapotec autonomy, one increasingly known for its resistencia to external po-
liti cal and economic impositions. Although Benito Juárez would accuse the 
Juchitecos of “immorality and disorder” since “very ancient times,” it seems 
more likely that Juchitán became the center of Zapotec autonomism and 
re sis tance only in the first half of the nineteenth  century as Tehuantepec be-
came acculturated to conservative po liti cal forces and as Juchitán’s own size 
and regional economic power grew. Eu ro pean travelers’ accounts through-
out the nineteenth  century uniformly depict Juchitán as a space of especially 
strong indio traditions, identity, and po liti cal unity. It is also not difficult to 
imagine that Juchitán had been for some time precisely the sort of place that 
istmeños might escape to if they  were dissatisfied with the hegemony of the 
Spanish and their cacique allies in Tehuantepec.
The image of the guerrero Juchiteco was then honed in a series of re-
volts led by a prosperous Juchitecan rancher, Che Gorio Melendre (José 
Gregorio Meléndez to the Mexicans), who fought against the eforts of the 
Oaxacan state and the Mexican government to raise income by privatizing 
and monopolizing isthmian salt deposits. Beginning in 1834, and continuing 
episodically  until 1853, Che Gorio and his supporters fought to maintain tra-
ditional communal rights to salt extraction.31 He attacked the state military 
garrison at Tehuantepec in 1847 and declared the separation of the isthmus 
from the state of Oaxaca.32 The uprising became perhaps the greatest chal-
lenge to the authority of Governor Benito Juárez’s administration. Although 
Juárez sought conciliation, claiming that traditional communal use rights 
would not be disturbed by the new salt monopolies, neither his promises 
nor military action— including the possibly inadvertent burning of Juchitán 
in 1850— seemed able to quell Melendre’s rebellion and guarantee istmeño 
ac cep tance of Oaxacan authority. State militia victories would see Melendre 
and his allies drift back into the forest only to reappear weeks or months 
 later as guerilla fighters, burning haciendas and encouraging Juchitecos to 
“rob” the salt flats. In January 1853, the rebels again occupied Tehuantepec and 
contributed forces to the occupation of Oaxaca City in February. When in 
April of the same year Antonio López de Santa Anna returned for his eighth 
and final stint as Mexican president, he quickly signed a decree creating the 
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Isthmus of Tehuantepec as its own federal territory separate from Oaxaca 
and Veracruz. Melendre, though, was found mysteriously poisoned the very 
same morning. His dream of istmeño po liti cal in de pen dence was realized, 
but it only lasted two years, the length of Santa Anna’s last term.
Viewed in the context of Mexican governmental eforts to license a rail 
corridor across the isthmus to foreign developers (as early as 1842) and the 
Gadsen Purchase Treaty of 1853— which established in the isthmus what 
amounted to a  free trade and movement zone for US persons and property— 
Santa Anna’s support for istmeño in de pen dence has to be viewed as some-
thing more than a capitulation of state authority to unruly indigeneity. Santa 
Anna and his successors (including Juárez) faced crippling foreign debts, 
uncertain incomes, and po liti cal unrest across the country. Transit rights 
across the isthmus seemed a safe bet to attract international interest and 
capital of a scale that dwarfed colonial repartimiento incomes and priva-
tized salt and ranching schemes. Throughout the 1850s,  until the McLane- 
Ocampo Treaty of 1859— which would have guaranteed the United States 
full use “in perpetuity” of the isthmus— failed to pass the US Senate, the 
promise of a railroad or a canal corridor across the isthmus brought a slew of 
northern explorers, surveyors, engineers, and investors to explore the pos-
sibility of transoceanic passage.33 Among the antieólic0 re sis tance, we heard 
the canal plan frequently invoked as the first invasion of transnational capi-
talism into the isthmus and as the harbinger of all megaproyectos to come.
Historian Francie Chassen- López argues that the period from the 1830s to 
the 1850s was critical for the formation of a radicalized indigenous identity in 
the region: “The isthmian wars demonstrated how far the Zapotecs of Juchitán 
 were willing to go in defense of their usos y costumbres, particularly access to 
land and natu ral resources. The Juchitecos, and their allies in other local ethnic 
groups, refused to accept defeat, and devised numerous forms of contesta-
tion (vio lence, land invasions, destruction of property, and armed rebellion), 
which forced the government and military leaders to negotiate with them.”34
During the Reforma period (1854–76), the Juchitecans’ reputation for vio-
lent in de pen dence bordering on savagery only grew as they became more di-
rectly and visibly involved in national po liti cal conflicts, such as the French 
intervention and then in the  battles that led to Porfirio Díaz’s dictatorship. In 
the strug gle between Díaz and Juaréz for the Mexican presidency, Juchiteco 
guerreros captured, flayed, castrated, and killed Porfirio’s  brother, Felix, for 
having viciously attacked Juchitán while he was governor of Oaxaca. Accord-
ing to local legend, the particularly violent nature of Díaz’s death was meant 
to repay his mutilation of the statue of Juchitecos’ patron saint San Vicente 
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as he sought to pacify the popu lar local Zapotec leader, Albino Jiménez, 
better known as “Binu Gada” (nine lives).
When Porifirio Díaz became governor of Oaxaca in 1881, this set of 
another wave of repression and re sis tance. Federal forces sought to bring 
Juchitán  under control by fighting rebels, burning villages, and installing 
their own preferred po liti cal leader. But the next year a new Juchiteco rebel 
movement arose, killing the jefe politico and inciting Díaz to lead troops 
from Oaxaca City in 1882 to lay siege to Juchitán and kill or exile a large part 
of the male population. As Colby Ristow writes, “For the next thirty years 
Díaz maintained control in Juchitán by appointing handpicked jefes políti-
cos, and transforming nearby San Gerónimo Ixtepec into ‘one of the biggest 
garrison towns in Mexico.’ ”35
But the po liti cal tensions between the rojos (reds) and verdes (greens) in 
the last de cades of the nineteenth  century endured— with the reds identify-
ing with more elite urban po liti cal, economic, and religious interests, includ-
ing the Porfirista científicos (scientists),36 and the greens identifying more 
closely with local ranching and campesino interests— simmering through-
out the Porfiriato.37 Another native Juchiteco leader, José “Che” Gómez,  rose 
to local prominence, representing the verdes. As Díaz’s regime collapsed 
in 1911, Gómez led another large rebellion against Oaxaca City.38 Although 
the uprising cost Gómez his life, the uprising became a new “cornerstone 
of Juchiteco exceptionalism.”39 By this point, that exceptionalism was not 
solely a regional  matter; Juchitán had come to occupy a very specific place 
in the Mexican national imagination as a specter of the violent indigeneity 
 imagined to lurk beyond liberal- democratic reform.
Colby Ristow writes: “As the democratic- nationalist revolution threat-
ened to open up the domain of the po liti cal in Mexico, agents of the center 
developed a discursive repertoire of marginalization that represented the 
 people of Juchitán as particularly dangerous to civilization. Travel narra-
tives, po liti cal addresses and newspapers represented the Juchitecos as in-
sufficiently civilized to manage po liti cal life, despite their relative economic 
prosperity and active participation in the po liti cal conflicts of the period. 
Specifically, elite repre sen ta tions of Juchitecos portrayed them as pre- political, 
insular and violently contentious. . . .  These repre sen ta tions mobilized 
 recognizable symbols of barbarism— Indianness, unchecked  women and the 
Orient—to underscore the unsuitability of the Juchitecos for inclusion in the 
po liti cal life of the nation.”40
At the same time that Juchitán’s po liti cal exclusion became a license 
for vari ous forms of governmental vio lence and expropriation during the 
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Porfiriato, Ristow argues, Juchiteco exceptionalism also prompted a more 
significant incorporation of regional, indigenous interests into Mexican na-
tional and Oaxacan state politics. “The Juchitecos’ insistence on the po liti cal 
and patriotic nature of their contentious politics challenged  future revolu-
tionary regimes to expand the national po liti cal sphere to include the poor 
and indigenous  peoples of the periphery. As national power shifted during 
the revolution, Juchiteco demands for po liti cal incorporation found more 
open responses from the federal government, culminating with the regime 
of Lázaro Cárdenas.”41
The pivotal figure in this pro cess was General Heliodoro Charis (see 
chapter 2), the dominant po liti cal figure in Juchitán for much of the mid- 
twentieth  century, an illiterate Juchiteco campesino who  rose through the 
ranks to lead the first authorized battalion of istmeño soldiers in the Mexican 
National Army. A trusted ally of President Álvaro Obregón, Charis became 
an esteemed veteran commander in the postrevolutionary army, and dur-
ing the 1920s his Thirteenth Battalion helped repress a number of uprisings, 
including indigenous uprisings, in other states. Despite pressure from the 
Mexican military hierarchy, Charis maintained Zapotec as the operational 
language of his unit and recruited only in the isthmus for new soldiers. In-
deed, only the Yaquis supplied more indigenous soldiers to the Mexican 
army during this period, and Charis’s was the only indigenous battalion 
willing and trusted to operate outside its native region. Benjamin T. Smith 
concludes, “By cultivating [a] clear- eyed ethos of sacrifice under- pinned 
by the expressed expectation of government reward, Charis and his men 
gradually forged an alternative to the threatening ste reo type of the armed 
Indian: the obedient, loyal, self- sacrificing Juchiteco.”42 Po liti cal inclusion 
fi nally beckoned.
In exchange for his loyalty to the revolutionary nation, Charis was al-
lowed to create a secure verde power base for himself in Juchitán that en-
dured largely without conflict with Mexico City  until his death in 1964.43 In 
May  1930, Charis marched hundreds of his demobilized soldiers onto six 
thousand hectares southwest of Juchitán and established the Colonia Militar 
of Álvaro Obregón, named for Charis’s federal patron. For the next thirty- 
five years, Álvaro materialized the power of Charis’s network in Juchitán and 
the isthmus. Smith writes: “The armed men, stationed a few kilo meters from 
the city of Juchitán, provided the local boss with the realistic threat of armed 
force if opposition politicians sought to take control of the district. . . .  Some 
troops also doubled as extra- legal pistoleros (gunmen) ordered to assassinate 
or intimidate particularly recalcitrant enemies. Fi nally, the former members 
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of the Thirteenth Battalion regularly provided Charis with a group of mobile 
and willing voters.”44
Since 2012, the town has become a notable site of re sis tance to wind 
power development.45 The town of Álvaro Obregón— capturing both the 
accommodation of revolutionary indigeneity to mestizaje nationalism and 
the perduring Juchiteco commitment to maintaining local Zapotec auton-
omy and power in the face of extranjero threats of  every scale and type— 
epitomizes how much the complex and contentious history of the isthmus 
overdetermines con temporary support for and rejection of wind power 
development. The work of con temporary asambleas like the appj echoes 
across time, summoning the grinding repartimiento relations of the sev-
enteenth and eigh teenth centuries, the contested plans to privatize and cede 
istmeño land to foreign elites in the nineteenth  century, the decades- long 
cycle of violent repression and rebellion experienced in the isthmus between 
the 1840s and the 1920s.
The lesson of this history is that Guidxiguie’— “city of flowers” in diidxazá— 
both does and does not belong to Mexico. Never fully assimilated to empire, 
Juchitán has long served as a power ful thorn in the side of Oaxacan and 
Mexican governance. It has represented the violent ungovernable foil against 
which Mexican settler liberalism has mea sured its capacity for justice. In the 
twentieth  century, both during the revolution and again during the cocei 
uprising of the 1970s— which many regard as the first major crack in the 
apparatus of the postrevolutionary pri party- state— Juchitán has helped to 
give substance, fire, and purpose to opponents of Mexican mestizaje na-
tionalism.46 Even resisting the urge to mythologize the revolutionary spirit of 
Juchitán, it seems fair to characterize the city and the isthmus as a  whole as an 
especially impor tant site of po liti cal potentiality within Mexico.47
The coming of aeolian politics to Juchitán over the past de cade has re-
ignited  these past potentialities and catalyzed what seem to be new po liti-
cal possibilities, a communitarianism that resonates as vibrantly with the 
global resurgence of neoanarchist, neoautonomist, and indigenist politics 
as it does with Zapotec traditions of po liti cal communalism.48 For some, 
wind power  will give Juchitán and its environs long- sought- after autochtho-
nous economic power with which to match its po liti cal fervor. For  others, 
the proyecto eólico threatens a final sacrifice of Juchiteco in de pen dence to 
the infrastructures of national and transnational governance and capital, 
a capitulation to el megaproyecto that has been more than two centuries 
in the making. The argument between  these positions— with two dif er ent 
views of Juchiteco power vying with one another for prominence, inflected 
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by experience, class, profession, gender— burns brightly in Juchitán  today, 
echoing the red/green conflicts of the past.
La Séptima
This was true above all in la Séptima, for de cades the epicenter of non-
elite, indigenous politics in Juchitán. We found that arguments concerning 
the  future  were at their most sensitive and  were raw in the barrios whose 
livelihood— fishing and field  labor— seemed most at risk from the prolif-
eration of wind turbines across the landscape. In  these neighborhoods, de-
spite increasing worries about “cultural homogenization,”49 the language of 
the markets and street remains diidxazá, and the strength of binnizá iden-
tity and culture is not doubted. We go, for example, to meet with Melanie’s 
friend, Na María Tecu, the one whose La Ventosan aunt had convinced her 
of the merits of wind power. But, just a few days  later, we find that she has 
reversed her opinion, at least in speaking with a  couple of extranjer@s.
Na María is cleaning fish in her courtyard with the help of her two 
 daughters. Several relatives and neighbors poke their heads in to have a look 
 because they have heard that  there are gringos  here.  There is a shrill whis-
FIGURE 5.6.   Asamblea Popu lar del Pueblo Juchiteco
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tling and cackling chorus of zanates in the trees that shade the courtyard,50 
almost loud enough to make  human conversation difficult. The courtyard 
has been created by the cinderblock homes surrounding it, decorated with 
a number of crucifixes painted on the walls, dominated by three large fish- 
drying racks made of the naked rusted- metal frames and springs of mat-
tresses. Na María continues working as we talk, sharpening a small dull 
knife on a whetstone, gutting the fish, cutting it in half from head to tail, and 
putting the fish on a drying rack. From time to time a zanate  will circle down 
from the trees above to tear a hunk of flesh  free before retreating swiftly back 
to the skies. A rooster pecks around below the cleaning station, looking for 
scraps.  Later in the day Na María smokes the dried fish in a clay oven fired 
with charcoal and covered with thin pieces of metal.
Na María says that the  whole Séptima is against the eólicos and, emphati-
cally, that she has always been against them too. “We  don’t want any of that 
 here. Nothing  else  will grow once they take the land. They  will take every thing! 
They  will take the sea! They  will create a sound that  will scare away the fish!”
Melanie tells us  later that she is surprised by how fast Na María has 
changed her mind; but charged information is circulating quickly through 
the barrio, inciting opinion first in one direction, then in the other. Mela-
nie suspects shame as a partial motivator as well since Na María is known 
 locally to have accepted a payment from Gas Natu ral Fenosa in exchange for 
her support.
FIGURE 5.7.   La Séptima
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We ask Na María cautiously about her aunt, the proponent of wind power 
from La Ventosa.
Perhaps suspecting our motives, Na María does not acknowledge having 
 family  there. But she does say, “In La Ventosa,  there’s no fishing, that’s why 
they have the eólicos  there.  Here we are puro pescador y campesino [purely 
fisherfolk and campesinos]. That’s why we are  going to resist in this pueblo, 
none of us want  these eólicos. What  will our  children eat if they ruin the 
fishing?”
We mention that  there was a march in  favor of the Playa Vicente proj ect 
just a week before.
Again, she waves this of with conviction. “Just the sindicatos [ union 
 people], all the campesinos are against it. Even in La Ventosa it is just the 
gente de dinero [ people with means] and the maestros [teachers/intellectuals] 
who want the eólicos. All the poor  people are against it.”
At a  house down the street, we talk with Rosa and her  sister Candida, 
who express much the same concerns about the eólicos. The  people of the 
Séptima have been fisherfolk and campesinos as long as anyone can re-
FIGURE 5.8.   Drying fish
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member. The sea is the ultimate safety net, where one can always turn for 
sustenance when all other sources of work and food run out. Rosa and 
Candida are deeply concerned about putting their relationship to the sea at 
risk with noisy turbines; the loss of security is not worth what ever dinerito 
( little money) the landholders would pay them to stay quiet.
“They want to take our beach, they want to take the food from our 
 children. We  don’t want the eólicos,” Candida says. She says she has heard 
that the trees die when the eólicos are placed near them, they kill the co-
conuts and the mangoes by drying the land. And the aeroes (turbines) also 
make the  water hot driving the fish away.
Rosa tells us that the mayor of Playa Vicente is giving money to many 
 people to accept the park, money he has received in turn from the wind 
companies. She has heard that some  people  there support the park but not 
the majority. “ Every party in power sells out to the eólicos.”
But Candida’s husband, Luís, who works on an oil platform of Campeche 
and who is enjoying a brief vacation at home, is not so sure about this re-
sis tance in the barrio. He worries about the lack of work in Juchitán, and 
he blames this on the líderes (po liti cal leaders) who scare away businesses. 
 Those líderes, regardless of  whether they are pri or cocei, “are dedicated 
only to themselves.” The one invests in large ranches, the other in a transpor-
tation com pany, and another has purchased a  hotel in Huatulco. “Prob ably 
more  people would invest in Juchitán if they  didn’t worry that  these políticos 
would steal their  things.”
Luís thinks that the fishing in Juchitán is slowly  dying. He says that it 
still supplies the livelihood of thousands of  people in the region, but over 
time their numbers have been declining.  People are looking for other kinds 
of work, and they are traveling away to find it. He is one of  those  people 
and says that working on the platform is a good job; it pays well. He wishes 
 there  were more factories in the isthmus. Again, the líderes are responsible, 
having driven them away both south and north. “Look at how well even 
Chiapas is  doing now!” So, in the end, the wind parks are “OK by him,” 
although he laughs and acknowledges that he is not in the majority in the 
Séptima. Some  people think the parks  will cause radiation, he says,  others 
fear the eólicos  will heat the land or cause cancer. He’s doubtful of  those 
efects, but he knows fishing well and avers, “Noise contamination is a real 
 thing! The fish  will flee it, especially when the noise is constant, not just like 




The outlook is very dif er ent at Café Santa Fé, which has been described to us 
as the place “where business gets done in Juchitán.”  These days the wind parks 
represent a big chunk of that business. The Santa Fé is an oddly unassuming 
roadside restaurant on the Panamerican Highway just west of where it crosses 
the highway to Ixtepec. Its artificial brick walls and bright- white table cloths 
contrast the grit and scent and wind of much of the city, a world away from the 
convoys of truck trailers hauling goods, materials, and equipment down 
the highway and from the packs of gaunt stray dogs patrolling its shoulders. 
The food is  simple but definitely not rústico and is served on quality table-
ware. The staf of the Santa Fé are professional and discreet, gliding in and out 
as needed, but giving a respectfully wide berth to the groups of men (and more 
rarely  women) hunkered down for serious conversations, often lasting hours. 
The Sante Fé’s back room can be cordoned of for larger, private meetings and 
occasionally becomes the site of press conferences. Its location is ideal for indi-
viduals transiting across the region. All this contributes to an atmosphere of an 
impor tant crossroads where  people can easily come and go, do their business, 
and remain strangely invisible in a transitory publicity. The Santa Fé’s clientele 
is diverse, but  there  will always be at least one  table, and often several, occupied 
by  people working in or with the wind industry. Local politicians also often cir-
culate through, pressing hands and slapping backs. If one wishes to see the poli-
tics of istmeño wind development in action, then one must visit the Santa Fé.
FIGURE 5.9.   Café Sante Fé
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And we did spend countless hours  there, observing quietly, chatting with 
friends, making new ones, hearing the latest rumors,  doing impromptu in-
terviews whenever we had the chance. Talk often focused on local po liti cal 
alliances and rivalries, where the latest blockades and land occupations  were 
and why, how vari ous wind park proj ects  were faring, what new contracts 
might be in the offing. At times the rumors  were bolder and more unsettling, 
like the one that the members of the power ful priista Gurrión  family  were 
laundering money for the Beltrán- Leyva cartel. Less frequently, one could 
also meet key figures among the antieólicos at the Santa Fé. Although the 
café’s aesthetics did not suit them, like us, they found it a con ve nient meeting 
place and a valuable information hub.
In one encounter, we  were asked to or ga nize a fake interview with an 
appj member so that he could surreptitiously observe another  table where, 
the asamblea suspected, the infamous pri state congressman Francisco 
García López (a.k.a. Paco Pisa, see chapter  3) was planning to bribe two 
San Dionisio del Mar comuneros to buy their support for the Mareña proj-
ect. Our friend in the appj wanted to make sure that our recording equip-
ment was very vis i ble so that “it  doesn’t look like I am taking money from 
gringos myself.” The comuneros arrived along with a man whom our friend 
described as the broker who had set up the meeting. He hoped even to cap-
ture Paco Pisa on camera with the bolsa (bag of money) in his hand. For 
about twenty minutes we taped an interview in which our friend discussed 
the judicial amparo against the Mareña proj ect and how  little faith the in-
conformes had in receiving justice through any arm of the Mexican govern-
ment. But the San Dionisians left, and Paco Pisa never showed;  either the 
information was bad or “perhaps they changed the meeting place once they 
saw we  were  there.” Such  were the intrigues that could unfold at the Santa Fé.
For that very reason, the Santa Fé is haunted by local journalists keeping 
a fin ger on the pulse of local politics.  There is always at least one press  table 
 there, sometimes two, with laptops out, cell phones spread across the  table. 
Mostly they chat with one another as they write up their stories; sometimes 
they are lucky, and an itinerant politician or prominent citizen  will ofer 
impromptu interviews and statements. Our friend Rusvel from La Ventosa 
was often at the Santa Fé. On one occasion he introduced us to several of 
his colleagues who write on wind power often and thoughtfully, including 
David Henestrosa and Faustino Romo.51
David writes in de pen dently for a number of periodicals in the isthmus and 
publishes his own weekly paper. He studied engineering “but was a bad engi-
neer,” he says laughing. He does not consider himself a periodista (journalist) 
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 because of his lack of training, but he enjoys practicing journalism all the 
same. Members of his  family are actively involved in the pan party in Sa-
lina Cruz. The pan is very weak in the isthmus compared to other parts of 
Mexico, he explains, but it gives him insight into how local power operates.
David is highly critical of how wind power development has taken place 
in the isthmus and only becomes more so over the months as we speak with 
him. He says the companies have largely been acting like “conquistadors.” He 
is, however, a supporter of clean energy and would like to see Mexico’s renew-
able energy transition advance, only in a more equitable way for all parties 
involved. He says he would even support the Mareña proj ect “if they could 
guarantee real benefits to the communities whose lands they are occupy-
ing.” He does not think forcing the companies to provide social development 
proj ects is the right strategy since “that is the responsibility of the govern-
ment.” What he would like to see instead is real profit sharing with the com-
munities who are currently only getting a fraction of what they are due.
He says one of the most striking  things about the eólicos is how they have 
brought the  bitter rivals of the pri and cocei together in a common cause. 
“They are at each other’s throats about almost every thing  else, but they come 
together to support the wind parks.” David had more re spect for “the Left” in 
Juchitán before the parks came. “cocei has become devaluada [devalued] 
more and more; they are oriented by money rather than by leftist ideology. 
And the wind parks have brought the opposing factions of cocei together 
like nothing  else. The factions led by Héctor Sánchez and by Leopoldo de 
Gyves, Alberto Reyna, Mariano Santana, they are all involved in the parks. 
It’s difficult  these days to diferentiate between pure priismo and the social 
líderes of the Left and their  children: Emilio de Gyves, Lenin López Nelio, 
Pavel López. They respond only to po liti cal and monetary interests; they 
have no true connection to leftist ideology.”
We ask him how much journalists have themselves become involved in 
promoting or criticizing the wind parks.
“It’s very hard to be in de pen dent in Mexico,” he says and shakes his head. 
“The local media need to eat too, and the biggest papers in the region, El Sur 
and El Sol del Istmo, are controlled by the Gurrión  family.  There is a lot of 
coverage that is bought  here  either directly by the wind companies or by the 
interests that support them.” David sees himself as one of the few journal-
ists willing to take seriously the inconformes’ re sis tance and their concerns 
about wind development. “With some of them, like ucizoni, you sense an 
ulterior motive, a desire to create trou ble and get attention for themselves. 
But then you meet  people like Mariano [López Gómez of the appj], and he’s 
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such an honest guy, a good kid; he’s from a  humble background and just is 
very passionate about his politics.”
David reiterates this opinion again, when, in late March and early 
April 2013, the po liti cal situation in Juchitán turns very ugly. The dual block-
ades of the Mareña and Gas Natu ral Fenosa construction sites are countered 
by a wave of violent intervention from the park’s supporters. Radio Totopo’s 
broadcast equipment is stolen, and Beedxe’s arm is broken. Mariano is de-
tained by the police on the suspicion of having demanded ransom money 
for construction equipment taken by the appj. Anonymous threatening 
phone calls and less anonymous visits from grupos de choque (groups of 
thugs) cause some leading apidiit and appj members to go into hiding.
David says he thinks the appj has a just cause and is all the more sure  after 
receiving a veiled threat at a traffic stop by state police, saying that he should 
consider “toning down” his coverage of what is happening in Álvaro. He sends 
us a message on Facebook, asking us to take note in case something happens.
We ask  whether he thinks all this is happening  because the supporters are 
getting scared.
He replies, “The  people who play politics around  here are prob ably used 
to threats. But for me, this is something new.”
Faustino meanwhile works for the Noticias network, a news organ ization 
with a historical reputation of being anti- pri and a current reputation of 
being pro- Cué. Faustino seems neither, more a patient analyst of the com-
plexities of istmeño politics than an advocate himself. He softly criticizes 
David for being “too one- sided” in his coverage of the wind parks. “He 
seems to  favor the re sis tance. I think you always need to see both sides of it.”
For Faustino, that means reckoning with the real benefits  these parks 
might bring. “As I see it, wind power has a global benefit, and Mexico is a 
strategic site for the development of this potential. And Oaxaca, particularly 
the isthmus, is a strategic site within Mexico  because of its resources. So 
far, so good. But what benefit  will it bring to the communities upon whose 
land the parks  will be built? They talk about a $1.2 billion investment. That 
could be very significant, something impor tant for this region that  hasn’t 
received  those magnitudes of investment  until now. But, OK, then you also 
have to ask, ‘Investment for whom? What part of  those resources might di-
rectly or indirectly benefit  people  here? And what is  going to the turbine 
manufacturers, the cable makers? What part of it  will end up staying in Oax-
aca [City]?’ They never break that information down.”
He winces at the attitudes of some wind developers. “When we asked 
the representative of [the Mexican wind energy lobby organ ization] amdee 
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why the proj ects did not incorporate community- wide benefits, he gave a 
nasty laugh and said, ‘Well, when they invest in and build their own proyecto 
eólico, they can do what they like with the profits.’ ” At the same time, he sees 
the opposition being steered by disreputable po liti cal groups like ucizoni 
and the blockade on the road to Playa Vicente being run “by gangs of delin-
quents who just like to go out and fight with the police.”
In his journalism, he becomes increasingly critical of the inconformes 
during the time we are in Mexico, and it is not clear to us  whether pressure 
is being exerted on him to do so or  whether he, too, has just become frus-
trated by the retardation of economic pro gress in Juchitán. Faustino is no 
campesino, rather a Spanish- speaking middle- class professional who is not 
obviously committed to any ideological agenda. He talks to us about the land 
invasions that have been accelerating as another heated mayoral campaign 
between the cocei and pri looms. The rival factions of the po liti cal parties 
are positioning themselves for advantage in the primary elections and estab-
lishing “vote banks,” much as Heliodoro Charis once did in Álvaro Obregón.
In late April he tells us, “Last week alone  there  were six new land inva-
sions. The municipio estimates  there are twenty- five invasions total  going 
FIGURE 5.10.   Land invasions, Juchitán
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on now. That’s a lot of land! In the old days, the invasions  were about getting 
homes for  people with no homes. But now most of the invaders already have 
homes.  They’re  doing this professionally for one faction or another. It’s about 
securing votes, bribes, extortion.”
Faustino greets all this with a mixture of resignation and wry humor; he 
is also fond of jokes and pranks. When the alleged Mayan “end of the world” 
prophecy fails to materialize in December 2012, he issues a fake news bulle-
tin via his Facebook page: “Breaking news: the Mayans have announced that 
nothing  will happen in the isthmus  because cocei, Sección 22, the moto-
taxistas, the taxistas, prd, pri, pt, the construction workers, the campesi-
nos, the sorghum farmers, all of the above are blockading the highways, 
conspiring to prevent the end of the world.”
How Caciques Think
Our journalist friends like Faustino, David, and Rusvel did not exactly say 
that the líderes would lie to us, but they did not seem hopeful that we would 
learn any truths from them  either. So much of the politics of Juchitán takes 
place at the street level—in the barrios, in the occupied lands— where dif er-
ent networks operate their own fleets of mototaxis and vie for territory and 
alliances. No líder would admit to a gringo what it  really takes to maintain 
power in Juchitán. Still, it would not hurt to ask. You might glean insights 
into the view from liderazgo as to how a cacique might think about  things.
Our eforts to make contact with local Juchiteco pri and cocei leaders 
bear  little fruit overall. We acquire their phone numbers easily enough, but 
cold calls prove in efec tive, and occasional promises of personal contacts do 
not pan out. The líderes never seem to be where they are supposed to be. But 
we have met Daniel Gurrión— the mayor of Juchitán, scion of the Gurrión 
construction empire—at the fier event in Oaxaca City (see chapter 3), and 
he has ofered to meet with us on our next visit to the isthmus.
Gurrión and his entourage (a burly driver and two underlings who say 
not a word through our entire trip) come to collect us in a brand- new white 
Chevrolet Suburban. Since the winds are high, he suggests we drive out to see 
one of the wind parks near La Ventosa. Gurrión is nothing if not a charmer, 
wielding power in a velvet glove. He establishes his elite, cosmopolitan cre-
dentials quickly by sprinkling a  little En glish into his discourse, telling us 
about his former life as a dentist, his vacations in Eu rope and the United 
States. He also has, thankfully, the nothing- at- stake candor of an oligarch.
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As the car winds its way through the heart of Juchitán, Gurrión gestures 
through the wind  toward the crowds of vendors, rewriting the indigenous 
essence of the city not as warrior but as trader.
“Basically, our ethnic group, the isthmus Zapotecs, is a group character-
ized by its commercial activity. We have been comerciantes desde siempre 
[merchants since forever].” Although he recognizes that  there is still much 
poverty in Juchitán, he attributes what wealth the Zapotecs have to their 
commercial resourcefulness.
His crown weighs heavy at the moment. He speaks at length about how 
difficult it is to manage Juchitán. “It’s hard.” Gurrión makes an airy motion 
with his hands. “We  don’t have recreation areas for  children or parks for 
sports. And we have a lot of trou ble with alcoholism and drug addiction 
 here. That is true elsewhere in the country, but I believe the statistics say that 
our consumption of beer is among the highest in the country.”
We pass several stands of mototaxistas, whom we know count among the 
most predictably unruly po liti cal presence in the city; they are foot soldiers 
for vari ous networks, some licensed, some unlicensed, skirmishing also with 
the normal taxi  drivers for the legitimacy to move passengers across Juchitán’s 
streetscape. Gurrión gestures to them as well.
“The state government made a bad decision recently to give out two thou-
sand new permits for the mototaxistas. It’s made  things even more difficult 
 here in terms of the traffic, and they constantly fight with one another.”
By the time we are on the highway heading east  toward La Ventosa, the 
conversation has shifted  toward cocei. In the beginning, Gurrión says, the 
movement was united and muy bonito, muy bueno. He even participated a 
 little in its fringes when he was young. Then he picks up a piece of paper and 
begins to draw what looks like a pizza, a circle with wedges filled with dots.
“Over time,” he says, “it began to be contaminated, distorted; it subdi-
vided into vari ous líderes, and each líder had his own group, his own  little 
group, and taken together, they represent a huge prob lem  here now.  Every 
one of them wants to maintain strength, to maintain  people, and what they do 
is they seize some plots of land, they take them, invade them, and they found 
colonias [colonies] and give them to their followers who then vote for them 
in the elections. It’s their modus vivendi: they blackmail  people, block the 
highway . . .” He trails of, not frustrated, just lost in his thoughts.
“You know, maybe two or three days ago, I met with the  people from Wal- 
Mart, they  were interested in investing  here, but I  don’t know  whether it  will 
go ahead. With the politics, someone would blockade the construction site, 
blackmail them, if the store opened, more chantaje político.”
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He speaks at length about chantaje (blackmail), how it has become an indus-
try itself, the spirit of comercio in predatory lawless form. “Yes, well, Juchitán 
es muy bonito, pero es muy complejo [it’s very nice, but it’s very complicated].”
We stop at an overpass overlooking a wind park, but the winds are so 
strong that we can scarcely speak to one another. We are blown back and 
forth by gusts as Gurrión gestures at the expanse of the turbines, which 
stretch far into the distance; he is telling us some stories about how the park 
came into being, but we cannot even hear him. A massive Grupo Bimbo 
tractor trailer whooshes past, more proof of Juchitán’s robust commercial 
life. On the  ride back, in the mobile quiet of the Suburban, Gurrión talks 
about the proyecto eólico, and he shares again the concerns he articulated 
in Oaxaca City. The federal authorities do not seem to be regulating the 
industry efectively, or rather they “regulate them in an arbitrary manner” 
and some proj ects—he mentions Acciona again specifically— seem to have 
been allowed to avoid paying their legally required cambio del uso del suelo 
(change of land use) fees to the municipal government.
“ Here in our downtown market,  there  isn’t a single vendor, even the ones 
who are practically sitting in the street with a tiny stand, the nopales ven-
dors, the egg vendors,  every single one of them pays their city taxes. So why 
not  these wind companies?”
He remains troubled by the elusive benefits of the parks as well. The ques-
tion of equitable exchange persists. Why should the commitment of land to 
electricity not be rewarded with cheaper electricity?
“The  people who live in this region had  great expectations about  these 
parks and the benefits they would bring. And I am not saying  there is no 
benefit  because  there obviously is a benefit. But, honestly, it  hasn’t lived up 
to the expectations. The electricity is still very expensive even though we are 
now creating all the electricity for the region.”
We ask him about the Ixtepec model of community- owned wind power, 
 whether that is something he could imagine supporting in Juchitán.
He says it would be ideal, but he won ders  whether it would be legally 
and eco nom ically  viable. He would be happy, he reiterates, with just a few 
turbines to call Juchitán’s own. “Just two or three, that would be enough, to 
provide the municipality electricity, to ofset the bills from cfe.”
By now we are having cofee at— where else?— the Santa Fé. Gurrión is 
in his ele ment, leaving us to circulate from  table to  table, at home with the 
comerciantes.
In April, we are also able to meet with the cocei candidate for mayor, 
Saúl Vicente Vázquez, who  will eventually become Gurrión’s successor when 
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he wins the 2013 election. Vázquez has a strong background in  human rights 
and indigenous rights issues; he is even a member of the United Nations 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues and enjoys considerable support 
from Juchitán’s binnizá intelligent sia as well as from Héctor Sánchez López’s 
faction of the cocei. His campaign office, however, is very  humble, just a 
 table and a few chairs and a single piece of white paper taped to the wall 
outlining strategy. Our meeting is compact and formal, and we get the sense 
that Vázquez is actively trying to avoid committing himself to any par tic u-
lar position regarding wind development, saying curtly, “It means a lot and 
 there are dif er ent opinions.”52
He says he has not seen any of the wind park contracts personally, but 
 those who have seen them tell him they are quite un balanced in  favor of 
the companies. He also says that he believes the companies did not inform 
 people fairly and sufficiently in advance of signing the contracts and that 
 there has been corruption at all levels of government, with bribes given to 
purchase consent. On the other hand, he sees nothing wrong with the parks 
in princi ple; from an environmental standpoint they are an improvement 
over how Mexico currently gets its electricity.
“With all this criticism of the eólicos, I won der why you never hear  people 
protesting Pemex with the same vigor.” He also notes with a slight smile that 
 people have a habit of complaining about forms of development whose 
products they happily use. “Like mining, no one likes it. But then look at this 
fork. Its metal came from some kind of mining somewhere.” Still, he says, 
wind developers should ultimately bear the responsibility for the protests. 
“It is their failures that have allowed doubts to grow into opposition.”
Vázquez  will not concede that the eólicos are a campaign issue, however. 
Shrugging, he says, “It would depend on  whether that person felt the muni-
cipio could address his feelings about the parks in some way.”
Perhaps Vázquez is being evasive or honestly reporting the herculean ef-
fort required to unite cocei’s many factions on any single issue.
This is the fact he wants to impress upon us most strongly: “One  can’t 
 really speak of the cocei. It  doesn’t exist in that way. It has never been a 
united po liti cal party. It’s a social movement composed of many dif er ent 
autonomous organ izations that coordinate with each other. And it includes 
the guy down the street who is cocei but  doesn’t belong to any group. At 
last count,  there are forty- eight dif er ent organ izations involved in cocei; 
all the ex- mayors have their own, and then are many more besides. So, with a 
wind park, for example, it could be that one part of cocei is for it and an-
other against it. That’s how it is with us.”
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Somos Viento
The inconformes are many and multiple in their backgrounds too, ranging 
from workers, campesinos, and fisherfolk to maestros and other intellectuals 
who have been drawn to the cause. The range of actors mirrors the ele ments 
of the cocei movement in the 1970s, which fought street  battles against po-
liti cal and economic priismo for much of the de cade before fi nally taking 
control of the city government in 1981, and then continued to fight against 
repression from federal priismo for the next de cade and a half. In the isth-
mus, as noted above, the pri had only a relatively weak network  until the 
mid-1960s, which left it susceptible to contentious politics. But while the in-
conformes who have or ga nized against wind megaprojects  today may identify 
themselves with the coceiistas of the 1970s and 1980s and their strug gle, 
they utterly reject what cocei has become  today. Their assessments are 
indeed more savage than  those we heard from a blood- enemy priista like 
Daniel Gurrión. When we attend the asambleas and marches or ga nized by 
the re sis tance, we rarely hear a sentence about the cocei uttered without 
a snarling reference to the movement’s degeneration and betrayal of the 
common Juchiteco. Leading coceiistas’ support for the wind parks, for the 
transfer of land to extranjeros, seems to have been something of a last straw 
culminating two de cades of abuse, lies, and manipulation.
This is the perspective shared with us by Bettina Cruz Velázquez, one of 
the cofound ers of the Asamblea de Pueblos Indígenas del Istmo en Defensa 
de la Tierra y el Territorio (apiidtt) and quite possibly the most famous 
binnizá activist in the world  today. She is not only lionized and vilified by 
turns in the Mexican national press but has also received substantial attention 
from international  human rights organ izations. Cruz has travelled widely 
in North Amer i ca and Eu rope, including once testifying before the  Eu ro pean 
Parliament, speaking against megaproyectos and for binnizá rights in the 
isthmus.53 But Cruz began her activist life as a teenager in Juchitán within 
cocei; members of her  family are still deeply involved in the movement. 
She scowls when she talks about cocei  today, its leaders “seduced by money 
and power,” a caricature of its former self.
Cruz’s husband, Rodrigo Peñaloza, is another apiidtt cofounder, and 
he sees in cocei a cautionary lesson for all “vanguard movements,” saying, 
“Any movement carries within itself the germ of its institutionalization, and 
for cocei, that germ was Stalinism.”
The purpose of apiidtt, according to both Cruz and Peñaloza, has been 
to help nurture a dif er ent kind of po liti cal movement in the isthmus, one 
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that is decentralized and antihierarchical and more strongly rooted in in-
digenous traditions of self- governance. “At first we  were calling ourselves a 
frente [front] but that was too vanguardist; we realized that the better model 
was the asamblea [assembly].”
We have lunch with Cruz and her  daughter, who is studying anthropol-
ogy herself, early on in our fieldwork. This is before the vio lence around 
the Mareña and Gas Fenosa proj ects erupts and Cruz is forced to go into 
hiding with her  family  after receiving a number of death threats she deemed 
credible. We spend the after noon in the Donaji restaurant, next door to the 
apiidtt office. The office is itself remarkable for having been the last func-
tioning office of Juchitán’s bienes comunales before the cocei leader and 
last president of the comuna, Victor Pineda Henestrosa (Victor “Yodo”), was 
kidnapped on July 11, 1978, by a group of men dressed in military uniform 
and dis appeared. The removal of the comuna leadership paved the way for 
the expansion of private property in the region.
Cruz and Peñaloza view this as a form of land occupation itself, one in 
which the wind parks have been directly implicated. “All of the contracts 
that have been written to lease what was once communal land for wind 
parks are illegal. You cannot write a private contract over communal land.” 
Rebuilding the leadership of the bienes comunales is one of the most con-
troversial campaigns the apiidtt is working for; another is their campaign 
against cfe’s electricity tarifs.
Cruz believes that the apiidtt is as close to a functioning asamblea as 
Juchitán has: “We began  here in Juchitán, and  here anyone is  free to join 
and become incorporated in the asamblea.  Every pueblo,  every community, 
 every committee, has its own rules and dynamics, though. What we do  here 
is distribute information, research  legal questions, deal with the media, en-
gaging issues which benefit all the members of the asamblea. Our ultimate 
goal is to stop el proyecto eólico in our communities and on our land.”
Cruz is disturbed by how the eólicos have contributed to the emptying of 
the primary economy of agriculture, driving campesin@s of their land to 
search for scarce work in the cities or abroad. “Working the land— farming, 
fishing, producing—is a way of life that has been abandoned and degraded 
in this country. But it is the heart of every thing.”
She is dubious of the wind companies not only as beacons of a white- 
collar  future for the region but also as to  whether they are in fact realizing 
positive change at a global level. “The same companies that are creating sup-
posedly renewable energy  here are producing thermoelectric power plants 
in other places. So what is this change they are talking about? I  don’t see 
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change  here other than in the discourse, and they are utilizing global sen-
timent [sentimiento mundial] to further their exploitation. What they are 
 doing is monetizing climate change.”
And she believes that the land, once taken for the wind parks,  will belong 
to  these companies forever. “When  will they return the land?  These are usu-
fructuary contracts for thirty years or more. This  will be their land forever; 
it  will be ruined anyway for agriculture. So where is the advantage for the 
 people  here?  There is no advantage. It is only for the government function-
aries, for the caciques who have massive landholdings. The campesino is 
losing his way of life.”
It turned out that the apiidtt would win its greatest victory during 
the period of our field research when a federal judge upheld the amparo 
complaint of the inconformes in San Dionisio del Mar to block the Mareña 
Renovables proj ect pending an investigation, an act that contributed even-
tually to the failure and relocation of the proj ect. Meanwhile, getting Cruz’s 
blessing proved invaluable for our research; connecting us to other asam-
bleas comunitarias and asambleas populares across the region. Over the 
course of 2012 and 2013, with her help, we got to know key figures in the 
assemblies of Álvaro Obregón, Juchitán, and San Dionisio del Mar well.
Alejandro López López, a cofounder of the asamblea comunitaria of 
 Álvaro, says he has known Rodrigo and Bettina since secondary school. They 
had all been  doing dif er ent  things, but the megaproyectos brought them 
together in defense of natu ral resources, especially land, “which is nature’s 
 mother, what connects the pre sent to the  future. Land is part of the  family, it 
has a special meaning for the campesinos.” Alejandro is not a campesino, but 
rather a maestro, and is very active in cnte 22 in Oaxaca City. He helps the 
inconformes to draw upon the resources of the teachers’  union to support 
their cause, which he says is not only to prevent wind parks from destroying 
the land and livelihood around Álvaro, it is also to wrest Álvaro out from 
 under the control of the líderes altogether.
The asamblea’s blockade of the access road to the Mareña Renovables 
wind park in November 2012 evolved over the next year into a challenge 
to the structure of po liti cal authority that had blanketed the town since the 
days of Charis. In August 2013 the asamblea voted to institute usos y cos-
tumbres law and to prevent the participation of po liti cal parties in munici-
pal elections. Voting booths  were burned, which in turn intensified acts of 
vio lence against the asamblea by its po liti cal opponents, and new municipal 
authorities from Juchitán  were imposed in August  2014. The conflict re-
mains unresolved  today, but the asamblea comunitaria is, its members say, 
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resolved to the defense and autonomy of Álvaro against all po liti cal parties.54 
The asamblea has or ga nized its own community police force and its own 
community radio, both named for General Charis, who remains a power ful 
symbol of binnizá futurity and autonomy.
Alejandro foresaw much of this conflict when we interviewed him formally 
in early January 2013. “The betrayal and selling out of Álvaro Obregón has 
been  going on for de cades. cocei has taken the force of Álvaro Obregón 
and treated it like a gold mine  because Álvaro Obregón has always been muy 
valiente (very brave). Álvaro Obregón are a  people of few words, but a de-
cisive  people, and decisive with their machetes. That is why all the leaders 
of cocei— Santana, Héctor, Leopoldo— they are all coming at us like rabid 
dogs  because we are depriving them of their gold mine.”
He explains, “They used to split the government of Álvaro Obregón like a 
cake; Santana would pick the president, Héctor the trea surer, and so on. But 
that is all over now. We are done with selling out to the líderes. They are all 
rich, and it  doesn’t  matter what party they represent,  whether the pri or the 
prd or the pt [ labor party] or the pan. They have just worked to the divide 
the pueblo for their own gain. We are retaking Álvaro Obregón and looking 
for unity. That’s why we call ourselves an asamblea, not a front, not a group.”
The strug gle against the líderes and the strug gle against the eólicos merge 
together in Alejandro’s discourse. The heart of the re sis tance to both forces, 
he says, is the sacred triangle of San Mateo, San Dionisio, and Álvaro Obregón 
 because that is where the asambleas are still held in the indigenous language, 
where even Spanish is resisted. “It’s all about history, about origins,” he says. 
 These asambleas are working together to spread their fuerza (force) across the 
region, to fight against the transnational companies and their po liti cal allies.
In several visits to Álvaro, we spend a good deal of time talking to mem-
bers of the assembly, and the vast majority are not maestr@s but rather fish-
erfolk and campesin@s, and  there are many  women among them. Some are 
motivated by an ideological commitment to the politics of land and sea, some 
wish simply to safeguard their livelihood, but all remember the day when 
the com pany began its vegetation removal work on the nearby sandbar and 
began asking fishermen for id cards to gain access to the place where they 
have put in their boats for as long as anyone can remember.55 That was the 
moment, they told us, when the community realized something was  going 
wrong, that this proj ect was threatening to take their land and sea away from 
them. Their anger was still palpable months  later.
“We are the  people of Charis!” one man said. “If they want to see blood in 
the sand, let them come. We are ready.”
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In the summer of 2013 we begin to see the slogan “Somos Viento” (we are 
the wind) spray- painted across Juchitán. The idea of the re sis tance occupy-
ing the wind is growing.
Mariano López Gómez, one of key organizers of the appj, posts on his 
Facebook page, “Somos viento y juntos seremos huracán.” (We are the wind, 
and together we  will become a hurricane.)
Carlos Sánchez, the jaguar, founder of Radio Totopo, embraces the wind 
too, helping to cofound a new collective, Binisá, “which means the wind from 
the south, the soft wind that brings rain. But sometimes it turns into a strong 
wind, a wind that only begins slowly and then comes with force and destroys 
what lies in its path.  Here what we  will destroy is the silence, the silence that 
has fallen over the  people of Mexico.”
We also meet with the youn gest generation of Juchiteco activists, the 
#YoSoy132 kids. Even though they speak Spanish, or ga nize through social 
media, and ofer detailed critiques of global neoliberalism, they continue to 
speak the language of an istmeño history of re sis tance.
Dalí Martínez explains to us, “The lucha [strug gle] has been  going on 
in the isthmus since before the time of the Mexican Revolution.  There has 
been wave  after wave of rebellion over the years. This is a tradition that we 
are proud of, and we want to carry it forward to the next generation. It is 
part of our identity, this history of lucha, so we want to defend it. When we 
heard about the eólicos,  these transnational proj ects with negative social and 
FIGURE 5.11.   “Somos viento”
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environmental consequences, we became worried about them and wanted 
to fight them. We want to achieve the autonomy of the isthmus, that is the 
ultimate goal.”
When we ask Dalí and his friends  whether Occupy and the Arab Spring 
influenced them in any way, they say no; this is  really about their cultural 
tradition of rebellion reinventing itself for each generation across time. This 
is about los tecos valientes (the brave Juchitecos) “the way it always has been.”
The ways  things have been in Juchitán  will undoubtedly influence the 
 future of aeolian politics in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. But  things have not 
only been one way; both the red politics of urban elites, landowners, and the 
commercial class and the green politics of campesin@s, fisherfolk, and mi-
grants have  shaped the history of the region in equal parts. Both greens and 
reds have been and continue to be further fractured into dozens of po liti cal 
networks defined by kinship, liderazgo, charisma, and ideology. Sometimes 
 these networks affiliate with existing po liti cal parties or aspire to create new 
ones. Often they claim land,  whether a mototaxista stand or a new colonia 
occupation on the outskirts of town. The anthropo liti cal terrain of Juchitán 
is im mensely complex, a subject demanding detailed po liti cal ethnography 
and po liti cal geography far beyond the scope of the pre sent volume. But in 
the zone where aeolian politics and anthropolitics intersect, we have seen 
how wind development has been avidly embraced by some as a means of 
concentrating wealth and power in the constant game of positional advan-
tage in the city. In some sense, wind parks are the ultimate form of land 
occupation, land claimed by concrete and steel and fencing, bringing in-
come to buy votes, trucks, new homes, and so much  else besides. For  others, 
meanwhile, we have seen how wind parks are excoriated as worst kind of 
megaproyecto development, the sinister collaboration of local caciques and 
transnational cap i tal ists to complete a centuries- long proj ect of capturing 
and expropriating the wealth of the isthmus. At the same time, even wind 
power’s worst critics would acknowledge that the proliferation of wind tur-
bines across the lands around Juchitán has galvanized po liti cal opposition 
and catalyzed a recommitment to asambleas and usos y costumbres the likes 
of which have been unknown for de cades.
The reason to end this journey across Mexico in Guidxiguie’/Juchitán is 
that it epitomizes the analytic limits of universalizing power concepts like 
“capital,” “biopower,” and “energopower” for defining the po liti cal terroir 
of istmeño wind. Yes,  these concepts have considerable value.  Those who 
push private property, factories, wage  labor, and consumerism in the region 
clearly desire to constitute the frontier ecol ogy of alienated land,  labor, and 
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value that “capital” denotes so well.56 “Biopower” is seemingly more remote 
to the everyday politics of the city, but when a po liti cal leader like Gurrión 
talks about cheap electricity and turbines dedicated to municipal energy 
supply, he is not just thinking of his bud getary bottom line. Although deeply 
and fiercely contested, the biopo liti cal aspirations of “development”— good 
jobs, good health, prosperity, growth— hang in the air both in the city hall 
and in the Séptima. “Energopower,” too, can ofer insight into istmeño aeo-
lian politics, both in electricity’s capacitation of biopo liti cal proj ects and in 
the infrastructures— grid, pipelines, highways— that crisscross the city and 
enable its many proj ects of modernizing and indigenizing. My point is sim-
ply that  these concepts are minima not maxima. The aeolian politics of the 
isthmus are powerfully, powerfully  shaped by identities and institutions that 
are not reducible to  either instantiations of or reactions to capital, biopoli-
tics, and energopolitics. Caciquismo and liderazgo belong to this spectrum, 
as do asambleas, usos y costumbres, and indigenismo, as do ways of life and 
forms of knowledge replete with soil and sea.
If we wish to imagine and discuss aeolian  futures in the Isthmus of 
 Tehuantepec—or, for that  matter, anywhere  else in the world— what is needed 
are more and better ethnographies of the multiplicity of forces (historical and 
con temporary, material and anthropo liti cal) that are generating, inflecting, 
and obstructing potential  futures. It never ceased to amaze us how  little the 
proponents of “Oaxacan wind power” in places like New York, Mexico City, 
and Oaxaca City seemed or cared to understand the reasons for its conten-
tious politics in the isthmus itself. The depth and seriousness of contention 
meanwhile made perfect sense to anyone who had spent a few weeks talk-
ing to  people in Juchitán. Part of building a  future that does not endlessly 
repeat the Anthropocene trajectory is caring about forms of enablement that 
exceed  those with which we are familiar, disabling our engines of epistemic 
and po liti cal universalization and rebalancing our analytical attentions and 
worldly engagements in  favor of what is meaningful and valuable in the lo-
calities where the wind blows. How we can make new and better aeolian 
 futures is the subject of our conclusion.
Joint Conclusion to Wind and Power in the Anthropocene
cymene howe and dominic boyer
Aeolian Politics, Aeolian  Futures
We went to the Isthmus of Tehuantepec as ardent supporters of renewable 
energy transition, and we left with that conviction intact. Wind power (along-
side solar power, tidal power, geothermal power, and biofuels) has an impor-
tant role to play in reducing green house gas emissions and decarbonizing 
electricity generation. But we also returned to the United States with a more 
skeptical view of renewable energy’s capacity to guarantee salvation from 
climate change let alone the Anthropocene. Renewable energy has a neces-
sary but insufficient role to play in a pro cess that  will amount to a refash-
ioning of the civilization(s) that brought us to our pre sent ecological and 
po liti cal conditions. What our field research on Mexico’s aeolian politics 
and the ecosystemic limits of wind power taught us above all is that it is all 
too easy for renewable energy development to occur with  little or no social, 
po liti cal, or economic transition attached to it. It is both pos si ble and com-
mon to build wind parks firmly within a model of resource extraction that is 
typical of global fossil fuel and mining industries. We have ofered extensive 
documentation of such wind development in our Mareña (Ecologics) and La 
Ventosa (Energopolitics) case studies— where attempts to capture the wind 
resulted in failures, both  human and other than  human. We have also shown 
in the case of Ixtepec (Energopolitics) that other development models exist, even 
if they are being actively resisted in Mexico. Where  human desires for energy 
are not in balance with their ecosystemic context, as we see across the Ecologics 
volume,  there is  little hope of remediating climates  either locally or globally.
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Taken together, the three case studies we have followed in Energopolitics 
and Ecologics demonstrate the turbulence surrounding renewable energy as 
the world awakens to the Anthropocene. They tell stories that are specific to 
Mexico and yet also exceed national bound aries. Carbon politics, finance 
capital, global industry, consumerism, and a lack of environmental protec-
tions have laid deep infrastructural grooves and have largely drawn aeolian 
politics into their orbits. Thus, the win- win- win visions of green financiers, 
entrepreneurs, and developers who promise that climate change can be re-
versed while maintaining every thing  else about the modern world, especially 
economic growth and a positive return on investment to shareholders, show 
a stubborn reluctance to abandon the structural deficits of carbon- based 
modernity.  Those imaginaries are shared to a  great extent by Mexican and 
Oaxacan politicians and technocrats who, steeped in neoliberal certainties 
and petropo liti cal anx i eties, yearn for foreign direct investment to extend 
and improve the biopo liti cal functions of governance in the form of health, 
security, and prosperity. Some even believe that wind power can help to ful-
fill delayed or abandoned plans to bring, at long last, the isthmus into the 
nation, not as a repartimiento vassal but as vigorous organ of the mestizaje 
national body. Local leaders and asambleas, elected and unelected, are like-
wise drawn  toward the biggest influx of international attention and activity 
the isthmus has experienced since the mid- nineteenth  century. Some fight 
for local or indigenous autonomy and sovereignty against the encroachment 
of megaproyectos,  others pursue windblown wealth to further dreams of 
better jobs for their  children or the accumulation of capital and leverage or 
for the opportunity to extend and deepen their networks of influence. It is 
not only in Mexico that dreams of aeolian  futures are paradoxical; what are 
heavenly images for some are nightmares for  others.
This is only to speak of the anthropo liti cal dimension of aeolian poli-
tics. We must also consider the Anthropocene trajectories of birds and bats 
and fish, the machinic life of turbines, the grid, and trucks, the unruly howl 
of el norte, and the gentle breezes of binisá. Aeolian politics is always al-
ready more than  human even if the ecological interde pen dency of  human 
and nonhuman potentials is largely ignored in standard treatments of wind 
power. It is for this reason that we have created a duograph to ofer not only 
an ethnographic division of  labor in its coverage of the three studies but also 
an analytic division of  labor that allows us to pursue, with better depth and 
peripheral vision, both the mapping of anthropo liti cal enablement and the 
mesh of human- nonhuman relationality that is often allowed to drift into 
the background of reckoning with the Anthropocene. Questions of wind 
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and power circle each other in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec— How can the 
fierce northern winds be harnessed? With what machines? To what end? 
Benefitting whom? Displacing whom? Earning what? Killing what? For how 
long? And with what consequences? We have likewise sought to let the ana-
lytics of wind and power speak to each other in this duograph, probing their 
potential to remake and unmake the Anthropocene. Enablement is always 
relational: some complex of forces,  things, and events begetting  others. Rela-
tions, for the same reason, always enable. The riddle of the Anthropocene is 
what mesh of relations and actions  will allow us to disable the reproduction 
of the pre sent while being pre sent in the production of a  future. For  those 
who wish to solve that riddle, we must attend to both  human politics and all 
the other relations and forces that make  those politics pos si ble.
An  earlier version of our duograph was titled Winds of Desire  because 
everywhere we turned in Mexico, we found  people wishing for the wind to 
deliver something: money, electricity, influence, legitimacy, prosperity, de-
velopment, power. At times, desire cloaked itself in mathe matics, rationality, 
and common sense. At other times, it reveled in naked hallucination.  Those 
who desired  were rarely satisfied with what the wind had already delivered 
to them. What desire always accomplishes best is the propagation of more 
desire.  Here, at the end of a proj ect that has been nearly a de cade in the 
making, we are asking ourselves what it is that we wish from wind power. It 
turns out that our object of desire is also elusive and receding. Still, we are 
drawn  toward it: we want better aeolian politics oriented  toward achieving 
better aeolian  futures.
Our final report to the National Science Foundation listed the following 
findings and recommendations based on our research:
The field research for nsf #1127246 yielded several impor tant find-
ings and recommendations that  will contribute to more positive de-
velopment outcomes in Mexican energy transition in the  future. (1) 
The dominant development model prioritizes the interests of inter-
national investors and developers and local Isthmus po liti cal elites 
over other stakeholder groups, especially the regional government 
and non- elite Isthmus residents. (2) The dominant development 
model has reinforced hierarchy and in equality in Isthmus commu-
nities through unequal distribution of new resources like land- rents. 
(3) The development model has generated significant polarization in 
Isthmus communities regarding wind parks and undermined trust in 
government and industry. (4) The financial benefits from land rents 
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are currently primarily being directed  toward luxury consumption by 
elites. (5) A majority of Isthmus residents appear to  favor wind power 
development  were its financial benefits to be more equally distributed. 
(6) Proj ect findings suggest that the Mexican government needs to re-
evaluate its development model to guarantee (a) that entire communi-
ties and not simply elites are involved in proj ect design and implemen-
tation, (b) that mechanisms be developed to guarantee that wind power 
development yields consistent and significant public benefits, and 
(c) that regional governments receive sufficient federal funds to develop 
a regulatory agency with the authority to guarantee that wind power de-
velopment is truly transparent and beneficial to all stakeholder groups.
To put this in less muted terms, in our view,  there  will be no “renewable 
energy transition” worth having without a more holistic reimagination of 
relations in which we avoid simply greening the predatory and accumulative 
enterprises of modern statecraft and capitalism. In this re spect, the rec ord 
of Mexican wind development thus far does not inspire much confidence. 
The model of wind development that currently dominates the isthmus has 
been very efective at building wind parks, but it has done almost nothing to 
disrupt the toxic kinds of relatedness that made it necessary to build wind 
parks in the first place. It has left wind power in the thrall of finance capital, 
state biopolitics, and energopolitics; parastatal utilities and infrastructure; 
priismo, caciquismo, consumerism, and many other - isms besides. The case 
of Mareña Renovables (in Ecologics) came to absorb and reflect all  these con-
ditions and in so  doing was stalled out of existence. In failing to account 
for local histories and  imagined  futures, and in repudiating local worries 
about environmental harm, Mareña’s potential to provide climatological re-
mediation and reduce green house gas emissions was drowned among the 
fish. With the Yansa- Ixtepec proj ect (in Energopolitics), we do find a scrappy 
diy prototype for a better aeolian  future, one that seeks to harness wind- 
generated electricity to help a rural farming collective to better guaran-
tee their own autonomy and futurity while still contributing to the global 
cause of decarbonization. Yansa- Ixtepec has flaws to be sure— its benefits 
 will not extend far beyond the collective, and it requires a grid and a failing 
parastatal electrical utility to pay its rents— but if the proj ect is ultimately 
thwarted, Mexico  will miss its best chance to connect the heady ambition 
to be a global leader in clean energy development with the interests, hopes, 
and worldviews of  people living in places where the wind is strongest. In the 
end, we need not just new energy sources to unmake the Anthropocene, we 
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need to put  those new energy sources in the ser vice of creating politics and 
ecologics that do not repeat the expenditures, inequalities, and exclusions 
of the past.
We  will conclude with an appeal for more collaborative anthropology in 
 every sense of the term. We need more anthropologists working together 
and working with other  humans and nonhumans on the prob lems that 
 matter most in this world.  Those prob lems, like energy transition, are com-
plex, massively scaled, and very often ill suited to critical and activist engage-
ment by individual researchers. As scholars, we  will better understand our 
pre sent dilemmas and pos si ble paths forward if we work together, whenever 
pos si ble drawing on varying but complementary skills and forms of exper-
tise in the pursuit of responses. As beings living on a damaged planet, what 
we already understand is that none of us can exit the Anthropocene on our 
own. The hyperindividualism of the past three de cades, the cap i tal ist empire 
building of the past two hundred years, the Northern privilege of the past 
five centuries, the mono the istic patriarchy of the past two thousand years, 
the agrilogistics of the past ten millennia— all of this, every thing,  will have to 
be remade if a global humanity is  going to be reborn that  will not be actively, 
constantly destroying its lifeworld and the lifeworld of the majority of the 
earth’s species. This proj ect  will be utopian in the sense that it  will have to 
make a world that has not yet existed. It  will be revolutionary in the sense 
that it  will not be accomplished by technology, or markets, or vio lence, or 
anthropocentrism, or any of the other be hav iors and attitudes that brought 
us  here in the first place. It  will be a proj ect accomplished by  humans who 
can accept their own diminishment of importance and entitlement relative 
to their nonhuman neighbors and by  those who are willing to work col-
laboratively to restabilize the vital systems of geos and bios on this planet. 
 These are the politics, aeolian and other wise, to which we should commit 
ourselves,  these are the  futures worth having.
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value of its currency to the dollar and thus indirectly to the American gold mono poly. 
In practice, however, what sustained the value of the dollar was its convertibility not to 
gold but to oil. In both value and volume, oil was the largest commodity in world trade. 
In 1945 the United States produced two- thirds of the world’s oil. As production in the 
 Middle East was developed, and the routes of pipelines plotted, most of this overseas 
oil was also  under the control of American companies” (2009, 414).
58. See, e.g., Graeber 2011.
59. What I mean by “neoliberal disarticulation” is that petropower is no lon-
ger made to directly serve state interests as it was in the heyday of Keynesianism. 
Instead, the typical arrangement is an alliance between oil and gas corporations and 
certain po liti cal factions and institutions in order to allow petropower to be exerted 
on behalf of  those corporations, their shareholders, and the speculative interests of 
the market.
60. See, e.g., Howe et al. 2015; Gordillo 2014; Gupta 2013.
61. Boyer 2016.
62. For Aristotle, “enérgeia” meant “activity” or “action” as distinct from δύναμις 
(dynamis), which meant “power” in the sense of capacity. James Faubion (pers. 
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comm.) cautions against “any temptation to read back the Newtonian notion of 
mechanical energy into Aristotle. . . .  What happens is that energeia is taken up in 
Latin as meaning (basically) the force or vigor of expression (of words but also of 
potentiae [potentials], which allows it to be brought into the same semantic field 
with vis (force, power) and vis viva (living force, living power) and which basi-
cally allows the classical distinction between energeia and dynamis to collapse 
into the singular notion of energy/force as it is codified in mechanistic physics.” 
Cara Daggett (2019) glosses Aristotle’s enérgeia as “dynamic virtue” and strongly 
diferentiates it from the Victorian conceptualization of energy as work, which was 
 shaped by, among other forces, empire, evolutionary theory, Presbyterianism and 
thermodynamics.
63. Massumi 2015. Along similar lines, the work of Jane Bennett on “vibrant  matter” 
comes to mind (2009), as does Povinelli’s critique (2016) of the biontological premise 
of (Deleuzian) afect theory and vitalist thinking more generally.
64. Boyer 2013b, 152–56.
65. Žižek 1997.
66. As well as memories of the  futures we wish to avoid; see, e.g., Oreskes and 
Conway 2013.
67. Many proj ects deserve recognition  here.  Those that have influenced this proj ect 
most directly include the multimedia works of Brian Eno, Natalie Jeremijenko, Jae 
Rhim Lee, Smudge Studio, and Marina Zurkow as well as the “climate fiction” of 
Margaret Atwood, Paolo Bacigalupi, J. G. Ballard, Ian McEwan, Kim Stanley Robinson, 
Jef VanderMeer, and Claire Vaye Watkins.
68. Howe and Boyer 2015.
69. I mean “terroir”  here less in the specific sense of “soil” and more in the capa-
cious sense of local “climate” and “environs.” It refers to the mesh of local power forms 
and forces that give a situation its distinct character, which we are only able to fully 
understand by being in that context.
70. I thank one of the two anonymous reviewers of the duograph for encouraging 
me to highlight the importance of the politics surrounding communal land tenure in 
this volume of the duograph. As they wrote in their notes, “One of the major  causes 
of internal community conflict is that a relatively small number of comuneros 
are the  legal  owners of the comunidad/ejido land (most but not all are men). The 
comisariado assembly is their collective space for decision making. The  whole 
comunidad agraria apparatus is heavi ly linked to the Mexican state imagination of 
rural agricultural productivity. This is a kind of terroir. . . .  A[nother] major axis of 
intracommunal tension is between the citizens who are not commoners/land  owners 
and get no benefit from individual private sales/leases or even community land 
leases. The collective po liti cal space for  these citizens is the municipality/agencia 
municipal. The municipio has very  little tax money and may be trying to raise money 
for roads, schools,  etc., through its  limited land use change authorization policy.” 
 These forms of tension are discussed at greater length in chapter 1 in the  matter of 
the bienes comunales of Ixtepec and in chapter 2 in the politics of the La Ventosan 
ejido and smallholder private landowners.
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1. ixtepec
1. See Meyer (2004) and Christensen (2013) for discussions of the history of Danish 
wind power and the par tic u lar importance of community- owned wind installations 
in Denmark. The Yansa Group involved two entities, the Yansa Foundation and Yansa 
Community Interest Com pany (cic). See the Yansa Group website, http:// www . yansa 
. org / sample - page / .
2. The Asociación Mexicana de Energía Eólica (www . amdee . org) was founded 
in 2004. The president at the time of Sergio’s visit was Carlos Gottfried Joy (see 
chapter 2).
3. Government rec ords from the Registro Agrario Nacional indicate that the 
Ixtepecan bienes comunales  were officially decreed on May 17, 1944, with control over 
29,440 hectares (approximately 114 square miles) of land (http:// www . gob . mx / ran). 
As in other Mexican communal estates, all decisions regarding land use are de cided 
through the collective discussion and voting of the asamblea. The lands are administered 
by a three- person (president, secretary, trea surer) commissariat (comisariado), which is 
in turn supervised by a three- person consejo de vigilancia (oversight committee). Elec-
tions for both groups occur  every three years.
4. When referring to the po liti cal entity governing the Ixtepecan bienes communales, 
Sergio tended to use the term “comuna” whereas the comuneros themselves typically re-
ferred to it as the “comunidad” or the “asamblea.” I vary my own descriptions accordingly.
5. The worker- peasant- student co ali tion of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, cocei (la 
Coalición Obrera Campesina Estudiantil del Istmo), was founded in Juchitán in 1973. 
According to Howard Campbell, they “took power in Juchitán in 1981,  after years of 
strug gle in which more than 20 Coceistas died at the hands of pistoleros, police, and 
soldiers. Juchitán became the first Mexican city controlled by the Left since the emer-
gence of the pri and its immediate pre de ces sors (ca. 1929).  After two turbulent years 
of cocei rule, during which time bloody shootouts and street fights  were common-
place, the Mexican government invaded City Hall, imprisoned numerous Coceistas, 
established a state of siege in Juchitán, and restored pri to power. Although cocei 
was temporarily forced to go under ground, Juchitán became a cause celebre among 
urban leftists and intellectuals, which sheltered the movement to some degree from 
further repression” (Campbell 1990, 50). See also Campbell et al. 1993; chapter 5 of this 
volume.
6. Anthropology has had its own long and complicated relationship with develop-
ment (e.g., Foster 1969; Malinowski 1929; Mead 1953) that deserves mention since it is 
an impor tant context for this ethnographic intervention. The expansion of programs 
aimed at fostering international aid and local development  after the Second World 
War helped establish a new subfield of “applied anthropology” (Evans- Pritchard 1946) 
that rapidly became an impor tant area of professional anthropological engagement 
during the 1950s and 1960s (Edelman and Haugerud 2005, 6–7). Concerns about 
the po liti cal conservatism of applied anthropology multiplied in the late 1960s. 
New paradigms such as “de pen dency theory” and “world systems theory” viewed 
the “underdevelopment” of the “third world” as a product of Western capitalism and 
imperialism’s eforts to maintain structural forms of de pen dency and domination in 
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its postcolonial peripheries (Frank 1969; Wallerstein 1974, 1979). Critical paradigms 
of transnational relations had a strong impact in anthropology in the 1970s and 1980s 
(see, e.g., Nash 1981; Roseberry 1988; Wolf 1982), and Kearney (1986, 338) notes especially 
the impact of de pen dency theory in anthropological research on development in Latin 
Amer i ca (e.g., Kemper 1977; Lomnitz 1977; Wiest 1978). An impor tant consequence 
of this critical turn in cultural anthropology was that it created the opportunity for 
greater anthropological investigation of the institutions, practices, and forms of expert 
knowledge involved in national and international development programs. Scholars 
such as Escobar (1991, 1994) and Ferguson (1990) took up this opportunity in the early 
1990s. Although theoretically opposed in many re spects to critical po liti cal economy 
approaches, the po liti cal anthropology of development shared a skepticism for 
the modernist ambitions of development programs (cf. Apfel- Marglin and Marglin 
1990; Mueller 1986) and highlighted how apparently depoliticized technical proj ects of 
intervention could actually “end up performing extremely sensitive po liti cal opera-
tions involving the entrenchment and expansion of institutional state power almost 
 invisibly” (Ferguson 1990, 256). The vibrant anthropological research lit er a ture 
focused on development in the neoliberal era (e.g., Bornstein 2005; Hanson 2007; Li 
2007; Rudnyckyj 2010; Sharma 2006; Vannier 2010) has developed this Foucauldian 
model further, paying special attention to the contributions of corporations and 
nonstate po liti cal entities such as ngos, religious organ izations, and social movements 
to “neoliberal governmentality.”
7. Fisher (1997) ofers a helpful introduction to early anthropological writing on 
ngos, highlighting that “the growth of a multicentric world and the practices of grow-
ing numbers of nonstate national and transnational actors have had significant impact 
on the sites and communities that have been the focus of anthropological research” 
(459). Anthropologists have subsequently been particularly attentive to the “statelike” 
functions that ngos absorbed during the heyday of structural adjustment policies 
during the 1990s (see, e.g., Elyachar 2005; Karim 2001; Smith- Nonini 1998) as well as 
to the complexity of ngos’ mediating relationship to social change in the neoliberal 
era (e.g., Grewal and Bernal 2014; Richard 2009; Schuller 2009; Redfield 2005). Yansa, 
in our experience, was quite sincere in its re spect for indigenous binnizá traditions of 
land use and management. Yet it also wished to modernize  these traditions in such 
a way as to undermine traditional patriarchal hierarchy and privilege, thus better 
commensurating the terralogical order of the comuna with modern liberal notions 
of belonging and communicative rationality (e.g., Habermas 1989). As fellow liberal 
subjects, we often felt that Yansa’s intervention had the potential to bear positive fruit. 
But it was clear enough that their cultivation of “community” was a power- knowledge 
anchored to a par tic u lar understanding of social development that was by no means 
“indigenous” to southern Mexico.
8. In the sense that MacKenzie has argued, following J. L. Austin, that expert models 
can help to constitute a real ity that they purport to simply depict (see MacKenzie 
2008; MacKenzie, Muniesa, and Siu 2007). Bourdieu’s concept of “theory efect” is 
relevant  here (Bourdieu 1991) as well as Barad’s rumination on the need to expand 
performativity beyond the scope of the  human (Barad 2003).
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9. Roughly speaking, Yansa’s proposal was to or ga nize funding for materials while 
relying on the men of El Zapote to provide the heavy  labor of digging and laying the 
pipework. This led to some question about how men who had to work their fields 
could find the time to hold up their end of the bargain.
10. Grupo Yansa 2012, 15.
11. Grupo Yansa 2012, 10. See also Hofmann 2012.
12. The question of land owner ship in the isthmus is a highly complex and contentious 
issue that  will receive fuller ethnographic treatment in chapters 2, 4, and 5. The short 
version is that Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution of 1917— what Ferry has termed 
“the most symbolically impor tant piece of Mexican legislation of the past 140 years” 
(2005, 206)— guarantees unimpeded usufructuary land rights and considerable local 
sovereignty to the asambleas governing bienes comunales and bienes ejidales and even 
the right to recover traditionally owned land away from large colonial estates. But 
Article 27 also states that all land is ultimately part of national patrimony and subject 
to national law, which means leaving open the possibility of revoking usufructuary 
rights and asamblea sovereignty “as the public interest may demand” (“Mexico’s 
Constitution of 1917 with Amendments through 2007,” Constitute, https:// www 
. constituteproject . org / constitution / Mexico _ 2007 . pdf). This keeping- while- giving, part 
of the mestizo “cunning of recognition” (Povinelli 2002), has clouded questions of 
land tenure in Mexico ever since. Between the 1930s and the 1970s the Mexican federal 
government transferred fully half the country’s land base to communal management 
(Perramond 2008). In Oaxaca, the impact was still higher, with 823 ejidos holding 
18  percent of the total land in the state and 716 comunidades holding 67  percent of 
the state’s land (Brown 2004, 4), empowering smallholders in areas where indigenous 
agrarian nuclei  were especially widespread and po liti cally active. In 1992 counterreforms 
prohibited further expansion of communal lands and opened bienes ejidales to the 
possibility of privatization. Although some scholars and many critics interpreted the 
1992–93 reforms as part of a  wholesale neoliberalization of Mexican society (e.g., Gledhill 
1995a; Hellman 1997),  others such as Perramond (2008) have argued that the land 
reforms  were less impactful than is often assumed and that, in the end, “the ejido 
has not been subsumed  under the new fabric of market- led approaches” (see Haenn 
2006 for another perspective). In any event, slippage between usufructuary rights and 
formal rights to land, clouded further by the federal government’s ultimate right of 
expropriation, is a crucial dynamic in all that follows.
13. Distrito Federal, or DF, the former name for the federal district of Mexico City, 
was dropped in 2016.
14. The building includes both the auditorium in which the general assembly of the 
bienes comunales meets as well as the offices of the comisariado.
15. In the spirit of Fabian 1983.
16. On the “particularly vexed” relationship between electric power and the poor 
in the global South, see Gupta 2015. Gupta’s comments on the “precarious power” of 
illegal tapping of energy infrastructure (2015, 561) are also very apt in the context of 
southern Mexico, where the resources of both the grid and pipelines are subject to 
vari ous practices of informal “recovery.” Chance (2015) likewise sheds light on the 
intersection of energy, protest politics, and poverty in the South.
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17. The enabling relationship of electricity to development and modernity is becoming 
a lively area of anthropological inquiry (see, e.g., Anusas and Ingold 2015; Boyer 2015; 
Degani 2017; El Khachab 2016; Gupta 2015; Özden- Schilling 2015), building upon the 
work of anthropologists such as Tanja Winther (2008) and Hal Wilhite (2005) and 
historians such as Thomas Hughes (1983) and David Nye (1992, 2010).
18.  There is widespread anger about the cost of electricity in southern Mexico, 
which has spawned several civil re sis tance movements against las altas tarifas (the 
high tarifs). During the course of fieldwork, we heard many accusations that cfe was 
possibly illegally and certainly immorally raising tarifs on the isthmus as a new mode 
of exploitation. The com pany denies such claims fervently (see chapter 4 for their 
explanation of why istmeño electricity bills are rising), but at the very least, they could 
be accused of having done a very poor job of explaining how electricity is priced and 
how certain kinds of appliances would afect billing.
19. See chapter 4 for a fuller discussion of cfe’s electricity pricing model. Mexico 
actually has among the highest domestic electricity subsidies anywhere in the world. 
Industry experts frequently describe the generosity of its subsidy structure as the 
reason that cfe is essentially bankrupt and unable to invest significantly in the power 
development proj ects it needs to meet consumer and industrial demand.
20. See Lomnitz 2005 on negative reciprocity.
21. Daniel is referring to the procede program of land registration (see de Ita 
2003; Tiedje 2008).
22. See Kelly et al. 2010. The  legal distinction therein is that the federal government 
granted stewardship of land to ejidos following the Mexican Revolution whereas 
with comunidades it recognized the stewardship they already possessed. See also 
Cornelius and Myhre 1998; Haenn 2006; Castellanos 2010.
23. The specific articles to which Daniel referred  were “los artículos 1, 2, 14, 16 y 27, 
fracción VII de la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos; artículo 21 
de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos; Artículos 23 fracción X; 26, 93, 
94, 95, 98, 99 y 100 de la Ley Agraria; así como lo dispuesto por los artículos 6, 13, 14, 
15 y 16 del Convenio 169 de la oit relativa a Pueblos Indígenas y Tribales en países inde-
pendientes y las disposiciones de la Declaración de las Naciones Unidas sobre Derechos 
de los Pueblos Indígenas.”
24. This majority was difficult to manage, in part  because hundreds of deceased 
comuneros remained officially on the rolls.
25. On the dynamics of mestizaje nationalism in Mexico— which sacralizes the 
intermixing of indigenous and Eu ro pean traditions for creating a nation superseding 
its ancestries— past and pre sent, see, in par tic u lar, Alonso 2004; Hartigan 2013; Loewe 
2011; Lomnitz 2001; Stephen 1997; Stern 2002.
26. Published in the Gaceta Parlamentaria, no. 3627-3, October 18, 2012. See also 
Méndez and Garduño 2012.
27. Southern Mexico—or what in the logic of the cfe grid is termed the “Área 
Oriental”—is composed of eight states: Guerrero, Morelos, Puebla, Tlaxcala, Veracruz, 
Tabasco, Oaxaca, and Chiapas. The Área Oriental was a net electricity producer for 
Mexico even before the introduction of the wind farms largely  because of the Grijalva 
hydroelectric complex in Chiapas. According to cfe planning documents, in 2011 the 
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peak demand for  these eight states was 6,577 megawatts. At the same time, the area’s 
generation capacity was nearly twice that at 12,856 megawatts.
28. According to a spokesperson of its manufacturer (abb), the svc device at 
Ixtepec Potencia “provide[s] fast- acting reactive power compensation in high- voltage 
electricity networks. This enhances stability by countering fluctuations in the voltage 
and current of an electric grid, thereby allowing more power to flow through and at 
the same time maintaining safety margins and increasing network stability.”
29. The first temporada abierta ran from 2010 to 2014 and brought nine wind park 
proj ects totaling 1.891 gigawatts of new generation capacity as well as 145 kilo meters of 
new transmission lines and, of course, the Ixtepec Potencia substation on grid.
30. As Norget writes, malinchismo refers “to a willingness to sell out your own, an 
attitude of disdain  toward your own country,  people or goods” and is often racialized, 
involving the “denigration of a dark- skinned indigenous identity,” which is taken as 
“an afront to mestizo Mexicans” (2006, 57).
31. The other amparo was resolved by default. Ixtepec was initially able to win 
an appeal of the judge’s initial decision to reject their Sureste I Fase II amparo. But 
enel Green Power was eventually allowed to complete the building of its park. 
Sureste I Fase II was inaugurated in March 2016 by President Enrique Peña Nieto, 
who spoke of it as proof of the “ great benefits” produced by his controversial energy 
reform law.
32. The Procuraduría Agragria is Mexico’s rural property regulatory agency.
33. In July 2016, Sergio told us that several Maya communities in Yucatán had also 
expressed interest in pursuing the development of community- owned wind parks.
2. la ventosa
1. For further discussion of the impact of the ppp regime across the world, see 
Kuriyan and Ray 2009; Shore and Wright 2003.
2. Approximately $325 per hectare. Proj ect financiers we  later interviewed in 
Mexico City spoke of a gentle upward trend in land rent payments since the wind 
boom began in the mid-2000s. Comparatively, compensation for land usage in the 
United States tends to focus on some combination of the number of turbines installed, 
the number of megawatts produced, and a percentage of net profit from electricity 
sales. The variability and privacy of contracts on all sides make it difficult to compare 
 whether Oaxacan compensation for land use is on par with, for example, the United 
States. But it is indeed plausible, in the best- case scenario outlined by Fernando, that a 
Oaxacan landowner might receive roughly equivalent annual payments to  those of an 
US landowner. Still, in Germany, the estimated average range is between 50,000 and 
70,000 Euros per year per turbine, which is several times higher than the Oaxacan 
payments. See, e.g., Coerschulte 2014.
3. Diódoro Carrasco Altamirano (1992–98), José Murat Casab (1998–2004), and 
Ulises Ruiz Ortiz (2004–10).
4. On the impact of Mexican land reform on bienes ejidales, see Perramond 
2008. See also discussion by D. Smith et al. (2009) of the land registration program 
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procede, especially regarding Oaxaca’s low participation rate and tendency  toward 
strategic partial engagement of land reform.
5.  These “smallholders” historically sufered greatly from land expropriation during the 
Porfiriato (the years when Porfirio Díaz and his allies ruled, 1876–1911; see Katz 1988) and 
 were among  those to be reenfranchised by the land reforms promised by the Mexican 
Constitution of 1917. Joseph (1988, 122f.) argues that the revolutionary idea of pequeña 
propiedad, as enshrined in the Constitution, captured the debates over bourgeois land 
reform that sought to replace the haciendas with modernized land relations (and 
modernized indigenous communities). However, as Hu- DeHart (1988, 175) observes in 
the Sonoran context, by the latter half of the twentieth  century, the term had often come 
to include what  were, in fact, very large and power ful landowners. Porfirio Montero in La 
Ventosa is a pequeño propietario in this latter sense.
6. Most often translated as “bosses,”  these informal local powerbrokers are seem-
ingly as ubiquitous as they are vari ous across the Mexican po liti cal landscape. Pansters 
explains that their essential po liti cal character is hard to pin down analytically, 
belonging to a “a semantic cluster that incorporates a number of other notions such as 
patronage, (inter)mediation, hierarchy, informality, vio lence, territory, authoritarianism, 
but also leadership, consent, paternalism and corruption” (2005, 350). Caciquismo 
involves coercive power, which is sometimes violent, but also the normative power of 
brokerage and efficacy (Friedrich 1965, 1970). See Bartra and Huerta 1978; Greenberg 
1997; Guerra 1992; Knight and Pansters 2005; B. Smith 2009, for more detailed 
discussion of the roots and consequences of caciquismo in Mexico. The term “cacique” 
also carries with it a Taíno indigenous etymology, meaning that it also signals a 
premodern racialized form of authority that is viewed as incommensurable with the 
princi ples and institutions of legitimate settler- mestizo governance.
7. The cocei uprising rekindled and transformed an older po liti cal division 
between “red” and “green” factions, which in the early part of the twentieth  century 
corresponded to class tensions in Juchitán between the northern (more elite, “red”) 
and southern (more working class, “green”) wards of the town. When the federalists 
burned Juchitán in 1911 to quell the (green) Chegomista rebellion, this was viewed as 
a victory for the reds, driving many greens out of Juchitán to nearby villages includ-
ing La Ventosa.  There green/red anger and resentment simmered for de cades. In the 
1980s, with the rise of cocei to power in Juchitán, Montero and his allies cleverly 
 invoked cocei’s po liti cal redness to ignite local fears that the Juchiteco elites  were 
again coming to trample La Ventosan interests— even though  those  these reds no 
longer identified with conservative elite social forces, indeed quite the contrary. 
 Montero’s green victory over the cocei made him something of a local legend, 
lending him charismatic authority in La Ventosa for years afterward that helped 
secure his cacicazgo. Ristow (2008) and Rubin (1997) relate the major ele ments of this 
story, although Montero’s own story was one we had to piece together through oral 
accounts and the help of José López de la Cruz.
8. It was often said that Montero had an uncanny knack for knowing where wind 
parks  were  going to be situated and for buying out other private landholders in 
advance.
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9. An Iberdrola representative estimated in December 2011 that the com pany was 
paying roughly seven million pesos a year for eighty megawatts. Given  those numbers, 
Montero’s proposal would have represented a 12.5  percent increase in payments.
10. An investigation of the social impacts of wind park development in the isthmus 
undertaken by the Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología 
Social (ciesas) and led by Salomón Nahmad Sittón found that in La Ventosa the issue of 
variable payments had indeed created significant tensions. Specifically, Iberdrola’s initial 
plan to pay 1  percent to 1.3  percent of the revenues from generation made “ those 
with contracts with Iberdrola complain that the payment for generation is less than 
fixed payments; they feel deceived. . . .  They always have the idea that they are being 
robbed. . . .  [And even with the promise of new contracts from Iberdrola,] the lack 
of information has already generated much distrust” (Nahmad Sittón 2011, 66).
11. For insight into the complex history of energy and power before, during, and 
 after the 1970s oil shocks, see, e.g., Bini and Garavini 2016; Dietrich 2008; Mitchell 
2011; Venn 2002.
12. Breglia (2013, 5) writes, “Mexican oil is a foundation for the economy and a 
cornerstone of nationalism. Lifeblood for the national economy, crude oil is strategi-
cally impor tant for the domestic economy. Its revenues fund up to 40  percent of the 
national bud get. In addition to supporting the energy needs of its neighbor the United 
States through exports, oil also serves Mexico’s own ever- rising domestic energy de-
mand.  These twin pressures on Mexico’s most valuable asset place the issue of resource 
sovereignty . . .  at the forefront of contentious debates.”
13. See unido 1975, p. 2, par. 10.
14. unido 1975, p. 11, par. 58, secs. f, g, l.
15. iie was part of the Mexican Ministry of Energy, sener. See Caldera Muñoz et al. 
1980. It was succeeded by the Instituto Nacional de Electricidad y Energías Limpias 
(INEEL).
16. Aiello et al. 1983.
17. Borja Díaz et al. 2005, 41.
18. Lomnitz writes of the Mexican state’s “dismodernity” during this period: “The 
1982 debt crisis dealt a terrible blow to the regime of state- fostered national develop-
ment, and the economic arrangement that has emerged provoked an intense strug gle 
for supremacy between diverse modernizing formulas” (2001, 111).
19. In terms of electrical infrastructure specifically, cfe’s power generation capacity 
more than doubled from 7.41 gigawatts in 1970 to 16.85 gigawatts in 1980. But in the 
subsequent de cade, capacity only increased very gradually to 18.27 gigawatts (Breceda 
2000, 11).
20. The consequences of this “turn” deserve some further discussion. Although 
 anthropologists (among  others) have theorized the general po liti cal, social, and 
cultural impacts of the global rise of neoliberal politics and policy (e.g., Comarof 
and Comarof 2001; Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Gledhill 2007; Harvey 2005), po liti cal 
anthropology of Latin Amer i ca has been especially successful at demonstrating that 
economic globalization and neoliberalism must be viewed as heterogeneous phenomena 
with complex and at times seemingly paradoxical cultural impacts. The social and 
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cultural conditions of the neoliberal era in Latin Amer i ca have been shown to combine, 
for example, new emphases on militarization and rule of law with rising levels of 
everyday vio lence and insecurity (e.g., Goldstein 2004, 2005; Rochlin 1997; Wacquant 
2008), overtures to participatory democracy with resurgent charismatic and populist 
politics (e.g., Paley 2001; Schiller 2011), and intensified ethnic and racist diferentiation 
with po liti cal multiculturalism (e.g., Hale 2006; Postero 2006). In the case of Mexican 
neoliberal statecraft and po liti cal culture, Schwegler has argued that “we lack a nuanced 
understanding of the mechanisms, pro cesses, and practices by which neoliberalism 
becomes entrenched in the institutions credited with its dissemination” (2008, 682). 
This is a striking omission, especially given anthropologists’ comparative attention to 
other impor tant dimensions of neoliberalism’s influence upon con temporary social 
experience in Mexico, including consumption and middle- class identity (Cahn 2008), 
national my thol ogy and imagination (Bartra 2002; Lomnitz 2001),  labor and migration 
(Cohen 2004; Kelly 2008; Wilson 2010), rural poverty (Gledhill 1995b), land reform 
(McDonald 1999; Nugent and Alonso 1994; Castellanos 2010), and the rising influence of 
ngos as intermediaries between the Mexican government and communities (Richard 
2009). Throughout this lit er a ture, the Mexican state is frequently portrayed as a key 
agent of neoliberal transformation and of the “growing deterioration of living standards” 
(Ochoa 2001, 154) within the country,  whether through benign neglect or, it is more 
often argued, through active dismantling of social ser vices, endemic corruption, and 
militarization.
21. Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología, Mexico’s national scientific and 
technology foundation.
22.  These speeds equal 20.8 and 67.1 miles per hour respectively. The Isthmus of 
Tehuantepec is widely regarded in the industry as having some of the best resources 
for terrestrial wind power anywhere in the world.
23. See Schwegler 2008 for a nuanced account of  these dynamics.
24. Declining petroleum production since 2004 created a parallel sense of po liti cal 
urgency around stimulating private investment in the oil and gas sector. In Decem-
ber 2012, Enrique Peña Nieto’s resurgent pri party was able to or ga nize an alliance, 
the Pacto por México, with the major opposition, the pan and prd parties, in order 
to streamline reforms in the education, telecommunications, banking, and energy 
sectors. Among other reforms, Articles 25 and 27 of the Mexican Constitution  were 
amended to mandate the transition of Pemex and cfe to “state- owned productive 
 enterprises” charged with creating economic value and profits rather than simply 
serving as stewards of national resources. The prd dropped out of the Pacto in 2013 in 
part  because of the issue of private sector investment in oil; the reforms stressed 
public- private partnerships in oil and gas exploration  going forward as well as open-
ing mid- and downstream oil and gas to private investment. Nevertheless, the reforms 
passed into law in 2014, marking what is certainly the most radical shift in Mexican 
energy policy since the 1930s. The reforms have been celebrated outside of Mexico 
as long- overdue market liberalization guaranteed by “courageous leadership and 
governance” (see Goldwyn, Brown, and Cayten 2014, 37).
25. See, e.g., Breceda 2000.
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26. See Breceda 2000, 24–27.
27. See Comisión Reguladora de Energia, https:// www . gob . mx / cre . Critics of the 
cre, such as the Frente de Trabajadores de la Energía, assert that the privatization 
of electricity generation is being hidden and that current and planned proj ects  will 
raise the proportion of privately generated electricity to more than 66  percent of the 
national supply. See “Peña Nieto quiebra a Pemex y cfe,” Energía 16, no. 335, May 15, 
2016, http:// www . fte - energia . org / E335 / 04 . html.
28. Galbraith and Price 2013, 66–68.
29. “Enredos burocráticos congelan central en Zacatecas,” La Jornada, May 1, 1998, 
http:// www . jornada . unam . mx / 1998 / 01 / 05 / zacatecas . html.
30. The permits  were for Fuerza Eólica del Istmo, completed in two stages of fifty 
megawatts and thirty megawatts in 2011 and 2012 respectively and for the La Rumorosa 
ten- megawatt park in Baja California, which was completed in 2010.
31. Capacity  factor is the average power generated by a power installation as a 
percentage of nominal total capacity. The La Venta figures remain outstanding twenty 
years  later. nrel’s Transparent Cost Database lists the median plant capacity for 
onshore wind farms from 2010 to 2014 as 38  percent (with a maximum of 52  percent). 
See “Transparent Cost Database,” OpenEI, http:// en . openei . org / apps / TCDB / #blank.
32. He was then serving as director of micro, small, and midlevel enterprises for the 
Oaxacan state agency of industrial and commercial development (sedic),
33.  There are also widespread rumors that Fernando’s Fundación accepted dona-
tions from wind developers in exchange for helping them to achieve results on the 
ground in the isthmus.
34. Mimiaga Sosa 2009.
35. segego is the Secretaría General de Gobierno, the Office of the Secretary 
General.
36. Oceransky notes, for example, that a former Fundación employee, Alvarez 
Velasquez Maldonado, went to work for the Spanish firm Preneal, which then received 
several choice plots in the core wind zone in the first temporada abierta (open season 
for investors) despite never subsequently developing a single proj ect (2010, 513–14).
37. See Elliott et al. 2003.
38. See Fernández- Vega 2004.
39. See the Ecologics volume.
40. José López de la Cruz pers. comm., 2013.
41. López de la Cruz pers. comm.
42. Velas are a pre- Hispanic ceremonial tradition practiced throughout the isthmus 
that have evolved into a series of annual public cele brations sponsored by dif er ent 
local associations, “comprising three days of parades and parties, an all- night dance, 
and a celebratory mass” (Royce 1991, 51). Velas are not only impor tant markers of the 
social calendar of istmeño towns but also power ful identifiers of associative solidarity 
and, indeed, “community” itself (see Münch Galindo 2006).
43. See Ristow 2008, 403.
44. Rubin, for example, describes Charis as the “regional po liti cal boss” (1997, 45) of 
the isthmus from the 1930s  until his death in 1964, striking a deal with Mexico City for 
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“regional autonomy in return for support for the post- revolutionary state” (1997, 48). 
See chapter 5.
45. More specifically, Rubin argues that although General Charis served the pri 
cause loyally in federal  matters, he impeded the development of local pri networks 
in the area since they challenged his personal authority (1997, 53–54). Thus, it was not 
 until the 1960s and 1970s that po liti cal parties  were first able to build strong in de pen-
dent networks in the isthmus.
46. Binford (1985) analyzes this complex and highly consequential story in  great 
detail.
47. See Campbell et al. 1993 on the rise of cocei.
48. In recent years, the @ symbol has been used for gender inclusivity in con-
temporary Mexican Spanish, e.g., “l@s Méxican@s.”
49. The La Ventosa ejido was decreed in 1954 as containing three thousand hectares, 
of which half is commons and half is currently parcelada into individual plots.  There 
are 250 ejidatarios currently.
50.  These two parks faced blockades and conflict in mid-2013 when a group of 
propietarios sought to derail the proj ect  because of a conflict over payments.
51. The payment for this easement was quoted to us by Cain López Toledo as seven 
thousand pesos per hectare annually. But it was not clear how many of the propi-
etarios received it.
52. López de la Cruz is referring to ucizoni (https:// www . facebook . com / ucizoni / ) 
and their leader, Carlos Beas.
53.  There are striking resonances of istmeño knowledge of wind turbines to the 
 “occult economy” described by Comarof and Comarof (1999).
54. For “Domingo” and “Ximena.”
55. See, e.g., El Sur Diario, http:// www . elsurdiario . com . mx / index . php ? option​=​com 
_ content&view​=​article&id​=​18767: - inauguran - centro - cultural - bacusa - gui - en - la 
- ventosa&catid​=​46:region&Itemid​=​95.
3. oaxaca de juaréz
1. On historical and recent dynamics of the pri and priismo in Mexico, see, e.g., 
Adler- Lomnitz, Salazar- Elena, and Adler 2010; Aitken et al. 1996; Varela Guinot 1993; 
Vázquez 2003.
2. Clientelism, corporatism, and vertical integration  were crucial vectors within the 
pri party- state. Selee writes, “The creation and consolidation of the pri as the party 
of power, together with the centralization of government functions and resources, 
successfully replaced the centrifugal forces of regional power holders with a functional 
structure for negotiating diferences among po liti cal actors. . . .  Within the pri, local 
organ izations— whether municipal party committees, neighborhood organ izations, 
or  union locals— were linked upward into ever larger second- and third- tier organ-
izations that ultimately  were part of one of the party’s sectors. Clientelism— the 
unequal exchange of po liti cal support for public benefits— linked citizens to par tic u lar 
organ izations and to their leaders at the local level. Corporatism within the national 
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and state pri connected  these organ izations within vertical party hierarchies” (2011, 
xx). Although perhaps less disciplined and bureaucratic in terms of party ideology, the 
general structuring of the po liti cal order is indeed quite similar to the party- states that 
flourished elsewhere in the mid- twentieth  century  under the influence of Marxism- 
Leninism (see, e.g., Boyer 2005; Verdery 1996). The folding of charismatic power and 
clientage into bureaucratic authority is, of course, familiar outside of Latin Amer i ca 
too. Hull’s description of “Zafar Khan” in Karachi is an excellent example (Hull 2012, 
77–80).
3. On the appo uprising and its repression, see Howell 2009; Martínez Vásquez 
2007, 2008; Nahmad 2007; Norget 2010; Stephen 2013.
4. A standby letter of credit is a guarantee issued by a bank to function as a payer of 
last resort should their client fail to fulfill a contractual commitment with another party.
5.  There are actually two teachers’  unions at work in Mexico, the snte (Sindicato 
Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación), founded in 1949 and currently the largest 
teacher’s  union in the Amer i cas, and the cnte (Coordinadora Nacional de Traba-
jadores de la Educación), founded in 1979. Both  unions have challenged neoliberal 
reform and federal power in Mexico since the 1980s. In recent years, both  unions’ 
section 22 (the Oaxacan sections) have tended to work together against eforts from 
Mexico City to promote education reform, which the  unions view as an efort to 
weaken their considerable po liti cal influence. The Oaxacan sections are known 
nationally for their militancy, particularly in the aftermath of the appo uprising of 
2006. We found that many of the key figures in the antieólico movement against wind 
megaprojects in the isthmus had ties to the snte/cnte. One teacher told us proudly 
that the center of gravity of po liti cal re sis tance in Oaxaca had shifted from Oaxaca 
City to the isthmus  after the decline of the appo. He told us that the wind parks had 
become a rallying point for not only local re sis tance but also regional and national 
re sis tance to neoliberal capitalism through the work of Section 22.
6. “Sexenio” refers to the six- year period of a Mexican presidency or governorship.
7. See the Ecologics volume.
8. Paso de la Reina is actually a federal hydroelectricity proj ect sponsored by cfe. 
More than a de cade in the planning, the proj ect has met fierce and sustained local 
re sis tance, including a community blockade since 2009. For documentation of the 
re sis tance, see Consejo de Pueblos Unidos por la Defensa del Río Verde, http:// 
pasodelareina . org.
9. See the discussion of the history of Mexican wind power in chapter 2. Abardia’s 
comment reflects the post-1982 consensus that private- public partnerships (ppps) are 
the optimal way to attract capital and share risk in major infrastructure proj ects.
10. segego is the Secretaría General de Gobierno (focusing on resolving social 
and po liti cal conflicts), and sai is the Secretaría de Asuntos Indígenas (charged with 
managing indigenous afairs) for the state of Oaxaca.
11. Gross’s work on the rise of Protestantism in Oaxaca is very relevant  here (2012a, 
2012b). Evangelical Protestants now make up more than 10  percent of Oaxaca’s popula-
tion, which is higher than the national average in Mexico. In the isthmus,  because of 
Porifirio Montero’s power ful network, Evangelical Chris tian ity has been a significant 
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force in the moral definition and social organ ization of wind power development. 
The Evangelical prioritization of self- interest over community interest is evident in 
Montero’s land- grab tactics as well as in Casillas’s opposition to corporatist politics. 
But the thrust of Evangelical individualism is often blunted by the dominant social 
Catholicism of Oaxaca, which in the isthmus is further inflected by indigenous com-
munalism and by the clientage- network politics of caciquismo.
12. What came across more strongly in other conversations we had with Casillas was 
his spiritual commitment to environmental defense and maintenance. This was not, 
perhaps, the ecocentric- spiritual ethics that Bron Taylor has diagnosed as “dark green 
religion” (2010) but certainly seemed to us a sincere commitment to “creation care.”
13. Cabrero Mendoza 2005, 5; see also 2007. The strug gle between centralized and 
decentralized governmental authority in Mexico dates back to the in de pen dence 
strug gle of the early nineteenth  century (Salinas Sandoval 2014). Mecham has 
 summarized the first hundred years (roughly) of the history of Mexican federalism: 
“Federalism has never existed in fact in Mexico. It is an indisputable commonplace 
that the Mexican nation is now and always has been federal in theory only; actually, 
it has always been centralistic” (1938, 164). The heyday of mid- twentieth- century 
priismo only reinforced this trend through its party organ ization: centralized 
bureaucratic authority and decision- making power remained concentrated in Mexico 
City. In 1957, Tucker commented, “Centralization of tax power has been growing 
steadily through the years, mainly through specific reforms to the Constitution” (160). 
Merchant and Rich have argued more recently that “the pattern for de cades has been 
the subservience of governors and of state legislatures to Mexico City and the calculated 
denial of resources for genuine federalism” (2003, 663). At the same time, Loaeza 
describes how, in the wake of the structural adjustment reforms implemented by the 
Salinas and Zedillo regimes, “the weakness of the Mexican state has become a feature 
of the prevailing institutional arrangement” (2006, 34; cf. Selee 2011). That she does 
not diferentiate strongly between the federal and state levels of “the Mexican state” 
suggests that the neoliberal era has been accompanied by a dissolution of federal 
authority without any substantial improvement at the state level.
14. This is an observation that has become a commonplace in po liti cal anthropol-
ogy (see, e.g., Crewe and Axelby 2013; Das and Poole 2004; Sharma and Gupta 2006; 
Trouillot 2001). Yet, as Abrams has argued, the concept of “the state” is precisely that 
which conceals “the  actual disunity of po liti cal power” (1988, 79) and, as such, has an 
impor tant performative efect on po liti cal knowledge.
15. Although unnamed, the diputad@s clearly had in mind ucizoni (https:// www 
. facebook . com / ucizoni / ) and the Asamblea de los Pueblos Indígenas del Istmo de 
Tehuantepec en Defensa de la Tierra y el Territorio (https:// tierrayterritorio . wordpress 
. com), which  were the most active ngos working in opposition to wind park develop-
ment in the isthmus.
16. Ruiz is a widely maligned and unpop u lar politician outside of the pri (see, e.g., 
Stephen 2013).
17. As elsewhere in Mexico, pri po liti cal networks in the isthmus are anchored by 
personal and kin loyalty to key figures and families. priista clientelism is frequently 
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indistinguishable from caciquismo, not just in local reckonings but also in the schol-
arly lit er a ture (see, e.g., Foweraker 1990; Kaufman 1981; Knight and Pansters 2005).
18. See the Ecologics volume.
19. See, e.g., Povinelli 2011; Jusionyte 2015. Late liberalism’s con temporary condi-
tion often invites both emic and etic rhe torics of tragedy and crisis, emphasizing 
often the perversion of au then tic liberal ideas and institutions by the logic of markets 
and capital (e.g., Brown 2015; Chalfin 2010; Harvey 2005; Muir 2015). But the parlous 
state of liberalism and democracy has also invited ironic and even ludic appropria-
tions,  reactions, and squattings (Bernal 2013; Boyer and Yurchak 2010; Boyer 2013b; 
Haugerud 2013; Knight 2015; Klumbyte 2011; Molé 2013) that both draw attention to 
the overformalization of late- liberal po liti cal practice but also to the potential for 
creative, even sincere, reappropriations of late- liberal ideas, values, and institutions.
20. Bobick 2012, 2014.
21. In his study of the administration of Oaxacan forests, Mathews (2011) argues 
that such per for mances are a more general condition of Mexican state- making, and 
indeed are characteristic in part of all state- making. “Once we see knowledge and 
nonknowledge as  going together, the importance of thinking about knowledge- 
making and state- making as more or less dramatic and unstable per for mances becomes 
clear. . . .  In the Mexican case, this means that officials have to pay  great attention to the 
texture of their per for mances of authoritative knowledge. They have to pay attention to 
how the audience knows, to the audience’s expectations of how state authority is to be 
performed, how knowledge is to be declared, and what forms of opposition and public 
declarations the audience might make.” See also Jusionyte 2015 on this point.
22. Cochineal was Oaxaca’s main source of income between 1758 and 1817 (Covarru-
bias 1946, 213).
23. utvco is a tsu (Técnico Superior Universitario) founded in 2009 and located 
in the Oaxaca Valley town of San Pablo Huixtepec. It ofers a course of study in 
renewable energy with a special focus on solar energy. daad is the German Academic 
Exchange Ser vice.
24. See the Ecologics volume.
25. The  wholesale market price of electricity in Germany declined more than 
66  percent in five years (2011–16) owing largely to the oversupply of electricity created 
by rapid renewable energy development combined with a slowness to retire conven-
tional baseload bulk power supply. See, e.g., Flauger and Hubik 2016.
26. A partly derogatory term for someone from Mexico City.
27. On ucizoni, see Kraemer Bayer 2008, 137f.; Zafra, Hernández- Díaz, and Garza 
Zepeda 2002.
28. Boyer 2003, 538.
29. The Guelaguetza festival has attracted significant anthropological attention as 
a site for exploring the complexities of indigeneity, race, and per for mance in Oaxaca. 
See, e.g., Brulotte 2009; Chavez 2013; Goertzen 2010; Kearney 2004; Lizama Quijano 
2006; Royce 1991, among  others.
30. Since 1995, Oaxacan municipios have been able to run elections through a com-
munal assembly (normally comprising predominantly if not exclusively men) instead 
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of a ballot box (Clarke 2000, 168). Benton (2011) calculates that a strong majority (418 
of 570) of Oaxacan municipios have  adopted the usos y costumbres model of gover-
nance and argues that the popularity of the shift can be linked to a desire to maintain 
social stability with the deterioriation of the authority of the pri party- state.
31. Sánchez Prado (2015) has written forcefully of the “impossibility of the po liti cal” 
in Mexico, arguing that “that the very question of the  future of radical politics in Mexico 
must start with a substantial reimagining of a  future that would disrupt the role of the 
rule of law as master signifier and the liberal matrix that supports it.” On the limits of 
settler liberalism, see also Burke 2002; Povinelli 2002; Simpson 2014; Veracini 2010.
32. Ahmed 2014; see also Ahmed’s FeministKilljoys blog post, “Against Students,” 
June 25, 2015, https:// feministkilljoys . com / 2015 / 06 / 25 / against - students / .
33. Stevenson 2012 was perhaps the most widely circulated piece.
34. See Guerrero 2013.
35. Simpson writes extensively of the conflation of indigeneity with criminality and 
“lawless savagery” in the context of settler colonialism in part  because settler law is 
intrinsically “precarious and fragile”  because of its violent imposition and legacy. For 
this reason, settler law is determined to extinguish presettler indigeneity at all costs 
(2014, 2016).
36. The new governor, Alejandro Murat Hinojosa, is the son of former governor 
José Murat Casab, who was instrumental in supporting the early stages of Oaxacan 
wind development.
4. distrito federal
1. See the Ecologics volume.
2. Raúl Salinas de Gortari is the elder  brother of former Mexican president Carlos 
Salinas de Gortari (1988–94), and he is infamous in Mexico for po liti cal corruption, 
money laundering, and drug trafficking. Raúl Salinas spent ten years in prison for 
hom i cide before being acquitted in 2005. In July 2013 the last remaining charge of 
“unlawful enrichment” against him was dismissed, allowing him to recover a substan-
tial portion of his former fortune. This landed him on Forbes’s list of “The 10 Most 
Corrupt Mexicans of 2013.”
3. The energy- reform pro cess in 2013 did not fail to ofer a spectacular watershed 
in the history of the Mexican petrostate. For a relatively balanced accounting of the 
reform pro cess and its outcomes, see Columbia Center on Global Energy Policy, 
https:// energypolicy . columbia . edu /research/global-energy-dialogue/ mexican - energy 
- reform - prospects - and - challenges.
4. Webber 2014.
5. See, e.g., Appel, Mason and Watts 2015; Behrends, Reyna, and Schlee 2011; McNeish 
and Logan 2012; Reyna and Behrends 2008; Sawyer 2004, 2007; Sawyer and Gomez 2012.
6. Doug Rogers (2015) analyzes similar dynamics in his study of Lukoil’s culture 
industry in Rus sia.
7. See Campbell (2014) on narco- propaganda and van Dun (2014) on narco- 
sovereignty, for example. See also Kruijt 2012.
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8. The par tic u lar story in this case was sener’s claim that a refinery would be fully 
operational in 2015 when the building had scarcely been started in 2013. Laurence 
explained to us that even once completed, a refinery takes three to five years to “fine 
tune” in order to ensure its stable operation.
9. In an interview with us in 2014, former president Calderón admitted that the 
figure had been as high as 43  percent during his administration.
10. This is precisely what happened when international oil prices fell sharply in 
the fourth quarter of 2014, from a high of $112 per barrel in June to $62 per barrel in 
December. A series of po liti cal and financial crises followed for Peña Nieto’s admin-
istration in 2015 and 2016, including a requirement that they remove subsidies on the 
domestic use of gas, leaving him with a 17  percent approval rating in early 2017. See, 
e.g., Tillman 2017.
11. This claim— that Mexico ofered extraordinary subsidies to its poorest citizens, 
ofset in part by higher electricity prices for industry— was one we heard relatively 
often, including from cfe employees themselves. It has a kernel of truth in that 
 Mexico has a tiered pricing system for electricity usage that  favors less use of electricity in 
nominal terms. And industrial electricity tarifs are about 70  percent higher in Mexico 
than they are, for example, across the border in the United States. A World Bank study 
(Komives et al. 2009) concluded, however, that “Mexico’s electricity tarif structures 
are among the most complex in the world, by design and by natu ral accretion” (45), 
and that its subsidies are also among the world’s largest (an estimated $9 billion in 
2006), with two- thirds of  those subsidies  going to residential consumers (vii) while 
“disproportionately benefit[ing] large- volume consumers” (20).
12. Wionczek 1965, 542.
13. The years when Porfirio Díaz and his allies ruled, 1876–1911, are generally 
 referred to as the Porfiriato.
14. The last chairman of MexLight, Maxwell Taylor, commented in his memoir, 
“MexLight was about as international as a business enterprise could be, having its 
headquarters in Toronto, its principal stockholders in Belgium, the source of most of 
its capital in Wall Street and the market for its product in Mexico. Its staf was made 
up largely of Mexicans but with a considerable sprinkling of Americans and Eu ro pe-
ans among the officers and technicians. Like most utilities its growth was fettered by 
the power rates which in our case  were set by the Mexican government; the latter was 
not inclined  toward generosity to a corporation which was popularly regarded as a 
symbol of Yankee industrial penetration.  Because of the low rate schedule, the com-
pany was having  great difficulty in expanding its capacity to meet the population and 
industrial growth in its area of responsibility, and consequently it often incurred the 
ire of its customers for inadequate ser vice” (M. Taylor 1972); see also Hausman and 
Neufeld 1997; Niblo 1999.
15. The aforementioned World Bank report (Komives et al. 2009) estimates Luz y 
Fuera’s distribution losses as “very high, exceeding 30%” (13).
16. See Belmont 2012 for a close analy sis of the conflict between the sme and the 
government. For international coverage of the Luz y Fuerza closure, see de Córdoba 
2009; Lacey 2009.
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17. As of the end of 2015, the percentage of electricity on the Mexican national grid 
 produced by cfe had dropped to 57.2  percent (Melgar, Díaz de Leon, and Luque 2015, 26).
18. The energy reform incentivized in de pen dent power production as well as 
private sector investment. In 2015, sener proudly projected $116 billion of new invest-
ment opportunities in generation, transmission, and distribution across the national 
grid between 2015 and 2030 (Melgar, Díaz de Leon, and Luque 2015, 28). The sener 
plan has a strong emphasis on natu ral gas and renewable energy sources with a target 
of 50  percent clean electricity by 2050. Speaking at Rice University in September 2016, 
Mexican energy secretary Pedro Joaquin Coldwell stated that Mexico has already 
received $22.4 billion in investment commitments from fifty- nine private companies 
since the energy- reform pro cess began. However, $19.5 billion of that investment has 
been focused on oil and gas exploration and pipelines (Hunn 2016).
19. Ilif 2015.
20. sener’s current five- year plan (2014–19) calls for ten new strategic gas pipelines 
and seven interconnections with the United States (Melgar, Díaz de Leon, and Luque 
2015, 19).
21. Arguments concerning baseload have recently become a front line in the strug-
gle for decarbonizing energy in the United States as well with fossil fuel lobbyists and 
po liti cal actors like US energy secretary Rick Perry declaring their commitment to 
defend baseload with  others, notably renewable energy financier and advocate Jigar 
Shah, declaring, “ There is no such  thing as baseload.” See Shah 2015; Joyce 2016.
22. Boyer 2015. Cf. Bakke 2016; Hughes 1983.
23. Özden- Schilling (2015) argues, however, that the unique materiality of electricity 
challenges conventional political- economic models of commodities and markets.
24. Popu lar imaginaries of electricity, including  those expressed to us by some cfe 
employees, tend to conceptualize electricity in terms of “flow,” as though electrons 
flow through wires like  water through pipes, surfacing the hydropolitics of  water 
and sewage that have historically informed public understanding of other critical 
infrastructures of modernity. Other electric administrators and engineers  were quick 
to note that the more accurate analogy is to think about electricity supply in terms of 
“load,” hence “baseload” as an “essential, constant supply.”
25. See, e.g., nerc 2014.
26. The Kyoto Protocol is an international treaty based on the 1992 United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (unfccc) in which the signatories have 
committed to reduce green house gas emissions.
27. See Comisión Reguladora de Energía 2012.
28. As of the time of this writing, Peña Nieto’s government has maintained Calderón’s 
commitment to 35  percent electricity from non- fossil- fueled sources by 2024.
29. In 2016, as part of the energy reform pro cess, management of the grid was 
transferred from cfe to a former subunit, cenace, Centro Nacional de Control de 
Energía, which is now or ga nized as the in de pen dent system operator for the  whole 
national power grid. The commission’s power generation assets  were meanwhile di-
vided into four subsidiary generation companies, which  will sell electricity into a new 
 wholesale market. See Manzagol and Hodge 2016.
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30. Calderón changed the step- like tarif system where a single extra kilowatt- hour 
would boost  people into a higher bracket and replaced it with a line- like tarif system 
with fewer “discontinuities.” Villagómez explained how, in old stepped system, at five 
hundred kilowatt- hours of consumption for two months, an electricity bill would be 
around nine hundred pesos but at 501 kilowatt- hours, it would jump to 2,500 pesos. 
This was again a “po liti cal” rather than “technical” decision, according to Villagómez, 
but “since most  people  don’t follow their electricity usage very carefully, the system 
was not clear to  people and created a lot of anger that cfe seemed to be setting arbi-
trary prices.”
31. We  later learned that the governor who approached her was Diódoro Carrasco.
32. Including the Ministry of the Interior (segob), the Environment Ministry 
(semarnat), and the National Commission for the Development of Indigenous 
 Peoples (cdi).
33. See Secretaría de Energía 2015.
34. See Anaya 2015.
35. See chapter 3 of the Ecologics volume.
36. See Derrida 1976.
37. This “ecological” dimension of enablement is, I would submit, an enduring 
lesson of the anthropology of infrastructure, something that numerous studies have 
explored and revealed in their own fashion. See, e.g., Anand 2012; Appel, Anand, and 
Gupta 2015; Barry 2013; Bowker 2010; Harvey, Bruun Jensen, and Mo rita 2017; Harvey 
and Knox 2015; Larkin 2013; Mitchell 2011; Star and Ruhleder 1996; Star 1999; von 
Schnitzler 2013.
5. guidxiguie’ (juchitán de Zaragoza)
1. For a study of the appj, see Ortiz Rubén et al. 2014.
2. Martínez López (1966) ofers a detailed account of the  battle itself.
3. The Gas Natu ral Fenosa park eventually became operational despite the re sis-
tance. To date, the only wind park proj ect that has been successfully blocked by the 
antieólico re sis tance has been the Mareña Renovables proj ect in San Dionisio del Mar 
(see the Ecologics volume of the duograph).
4. Radio Totopo is a locally celebrated station that has been broadcasting in diidxazá 
(Zapotec) from the Séptima Sección of Juchitán since 2005 (Nava Morales 2015). 
Since 2008, the station has been actively involved in organ izing and publicizing 
re sis tance against wind development in the isthmus. See, e.g., “Pronunciamiento 
de la asamblea de radios libres y comunitarias de oaxaca,” Radio Totopo, August 31, 
2008, http:// alimentandolaresistenciaradiototopo . blogspot . com. On the importance 
of community and indigenous radio in Oaxaca, see Stephen 2012. On the politics of 
indigenous linguistic revival in Mexico, see Faudree 2013, 2015.
5. #YoSoy132 was a mass student and youth protest movement in Mexico that devel-
oped in response to the 2012 presidential campaign and, in par tic u lar, in opposition to 
the return to power of the pri party and their controversial candidate Enrique Peña 
Nieto (see Favela 2015). #YoSoy132 made exceptional use of social media (Bacallao- 
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Pino 2016; Treré 2015), which helped them to attract international visibility and 
 support even though they  were, strictly speaking, unsuccessful in their efort to 
prevent a pri victory.
6. This is one of the more legendary tunes within what Conant has termed the 
“poetics of re sis tance” within zapatismo (2010).
7. Conquistadors Pedro de Alvarado and Hernán Cortés  were redheaded according 
to legend.
8. This per for mance is one that, Audra Simpson reminds us (2014), has been solicited 
in no small part by the settler empire’s efort to conjure and stabilize the imagination 
of a militant indigenous savage other, which then operates as the alibi for further 
violent intervention. Simpson has theorized this relation with re spect to the Mohawk 
and questions of “how one is to define a citizenship for one’s own  people, according 
to one’s po liti cal traditions while operating in the teeth of Empire, in the face of state 
aggression.”
9. For further glimpses into the complex ecol ogy of power in Juchitán see, e.g., 
Bailón and Zermeño 1987; Campbell 1990; Campbell et al. 1993; Kraemer Bayer 2008; 
Rubin 1997.
10. On  these dynamics in Mexico, see especially Lifman 2011; Muehlmann 2013; 
Rodríguez 2002; Taylor 2009. More broadly, I have in mind the works of scholars 
such as Coulthard 2007, 2014; Kauanui 2008; Moreton- Robinson 2015; Povinelli 2002; 
Simpson 2014; Veracini 2015.
11. Povinelli 2002.
12. For deeper insight into mestizaje nationalism, see Alonso 2004; Bartra 2002; 
Loewe 2011; Lomnitz 2001. My analytic strategy in this chapter intends no disre-
spect to the rich tradition of anthropological analy sis of and cultural commentary 
on mestizaje relations and thinking in Mexico. What I am trying to do is show that 
recent critical research on settler liberalism— including especially settler statecraft and 
indigenous sovereignty— has useful insights to share in the context of understanding 
Juchitán, whose citizens commonly understand themselves to live outside the sphere 
of mestizaje nationalism in a zone of enduring, if contested, indigenous autonomy on 
the frontier of Mexican law and state vio lence.
13. What the 1917 Mexican Constitution’s famous Article 27 granted was not 
sovereignty to indigenous  peoples but rather usufructuary rights to “centers of 
population which, by law or in fact, possess a communal status . . .  to enjoy common 
possession of the lands, forests, and  waters belonging to them or which have been 
or may be restored to them.” Meanwhile, “owner ship of the lands and  waters within 
the bound aries of the national territory is vested originally in the Nation, which has 
had, and has, the right to transmit title thereof to private persons, thereby constituting 
private property.” Bienes comunales and bienes ejidales thus become specific forms 
of private property awarded by the nation— itself conceived as an indivisible sover-
eign subject—to groups, including indigenous  peoples, over which it continues to 
exert a right of  expropriation “for reasons of public use and subject to payment of 
indemnity.” See “1917 Constitution of Mexico,” Latin American Studies, http:// www 
. latinamericanstudies . org / mexico / 1917 - Constitution . htm; cf. Simpson 2014.
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14. In a fascinating article, Kourí (2002) has further argued that the objective in 
restoring land and some po liti cal autonomy to indigenous pueblos was not multicul-
tural freedom but rather a Comtean- Spencerian logic of creating the most efficient 
vehicle for the peaceful evolution and eventual assimilation of indigenous  peoples 
into the Mexican nation.
15. I mean this in Simpson’s (2016) sense of “refusal” as a fundamental unwilling-
ness to accept the sovereign claims of settler governance: “Refusal holds on to a truth, 
structures this truth as stance through time, as its own structure and comingling with 
the force of presumed and inevitable disappearance and operates as the revenge of 
consent— the consent to  these conditions, to the interpretation that this was fair, and 
the ongoing sense that this is all over with.”
16. According to Broadwell (2015), “The historical circumstances that led to the 
movement of some Valley Zapotecs  toward the Isthmus are complex and the subject 
of ongoing research among historians, but the emerging view . . .  seems to be that the 
 earlier Zapotec kingdom was based in Zaachila in the Valley of Oaxaca. It began to 
expand  toward the Pacific Coast and the Isthmus of Tehuantepec in the  fourteenth 
 century. For about 150 years,  there was both a Valley and an Isthmus center of power, 
with tensions between the two, and movements of populations from one center to the 
other.” See also King 2012.
17. See Saynes- Vásquez 2002, 40; see also Tutino 1993; Zeitlin 1994.
18. See, e.g., King 2012.
19. See Oudijk 2000; Zeitlin 1994.
20. See Gutiérrez Brockington 1989.
21. Taussig (1987) has documented the cultural legacy of this brutal period unfor-
gettably. See also Patel and Moore 2017.
22. Tutino 1980.
23. Tutino 1980; translated by the author.
24. The repartimiento system flourished in Mexico between 1550s and 1630s, 
guaranteeing indigenous  labor for the Spaniards during a time of massive popula-
tion loss while familiarizing Indians with temporary wage  labor and patterns of 
hacienda production. “Like other colonial corveés, therefore, the repartimiento 
system indirectly helped pave the way for freer forms of proletarian  labour” (Knight 
2002, 83). Taylor supports the standard critical account of repartimiento in Oaxaca 
but notes that  because of  labor shortages and the difficulty of contracting  labor, 
Oaxacan peasants  were actually paid relatively well on Spanish colonial estates 
in the seventeenth and eigh teenth centuries although instances of coercion  were 
 common (W. Taylor 1972). With the help of neoclassical economic theory, Baskes 
(2000) even reimagines Oaxacan repartimiento as a mostly benign credit system 
(cf. Ruiz Medrano 2005).
25. Anderson 1983; see also Sánchez Santiró 2001.
26. Zeitlin writes, more specifically, “Virtually the entire province was kept busy 
meeting diverse  labor demands for Avellán’s gain: salt- making, fishing, preparing deer 
hides, hunting and collecting rabbit wool for hats. He forced communities to sell him 
vanilla, which at least was produced locally, but paid them only half the  going price. 
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Worst of all, however, was the cotton cloth quota, which no other alcade mayor had 
attempted to institute in recent memory. Since cotton was not produced locally at the 
time,  people had to journey all the way to Chiapas” (2005, 184).
27. Zeitlin 2005, 169.
28. See Rojinsky 2008 for a subtle analy sis of the case.
29. Zeitlin 2005, 213f.
30. See, e.g., Díaz- Polanco and Burguete 1989.
31. See de la Cruz 1983; Chassen- López 2004.
32. Chassen- López 2004, 321.
33. Rippy (1920) explains in more detail the complexities of the po liti cal situation, 
including both the fallout from the US- Mexican War and the jealousies among  those 
advocating for alternative transoceanic routes in Panama and Nicaragua.
34. Chassen- López 2004, 326.
35. Ristow 2008, 105.
36. Díaz’s circle of positivist technocrats whose combined use of infrastructure and 
foreign capital to modernize Mexico remains controversial to this day. See, e.g., Hale 
1991; Katz 2004; Raat 1975; Vélazquez Becerril 2010.
37. Chassen- López 2004, 328–29.
38. This was known subsequently as the Chegomista Rebellion; see de la Cruz 1990; 
Purnell 2005; Chassen- López 2009, 30–33.
39. Ristow 2008, 170.
40. Ristow 2008, 106.
41. Ristow 2008, 169.
42. Smith 2012, 119; see also Rubin 1997, 53.
43. See, e.g., de la Cruz 1993 on the “pacification” of post- Revolutionary Mexico.
44. Smith 2012, 121.
45. See the Ecologics volume.
46. On the origins and rise to power of the cocei, see López Villalobos 2004.
47. See, e.g., Bailón Corres and Zermeño 1987; Campbell 1990.
48. On global indigenist politics, see Merlan 2009; on the rise of neoanarchism, 
see Graeber 2002; Boyer 2013b. On con temporary indigenous responses to settler 
energy infrastructure, see “#StandingRockSyllabus,” NYC Stands with Standing Rock 
Collective, September 5, 2016, https:// nycstandswithstandingrock . wordpress . com 
/ standingrocksyllabus / .
49. See, e.g., Terán 2012.
50. Zanates are Quiscalus mexicanus, great- tailed grackles.
51. Sadly, David passed away during the writing of the duograph.
52. Throughout his mayorship, Vicente was accused by both supporters and critics 
of wind power development of not  doing enough to support their cause, evidence 
perhaps that he was trying to remain neutral.
53. “Bettina Cruz: Mexican  Human Rights Defender Working on Business and 
 Human Rights,” International Ser vice for  Human Rights, January 6, 2015, http:// www 
. ishr . ch / news / bettina - cruz - mexican - human - rights - defender - working - business - and 
- human - rights.
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54. See, e.g., “Oaxaca: Policía de Juchitán balacea a compañeros de la Asamblea 
Comunitaria de Alvaron Obregón,” Centro de Medios Libres, May 14, 2016, https:// 
www . centrodemedioslibres . org / 2016 / 05 / 14 / oaxaca - policia - de - juchitan - balacea - a 
- companeros - de - la - asamblea - comunitaria - de - alvaron - obregon / .
55. See the Ecologics volume.
56. “Frontier” is meant  here in the sense developed by Tsing 2015; Patel and Moore 
2017.
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